NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA
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v. :
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NAISEJA WASHINGTON :
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Appellant : No. 1644 EDA 2025
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered June 2, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-39-CR-0000503-2024
BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., SULLIVAN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E. * MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, P.J.: FILED AUGUST 18, 2026 Naiseja Washington appeals from the judgment of sentence, entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County, after a jury convicted him of one count of possession with intent to deliver (PWID) (cocaine) 1, possession of a controlled substance,2 and possession of drug paraphernalia. 3 On appeal, Washington contends the trial court erred in denying his omnibus pretrial motion to suppress evidence obtained during a vehicular stop. After careful review, we affirm in part and vacate in part the trial court’s suppression order and affirm Washington’s judgment of sentence.
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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30).
2 Id. at § 780-113(a)(16).
3 Id. at § 780-113(a)(32).
On the evening of October 27, 2023, Officer Kaila Balatgek of the Allentown Police Department activated her police cruiser’s emergency lights and sirens to conduct a vehicle stop of a rented Nissan Altima with a Massachusetts license plate after it failed to stop at a traffic light at the intersection of North Second and Gordon Streets in the City of Allentown. N.T. Suppression Hearing, 9/17/24, at 11-12, 16, 17-20. Washington was the passenger in the vehicle and the driver was an individual named Irving Pollard. Id. at 22-23. Pollard had the proper documentation that showed he, and he alone, was authorized to operate the rental vehicle. Id. at 25-26. However, Pollard was soon detained because he had an outstanding warrant from South Whitehall Township for his arrest. Id. at 26. Due to Pollard’s pending arrest, Officer Balatgek requested back-up and Officer Pedro Bautista responded the he was coming to the scene as back-up. 4 Id. at 27-30. Pollard was asked to step out of the vehicle, which he did, and was then handcuffed. Id. at 34.
Immediately after Pollard was handcuffed, Officer Balatgek approached the passenger side of the vehicle and spoke to Washington. See Commonwealth Exhibit 1, Kaila Balatgek Dashcam Footage, 10/27/23, at
5:22.5 During this interaction, Officer Balatgek noted Washington’s furtive
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4 At or around the time Officer Bautista arrived on the scene, Officer Jeffrey Tanner also arrived at the scene to provide backup. 5 The dashcam footage, Commonwealth’s Exhibit 1, does not match the trial
court’s recitation of the sequence of events during the stop. We have summarized the facts according to the dashcam footage, which was corroborated by Officer Balatgek’s testimony. See Commonwealth Exhibit 1, Kaila Balatgek Bodycam Footage, 10/27/23, at 5:22.
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movement including his failure to make eye contact with her, sweating, and rapid breathing. See N.T. Suppression Hearing, 9/17/24, at 31, 37. After speaking with Washington and observing his suspicious behavior, Officer Balatgek believed he may be hiding a weapon, so she asked him to step out of the vehicle. Id. at 38. When Washington exited the vehicle, he put his left pants pocket against the vehicle, which Officer Balatgek believed to be a maneuver to hide a weapon. See id. at 39. Concerned that Washington was concealing a weapon, Officer Balatgek handcuffed Washington and then conducted a pat-down search and discovered “a large quantity of [a] rock-like substance” in his left pocket, which, based on her experience, 6 Officer Balatgek believed to be crack cocaine. See id; Commonwealth Exhibit 1, 10/27/23, at 7:40.7 Officer Balatgek removed the substance from Washington’s pockets, revealing three sandwich bags of cocaine. See Commonwealth Exhibit 1, Kaila Balatgek Bodycam Footage, 10/27/23, at 7:50; Commonwealth Exhibit 2, 2/22/24, at 1.
Once Pollard and Washington were handcuffed and sitting on the curb
behind the rental vehicle, Officer Balatgek returned to her police car to
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6 Officer Balatgek has worked as a police officer for seven and a half years in
multiple cities in Pennsylvania, including Reading, Pittsburgh, and Allentown. See N.T. Suppression Hearing, 9/17/24, at 11-12. Officer Balatgek also testified that she previously interacted with Washington an earlier warrant on a traffic stop and found he was in possession of illegal narcotics at that time. See id. at 53-55.
7 The substance was tested and determined to be crack cocaine. The parties stipulated to the amount and types of drugs as detailed in a Pennsylvania State Police lab report. See Commonwealth Exhibit 2, 2/22/24, at 1.
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determine if there were any outstanding warrants for Washington. See id. at 41. After confirming there were no active warrants for Washington, Officer Balatgek asked Pollard for consent to a search of the vehicle due to the drugs found on Washington; Pollard assented. See id. at 42; see also Commonwealth Exhibit 1, Kaila Balatgek Bodycam Footage, 10/27/23, at 11:16. During the search of the car, Officer Balatgek discovered a black backpack which she indicated had been between Washington’s feet during the stop. See N.T. Suppression Hearing, 9/17/24, at 41-42. Based upon the consent obtained from Pollard, Officer Balatgek searched the backpack which contained “one operable blank CR scale, digital in nature, and . . . was one pink box of liquid THC[;]” identification linking the backpack to Washington was also found within the bag. See id.
Prior to trial, Washington filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained during the vehicular stop claiming that: (1) the initial traffic stop had ended before he was searched; (2) there was no reasonable suspicion for the stop and frisk; and (3) there was no valid consent to search his backpack. See Omnibus Pre-trial Motion to Suppress, 8/5/24, at 3-4 (unpaginated). On September 17, 2024, the court held a suppression hearing. After the hearing, the court requested additional briefing from both parties. On December 3, 2024, the trial court denied Washington’s motion to suppress. Following a jury trial, held on March 31, 2025, Washington was found guilty of the above- named offenses. The trial court ordered the preparation of a pre-sentence investigation report and deferred sentencing. On June 2025, the trial court
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sentenced Washington to an aggregate sentence of 24 to 48 months of imprisonment.8 Washington filed a timely notice of appeal and court-ordered Pa.R.A.P.
1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal. Washington raises the following issue for our review:
Did the trial court err in denying [Washington’s] omnibus pretrial motion[,] filed on August 5, 2024, seeking suppression of evidence obtained and testimony pertaining to the illegal search of [Washington’s] person and a backpack found in the vehicle he occupied[,] both of which occurred on the date of his arrest?
Appellant’s Brief, at 4 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).
Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to a trial court’s denial of a suppression motion is limited to determining whether the factual findings are supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are correct. We are bound by the suppression court’s factual findings so long as they are supported by the record; our standard of review on questions of law is de novo. Where, as here, the defendant is appealing the ruling of the suppression court, we may consider only the evidence of the Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted. Our scope of review of suppression rulings includes only the suppression hearing record and excludes evidence elicited at trial.
Commonwealth v. Smith, 177 A.3d 915, 918 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citations omitted).
First, Washington claims that the search of his person was illegal because it was the result of an improper extension of the initial traffic stop.
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8 The court imposed the sentence of imprisonment on the PWID charge and
imposed only the costs of prosecution on the simple possession and possession of drug paraphernalia charges.
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Specifically, Washington asserts that any evidence seized after the conclusion of the initial traffic stop should be suppressed for lack of reasonable, independent suspicion to further detain him. See Appellant’s Brief, at 25.
A police officer may conduct a lawful traffic stop when a traffic violation occurs, and upon such a stop, he or she has the authority to request certain information to enforce the law. See 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 6308(b); see also Commonwealth v. Prizzia, 260 A.3d 263, 267 (Pa. Super. 2021) (“Pennsylvania law makes clear that a police officer has probable cause to stop a motor vehicle if the officer observes a [vehicle] code violation, even if it is a minor offense.”). Further, during a routine traffic stop, a police officer may request that the driver and any passengers step out of the stopped vehicle as a matter of course. See Commonwealth v. Campbell, 862 A.2d 659, 663 (Pa. Super. 2004). Finally, while “[a police] officer [] may conduct certain unrelated checks during an otherwise lawful traffic stop[, the officer] may not do so in a way that prolongs the stop, absent the reasonable suspicion ordinarily demanded to justify detaining an individual.” Commonwealth v. Sloan, 303 A.3d 155, 163-64 (Pa. Super. 2023) (quotation marks omitted). Reasonable suspicion is based on “the totality of the circumstances.” See id. at 164.
Instantly, the traffic stop in question was lawful where Pollard violated the Vehicle Code by running a red light. See 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 6308(b); Prizzia, supra. Upon running Pollard’s license through the police database, Officer Balatgek discovered that there was an outstanding warrant for Pollard’s arrest.
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See N.T. Suppression Hearing, 9/17/24, at 26. Moreover, the officer testified that Washington was exhibiting unusual behavior—acting extremely nervous, “visibly sweating,” and refusing to look in the officer’s direction. See id. at 31. At that point, the officer believed that Washington might possess a firearm. Even if Officer Balatgek had not observed unusual behavior or thought Washington possessed a weapon, she was permitted to ask Washington to step out of the vehicle. 9 See Campbell, supra. Accordingly, considering the totality of the circumstances, which included Pollard’s active warrant and Washington’s suspicious and unusual behavior, Officer Balatgek had the requisite reasonable suspicion to prolong the stop beyond the initial traffic violation and, therefore, Washington’s first claim is without merit. See Sloan, supra.
Washington next argues that Officer Balatgek did not have the legal authority to stop and frisk him after he exited the vehicle where Officer Balatgek did not reasonably believe that Washington was armed or dangerous. See Appellant’s Brief at 23. We disagree. It is well-established that a stop
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9 See also Commonwealth v. Wright, 224 A.3d 1104, 1109 (Pa. Super. 2019) (during lawful traffic stop, police may order driver and passengers to exit vehicle until stop completed); Commonwealth v. Pratt, 930 A.2d 561, 567-68 (Pa. Super. 2007) (“[A]llowing police officers to control all movement in a traffic encounter . . . is a reasonable and justifiable step towards protecting their safety[.]”). Additionally, for officer safety, police are permitted to ask occupants whether they have a weapon or anything concerning as a matter of course during the traffic stop. See Commonwealth v. Clinton, 905 A.2d 1026, 1031 (Pa. Super. 2006).
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and frisk is appropriate where a police officer, based on his or her experience, has reasonable suspicion that the defendant poses a danger. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968) (“where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, . . . he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons”); see also Commonwealth v. Simmons, 17 A.3d 399, 404 (Pa. Super. 2011) (furtive movements, when witnessed within scope of lawful traffic stop, provide reasonable basis for protective frisk) (citations omitted). Moreover, “if a suspect engages in hand movements that police know, based on their experience, are associated with the secreting of a weapon, those movements will buttress the legitimacy of a protective weapons search of the location where the hand movements occurred.” Commonwealth v. Foglia, 979 A.2d 357, 361 (Pa. Super. 2009) (en banc) (citations omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Tuggles, 58 A.3d 840, 844 (Pa. Super. 2012) (explaining, “[w]here a person performs an activity that is indicative of an attempt to secrete a weapon, that movement . . . can support a belief that the person has a gun”).
Here, Officer Balatgek reasonably suspected that Washington may be armed and dangerous based on her experience as a police officer. See N.T. Suppression Hearing, 9/17/24, at 37-39. Specifically, Officer Balatgek testified that Washington seemed extremely nervous, citing that he did not
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make eye contact with her when they were speaking, he was visibly sweating in a cold-winter month, October, and he seemed to be breathing rapidly. See id. at 31; Terry, supra; Simmons, supra. Further, Officer Balatgek testified that the way Washington exited the vehicle and leaned his left side against the car was indicative of an attempt to conceal a weapon. See N.T. Suppression Hearing, 9/17/24, at 39; see also Foglia, supra. Accordingly, the stop and frisk conducted by Officer Balatgek was reasonable given Washington’s suspicious behavior and furtive movements and, thus, Washington’s second claim is meritless. See Tuggles, supra.
Finally, Washington argues that Pollard did not have the authority to consent to Officer Balatgek’s search of Washington’s “closed and opaque” black backpack. See Appellant’s Brief, at 28. Specifically, Washington claims that although consent is a recognized exception to the warrant requirement, such consent must come from an individual with authority. Thus, “[because] this was a sealed, closed[-] off backpack found at [Washington’s] feet, [] the only person who could give lawful authority and consent to search it was [] Washington himself.” Id. Thus, he asserts that the court improperly denied suppression of the contents of his illegally searched backpack. We agree.
Both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution protect individuals and their effects and possessions from unreasonable searches and seizures. Commonwealth v. Valdivia, 195 A.3d 855, 861 (Pa. 2018). A search conducted without a warrant is unreasonable and, therefore, constitutionally
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impermissible, unless an established exception to the warrant requirement applies. Id.; Commonwealth v. Carmenates, 266 A.3d 1117, 1124 (Pa. Super. 2021) (en banc). In Commonwealth v. Alexander, 243 A.3d 177 (Pa. 2020), our Supreme Court held that under Article I, Section 8, the fact that an automobile is involved does not automatically exempt a search from the requirement that police obtain a warrant. Id. at 207-08. A warrantless search of a vehicle and closed containers found therein is, therefore, unconstitutional under Article I, Section 8, if the police have probable cause, unless exigent circumstances or another exception to the warrant requirement is shown. Id. Those exceptions include, inter alia, searches incident to arrest and consent searches. See Commonwealth v. Wilmer, 194 A.3d 564, 568 (Pa. 2018).
Instantly, the trial court found that Pollard properly consented to the search of Washington’s backpack, stating:
The testimony from the suppression hearing revealed that []
Pollard was the only person authorized to operate the rental vehicle. He also had actual or apparent authority to consent to the search of the vehicle, including its contents. The defendant never claimed ownership of the backpack, nor objected to the search of it by the officers. A consent to search the backpack was granted by [] Pollard, and then the search was conducted without a search warrant.
A search is presumptively unreasonable unless conducted pursuant to a warrant. If a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy, in this case a backpack, then the police are required to obtain a warrant to search that property. One exception to the warrant requirement exists when a person with authority over the property to be searched voluntarily consents to the search.
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Here, Officer Balatgek confirmed who rented the vehicle and who had permission to operate the vehicle, which was [] Pollard. The defendant, as a passenger, does not by his mere presence have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the entire passenger compartment of that vehicle. Commonwealth v. Viall, 890 A2d 419, 423 (Pa. Super. 2005). A passenger like [Washington]
maintains a reasonable expectation of privacy in luggage such as a backpack, that he places inside a vehicle[,] provided, however, that the passenger, by his [] conduct, exhibits an actual or subjective expectation of privacy in the backpack as determined by the totality of the circumstances and that expectation is one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.”
[Commonwealth v.] Rivera, 273 A.3d [1032,] at *5 [(Pa.
Super. filed Feb. 8, 2022) [(unpublished memorandum decision)].
The only evidence presented that [Washington] had any expectation of privacy in the backpack was its location at his feet.
No markings were visible on the backpack, and [Washington]
neither claimed ownership of it, nor did he object to the search.
[Washington] claims that Officer Balatgek concluded that the backpack belonged to [Washington] “after searching [the] book bag.” That conclusion does [not] mean that Officer Balatgek knew who owned the backpack before the search of it. [Washington]
has the preliminary burden of establishing standing and a “legitimate expectation of privacy in the area searched or items seized. . . . The determination [of] whether [a] defendant has met this burden is made upon evaluation of the evidence presented by the Commonwealth and the defendant.”
Commonwealth v. Burton, 973 A.2d 428, 434-35 (Pa. Super.
2009) (en banc). [Washington] has failed to meet his burden, and the consent to search the vehicle was lawful. As stated in Viall, the defendant “assumed the risk that the driver would permit the common areas of the car to be searched.” 890 A.2d at 423.
Trial Court Opinion, 8/5/25, 8-10 (emphasis added).
The trial court misses the mark in its consent analysis. Specifically, the court found that the search of Washington’s backpack was legal because Pollard had the apparent authority, as the renter and sole authorized driver of the vehicle, to consent to search the common areas of the car. While this may be true, “[a] search of a closed container, such as a backpack, intrudes
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on constitutionally protected privacy interests distinct from any privacy interest that the defendant has with respect to the area where the container is found.” Commonwealth v. Ginnery, 293 A.3d 624, *11 (Pa. Super. filed Feb. 17, 2023) (unpublished memorandum decision) (emphasis added),10 citing Commonwealth v. Perel, 107 A.3d 185, 189-90 (Pa. Super. 2014).
While Pollard could properly give Officer Balatgek consent to search the common areas of the rental vehicle, he did not have the apparent authority to consent to the search of Washington’s backpack. See id. It is clear Officer Balatgek did not reasonably believe the bag belonged to Pollard where she testified that the backpack was at Washington’s feet during the entirety of the stop, referred to the bag as Washington’s, and indicated her motivation to search the car and the decision to search the bag stemmed from the crack cocaine found on Washington. See Strader supra; Commonwealth Exhibit 1, Kaila Balatgek Bodycam Footage, 10/27/23, at 11:16, 17:42; N.T. Suppression Hearing, 9/17/24, at 42, 46.
Furthermore, the search of Washington’s backpack did not meet the requirements of a search incident to arrest where the backpack was neither on Washington’s person at the time of his arrest nor within his immediate reach or control. In fact, at the time of his arrest, Washington was handcuffed behind the vehicle and the closed, black, opaque backpack remained in the
vehicle. See Commonwealth Exhibit 1, Kaila Balatgek Bodycam Footage,
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10 See Pa.R.A.P. 126(b) (non-precedential decisions filed after May 1, 2019, may be cited for persuasive value).
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10/27/23, at 8:14, 13:13; Commonwealth v. Lutz, 270 A.3d 571, 580 (Pa. Super. 2022) (marijuana found in glasses case in defendant’s vehicle should have been suppressed as illegal search incident to arrest where search not related to defendant’s person or area within her immediate control as defendant was handcuffed, in custody of two police officers, and in general vicinity of her car at time of search). As such, the bag should not have been subject to a warrantless search and the evidence found within it should have been suppressed. Perel, supra (defendant had expectation of privacy in closed, opaque containers containing personal items).
It is well-settled that “once this Court has concluded that admitted evidence should have been suppressed, it must determine beyond a reasonable doubt whether the error was harmless.” Commonwealth v. Stauffenberg, 318 A.3d 399, 409 (Pa. Super. 2024). “Where the error is harmless, a new trial is not warranted.” Id.
In the instant case, Officer Balatgek testified at the suppression hearing that, in addition to the items recovered from Washington’s backpack, she retrieved a “medium to large size sandwich bag [which had i]nside of it [] three additional individual sandwich bags [from Washington’s pants pocket].” N.T. Suppression Hearing, 9/17/24, at 40. “One sandwich bag contained crack cocaine, another sandwich bag contained powder cocaine, and there was a smaller bag in there that contained powder cocaine as well.” Id. Moreover, the assistant district attorney told the court that it was “the packaging, the sandwich bags the cocaine is in, [] the digital scale . . . and the box” that
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formed the basis for the drug paraphernalia charge. Id. at 60 (emphasis added); see also Criminal Complaint, 10/27/23, at 4 (listing “CLEAR SANDWICH BAGGIES, OPERABLE DIGITAL SCALE AND BOTTLE” as drug paraphernalia possessed by Washington to support drug paraphernalia charge under subsection 780-11(a)(32)) (capitalization in original); Bill of Information, 3//28/24 (same); Commonwealth Exhibit 2, 2/22/24, at 1 (search of Washington’s person revealed “one knotted sandwich bag, two knotted sandwich bags containing white powder, and one knotted sandwich bag containing white substance”).
The crime of possession of drug paraphernalia is defined as:
The use of, or possession with intent to use, drug paraphernalia for the purpose of planting, propagating, cultivating, growing, harvesting, manufacturing, compounding, converting, producing, processing, preparing, testing, analyzing, packing, repacking, storing, containing, concealing, injecting, ingesting, inhaling or otherwise introducing into the human body a controlled substance in violation of this act.
35 P.S. § 780-113(32) (emphasis added). Furthermore, section 780-102 of the Pennsylvania Drug and Alcohol Abuse Control Act, lists the following examples of drug paraphernalia: “capsules, balloons, envelopes and other containers used, intended for use[,] or designed for use in packaging small quantities of controlled substances [and c]ontainers and other objects used, intended for use[,] or designed for use in storing or concealing controlled substances.” See 35 P.S. §§ 780-102(9)-(10) (emphasis added).
Moreover, it is well-established that “[d]rug paraphernalia includes bags used to package or store marijuana.” Commonwealth v. Pitner, 928 A.2d
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1104, 1108 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citation omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Torres, 617 A.2d 812, 815 (Pa. Super. 1992) (“it is clear that ordinary packaging material can be drug paraphernalia”). However, because bags and containers are often used for legal purposes, “the Commonwealth must establish that the items possessed [] were used or intended to be used with a controlled substance. This burden may be met by the Commonwealth through circumstantial evidence.” Torres, 617 A.2d at 815.
In Pitner, the defendant’s judgment of sentence for possession of drug paraphernalia, as an accomplice, was affirmed on appeal when the defendant drove a third party to three separate drug deals and where that third party sold “marijuana that was contained in a bag” to an undercover officer. 928 A.2d at 1107. Moreover, in Torres, supra, this Court affirmed a drug paraphernalia conviction involving plastic sandwich bags where “[t]he Commonwealth [] presented the expert testimony of [an] officer . . . who testified that[,] as the sandwich bags were similar to the material used to package the cocaine, he believed these sandwich bags were additional drug packaging material.” See id. at 815.
Instantly, the jury concluded that the plastic baggies found on Washington that contained powder and crack cocaine were possessed with the intent to deliver and personally use illegal drugs. Under such circumstances, we find that there was sufficient evidence to support a possession of drug paraphernalia conviction based on the plastic baggies alone. Pitner, supra; Torres, supra. Thus, the trial court’s improper admission of the contents of
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Washington’s backpack (digital scale and bottle) was harmless error and we not need remand for a new trial on the possession of drug paraphernalia charge. Stauffenberg, supra.
Suppression order vacated in part and affirmed in part. Judgment of sentence affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Date: 8/18/2026