Com. v. West, M.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: July 9, 2026
• Docket: 296 EDA 2025
• Status: Unpublished
• Author: Murray

Opinion

J-S15021-26

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : MARTIN WEST : : Appellant : No. 296 EDA 2025

Appeal from the Order Entered December 19, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0001288-2022

BEFORE: OLSON, J., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E. *

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED JULY 9, 2026

Martin West (Appellant) appeals, pro se, from the order dismissing his

timely first petition filed under the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42

Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.

On December 13, 2021, Paul Blassingame (the victim) was found dead

in his Philadelphia apartment. N.T. (Guilty Plea), 7/7/23, at 12

(Commonwealth’s recitation of the factual basis for Appellant’s guilty plea).

The medical examiner determined the cause of the victim’s death was “sharp

and blunt impact injuries to the head and neck,” and the manner of death was

homicide. Id. at 13. After learning that Appellant, the victim’s roommate,

was in custody on an unrelated matter, police questioned him regarding the

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court. J-S15021-26

victim’s death. Id. at 14-15. In a videotaped statement, Appellant waived

his Miranda1 rights and told police he killed the victim with an axe. Id. at

15. Appellant further indicated he discarded the axe near a particular store,

and police thereafter found a blood-stained axe at that location. Id.

The Commonwealth charged Appellant with one count each of murder,

possessing an instrument of crime (PIC), and tampering with evidence. 2 On

July 7, 2023, Appellant entered a negotiated guilty plea to one count each of

third-degree murder3 and PIC. In accordance with the plea agreement, the

trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of 12½ to 25 years’ imprisonment.

No post-sentence motion or appeal followed.

On August 7, 2024, Appellant, pro se, filed the instant, timely PCRA

petition, his first. Therein, Appellant claimed his trial counsel rendered

ineffective assistance by failing to file a requested direct appeal. PCRA

Petition, 8/7/24, Attachment ¶ 6.

The trial court appointed Walter Chisholm, Esquire (PCRA counsel), to

represent Appellant. On October 27, 2024, PCRA counsel filed a motion to

withdraw from representation and no-merit letter pursuant to

Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988), and Commonwealth

1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

2 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502, 907(a), 4910(1).

3 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(c).

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v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc). In the no-merit letter,

PCRA counsel concluded Appellant’s ineffectiveness claim based on trial

counsel’s failure to file a requested direct appeal lacked merit. No-Merit

Letter, 10/27/24, at 4-6. PCRA counsel noted that, at his guilty plea hearing,

Appellant testified under oath that he did not want trial counsel to file an

appeal. Id. at 4-5 (citing N.T., 7/7/23, at 32). PCRA counsel also attached

an email from himself to trial counsel, memorializing a conversation in which,

according to PCRA counsel, trial counsel confirmed that Appellant never

requested that trial counsel file an appeal. Id., Exhibit A. PCRA counsel

further stated that he reviewed the record and was unable to identify any

other “potential claims of arguable merit” that could be asserted on Appellant’s

behalf. Id. at 4.

On November 18, 2024, the PCRA court issued Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 Notice

of its intent to dismiss Appellant’s PCRA petition without a hearing. The PCRA

court relied on the reasons stated in PCRA counsel’s no-merit letter, and

further opined that any direct appeal would have been meritless because the

record confirmed that Appellant tendered a knowing, voluntary and intelligent

guilty plea. See Rule 907 Notice, 11/18/24. The PCRA court advised that

should Appellant choose to respond to the Rule 907 Notice, his response must

be filed within 20 days. Id. The PCRA court further advised that it intended

to dismiss Appellant’s PCRA petition on December 19, 2024. Id.

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On December 19, 2024, having received no response from Appellant,

the PCRA court entered a final order dismissing Appellant’s PCRA petition and

granting PCRA counsel’s motion to withdraw from representation.

On January 8, 2025, the PCRA court received and docketed a pro se

motion seeking leave to amend Appellant’s PCRA petition. In the motion’s

proof of service, Appellant stated that he caused the motion to be served on

December 5, 2024. See Motion for Leave to Amend PCRA Petition, 1/8/25, at

3 (unpaginated). The record does not include the envelope in which the

motion was mailed; therefore no postmark establishes the date of

mailing.

On January 17, 2025—without the PCRA court acting on Appellant’s

motion for leave to amend—Appellant filed a notice of appeal from the PCRA

court’s December 19, 2024, order. The PCRA court did not order Appellant to

file a concise statement of matters complained of on appeal under Pa.R.A.P.

1925(b).

On March 18, 2025, Appellant filed in this Court a “Petition for Release

of Notes of Testimony and All Other Related Documents.” In the petition,

Appellant asked this Court to compel numerous agencies and persons—

including the District Attorney’s Office, Appellant’s former attorneys, and

various law enforcement agencies—to produce a host of documents relating

to the underlying murder investigation. See generally Petition, 3/18/25.

Upon consideration of the petition, this Court remanded this matter to the

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PCRA court for 60 days, directing the PCRA court “to provide Appellant, either

directly or via prior counsel, with any requested documents and transcripts

that the PCRA court deems necessary and relevant to allow for a complete and

judicious assessment of the issues raised on appeal.” Order, 4/4/25.

On April 14, 2025, the PCRA court directed the Office of Judicial Records,

the Court Reporter’s Office, and the District Attorney’s Office to provide PCRA

counsel with complete copies of the lower court record, transcripts, and

discovery materials. PCRA Court Order, 4/14/25. The PCRA court further

directed PCRA counsel to deliver all of those materials to Appellant. Id. On

July 7, 2025, the PCRA court filed a letter in this Court indicating that the

PCRA court had complied with our April 4, 2025, order, and all of the

referenced materials had been forwarded to Appellant. See PCRA Court

Letter, 7/7/25.

On September 9, 2025, Appellant filed a petition requesting an

extension of time to file his appellate brief. Therein, Appellant alternatively

requested a remand to facilitate his “proper view[ing]” of two CDs/DVDs

containing a 911 call and Appellant’s videotaped interrogation. Petition,

9/9/25, ¶¶ 1, 5. Appellant claimed that PCRA counsel had sent the CDs/DVDs

to Appellant, but that the CDs/DVDs “were sent back to … PCRA counsel after

viewing them once, as instructed by … PCRA counsel.” Id. ¶ 5. Appellant

stated he had been unable to hear the 911 call’s audio “due to some type of

technical disfunction/difficulty.” Id. Appellant further stated that he needed

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additional viewing of the CDs/DVDs in order to have “his appointed Legal

Aide/Legal Assistant-Paralegal” assist him in taking notes. Id.

On September 19, 2025, this Court granted Appellant’s request for an

extension of time to file his brief, but denied his “alternate request for

remand[,] … without prejudice to Appellant’s right to seek any additional

requested relief from the PCRA court.” Order, 9/19/25.

Appellant presents two questions for our review:

1. Was [Appellant] denied due process of law when the [PCRA court] erred in claiming no response to [the court’s Rule 907] Notice … was filed?

2. Was [Appellant] denied due process of law when the [PCRA court] disregarded [Appellant’s] plea to have his two CDs/DVDs re-sent to him[,] and in further disregard [of the] Superior Court’s Order of September 19, 2025?

Appellant’s Brief at 3.4, 5

When reviewing the dismissal of a PCRA petition,

we examine whether the PCRA court’s conclusions are supported by the record and free from legal error. The PCRA court’s findings will not be disturbed unless there is no support for the findings in the certified record. This Court grants great deference to the findings of the PCRA court, and we will not disturb those findings merely because the record could support a contrary holding. In contrast, we review the PCRA court’s legal conclusions de novo. ____________________________________________

4 The PCRA court’s Rule 907 Notice and its December 19, 2024, order set forth

its reasons for dismissing Appellant’s PCRA petition. However, the PCRA court did not address the issues Appellant now raises on appeal, both of which involve events transpiring after the dismissal of Appellant’s petition.

5 We observe that “[a]lthough this Court is willing to construe liberally materials filed by a pro se litigant, a pro se appellant enjoys no special benefit.” Commonwealth v. Westlake, 295 A.3d 1281, 1286 n.8 (Pa. Super. 2023) (citation omitted).

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A PCRA petitioner has the burden of persuading an appellate court that the PCRA court erred and that such error requires relief.

Commonwealth v. Hunter, 355 A.3d 394, 413-14 (Pa. Super. 2026)

(citations, quotation marks, and brackets omitted).

In his first issue, Appellant argues he was improperly denied the

opportunity to amend his PCRA petition in response to the PCRA court’s Rule

907 Notice. Appellant’s Brief at 5-8. Appellant maintains this denial violated

his due process rights under both the United States and Pennsylvania

Constitutions. Id. at 6-7. Appellant contends he timely responded to the Rule

907 Notice within 20 days. Id. at 6. Although his motion for leave to amend

was not docketed until January 8, 2025, Appellant asserts that he “submitted”

the motion “to prison authorities” on December 5, 2024. Appellant’s Reply

Brief at 2-3 (unpaginated).

In his reply brief, Appellant invokes the prisoner mailbox rule, which

“provides that a pro se prisoner’s document is deemed filed on the date he

delivers it to prison authorities for mailing.” Id. at 2 (unpaginated) (quoting

Commonwealth v. DiClaudio, 210 A.3d 1070, 1074 (Pa. Super. 2019)).

Appellant notes appellate courts are “inclined to accept any reasonably

verifiable evidence of the date that the prisoner deposit[ed] the [document]

with the prison authorities.” Id. at 3-4 (unpaginated) (quoting

Commonwealth v. Jones, 700 A.2d 423, 426 (Pa. 1997)). Appellant argues

his motion’s proof of service, in which he stated that he caused the motion to

be served on December 5, 2024, constitutes proper evidence of the date of

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deposit. Id. at 4 (unpaginated) (citing Motion for Leave to Amend PCRA

Petition, 1/8/25, at 3 (unpaginated)). Appellant asks us to remand this matter

and direct the PCRA court to grant him leave to file an amended PCRA petition.

Appellant’s Brief at 8.

The Commonwealth counters that Appellant’s self-dating of his motion’s

proof of service does not constitute reasonably verifiable evidence of the date

of delivery, particularly where the PCRA court received the motion “30 days

after [Appellant’s response to the Rule 907 Notice] was due and 20 days after

the court had already dismissed his petition.” Commonwealth Brief at 10. The

Commonwealth maintains that “such a long delay precludes the inference that

[Appellant’s response] was timely filed.” Id. at 11. The Commonwealth

argues this case can be “distinguished from similar cases where a petitioner’s

response arrived untimely by merely two or three days, and courts were able

to infer a timely submission based on the reported date of delivery.” Id. at

10 (citing Commonwealth v. Betts, 240 A.3d 616, 619 n.5 (Pa. Super.

2020) (where the appellant’s self-dated certificate of service was the only

evidence indicating when he submitted his Rule 907 response to prison

authorities, and where the “filing was untimely by only two days,” this Court

concluded the response “must have been” timely deposited, “[g]iven the

inherent delays associated with mail delivery and the totality of the

circumstances”), and Commonwealth v. Patterson, 931 A.2d 710, 714 (Pa.

Super. 2007) (“Although the record is bereft of the envelope in which the

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notice of appeal was mailed, and thus lacks a postmark definitively noting the

date of mailing, we note that … in order for the trial court to have received

the notice of appeal by September 25th, it is likely that [a]ppellant mailed his

notice of appeal on or before September 22nd. Accordingly, we decline to

quash the appeal for untimeliness.”)).

The Commonwealth further argues that, even if Appellant’s motion for

leave to amend was deemed timely filed, the motion failed to identify any

meritorious grounds for granting leave to amend. Id. at 11. Therefore, the

Commonwealth argues, Appellant suffered no prejudice when the PCRA court

dismissed his PCRA petition without considering his motion for leave to amend.

Id.

We agree with the Commonwealth that Appellant’s self-dated proof of

service cannot, by itself, support an inference that Appellant’s motion was

timely filed, where the PCRA court received the motion 30 days after the filing

was due. We therefore cannot conclude that Appellant timely filed his motion.

We are guided by our decision in Commonwealth v. Ramsey, 843

WDA 2025, 2026 WL 1031363 (Pa. Super. filed April 16, 2026) (unpublished

memorandum), in which we observed that “[w]hen the filing is received by

the relevant court only a few days after the expiration of the filing period, this

Court assumes, without remanding for an evidentiary hearing, that the pro se

filing must have been submitted to prison authorities for mailing by the last

day of the filing period.” Id. (unpublished memorandum at 3-4) (citing Betts,

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240 A.3d at 619 n.5, and Patterson, 931 A.2d at 714); see also Pa.R.A.P.

126(b) (unpublished, non-precedential decisions of this Court filed after May

1, 2019, may be cited for persuasive value). In Ramsey, the appellant’s

notice of appeal was self-dated June 3, 2025, but was not received by the

PCRA court until July 10, 2025, 22 days after the appeal period ended. Id.

(unpublished memorandum at 4). Given the lengthy, unexplained delay, we

determined the appellant’s “self-dating … on the notice of appeal is not

‘reasonably verifiable evidence’ of the date he submitted the notice to prison

authorities…. If anything, it only reasonably verifies the date [the appellant]

prepared the notice of appeal.” Id. (unpublished memorandum at 5).

Accordingly, we quashed the appeal as untimely filed. Id.; see also

Commonwealth v. McMillian, 245 A.3d 1045, 3196 EDA 2019 (Pa. Super.

filed Dec. 4, 2020) (unpublished memorandum at 5) (relying on Betts and

Patterson in concluding that an appellant’s “self-dating the last day of the

appeal period on the notice of appeal is not ‘reasonably verifiable evidence’ of

the date [a]ppellant submitted the notice to prison authorities,” where the

trial court did not receive the filing until 15 days after the appeal period

ended).

We further agree with the Commonwealth that, even if Appellant’s

motion for leave to amend had been timely filed, the motion failed to identify

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any grounds for granting leave to amend.6 Appellant’s motion sought leave

to amend pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 905(A), which provides that “[t]he judge

may grant leave to amend or withdraw a petition for post-conviction collateral

relief at any time. Amendment shall be freely allowed to achieve substantial

justice.” Motion for Leave to Amend PCRA Petition, 1/8/25, ¶ 6 (quoting

Pa.R.Crim.P. 905(A)). In his motion, Appellant acknowledged Rule 905’s

purpose is “to provide PCRA petitioners with a legitimate opportunity to

present their claims to the PCRA court in a manner sufficient to avoid

dismissal due to a correctable defect in claim pleading or

presentation.” Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. McGill, 832 A.2d 1014,

1024 (Pa. 2003)) (emphasis added).

However, Appellant’s motion for leave to amend failed to explain how

Appellant intended to amend his PCRA petition, and did not propose to correct

any defect. See generally id. Though the motion referred to trial counsel’s

alleged failure to file a requested direct appeal, id. ¶ 5, the motion did not

address the PCRA court’s reasons for concluding that claim lacked merit.

Neither the motion nor Appellant’s briefs in this Court challenge the

conclusions set forth in the PCRA court’s Rule 907 Notice or PCRA counsel’s

6 We review a PCRA court’s decision whether to grant leave to amend a PCRA

petition for an abuse of discretion. See Commonwealth v. Keaton, 45 A.3d 1050, 1060 n.3 (Pa. 2012).

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no-merit letter. See generally id.; Appellant’s Brief; Appellant’s Reply Brief.7

As Appellant offers no amendment that could render his claim meritorious, 8

we would conclude that—even if Appellant’s motion had been timely filed—

Appellant was not aggrieved by the lack of an opportunity to amend.

Appellant’s first issue therefore merits no relief.

In his second issue, Appellant argues he was denied due process of law

when the PCRA court “disregarded” Appellant’s request to have the two

CDs/DVDs re-sent to him, which Appellant characterizes as the PCRA court

“disregard[ing]” this Court’s September 19, 2025, order. Appellant’s Brief at

9. Appellant asserts that, per our September 19 order, he “moved, via

correspondence, to have his CDs/DVDs re-sent” to him, and the PCRA court

did not respond to his request. Id. at 13 (citing id., Exhibit H).9 Appellant

7 Appellant does not dispute PCRA counsel’s determination that Appellant did

not, in fact, request that trial counsel file a direct appeal. See No-Merit Letter, 10/27/24, at 4-6.

8 Though Appellant’s argument on his first issue does not describe any proposed amendment, see Appellant’s Brief at 5-9, Appellant suggests in his second issue that he wishes to assert an entirely new claim, i.e., that Appellant’s confession was obtained in violation of his Miranda rights, id. at 10-12. Appellant did not mention this claim in his motion for leave to amend. See generally Motion for Leave to Amend PCRA Petition, 1/8/25; see also Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (issues cannot be raised for the first time on appeal).

9 Appellant’s brief attaches numerous documentary exhibits, some of which

do not appear in the certified record before this Court. See Commonwealth v. Holston, 211 A.3d 1264, 1275 (Pa. Super. 2019) (en banc) (recognizing “the well established principle that [appellate] review is limited to those facts which are contained in the certified record and what is not contained in the (Footnote Continued Next Page)

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asserts that he needs the CDs/DVDs in order to develop a claim that his

confession was obtained in violation of his Miranda rights.10 Id. at 10-12.

The Commonwealth counters that the PCRA court fully complied with

this Court’s April 4, 2025, order, which directed the PCRA court to provide

Appellant with any documents “that the PCRA court deems necessary and

relevant to allow for a complete and judicious assessment of the issues on

appeal.” Commonwealth Brief at 12 (quoting Order, 4/4/25). The

Commonwealth argues Appellant’s stated reasons for wanting to obtain the

CDs/DVDs involve a claim that was never raised in the PCRA court and,

therefore, is not properly before this Court. Id. at 13-14.

certified record does not exist for purposes of our review.” (citations and quotation marks omitted)). Appellant’s Exhibit H includes, inter alia, a handwritten letter “asking for the CDs/DVDs to be re-sent for viewing by me and my legal aide.” Appellant’s Brief, Exhibit H. The letter is undated, identifies no addressee, and, on its face, does not indicate that it was sent to or filed with the PCRA court. Id. However, even assuming arguendo that Appellant asked the PCRA court for the CDs/DVDs following our September 19, 2025, order, this fact would not affect our analysis.

10 Appellant notes that trial counsel filed an omnibus pretrial motion, which

included a motion to suppress Appellant’s confession. Appellant’s Brief at 12 (citing Omnibus Pretrial Motion, 3/17/22). Appellant maintains that he is unaware whether this motion had ever been responded to or ruled upon. Id. at 11-12. Our review of the certified record discloses the Commonwealth filed no response to the motion, and it remained pending when Appellant pled guilty. See generally Trial Court Docket; see also N.T., 7/7/23, at 6-7 (Appellant agreeing he understood that, by pleading guilty, he waived his “right to litigate any pretrial motions like, asserting, for example, that the Commonwealth obtained at least some of the evidence against [him] unlawfully, and, therefore, that evidence must be excluded from [his] trial.”).

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We conclude Appellant’s second issue fails to establish any grounds for

appellate relief. We agree with the Commonwealth that Appellant’s request

to obtain further access to the CDs/DVDs is not relevant to any issue properly

before this Court. Appellant appealed the PCRA court’s December 19, 2024,

order dismissing his PCRA petition. Appellant’s PCRA petition advanced the

sole claim that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to file a

requested direct appeal. To the extent that Appellant wishes to review record

evidence to develop future claims, we reiterate our September 19, 2025,

order’s direction that Appellant seek relief in the PCRA court.

Order affirmed.

Date: 7/9/2026

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