J.A22045/14
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA Appellee : : v. : : : LEWIS TODD WATKINS, : : Appellant : No. 2270 MDA 2013
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence November 16, 2013 In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County Criminal Division No(s).: CP-36-CR-0003573-2013
BEFORE: PANELLA, SHOGAN, and FITZGERALD,* JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY FITZGERALD, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 10, 2014
Appellant, Lewis Todd Watkins, appeals from the judgment of sentence
entered in the Lancaster County Court of Common Pleas, following a bench
trial and his conviction for criminal mischief.1 Appellant contends that
because the property he damaged was part of his leasehold,2 he could not
* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court. 1 18 Pa.C.S. § 3304(a)(5). 2
renter) through a lease transferring the rights of use and occupancy for a Tech One Assocs. v. Bd. of Prop. Assessment, Appeals & Review of Allegheny Cnty., 53 A.3d 685, 689 n.13 (Pa. 2012) (citation omitted). J. A22045/14
Appellant rented a room in a house owned by Jeffrey Wool, which Mr.
Wool did not occupy himself.3 N.T., 11/19/13, at 7, 15-16. According to Mr.
Wool, Appellant stopped paying rent, so Mr. Wool traveled to the house to
Id. at 12, 17.
Mr. Wool was under the impression that Appellant had vacated the premises.
Id. at 12. After Mr. Wool changed the lock but before he left the property,
Appellant returned, tried to use his key, and when that failed, kicked the
door, damaging it. Id. at 8, 13, 23. Mr. Wool unlocked the door, let
Appellant into the home, and contacted the police. Id. at 8. After the police
arrived, Mr. Wool reentered the home and discovered damage to two
windows and a kitchen cabinet. Id. at 9. Appellant admitted causing the
damage. Id. at 21.
Appellant was arrested and tried for the aforementioned crimes. The
court found Appellant guilty on November 19, 2013, and sentenced him that
day to one year of probation and restitution of $1,500. Id. at 36. According
to the docket,4 Appellant filed a timely appeal on December 19, 2013.
Appellant timely filed a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement.
Appellant raises the following issue:
3 We state the facts in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, as it was the verdict-winner. Commonwealth v. Ratsamy, 934 A.2d 1233, 1237 (Pa. 2007). 4 The record does not contain the notice of appeal.
-2- J. A22045/14
Could [Appellant] be convicted of criminal mischief where the property he damaged was part of his leasehold and
argues that the
Commonwealth conceded he had a legal right to be present and that Mr.
Wool improperly locked him out. Thus, Appellant maintains, the property he
damaged belonged to him as it was part of his leasehold. We hold Appellant
is due no relief.
The standard of review for a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence is
de novo, as it is a question of law. Ratsamy, 934 A.2d at 1235.
[T]he critical inquiry on review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction . . . does not require a court to ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Instead, it must determine simply whether the evidence believed by the fact-finder was sufficient to support the verdict.
Id. at 1235-36
the sufficiency of the evidence, an appellate court must determine whether
the evidence, and all reasonable inferences deducible from that, viewed in
the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, are
sufficient to establish all of the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable
Id. at 1237.
Criminal mischief is defined by Section 3304 of the Crimes Code:
(a) Offense defined. A person is guilty of criminal mischief if he:
* * *
-3- J. A22045/14
(5) intentionally damages real or personal property of another[.]
18 Pa.C.S. § 3304(a)(5).
review is de novo Commonwealth v.
Hacker, 15 A.3d 333, 335 (Pa. 2011) (citation omitted).
In all matters involving statutory interpretation, we apply the Statutory Construction Act, 1 Pa.C.S. § 1501 et seq., which provides that the object of interpretation and construction of statutes is to ascertain and effectuate the
language generally provides the best indication of legislative intent. Only where the words of a statute are not explicit will we resort to other considerations to discern legislative intent.
Commonwealth v. McCoy, 962 A.2d 1160, 1166 (Pa. 2009) (citations
omitted); see also 18 Pa.C.S. § 105.
3304(a)(5). Arson, a different Chapter 335 crime, however, defines
A building or other property, whether real or personal, in which a person other than the actor has an interest which the actor has no authority to defeat or impair, even though the actor may also have an interest in the building or property.
See generally 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3301-3313.
-4- J. A22045/14
18 Pa.C.S. § 3301(j). Chapter 396 of the Crimes Code, which addresses
Anything of value, including real estate, tangible and intangible personal property . . . .
Includes property in which any person other than the actor has an interest which the actor is not privileged to infringe, regardless of the fact that the actor also has an interest in the property . . . .
18 Pa.C.S. § 3901.
as follows:
real property. Land and anything growing on, attached to, or erected on it, excluding anything that may be severed without injury to the land.
personal property. 1. Any movable or intangible thing that is subject to ownership and not classified as real property. . . .
inter
alia
(1971).
In Fuller v. State, 230 P.3d 309 (Wyo. 2010),7 the Wyoming
Against Prope See generally 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3301-4120.
-5- J. A22045/14
destruction and defacement if he knowingly defaces, injures or destroys
property of another Id. at 310 (quoting
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-201(a) (2014) (emphasis added)).
In Fuller,
Mr. Fuller and his wife leased a house and garage in Casper, Wyoming. After an argument with his wife, Mr. Fuller drove his pickup through the closed garage door,
then rammed the car again, this time pushing it through the rear wall of the garage. Both the garage and the car were damaged. . . .
Mr. Fuller was charged with the crime of property destruction and defacement for damaging the car and the
moved for acquittal, asserting that he could not be convicted for damaging the car he owned or the garage he leased. The district court granted the motion as it related
owned it. The district court denied the motion as it related to the ga of the property, the State had offered sufficient evidence that the landlords owned the garage. The jury convicted Mr. Fuller, and after sentencing, he filed this appeal.
Mr. Fuller focus contending that it is ambiguous when applied to property in which a defendant has an ownership interest. Because the lease entitled him to sole possession of the garage at
7 This Court, although not bound by the decisions of our sister states, may adopt their reasoning if we find it persuasive. See Commonwealth v.
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J.A22045/14
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA Appellee : : v. : : : LEWIS TODD WATKINS, : : Appellant : No. 2270 MDA 2013
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence November 16, 2013 In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County Criminal Division No(s).: CP-36-CR-0003573-2013
BEFORE: PANELLA, SHOGAN, and FITZGERALD,* JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY FITZGERALD, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 10, 2014
Appellant, Lewis Todd Watkins, appeals from the judgment of sentence
entered in the Lancaster County Court of Common Pleas, following a bench
trial and his conviction for criminal mischief.1 Appellant contends that
because the property he damaged was part of his leasehold,2 he could not
* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court. 1 18 Pa.C.S. § 3304(a)(5). 2
renter) through a lease transferring the rights of use and occupancy for a Tech One Assocs. v. Bd. of Prop. Assessment, Appeals & Review of Allegheny Cnty., 53 A.3d 685, 689 n.13 (Pa. 2012) (citation omitted). J. A22045/14
Appellant rented a room in a house owned by Jeffrey Wool, which Mr.
Wool did not occupy himself.3 N.T., 11/19/13, at 7, 15-16. According to Mr.
Wool, Appellant stopped paying rent, so Mr. Wool traveled to the house to
Id. at 12, 17.
Mr. Wool was under the impression that Appellant had vacated the premises.
Id. at 12. After Mr. Wool changed the lock but before he left the property,
Appellant returned, tried to use his key, and when that failed, kicked the
door, damaging it. Id. at 8, 13, 23. Mr. Wool unlocked the door, let
Appellant into the home, and contacted the police. Id. at 8. After the police
arrived, Mr. Wool reentered the home and discovered damage to two
windows and a kitchen cabinet. Id. at 9. Appellant admitted causing the
damage. Id. at 21.
Appellant was arrested and tried for the aforementioned crimes. The
court found Appellant guilty on November 19, 2013, and sentenced him that
day to one year of probation and restitution of $1,500. Id. at 36. According
to the docket,4 Appellant filed a timely appeal on December 19, 2013.
Appellant timely filed a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement.
Appellant raises the following issue:
3 We state the facts in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, as it was the verdict-winner. Commonwealth v. Ratsamy, 934 A.2d 1233, 1237 (Pa. 2007). 4 The record does not contain the notice of appeal.
-2- J. A22045/14
Could [Appellant] be convicted of criminal mischief where the property he damaged was part of his leasehold and
argues that the
Commonwealth conceded he had a legal right to be present and that Mr.
Wool improperly locked him out. Thus, Appellant maintains, the property he
damaged belonged to him as it was part of his leasehold. We hold Appellant
is due no relief.
The standard of review for a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence is
de novo, as it is a question of law. Ratsamy, 934 A.2d at 1235.
[T]he critical inquiry on review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction . . . does not require a court to ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Instead, it must determine simply whether the evidence believed by the fact-finder was sufficient to support the verdict.
Id. at 1235-36
the sufficiency of the evidence, an appellate court must determine whether
the evidence, and all reasonable inferences deducible from that, viewed in
the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, are
sufficient to establish all of the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable
Id. at 1237.
Criminal mischief is defined by Section 3304 of the Crimes Code:
(a) Offense defined. A person is guilty of criminal mischief if he:
* * *
-3- J. A22045/14
(5) intentionally damages real or personal property of another[.]
18 Pa.C.S. § 3304(a)(5).
review is de novo Commonwealth v.
Hacker, 15 A.3d 333, 335 (Pa. 2011) (citation omitted).
In all matters involving statutory interpretation, we apply the Statutory Construction Act, 1 Pa.C.S. § 1501 et seq., which provides that the object of interpretation and construction of statutes is to ascertain and effectuate the
language generally provides the best indication of legislative intent. Only where the words of a statute are not explicit will we resort to other considerations to discern legislative intent.
Commonwealth v. McCoy, 962 A.2d 1160, 1166 (Pa. 2009) (citations
omitted); see also 18 Pa.C.S. § 105.
3304(a)(5). Arson, a different Chapter 335 crime, however, defines
A building or other property, whether real or personal, in which a person other than the actor has an interest which the actor has no authority to defeat or impair, even though the actor may also have an interest in the building or property.
See generally 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3301-3313.
-4- J. A22045/14
18 Pa.C.S. § 3301(j). Chapter 396 of the Crimes Code, which addresses
Anything of value, including real estate, tangible and intangible personal property . . . .
Includes property in which any person other than the actor has an interest which the actor is not privileged to infringe, regardless of the fact that the actor also has an interest in the property . . . .
18 Pa.C.S. § 3901.
as follows:
real property. Land and anything growing on, attached to, or erected on it, excluding anything that may be severed without injury to the land.
personal property. 1. Any movable or intangible thing that is subject to ownership and not classified as real property. . . .
inter
alia
(1971).
In Fuller v. State, 230 P.3d 309 (Wyo. 2010),7 the Wyoming
Against Prope See generally 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3301-4120.
-5- J. A22045/14
destruction and defacement if he knowingly defaces, injures or destroys
property of another Id. at 310 (quoting
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-201(a) (2014) (emphasis added)).
In Fuller,
Mr. Fuller and his wife leased a house and garage in Casper, Wyoming. After an argument with his wife, Mr. Fuller drove his pickup through the closed garage door,
then rammed the car again, this time pushing it through the rear wall of the garage. Both the garage and the car were damaged. . . .
Mr. Fuller was charged with the crime of property destruction and defacement for damaging the car and the
moved for acquittal, asserting that he could not be convicted for damaging the car he owned or the garage he leased. The district court granted the motion as it related
owned it. The district court denied the motion as it related to the ga of the property, the State had offered sufficient evidence that the landlords owned the garage. The jury convicted Mr. Fuller, and after sentencing, he filed this appeal.
Mr. Fuller focus contending that it is ambiguous when applied to property in which a defendant has an ownership interest. Because the lease entitled him to sole possession of the garage at
7 This Court, although not bound by the decisions of our sister states, may adopt their reasoning if we find it persuasive. See Commonwealth v. Grife, 664 A.2d 116, 120 (Pa. Super. 1995) (adopting analyses of courts of sister states).
-6- J. A22045/14
the time it was damaged, Mr. Fuller asserts that the garage could be considered his property as well as
statutory language is subject to varying interpretations, and is therefore ambiguous.
Id. at 310-11.
The Wyoming Supreme Court disagreed, and held that the phrase
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6 1 commonly understoo addition . . . one that is different from the first or present
When Mr. Fuller damaged the leased garage, he destroyed
a clear and unambiguous meaning, we will give effect to the plain language of the statute.
Id. at 311. Thus, the Court affirmed Mr. Fuller Id. at 312.
of the phrase. See McCoy, 962 A.2d at 1166. We hold that in Section
3304, the term
to, or erected on it, excluding anything that may be severed without injury
thing subject to ownership and is not real p See
Dictionary 1254. These definitions are also in accord with the definition of
-7- J. A22045/14
offense of arson, and Section 3901, which defines theft. See 18 Pa.C.S. §§
3301(j) (defining property as including real or personal property), 3901
(describing property as real estate and tangible personal property); accord
Fuller
encompasses the instant damaged items of two windows, kitchen cabinet,
and back door. See cf. 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3301(j),
3901.
de See
Dictionary 89 (1971); accord Fuller, 230 P.3d at 312. Similar to the
landlord in Fuller, Mr. Wool owns the instant home and the fixtures within.
See N.T. at 7, 15-16; cf. Fuller, 230 P.3d at 311. Mr. Wool, therefore, has
a property interest. See Fuller, 230 P.3d at 311. Thus, it follows that
because Mr. Wool has a property interest, the damaged property is
Cf.
as including real or personal property that actor and person other than actor
personal or real property in which non-actor and actor has an interest);
Fuller, 230 P.3d at 311 (holding landlords had interest in property tenant
criminalizing property destruction). Because the Commonwealth established
-8- J. A22045/14
that Mr. Wool had an interest in the damaged property, we perceive no error
judgment of sentence. See Ratsamy, 934 A.2d at 1235.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary
Date: 9/10/2014
-9-