Com. v. Weber, C.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: June 2, 2025
• Docket: 2716 EDA 2024
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

J-S09028-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : CHRISTIAN ARTHUR WEBER, JR. : : Appellant : No. 2716 EDA 2024

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered August 21, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-09-CR-0000723-2024

BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., BECK, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY BECK, J.: FILED JUNE 2, 2025

Christian Arthur Weber, Jr. (“Weber”) appeals from the judgment of

sentence entered by the Bucks County Court of Common Pleas (“trial court”)

after it convicted him of possession of a controlled substance, possession of

drug paraphernalia, and public drunkenness (a summary offense). 1 On

appeal, Weber challenges the trial court’s denial of his suppression motion.

Because we find no error in the trial court’s decision, we affirm.

The trial court summarized the factual and procedural histories of this

case as follows:

In the early morning hours of November 20, 2023, Officer Brown of the Upper Southampton Police Department received a bystander report of a man standing in a busy roadway. Officer ____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(16), (32); 18 Pa.C.S. § 5505. J-S09028-25

Brown located [Weber] in the roadway, noticed several signs of intoxication, and placed [him] under arrest. Following the search incident to arrest, Officer Brown discovered a capped syringe in [Weber]’s pocket, a blue wax baggy containing a solid white substance later determined to be fentanyl, as well as three vials in [his] wallet. [Weber] was charged with possession of a controlled substance, possession of drug paraphernalia, and public drunkenness.

On August 6, 2024, [Weber] filed a motion to suppress, challenging the legality of his arrest and subsequent search incident to arrest. On August 21, 2024, after a hearing on [Weber]’s motion, [the trial court] denied [Weber]’s motion to suppress. [Weber] then proceeded with a stipulated waiver trial and [the trial court] found [Weber] guilty of possession of a controlled substance, possession of drug paraphernalia, and public drunkenness. That same day, [the trial court] sentenced [Weber] to a term of probation for twelve months on the count of possession of a controlled substance, with no further penalty on the remaining counts.

On August 30, 2024, [Weber] filed a [post-sentence motion]. On [September] 4, 2024, the motion was denied. On October 3, 2024, [Weber] filed a notice of appeal to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

On October 7, 2024, [the trial court] ordered [Weber] to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal. After [the trial court] granted [Weber]’s motion for extension of time, on October 22, 2024, [Weber] filed a timely concise statement.

Trial Court Opinion, 12/3/2024, at 1-2 (footnotes and unnecessary

capitalization omitted). Weber presents one issue for review: “Did the trial

court err in denying suppression where police lacked probable cause to arrest

[him] for public drunkenness?” Weber’s Brief at 4.

Our standard of review for the denial of a suppression motion is well-

settled:

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Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to the denial of a suppression motion is limited to determining whether the suppression court’s factual findings are supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are correct. Because the Commonwealth prevailed before the suppression court, we may consider only the evidence of the Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as a whole. Where the suppression court’s factual findings are supported by the record, we are bound by these findings and may reverse only if the court’s legal conclusions are erroneous. The suppression court’s legal conclusions are not binding on an appellate court, whose duty it is to determine if the suppression court properly applied the law to the facts. Thus, the conclusions of law of the courts below are subject to our plenary review.

Moreover, appellate courts are limited to reviewing only the evidence presented at the suppression hearing when examining a ruling on a pre-trial motion to suppress.

Commonwealth v. Carey, 249 A.3d 1217, 1223 (Pa. Super. 2021).

Weber raises two arguments in support of his claim of error. First,

Weber argues that police lacked probable cause to arrest him for public

drunkenness because he immediately complied with Officer Brown’s command

to remove himself from the road and he was cooperative with police

throughout the encounter. Weber’s Brief at 15. He maintains that his conduct

after police arrived at the scene demonstrated that he was not an ongoing

danger to himself, other persons, or property, and thus, police did not have

the authority to conduct a warrantless arrest for a summary offense. Id. at

17-18.

Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution and the Fourth

Amendment to the United States Constitution protect individuals from

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unreasonable searches and seizures. Interactions between citizens and police

fall into three separate categories:

The first, a “mere encounter,” does not require any level of suspicion or carry any official compulsion to stop or respond. The second, an “investigative detention,” permits the temporary detention of an individual if supported by reasonable suspicion. The third is an arrest or custodial detention, which must be supported by probable cause.

Commonwealth v. Lyles, 97 A.3d 298, 302 (Pa. 2014) (citations omitted).

“Probable cause exists where the facts and circumstances within the

officer's knowledge are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in

the belief that an offense has been or is being committed.” Commonwealth

v. Saunders, 326 A.3d 888, 897 (Pa. 2024) (quotation marks and citations

omitted). “Probable cause is a practical, non-technical concept that is

evaluated under a traditional totality-of-the-circumstances test.” Id.

(quotation marks and citations omitted).

The Pennsylvania Crimes Code defines public drunkenness as follows:

“[a] person is guilty of a summary offense if he appears in any public place

manifestly under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance … to the

degree that he may endanger himself or other persons or property, or annoy

persons in his vicinity.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 5505. Importantly, section 8902(a)(1)

of the Judicial Code authorizes police officers to arrest individuals without a

warrant for the summary offense of public drunkenness “upon probable cause

when there is ongoing conduct that imperils the personal security of any

person or endangers public or private property.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 8902(a)(1).

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In rejecting Weber’s claim that police lacked probable cause to arrest

Weber for public drunkenness, the trial court explained:

[T]he totality of the facts was sufficient to justify a person of reasonable caution in believing that [Weber] had committed the crime of public drunkenness. While the crime of public drunkenness is a summary offense, … Officer Brown had no alternative but to take [Weber] into custody in the interest of [Weber]’s own safety and the safety of others. [Weber]’s location in the roadway posed a risk of danger to himself and others traveling on the roadway. Therefore, Officer Brown possessed probable cause necessary to support the warrantless arrest of [Weber] for public drunkenness.

Trial Court Opinion, 12/3/2024, at 5.

The record reflects that at the hearing on Weber’s suppression motion,

Officer Brown testified that on the night in question, he was on a routine patrol

near the Redwood Shopping Center in Upper Southhampton Township when

an individual drove up to him at around 12:00 a.m. and informed him that

there was a man standing in the roadway at the nearby intersection of Second

Street Pike and Knowles Avenue. N.T., 8/21/2024, at 5-6. Officer Brown

stated that he immediately traveled to the intersection where he encountered

Weber. Id. at 7. Officer Brown explained that upon his arrival at the scene,

Weber was standing in the roadway and that “[h]is knees were bent, his head

was forward, and based on my training and experience, it appear[ed] he was

nodding out or dipping out, which is a common term for someone who is under

the influence of an opiate[.]” Id. Officer Brown also indicated that there was

traffic on the roadway where Weber was standing. Id. at 8. Officer Brown

testified that when he approached Weber, he noticed that Weber appeared

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nearly asleep, his knees were buckling, he was slurring his speech, his eyelids

were droopy, and he was unsteady on his feet. Id. at 11. Officer Brown

stated that Weber’s mannerisms were delayed, he did not know the time, and

he had difficulty explaining where he was traveling. Id. Officer Brown

reported that eventually, Weber informed him that he was walking home from

a nearby gas station and that he lived roughly a mile-and-a-half away. Id. at

16, 20. Officer Brown explained that when he asked Weber for identification,

Weber initially provided his debit card. Id. at 12.

Officer Brown testified that, based on his training and experience, Weber

was displaying “telltale signs of someone who was under the influence of an

opiate.” Id. Additionally, Officer Brown stated that although Weber denied

having used drugs, Weber eventually admitted that to having taken

prescription medication. Id. at 21. Officer Brown explained that at that point,

he did not believe Weber would be able to safely walk home, that he was a

danger to himself and drivers in the area, and consequently, he placed him

under arrest for public drunkenness. Id. at 13-15.

We emphasize that the trial court found Officer Brown’s testimony

credible, and Weber concedes this point. See Weber’s Brief at 17. Instead,

Weber asserts that because he complied with Officer Brown’s instruction to

remove himself from the roadway and because he was cooperative with police,

he displayed no ongoing conduct that imperiled the personal security of any

person or endangered any public or private property sufficient for the officer

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to conduct a warrantless arrest for a summary offense under section

8902(a)(1). See Weber’s Brief at 17-18. Weber’s argument, however, is

entirely belied by the record, as Officer Brown’s testimony revealed that

Weber was barely able to stand, let alone walk, he was confused as to his

whereabouts, and was slurring his speech. See N.T., 8/21/2024, at 5-21.

Furthermore, video from Officer Brown’s Mobile Video Recorder and body

camera shows that Weber was impeding traffic and that a vehicle had to slow

down and drive around Weber to avoid hitting him. See id., Exhibits CS-1, 2.

Evidence that Weber was compliant with Officer Brown’s instructions is

not evidence that he no longer presented an ongoing danger to himself or

others, and he cites to no evidence indicating that his intoxicated condition

somehow improved throughout the course of his interaction with police. Thus,

the record plainly supports Officer Brown’s determination that Weber

presented a danger to himself and drivers in the area.

Accordingly, based on the foregoing, our review reveals that the trial

court’s factual findings are supported by the record. Additionally, we discern

no error in the trial court’s determination that the evidence established

Weber’s “ongoing conduct that imperil[ed] the personal security of any

person,” 42 Pa.C.S. § 8902(a)(1), and that Officer Brown had probable cause

to arrest Weber for public drunkenness.

Second, Weber argues that police did not have the authority to arrest

him for a summary offense because “conducting arrests in summary public

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drunkenness cases is disfavored in the Commonwealth and is only appropriate

in exceptional circumstances.” Weber’s Brief at 11. In addition to noting

section 8902(a)’s requirement that an arrest for public drunkenness must

include ongoing dangerous conduct, Weber relies on the explanatory comment

to Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 440, which he claims limits

warrantless arrests for summary offenses to “exceptional circumstances” that

involve violence, the threat of violence, or a risk that the defendant will flee,

and that no such circumstances existed in this case. Id. at 13-14, 18.

Rule 440 states that “[w]hen an arrest without a warrant in a summary

case is authorized by law, a police officer who exhibits some sign of authority

may institute proceedings by such an arrest.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 440. Weber is

correct that the explanatory comment to Rule 440 states that “[o]nly a police

officer, … may institute a summary criminal proceeding by arrest. It is

intended that these proceedings will be instituted by arrest only in exceptional

circumstances such as those involving violence, or the imminent threat of

violence, or those involving a danger that the defendant will flee.” Id.,

Explanatory Comment. However, we previously rejected the argument that

Weber makes here—that the comment to Rule 440 precludes an arrest for

public drunkenness where the Commonwealth establishes “ongoing conduct

that imperils the personal security of any person or endangers public or private

property” pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 8902(a)(1). See Commonwealth v.

Williams, 568 A.2d 1281 (Pa. Super. 1990).

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In Williams, the appellant likewise relied on the explanatory comment

to Rule 4402 to argue that the proper procedure for dealing with nonviolent

summary offenses was to issue a citation as opposed to conducting a custodial

arrest. Id. at 1282, 1284-85. We rejected this claim and explained that

“[t]he comments, while often helpful in resolving ambiguities, are not

controlling. To the extent the comment purports to restrict express authority

to arrest conferred by statute, it must be rejected.” Id. at 1285 (citation

omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Crosby, 329 A.3d 1141, 1149 (Pa.

2025) (stating that to the extent that a comment conflicts with the text of a

statute, the text of the statute controls).

In this case, as Weber concedes, section 8902(a)(1) plainly authorized

Officer Brown to arrest Weber if he displayed ongoing conduct that imperils

the personal security of any person or endangers public or private property.

See 42 Pa.C.S. § 8902(a)(1). As we explained above, the record supports

Officer Brown’s determination that Weber’s condition at the time of the

encounter presented an ongoing danger, and that he therefore possessed

probable cause to arrest him for the summary offense of public drunkenness.

Thus, Weber’s arrest was authorized by law, satisfying both the relevant

statute and the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure. See id.;

Pa.R.Crim.P. 440.

____________________________________________

2At the time we decided Williams, Rule 440 was numbered Rule 70. See Williams, 568 A.2d at 1284-85; see also Pa.R.Crim.P. 440.

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As such, the trial court correctly determined that Officer Brown had both

probable cause and the authority to arrest Weber for public drunkenness. We

therefore conclude that the trial court did not err in denying Weber’s

suppression motion.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Date: 6/2/2025

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