Com. v. Watts, S.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: November 5, 2021
• Docket: 1468 MDA 2020
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

J-A16006-21

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : SHANNON ROBERT WATTS : : Appellant : No. 1468 MDA 2020

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered September 25, 2019, in the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County, Criminal Division at No(s): CP-28-CR-0001071-2017.

BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., McCAFFERY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED: NOVEMBER 5, 2021

Shannon Robert Watts appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed

after a jury convicted him of drug delivery resulting in death (DDRID).1 Upon

careful review, we affirm.

On October 24, 2016, Allen Chapman invited his friend, Forrest Miller,

and Miller’s family over to his apartment, where he lived with his wife and

daughter. While there, Chapman drank alcohol and Miller smoked marijuana.

Later, Chapman and Miller went to Watts’ house to buy prescription

narcotics. After each bought 4 pills from Watts, Miller crushed 2 and snorted

them. Chapman did the same with all 4 pills he purchased from Watts. After

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2506(a). J-A16006-21

leaving Watts’ house, Chapman and Miller briefly stopped at a bar and then a

store to buy beer and cigarettes.

Chapman and Miller later returned to the apartment. Chapman was

irritated, acted a bit crazy, and argued with his wife. He appeared high and

spacey, had trouble talking, stumbled around, and needed help with eating.

Shortly after Miller and his family left, Chapman fell asleep on the sofa.

The next morning, Chapman’s wife found him still asleep on the sofa,

snoring. She shook his shoulder to try to wake him, and his head fell off the

arm of the sofa. Chapman then went silent and stopped breathing.

When the paramedics arrived, Chapman was not breathing and had no

pulse. The paramedics used a defibrillator and started CPR on Chapman. On

the way to the hospital, the paramedics continued to try to resuscitate

Chapman, but could not keep his heart beating. The paramedics pronounced

Chapman dead.

The next day, the police interviewed Miller about what occurred the

night before. Miller and his girlfriend had consumed the other 2 pills he got

from Watts. The police set up a controlled buy using Miller as a confidential

informant to buy drugs from Watts.

Miller met Watts and bought 3 oxymorphone pills from him. As a result,

the police arrested Watts and interviewed him about Chapman. Watts

admitted that he sold pills to Miller, and watched Miller and Chapman snort

them. Watts was charged with Chapman’s death.

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Following trial, a jury convicted Watts of DDRID and other related

offenses. The trial court sentenced Watts to 78 months to 240 months of

incarceration. Watts filed a post-sentence motion, which the trial court

denied. No appeal was filed.

After an amended PCRA petition, the court reinstated Watts’ direct

appellate rights. Watts filed this timely appeal. Watts and the trial court

complied with Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925.

On appeal, Watts raises the following two issues:

1. Whether the Commonwealth's evidence was sufficient to prove that [Watts'] delivery of drugs was a direct and substantial cause of the death of Allen Chapman?

2. Whether, in the alternative, the weight of the evidence was so weak and inconclusive such that no possibility of guilt should have been determined that [Watts'] delivery of drugs was a direct and substantial cause of the death of Allen Chapman?

Watts’ Brief at 9.

In his first issue, Watts claims that there was insufficient evidence to

convict him of DDRID. In reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, this

Court:

must determine whether the evidence admitted at trial, as well as all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, are sufficient to support all elements of the offense. Additionally, we may not reweigh the evidence or substitute our own judgment for that of the fact finder. The evidence may be entirely circumstantial as long as it links the accused to the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.

Commonwealth v. Koch, 39 A.3d 996, 1001 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citations

omitted). However, “the inferences must flow from facts and circumstances

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proven in the record, and must be of such volume and quality as to overcome

the presumption of innocence and satisfy the jury of an accused's guilt beyond

a reasonable doubt.” Commonwealth v. Scott, 597 A.2d 1220, 1221 (Pa.

Super. 1991). “The trier of fact cannot base a conviction on conjecture and

speculation and a verdict which is premised on suspicion will fail even under

the limited scrutiny of appellate review.” Id. “Because evidentiary sufficiency

is a question of law, our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review

is plenary.” Commonwealth v. Diamond, 83 A.3d 119, 126 (Pa. 2013).

DDRID is defined as follows:

A person commits a felony of the first degree if the person intentionally administers, dispenses, delivers, gives, prescribes, sells or distributes any controlled substance or counterfeit controlled substance in violation of . . . The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act, and another person dies as a result of using the substance.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2506(a). The offense “consists of two principal elements: (i)

intentionally administering, dispensing, delivery, giving, prescribing, selling or

distributing any controlled substance or counterfeit controlled substance and

(ii) death caused by (“resulting from”) the use of that drug.” Commonwealth

v. Kakhankham, 132 A.3d 986, 991-92 (Pa. Super. 2015) (footnote

omitted).

Watts does not challenge whether he sold a controlled substance to

Chapman. Instead, Watts argues that the evidence failed to satisfy the second

element, i.e., that the drugs he sold to Chapman caused his death. Watts’

Brief at 13. According to Watts, the Commonwealth’s experts could not

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distinguish between Chapman's physical ailments and his substance abuse as

the cause of death. Additionally, the evidence showed that Chapman had

other substances in his blood. Id. at 14. Thus, Watts contends that the

evidence was not sufficient to establish that the drugs Chapman got from him

were a direct and substantial cause of Chapman’s death. Id. at 13. We

disagree.

The causal relationship necessary to impose criminal liability under the

DDRID statute is a "but-for" test of causation. Commonwealth v. Carr, 227

A.3d 11, 15-16 (Pa. Super. 2020). "[C]riminal causation requires [that] the

results of the defendant's actions cannot be so extraordinarily remote or

attenuated that it would be unfair to hold the defendant criminally

responsible." Id. However, a defendant's conduct "‘need not be the only

cause of the victim's death in order to establish a causal connection. Criminal

responsibility may be properly assessed against an individual whose conduct

was a direct and substantial factor in producing the death even though other

factors combined with that conduct to achieve the result.’" Kakhankam, 132

A.3d at 993 n.8 (quoting Commonwealth v. Nunn, 947 A.2d 756, 760 (Pa.

Super. 2008)).

In this case, Dr. Nadine Koenig, a forensic toxicologist, testified at trial.

See N.T., 7/16/19, at 64-90. Dr. Koenig tested Chapman’s blood for the

presence of alcohol and controlled substances. No alcohol was detected in his

system in a measurable amount (above 10 milligrams per deciliter). THC

(marijuana) was detected at 3.2 nanograms per milliliter. Both metabolites

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(byproducts of a drug when the body breaks it down) of THC were detected

at 1.2 nanograms per milliliter and 7.6 nanograms per milliliter. Norfluoxetine

(an anti-depressant) was detected at 167 nanograms per milliliter. Oxycodone

was detected at 27 nanograms per milliliter. Oxymorphone was detected at

638 nanograms per milliliter.

Dr. Koenig explained that oxymorphone is 6 to 10 times more potent

than morphine; fatalities have occurred from 20 nanograms per milliliter to

550 nanograms per milliliter and higher. While oxymorphone may be

prescribed by itself, it is also a component of oxycodone, which is found in

Percocet.2

Dr. Michael Johnson, an expert in the field of forensic pathology, also

testified at trial. See id. at 3-62. In determining the cause of Chapman’s

death, he relied on the findings from his autopsy of Chapman and the findings

of Dr. Koenig.

Dr. Johnson testified that his autopsy revealed that Chapman a number

of physical ailments. In particular, he had an enlarged heart, pneumonia, and

arteriosclerotic cardiovascular disease (fatty deposits in the arteries). He later

learned that Chapman had asthma. Additionally, he found crystalline, non-

natural, material in Chapman’s lungs consistent with a person crushing up a ____________________________________________

2 Notably, the record indicates the pills Miller and Chapman bought together

from Watts were believed to be Percocets. The pills that Miller later purchased from Watts were determined conclusively to be oxymorphone. Which of these two drugs Chapman consumed is not significant in this case. Oxymorphone and oxycodone were both found in Chapman’s system. Watts does not contend that Chapman obtained opioid drugs from another source.

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pill and snorting it. The toxicology results showed a "very high" amount of

oxymorphone in Chapman’s system.

Dr. Johnson explained that by crushing and snorting the drugs,

Chapman circumvented having his liver break down the drugs. This way, he

would get high faster and better. Because drugs are typically swallowed, Dr.

Johnson opined that this was an abuse, as was Chapman’s mixing of various

drugs.

Dr. Johnson further explained that the side effects of opioids, which

oxycodone and oxymorphone are, have a direct effect on the brain, and on

the way the heart and lungs work. Essentially, they suppress or depress one’s

respiratory drive, the mechanism that keeps a person breathing. In certain

situations, the cardio-respiratory system can start to collapse preventing a

person from getting typical respiration. Then the other organs are affected.

Here, Chapman’s heart condition, pneumonia, and asthma already put him at

risk for sudden death and having respiratory problems. When he snorted the

pills he got from Watts, it compounded his existing problems.

Dr. Johnson opined that the cause of Chapman’s death was mixed

substance abuse, pneumonia, an enlarged heart, and arteriosclerotic

cardiovascular disease. Dr. Johnson further stated that all of these factors

contributed to Chapman’ death so that none of them could be "taken out" such

that he would have lived. Dr. Johnson’s testimony and opinions were given

with a reasonable degree of medical certainty.

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Based upon the evidence, we conclude that Watts’ conduct was not “so

extraordinarily remote or attenuated that it would be unfair” to hold Watts

criminally responsible for Chapman’s death. Kakhankam, supra. Watts sold

the prescription drugs to Chapman and then watched him snort them, an

abusive way to take the drugs. Oxycodone and a very high amount of

oxymorphone, the same drug Watts sold to Miller during the controlled buy,

was present in Chapman’s blood. Finally, Dr. Johnson opined that Chapman’s

crushing and snorting the pills he got from Watts, was in part the cause of

Chapman’s death. Watts’ conduct need not be the only factor that caused

Chapman’s death, contrary to Watts’ argument. Id. Dr. Johnson further

stated that not one of the contributing factors could be eliminated so that

Chapman would have survived. Thus, applying the test for criminal liability

under the DDRID statute, “but for” Watts’ delivery of drugs, Chapman would

have lived. See id. As the trial court noted, Watts did not present any

evidence to contradict the Commonwealth’s testimony. Thus, viewing the

evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as the verdict

winner, we conclude that the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence to

support Watts’ conviction for DDRID.

In his second issue, Watts claims that the verdict for DRRID was against

the weight of the evidence. Watts’ Brief at 14. In support of his claim, Watts

essentially reargues his sufficiency clam. i.e., that the drugs Watts delivered

to Chapman were not a direct and substantial cause of his death. Watts’ Brief

at 20.

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When reviewing a challenge to the weight of the evidence, our standard

of review is as follows:

The essence of appellate review for a weight claim appears to lie in ensuring that the trial court's decision has record support. Where the record adequately supports the trial court, the trial court has acted within the limits of its discretion.

***

A motion for a new trial based on a claim that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence is addressed to the discretion of the trial court. A new trial should not be granted because of a mere conflict in the testimony or because the judge on the same facts would have arrived at a different conclusion. Rather, the role of the trial judge is to determine that notwithstanding all the facts, certain facts are so clearly of greater weight that to ignore them or to give them equal weight with all the facts is to deny justice.

An appellate court's standard of review when presented with a weight of the evidence claim is distinct from the standard of review applied by the trial court. Appellate review of a weight claim is a review of the exercise of discretion, not of the underlying question of whether the verdict is against the weight of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Clay, 64 A.3d 1049, 1054–55 (Pa. 2013) (citations

omitted) (emphasis added). Absent an abuse of discretion, the trial court’s

decision will not be disturbed. See Commonwealth v. Griffin, 515 A.2d

865, 869 (Pa. 1986). An abuse of discretion “is not merely an error in

judgment. Rather, it involves bias, partiality, prejudice, ill-will, manifest

unreasonableness or a misapplication of the law.” Commonwealth v. West,

937 A.2d 516, 521 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citation omitted). By contrast, a proper

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exercise of discretion “conforms to the law and is based on the facts of record.”

Id.

Initially, we observe that “[o]ne of the least assailable reasons for

granting or denying a new trial is the lower court's conviction that the verdict

was or was not against the weight of the evidence and that a new trial should

be granted in the interest of justice.” Commonwealth v. Clay, 64 A.3d 1049,

1055 (Pa. 2013). Here, the trial court explained its rationale for denying

Watts’ weight claim:

[Watts] has never pointed to evidence that he believes was entitled to greater weight than that assigned by the jury. He simply asserts that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence based upon the same evidence outlined in SECTION III(A) above [his sufficiency challenge]. We fail to see how this is a proper claim for a new trial. [Watts] never posited specific trial evidence which was entitled to more weight than assigned by the jury.

Under these circumstances, we do not believe we abused our discretion in denying [Watts’] post-sentence motion for a new trial. In light of the substantial evidence mounted against [Watts] by the Commonwealth, this Court's conscience is not shocked by the verdict of guilt.

Trial Court Opinion, 1/11/21, at 15. Given this explanation and the trial court’s

thorough consideration of the evidence in this case, we conclude that the trial

court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the jury’s verdict was not

against the weight of the evidence.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 11/5/2021

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