J-S39041-24
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : REGGINAL DUANE WELCH, III : : Appellant : No. 350 WDA 2024
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered December 2, 2022 In the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-25-CR-0001640-2021
BEFORE: DUBOW, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and NICHOLS, J.
MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED: May 22, 2025
Appellant Regginal Duane Welch, III, appeals from the judgment of
sentence imposed following his convictions for first-degree murder and related
offenses. Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. For the
reasons set forth below, we vacate the trial court’s March 5, 2024 order and
quash the appeal.
Briefly, on September 16, 2022, a jury found Appellant guilty of first-
degree murder, second-degree murder, two counts of aggravated assault,
simple assault, two counts of recklessly endangering another person, firearms
not to be carried without license, robbery, flight to avoid apprehension, and
possession of instruments of crime.1 On December 2, 2022, the trial court
____________________________________________
1 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 2502(a), 2502(b), 2702(a)(1), 2702(a)(4), 2701(a)(2), 2705,
6106(a)(1), 3701(a)(1)(i), 5126(a), and 907, respectively. J-S39041-24
sentenced Appellant to an aggregate term of life without parole for these
convictions. Appellant did not file any post-sentence motions.
Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on December 29, 2022, which
was docketed with this Court at 20 WDA 2023. After Appellant failed to file
an appellate brief, this Court dismissed the appeal on February 21, 2024.2 On
March 4, 2024, Appellant filed a motion to reinstate his post-sentence and
appellate rights nunc pro tunc with the trial court. The next day, the trial
court entered an order providing, in relevant part: “And now, this 5th day of
March, 2024, it is hereby ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED the Motion is
granted, the Defendant’s right to file a post-sentence motion and/or notice of
appeal is reinstated.” See Trial Ct. Order, 3/5/24. This Court did not remand
the record for Appellant’s direct appeal at 20 WDA 2023 until April 2, 2024.
Pursuant to the trial court’s order reinstating his direct appeal rights
nunc pro tunc, Appellant filed a notice of appeal on March 22, 2024 and both
Appellant and the trial court timely complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
On appeal, Appellant raises the following issue:
Whether the Commonwealth failed to present sufficient evidence to convict . . . Appellant beyond a reasonable doubt of murder of the first degree, murder of the second degree, aggravated assault, simple assault, recklessly endangering another person, robbery, and possession of an instrument of crime.
Appellant’s Brief at 3 (some formatting altered). ____________________________________________
2 See Commonwealth v. Welch, 20 WDA 2023 (Pa. Super. filed Feb. 21,
2024) (per curiam).
-2- J-S39041-24
Initially, we must address whether we have jurisdiction. See
Commonwealth v. Burks, 102 A.3d 497, 500 (Pa. Super. 2014) (noting that
“[t]his Court can raise the matter sua sponte, as the issue is one of jurisdiction
to entertain the appeal” (citation omitted)). “In a criminal case in which no
post-sentence motion has been filed, the notice of appeal shall be filed within
30 days of the imposition of the judgment of sentence in open court.”
Pa.R.A.P. 903(c)(3).
This Court has stated that “regardless of how a petition is titled, courts
are to treat a petition filed after a judgment of sentence becomes final as a
[Post Conviction Relief Act3 (PCRA)] petition if it requests relief contemplated
by the PCRA.” Commonwealth v. Fantauzzi, 275 A.3d 986, 995 (Pa. Super.
2022) (citation omitted). The PCRA governs all claims, however styled or
titled, alleging that the movant or petitioner was “convicted of crimes they did
not commit” and provides that a PCRA petition “shall be the sole means of
obtaining collateral relief.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9542. Our Supreme Court has
explained that a request for collateral relief that must be brought under the
PCRA includes a “request for a direct appeal nunc pro tunc[.]”
Commonwealth v. Hall, 771 A.2d 1232, 1235 (Pa. 2001).
Generally, a petition seeking relief pursuant to the PCRA must be filed
“within one year of the date the judgment becomes final” and “a judgment
becomes final at the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review
3 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.
-3- J-S39041-24
. . . or at the expiration of time for seeking the review.” 42 Pa.C.S. §
9545(b)(1), (3). That is, where a petitioner has pursued a direct appeal the
one-year window of time for seeking PCRA relief commences thirty days after
the conclusion of direct review. See Commonwealth v. Turner, 73 A.3d
1283, 1285-86, 1286 n.4 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citing 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3)).
“If a petition is filed while a direct appeal is pending, the PCRA court should
dismiss it without prejudice towards the petitioner’s right to file a petition once
his direct appeal rights have been exhausted.” Commonwealth v. Williams,
215 A.3d 1019, 1023 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation omitted).
Additionally, with respect to a trial court’s jurisdiction, Pa.R.A.P. 1701(a)
states that “[e]xcept as otherwise prescribed by these rules, after an appeal
is taken . . . the trial court . . . may no longer proceed further in the matter.”
Pa.R.A.P. 1701(a); see also Pa.R.A.P. 1701(b) (providing exceptions to the
general rule at subsection (a)). “[U]nder Appellate Rules 1701 and 2572, a
trial court has no jurisdiction over a case until an appellate court returns the
record to it with instructions for the trial court to proceed. Otherwise . . . ,
the trial court risks following an appellate decision that may not ultimately be
the final law of the case.” Commonwealth v. Harris, 230 A.3d 1124, 1127
(Pa. Super. 2020).4 “The court possessed of the record shall remand 30
4 Between the issuance of a dispositional order by this Court and the return or
remand of the record to the trial court, any party to the appeal may apply for reargument or any other application in response to our order, or petition our Supreme Court for allowance of appeal from our order. See Pa.R.A.P. 2572(b).
-4- J-S39041-24
days after either the entry of a final order or the disposition of all post-
decision applications, whichever is later.” Id. (emphasis added). This Court
has held that “Rule 1701 provides no exceptions that would have permitted
the trial court to enter a valid order granting leave to appeal nunc pro tunc”
after a party “filed her first notice of appeal with this Court and before the
record was remanded to the trial court pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 2591(a).” Bell
v. Kater, 839 A.2d 356, 358 (Pa. Super. 2003) (emphasis in original). When
“the record ha[s] not yet been remanded . . . [a] trial court d[oes] not have
jurisdiction to enter such order and, therefore, such order is void[]” or, in
other words, “is a nullity.” Id. (citation omitted).
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J-S39041-24
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : REGGINAL DUANE WELCH, III : : Appellant : No. 350 WDA 2024
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered December 2, 2022 In the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-25-CR-0001640-2021
BEFORE: DUBOW, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and NICHOLS, J.
MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED: May 22, 2025
Appellant Regginal Duane Welch, III, appeals from the judgment of
sentence imposed following his convictions for first-degree murder and related
offenses. Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. For the
reasons set forth below, we vacate the trial court’s March 5, 2024 order and
quash the appeal.
Briefly, on September 16, 2022, a jury found Appellant guilty of first-
degree murder, second-degree murder, two counts of aggravated assault,
simple assault, two counts of recklessly endangering another person, firearms
not to be carried without license, robbery, flight to avoid apprehension, and
possession of instruments of crime.1 On December 2, 2022, the trial court
____________________________________________
1 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 2502(a), 2502(b), 2702(a)(1), 2702(a)(4), 2701(a)(2), 2705,
6106(a)(1), 3701(a)(1)(i), 5126(a), and 907, respectively. J-S39041-24
sentenced Appellant to an aggregate term of life without parole for these
convictions. Appellant did not file any post-sentence motions.
Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on December 29, 2022, which
was docketed with this Court at 20 WDA 2023. After Appellant failed to file
an appellate brief, this Court dismissed the appeal on February 21, 2024.2 On
March 4, 2024, Appellant filed a motion to reinstate his post-sentence and
appellate rights nunc pro tunc with the trial court. The next day, the trial
court entered an order providing, in relevant part: “And now, this 5th day of
March, 2024, it is hereby ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED the Motion is
granted, the Defendant’s right to file a post-sentence motion and/or notice of
appeal is reinstated.” See Trial Ct. Order, 3/5/24. This Court did not remand
the record for Appellant’s direct appeal at 20 WDA 2023 until April 2, 2024.
Pursuant to the trial court’s order reinstating his direct appeal rights
nunc pro tunc, Appellant filed a notice of appeal on March 22, 2024 and both
Appellant and the trial court timely complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
On appeal, Appellant raises the following issue:
Whether the Commonwealth failed to present sufficient evidence to convict . . . Appellant beyond a reasonable doubt of murder of the first degree, murder of the second degree, aggravated assault, simple assault, recklessly endangering another person, robbery, and possession of an instrument of crime.
Appellant’s Brief at 3 (some formatting altered). ____________________________________________
2 See Commonwealth v. Welch, 20 WDA 2023 (Pa. Super. filed Feb. 21,
2024) (per curiam).
-2- J-S39041-24
Initially, we must address whether we have jurisdiction. See
Commonwealth v. Burks, 102 A.3d 497, 500 (Pa. Super. 2014) (noting that
“[t]his Court can raise the matter sua sponte, as the issue is one of jurisdiction
to entertain the appeal” (citation omitted)). “In a criminal case in which no
post-sentence motion has been filed, the notice of appeal shall be filed within
30 days of the imposition of the judgment of sentence in open court.”
Pa.R.A.P. 903(c)(3).
This Court has stated that “regardless of how a petition is titled, courts
are to treat a petition filed after a judgment of sentence becomes final as a
[Post Conviction Relief Act3 (PCRA)] petition if it requests relief contemplated
by the PCRA.” Commonwealth v. Fantauzzi, 275 A.3d 986, 995 (Pa. Super.
2022) (citation omitted). The PCRA governs all claims, however styled or
titled, alleging that the movant or petitioner was “convicted of crimes they did
not commit” and provides that a PCRA petition “shall be the sole means of
obtaining collateral relief.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9542. Our Supreme Court has
explained that a request for collateral relief that must be brought under the
PCRA includes a “request for a direct appeal nunc pro tunc[.]”
Commonwealth v. Hall, 771 A.2d 1232, 1235 (Pa. 2001).
Generally, a petition seeking relief pursuant to the PCRA must be filed
“within one year of the date the judgment becomes final” and “a judgment
becomes final at the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review
3 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.
-3- J-S39041-24
. . . or at the expiration of time for seeking the review.” 42 Pa.C.S. §
9545(b)(1), (3). That is, where a petitioner has pursued a direct appeal the
one-year window of time for seeking PCRA relief commences thirty days after
the conclusion of direct review. See Commonwealth v. Turner, 73 A.3d
1283, 1285-86, 1286 n.4 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citing 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3)).
“If a petition is filed while a direct appeal is pending, the PCRA court should
dismiss it without prejudice towards the petitioner’s right to file a petition once
his direct appeal rights have been exhausted.” Commonwealth v. Williams,
215 A.3d 1019, 1023 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation omitted).
Additionally, with respect to a trial court’s jurisdiction, Pa.R.A.P. 1701(a)
states that “[e]xcept as otherwise prescribed by these rules, after an appeal
is taken . . . the trial court . . . may no longer proceed further in the matter.”
Pa.R.A.P. 1701(a); see also Pa.R.A.P. 1701(b) (providing exceptions to the
general rule at subsection (a)). “[U]nder Appellate Rules 1701 and 2572, a
trial court has no jurisdiction over a case until an appellate court returns the
record to it with instructions for the trial court to proceed. Otherwise . . . ,
the trial court risks following an appellate decision that may not ultimately be
the final law of the case.” Commonwealth v. Harris, 230 A.3d 1124, 1127
(Pa. Super. 2020).4 “The court possessed of the record shall remand 30
4 Between the issuance of a dispositional order by this Court and the return or
remand of the record to the trial court, any party to the appeal may apply for reargument or any other application in response to our order, or petition our Supreme Court for allowance of appeal from our order. See Pa.R.A.P. 2572(b).
-4- J-S39041-24
days after either the entry of a final order or the disposition of all post-
decision applications, whichever is later.” Id. (emphasis added). This Court
has held that “Rule 1701 provides no exceptions that would have permitted
the trial court to enter a valid order granting leave to appeal nunc pro tunc”
after a party “filed her first notice of appeal with this Court and before the
record was remanded to the trial court pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 2591(a).” Bell
v. Kater, 839 A.2d 356, 358 (Pa. Super. 2003) (emphasis in original). When
“the record ha[s] not yet been remanded . . . [a] trial court d[oes] not have
jurisdiction to enter such order and, therefore, such order is void[]” or, in
other words, “is a nullity.” Id. (citation omitted).
Here, this Court dismissed Appellant’s direct appeal at 20 WDA 2023 on
February 21, 2024, but did not remand the record to the trial court until April
2, 2024, after the thirty-day period in which Appellant could request
reconsideration by this Court or file a petition for allowance of appeal with our
Supreme Court. See Pa.R.A.P. 1113 (setting time limit for petitioning for
allowance of appeal), 2542 (setting time limit for applying for reargument),
and 2572(b) (effect of pending post-decision applications on remand of
record).
As we have noted, Appellant filed his motion to reinstate post-sentence
and appellate rights nunc pro tunc with the trial court on March 4, 2024. While
Appellant does not cite to the PCRA in this motion, the PCRA governs all
motions and petitions, however styled or titled, where the movant or
petitioner seeks to “obtain collateral relief” from a criminal conviction. See
-5- J-S39041-24
42 Pa.C.S. § 9542; see also Fantauzzi, 275 A.3d at 995. Therefore, we are
constrained to treat Appellant’s motion as a PCRA petition that must be filed
“within one year of the date the judgment becomes final.” 42 Pa.C.S. §
9545(b)(1).
Further, because Appellant had filed a direct appeal, we determine that
Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final “at the expiration of time for
seeking” any further review of that direct appeal, which occurred on March
22, 2024, thirty days after this Court dismissed Appellant’s direct appeal at
20 WDA 2023, when the time for filing a petition for allowance of appeal with
our Supreme Court expired. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3); Turner, 73 A.3d
at 1285-86; Welch, 20 WDA 2023. Accordingly, Appellant’s PCRA petition of
March 4, 2024 was prematurely filed, as the period in which he could seek
collateral review under the PCRA had not yet commenced because his
judgment of sentence did not become final until the direct appeal at 20 WDA
2023 concluded. See Williams, 215 A.3d at 1023; Turner, 73 A.3d at 1285-
86.
Turning now to consider the trial court’s issuance of an order reinstating
Appellant’s direct appeal rights nunc pro tunc on March 5, 2024, we find that
the trial court lacked jurisdiction to entertain Appellant’s petition seeking
collateral relief only available under the PCRA because Appellant’s petition was
filed prematurely. We also conclude that the trial court had not yet been
revested with jurisdiction over this matter on March 5, 2024 because, as of
that date, this Court had not yet remanded the record to the trial court. The
-6- J-S39041-24
record was remanded after the dismissal of Appellant’s prior direct appeal.
See Pa.R.A.P. 1701(a); Harris, 230 A.3d at 1127. Due to the trial court’s
lack of jurisdiction to issue such an order, we are constrained to conclude that
its March 5, 2024 order reinstating Appellant’s direct appeal rights nunc pro
tunc is void and a nullity. See Pa.R.A.P. 1701(a), 2572; Bell, 839 A.2d at
358; Williams, 215 A.3d at 1023.
For these reasons, the instant appeal, filed more than thirty days after
the imposition of sentence in open court, is untimely and must be quashed.5
See Pa.R.A.P. 903(c)(3).
Appeal quashed. Jurisdiction relinquished.
DATE: 5/22/2025
5 We quash without prejudice to Appellant’s right to seek relief under the PCRA.
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