Com. v. Walls, E.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: November 10, 2014
• Docket: 2001 WDA 2013
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

J. S61012/14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA v. : : EDWARD WALLS, : No. 2001 WDA 2013 : Appellant :

Appeal from the PCRA Order, December 11, 2013 in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at No. CP-02-CR-0008331-1996

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., WECHT AND STRASSBURGER,* JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED NOVEMBER 10, 2014

Edward Walls appeals from the order of December 11, 2013,

dismissing his serial PCRA1 petition. We affirm.

On March 6, 1997, following a jury trial, appellant was found guilty of

one count of criminal homicide, two counts of criminal attempt, two counts

of aggravated assault, two counts of criminal conspiracy, one count of

receiving stolen property, and one count of violating the Uniform Firearms

Act. The charges related to a May 25, 1996 drive-by shooting in which the

victim, Torie Jones, sustained a fatal gunshot wound to the head. Appellant,

who was 15 years old at the time of the incident, was sentenced to the

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. 1 Post-Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. J. S61012/14

mandatory term of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole on the

criminal homicide charge, and an aggregate of 10 years, 9 months to

45 years’ imprisonment on the remaining counts.

On August 11, 1999, this court affirmed the judgment of sentence.

Commonwealth v. Walls, 1121 Pittsburgh 1997, unpublished

memorandum (Pa.Super. filed August 11, 1999). Appellant did not file a

petition for allowance of appeal with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.

Appellant filed two PCRA petitions which were dismissed. The instant

petition, his third, was filed on July 5, 2012. In his petition, appellant

alleged that the after-recognized constitutional right exception to the PCRA’s

one-year statutory time-bar applied, invoking the United States Supreme

Court’s June 2012 decision in Miller v. Alabama, U.S. , 132 S.Ct.

2455, 2469 (2012) (holding that mandatory life-without-parole sentences,

as applied to those under age 18, offend the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition

against cruel and unusual punishment by preventing sentencing authorities

from considering juveniles’ “diminished culpability and heightened capacity

for change”).

Counsel was appointed, and he filed a motion for stay pending the

outcome of our supreme court’s decision in Commonwealth v.

Cunningham, 81 A.3d 1 (Pa. 2013), cert. denied, U.S. , 134 S.Ct.

2724 (U.S.Pa. Jun. 09, 2014). The motion for stay was granted. On

October 30, 2013, Cunningham was handed down, wherein our supreme

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court determined that Miller did not apply retroactively to cases on

collateral appeal. On December 11, 2013, following appropriate Rule 9072

notice, appellant’s petition was dismissed. This timely appeal followed.

Appellant complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), and the PCRA court filed an

opinion.

Appellant has raised the following issues for this court’s review:

I. Whether the United States Supreme Court decision in Miller v. Alabama applies retroactively on collateral review under either federal law or broader principles of retroactivity under state law[?] And, whether the appellant’s PCRA petition raising these claims therefore was timely under the [PCRA][?]

II. Whether a mandatory juvenile sentence of life without parole violates Article 1, §§ 1, 9 and 13 of the Pennsylvania Constitution and the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, where two classes of prisoners sentenced to life without parole are treated differently and where their respective sentences are disproportionate[?]

Appellant’s brief at 4.

“The PCRA’s time restrictions are jurisdictional in nature. Thus, [i]f a PCRA petition is untimely, neither this Court nor the trial court has jurisdiction over the petition. Without jurisdiction, we simply do not have the legal authority to address the substantive claims.” Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 606 Pa. 64, 994 A.2d 1091, 1093 (2010) (quoting Commonwealth v. Chester, 586 Pa. 468, 895 A.2d 520, 522 (2006)). Statutory time limitations “are mandatory and interpreted literally; thus, a court has

2 Pa.R.Crim.P., Rule 907, 42 Pa.C.S.A.

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no authority to extend filing periods except as the statute permits.” [Commonwealth v.] Fahy, 737 A.2d [214] at 222 [Pa. 1999].

Commonwealth v. Seskey, 86 A.3d 237, 241 (Pa.Super. 2014).

In Commonwealth v. Jackson, we articulated the timeliness standards under the PCRA as follows:

The PCRA “provides for an action by which persons convicted of crimes they did not commit and persons serving illegal sentences may obtain collateral relief.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9542. When an action is cognizable under the PCRA, the PCRA is the “sole means of obtaining collateral relief and encompasses all other common law and statutory remedies for the same purpose[.]” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9542.

In order for a court to entertain a PCRA petition, a petitioner must comply with the PCRA filing deadline. See Commonwealth v. Robinson, 575 Pa. 500, 837 A.2d 1157, 1161 (2003). The time for filing a petition is set forth in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b), which provides in relevant part:

(b) Time for filing petition.--

(1) Any petition under this subchapter, including a second or subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of the date the judgment becomes final, unless the petition alleges and the petitioner proves that:

(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was

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the result of interference by government officials with the presentation of the claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States;

(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or

(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and has been held by that court to apply retroactively.

***

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b).

“[T]he time limitations pursuant to . . . the PCRA are jurisdictional.” [Fahy, 737 A.2d at 222]. “[Jurisdictional time] limitations are mandatory and interpreted literally; thus, a court has no authority to extend filing periods except as the statute permits.” Id. “If the petition is determined to be untimely, and no exception has been pled and proven, the petition must be dismissed without a hearing because Pennsylvania

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courts are without jurisdiction to consider the merits of the petition.” Commonwealth v. Perrin, 947 A.2d 1284, 1285 (Pa.Super.2008).

Commonwealth v. Jackson, 30 A.3d 516, 518-19 (Pa.Super.2011).

Id. at 242.

Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final on September 10,

1999, thirty days after this court affirmed the judgment of sentence and the

time for filing a petition for allowance of appeal with the Pennsylvania

Supreme Court expired. Commonwealth v. Rojas, 874 A.2d 638, 643-644

(Pa.Super. 2005); Pa.R.A.P. 1113(a). Thus, the instant petition, filed July 5,

2012, is facially untimely.

Appellant attempted to invoke the after-recognized constitutional right

exception to the PCRA’s time-bar under Subsection 9545(b)(1)(iii),

predicated upon the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Miller.

However, in Cunningham, our supreme court held that the constitutional

right announced by the court in Miller does not apply retroactively to

prisoners, such as appellant, whose judgments of sentence were already

final at the time of the Miller decision. Therefore, appellant cannot rely on

Miller or subsection 9545(b)(1)(iii) to establish jurisdiction over his untimely

PCRA petition. Seskey, 86 A.3d at 243.

Appellant argues that Cunningham was wrongly decided and that

Miller is retroactive on its face. (Appellant’s brief at 17.) Appellant sets

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forth other jurisdictions which have found Miller to apply retroactively on

collateral review. (Id. at 15-16.) However, appellant acknowledges that the

United States Supreme Court recently denied certiorari in Cunningham,

and we are bound by our supreme court’s decision. Commonwealth v.

Shaffer, 734 A.2d 840, 844 n.6 (Pa. 1999) (reminding the Pennsylvania

Superior Court of its duty and obligation to follow the decisional law of the

Pennsylvania Supreme Court).

Appellant also argues for a broader retroactivity analysis under

Pennsylvania law, claiming that the non-retroactive application of Miller

creates two classes of juvenile offenders in Pennsylvania who are treated

differently based solely on when their convictions became final. (Appellant’s

brief at 24.) Appellant contends that his mandatory sentence of life

imprisonment without parole is unconstitutional because the creation of two

classes of juvenile offenders, one eligible for relief under Miller and one

ineligible, based solely and arbitrarily on when their convictions became

final, violates the Pennsylvania Constitution’s guarantees of due process and

equal protection. (Id. at 32.) Appellant also argues that his sentence

constitutes cruel punishment under Article 1, § 13 of the Pennsylvania

Constitution. (Id. at 27.) This court addressed similar claims in Seskey,

supra:

Throughout his brief, Appellant attempts to circumvent the effect that Cunningham has upon our jurisdiction by arguing, inter alia: that he is entitled to relief under Article 1, § 13 of the

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Pennsylvania Constitution (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel punishments inflicted.”), independently of the Eighth Amendment []; that Miller should be applied retroactively based upon Pennsylvania’s broader retroactivity principles []; and that the inequitable result that Miller created violates Pennsylvania’s due process and equal protection principles []. While these arguments someday may require consideration by our courts, today cannot be that day. Before a court may address Appellant’s arguments, or similar contentions, that court must have jurisdiction. We cannot manufacture jurisdiction based upon the substantive claims raised by the parties. Presently, we are confined by the express terms of subsection 9545(b)(1)(iii) and our Supreme Court’s decision in Cunningham. Combined, those two elements require us to conclude that we lack jurisdiction. No substantive claim can overcome this conclusion.

Seskey, 86 A.3d at 243 (citations to the appellant’s brief omitted). See

also Commonwealth v. Breakiron, 781 A.2d 94, 100-101 (Pa. 2001),

citing Commonwealth v. Murray, 753 A.2d 201, 202 (Pa. 2000) (“[T]he

nature of the constitutional violation alleged in a PCRA petition has no

bearing on the applicability of the PCRA’s timeliness requirements.”). Even

claims of a constitutional dimension are subject to the PCRA’s timeliness

requirements. Breakiron; Commonwealth v. Kutnyak, 781 A.2d 1259,

1261 (Pa.Super. 2001) (no alternative basis for relief outside the framework

of the PCRA) (citations omitted).

For these reasons, the PCRA court lacked jurisdiction to consider

appellant’s substantive claims as his third PCRA petition was untimely, with

no applicable exceptions.

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Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 11/10/2014

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