J-S47025-24
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : PHILIP WASHINGTON : : Appellant : No. 1947 EDA 2024
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered July 1, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-15-CR-0002325-2006
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : PHILIP WASHINGTON : : Appellant : No. 1948 EDA 2024
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered July 1, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-15-CR-0002421-2006
BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., SULLIVAN, J., and BECK, J.
MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED MARCH 17, 2025
Philip Washington appeals pro se from the order dismissing his untimely
serial petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). 42
Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.
The pertinent facts and procedural history are as follows: In the early
morning hours of Friday, April 21, 2006, police responded to a report of a
homicide in the rear parking area of a residence in West Chester Borough. J-S47025-24
Once there, police officers found Andre Newton dead of a gunshot wound to
the head. Later that day, Washington voluntarily met with investigating
officers regarding what he knew about Newton’s death. Once the interview
ended, Washington left the police station.
On the next morning, Washington entered the college apartment of
Tiffany Ford and stabbed her in the abdomen. After he left, Ms. Ford called
the police and reported the incident. Later, Washington was taken into
custody at the Chester County Hospital, where he had gone for treatment of
a knife wound to his hand. Ultimately Washington was charged at No. CP-15-
CR-0002325-2006 with attempted murder and related charges [“the
attempted murder case”).
After being given his Miranda1 rights and waiving them, Washington
was questioned about the stabbing. At that time, Washington admitted that
he had intended to kill Ms. Ford and then kill himself with a handgun. He then
described with specificity where he had hidden the handgun. When asked
when he last saw the gun, Washington responded that he saw it after he used
the gun to shoot Newton.
Police immediately stopped the interview and Washington was reread
his Miranda rights regarding Newton’s death. He again waived his rights and
continued to speak with the police. Washington then provided police with
details leading up to Newton’s killing. After the interview was ended, the
____________________________________________
1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
-2- J-S47025-24
police went to the location described by Washington and retrieved the gun.
Ultimately, Washington was charged at CP-15-CR-0002421-2006 with
criminal homicide and related charges (“the homicide case”).
With regard to both cases, Washington filed a single motion seeking to
suppress his April 22, 2006 statements to police. Following a hearing, the
suppression court denied this motion. Thereafter, the homicide case
proceeded to trial. On March 7, 2008, a jury convicted Washington of first-
degree murder and related charges. That same day, the trial court imposed
an aggregate sentence of life imprisonment plus 2½ to 5 years. Washington
did not file a post-sentence motion.
On January 16, 2009, Washington waived his right to a jury trial on the
attempted murder case, and the court conducted a stipulated fact trial. That
same day, the trial court convicted him of one count of criminal attempt to
commit first-degree murder and sentenced Washington to a term of 5 to 10
years to run concurrent to the sentence imposed in the homicide case.
Washington appealed both dockets, but was denied relief. On December
8, 2010, Washington filed a pro se PCRA petition, listing both docket numbers.
The PCRA court appointed counsel, who later filed a petition to withdraw and
a no-merit letter pursuant to Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa.
1988), and Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en
banc). Thereafter the PCRA court issued a criminal procedure Rule 907 notice
of its intent to dismiss Washington’s petition without a hearing. Washington
filed a response. By order entered December 1, 2011, the PCRA court
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dismissed the petition. Washington appealed. On November 8, 2012, we
affirmed the PCRA court’s order denying Washington post-conviction relief,
and, on May 13, 2013, our Supreme Court denied his petition for permission
to appeal. Commonwealth v. Washington, 63 A.3d 823 (Pa. Super. 2012),
appeal denied, 7 A.3d 797 (Pa. 2013).
Over the next decade, Washington filed multiple unsuccessful PCRA
petitions at each docket, as well as an unsuccessful federal petition for writ of
habeas corpus. His prior PCRA petitions did not always include both dockets,
however. On February 8, 2024, Washington filed the instant PCRA petition
at both dockets; his fourth in the attempted murder case, and his fifth in the
homicide case. On April 17, 2024, the PCRA court issued a Rule 907 notice of
its intent to dismiss Washington’s serial petition. Washington filed a response.
By order entered June 28, 2024, the PCRA court denied the petition. These
appeals followed, which we later consolidated. Both Washington and the PCRA
court have complied with appellate Rule 1925.
Washington raises the following two issues on appeal:
1. Whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to argue and raise on appeal that [Washington’s] confession was the result of police coercion?
2. Whether the trial court erred in denying [Washington’s] Motion to Suppress his confession of April 26, 2006, and all derivative evidence thereof, by order dated September 12, 2007?
Washington’s Brief at 4 (unnumbered).
-4- J-S47025-24
Before addressing these claims, however, we must first determine
whether Washington’s serial PCRA petition was timely filed.
The timeliness of a post-conviction petition is jurisdictional.
Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 79 A.3d 649, 651 (Pa. Super. 2013).
Generally, a petition for relief under the PCRA must be filed within one year
of the date the judgment becomes final unless the petition alleges, and the
petitioner proves, that an exception to the time for filing the petition is met.
The three narrow statutory exceptions to the one-year time bar are as
follows: “(1) interference by government officials in the presentation of the
claim; (2) newly discovered facts; and (3) an after-recognized constitutional
right.” Commonwealth v. Brandon, 51 A.3d 231, 233-34 (Pa. Super. 2012)
(citing 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i-iii)). In addition, exceptions to the PCRA’s
time bar must be pled in the petition and may not be raised for the first time
on appeal. Commonwealth v. Burton,
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J-S47025-24
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : PHILIP WASHINGTON : : Appellant : No. 1947 EDA 2024
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered July 1, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-15-CR-0002325-2006
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : PHILIP WASHINGTON : : Appellant : No. 1948 EDA 2024
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered July 1, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-15-CR-0002421-2006
BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., SULLIVAN, J., and BECK, J.
MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED MARCH 17, 2025
Philip Washington appeals pro se from the order dismissing his untimely
serial petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). 42
Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.
The pertinent facts and procedural history are as follows: In the early
morning hours of Friday, April 21, 2006, police responded to a report of a
homicide in the rear parking area of a residence in West Chester Borough. J-S47025-24
Once there, police officers found Andre Newton dead of a gunshot wound to
the head. Later that day, Washington voluntarily met with investigating
officers regarding what he knew about Newton’s death. Once the interview
ended, Washington left the police station.
On the next morning, Washington entered the college apartment of
Tiffany Ford and stabbed her in the abdomen. After he left, Ms. Ford called
the police and reported the incident. Later, Washington was taken into
custody at the Chester County Hospital, where he had gone for treatment of
a knife wound to his hand. Ultimately Washington was charged at No. CP-15-
CR-0002325-2006 with attempted murder and related charges [“the
attempted murder case”).
After being given his Miranda1 rights and waiving them, Washington
was questioned about the stabbing. At that time, Washington admitted that
he had intended to kill Ms. Ford and then kill himself with a handgun. He then
described with specificity where he had hidden the handgun. When asked
when he last saw the gun, Washington responded that he saw it after he used
the gun to shoot Newton.
Police immediately stopped the interview and Washington was reread
his Miranda rights regarding Newton’s death. He again waived his rights and
continued to speak with the police. Washington then provided police with
details leading up to Newton’s killing. After the interview was ended, the
____________________________________________
1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
-2- J-S47025-24
police went to the location described by Washington and retrieved the gun.
Ultimately, Washington was charged at CP-15-CR-0002421-2006 with
criminal homicide and related charges (“the homicide case”).
With regard to both cases, Washington filed a single motion seeking to
suppress his April 22, 2006 statements to police. Following a hearing, the
suppression court denied this motion. Thereafter, the homicide case
proceeded to trial. On March 7, 2008, a jury convicted Washington of first-
degree murder and related charges. That same day, the trial court imposed
an aggregate sentence of life imprisonment plus 2½ to 5 years. Washington
did not file a post-sentence motion.
On January 16, 2009, Washington waived his right to a jury trial on the
attempted murder case, and the court conducted a stipulated fact trial. That
same day, the trial court convicted him of one count of criminal attempt to
commit first-degree murder and sentenced Washington to a term of 5 to 10
years to run concurrent to the sentence imposed in the homicide case.
Washington appealed both dockets, but was denied relief. On December
8, 2010, Washington filed a pro se PCRA petition, listing both docket numbers.
The PCRA court appointed counsel, who later filed a petition to withdraw and
a no-merit letter pursuant to Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa.
1988), and Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en
banc). Thereafter the PCRA court issued a criminal procedure Rule 907 notice
of its intent to dismiss Washington’s petition without a hearing. Washington
filed a response. By order entered December 1, 2011, the PCRA court
-3- J-S47025-24
dismissed the petition. Washington appealed. On November 8, 2012, we
affirmed the PCRA court’s order denying Washington post-conviction relief,
and, on May 13, 2013, our Supreme Court denied his petition for permission
to appeal. Commonwealth v. Washington, 63 A.3d 823 (Pa. Super. 2012),
appeal denied, 7 A.3d 797 (Pa. 2013).
Over the next decade, Washington filed multiple unsuccessful PCRA
petitions at each docket, as well as an unsuccessful federal petition for writ of
habeas corpus. His prior PCRA petitions did not always include both dockets,
however. On February 8, 2024, Washington filed the instant PCRA petition
at both dockets; his fourth in the attempted murder case, and his fifth in the
homicide case. On April 17, 2024, the PCRA court issued a Rule 907 notice of
its intent to dismiss Washington’s serial petition. Washington filed a response.
By order entered June 28, 2024, the PCRA court denied the petition. These
appeals followed, which we later consolidated. Both Washington and the PCRA
court have complied with appellate Rule 1925.
Washington raises the following two issues on appeal:
1. Whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to argue and raise on appeal that [Washington’s] confession was the result of police coercion?
2. Whether the trial court erred in denying [Washington’s] Motion to Suppress his confession of April 26, 2006, and all derivative evidence thereof, by order dated September 12, 2007?
Washington’s Brief at 4 (unnumbered).
-4- J-S47025-24
Before addressing these claims, however, we must first determine
whether Washington’s serial PCRA petition was timely filed.
The timeliness of a post-conviction petition is jurisdictional.
Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 79 A.3d 649, 651 (Pa. Super. 2013).
Generally, a petition for relief under the PCRA must be filed within one year
of the date the judgment becomes final unless the petition alleges, and the
petitioner proves, that an exception to the time for filing the petition is met.
The three narrow statutory exceptions to the one-year time bar are as
follows: “(1) interference by government officials in the presentation of the
claim; (2) newly discovered facts; and (3) an after-recognized constitutional
right.” Commonwealth v. Brandon, 51 A.3d 231, 233-34 (Pa. Super. 2012)
(citing 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i-iii)). In addition, exceptions to the PCRA’s
time bar must be pled in the petition and may not be raised for the first time
on appeal. Commonwealth v. Burton, 936 A.2d 521, 525 (Pa. Super.
2007); see also Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (providing that issues not raised before the
lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal).
Moreover, a PCRA petition invoking one of these statutory exceptions must be
filed within one year of the date the claim could have been presented. 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2).
Finally, if a PCRA petition is untimely and the petitioner has not pled and
proven an exception “neither this Court nor the [PCRA] court has jurisdiction
over the petition. Without jurisdiction, we simply do not have the legal
-5- J-S47025-24
authority to address the substantive claims.” Commonwealth v.
Derrickson, 923 A.2d 466, 468 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citation omitted).
Here, Washington’s judgment of sentence at both dockets became final
in 2010. Because Washington filed the petition at issue in 2024, it is patently
untimely unless he has satisfied his burden of pleading and proving that one
of the enumerated exceptions applies. See Hernandez, supra.
Washington has failed to plead let alone prove an exception to the
PCRA’s time bar. In both his petition and his brief, Washington cites Rule 33
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure as a basis to grant him a new trial
in the “interest of justice.” Washington’s Brief at 1 (unnumbered) (citing
Commonwealth v. Powell, 590 A.2d 1240 (Pa. 1991)). This claim entitles
him to no post-conviction relief.
“The rationale ‘in the interest of justice,’ employed to rectify errors
which would otherwise result in unfairness, is deeply rooted in both federal
jurisprudence and the common law of Pennsylvania.” Powell, 590 A.2d at
1242. However, “[t]his concept of ‘in the interest of justice’ is merely a
recognition of the trial court’s discretionary power to ensure the fairness of
the proceedings during the adjudicatory stage.” Powell, 590 A.2d at 1243.2
This concept has no effect on the timeliness requirements of a post-conviction
2 As noted above, Washington cites the federal counterpart regarding judicial
discretion.
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petition. Rather, the only exceptions to the PCRA’s time bar are the three
listed in Section 9545(b)(1)(i-iii) of the statute.
In sum, because Washington’s serial petition was untimely, and he failed
to plead and prove a time-bar exception, both this Court and the PCRA court
lacked jurisdiction to consider its merits. Derrickson, supra. We therefore
affirm the PCRA court’s order dismissing Washington’s petition.
Order affirmed.
Date: 3/17/2025
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