Com. v. Waldron, J.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: September 12, 2025
• Docket: 1653 EDA 2024
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

J-A18035-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : JAMES M. WALDRON : : Appellant : No. 1653 EDA 2024

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered May 28, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-23-CR-0001233-2023

BEFORE: OLSON, J., DUBOW, J., and BECK, J.

MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 12, 2025

Appellant James M. Waldron appeals from the judgment of sentence

entered by the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas after his bench trial

conviction of Possession of a Firearm Prohibited and Firearms Not to be Carried

Without a License.1 He challenges the denial of his suppression motion. After

careful review, we affirm.

We glean the relevant facts and procedural history from the trial court’s

October 8, 2024 Opinion and the certified record. On October 4, 2022,

Haverford Township Police Officer Brian McDonald responded to a radio

dispatch relaying that a man, later identified as Appellant, was slumped over

in the driver’s seat of a pick-up truck with the engine running. The officer

parked on the opposite side of the street, walked to Appellant’s open window,

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1 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 6105(a)(1), 6106(a)(1) J-A18035-25

and tried to rouse Appellant to no avail. When Officer McDonald reached into

Appellant’s car through the open window to turn the car off, Appellant awoke.

The officer observed that Appellant’s eyes were glassy and bloodshot with

constricted pupils, and his speech was sluggish. In response to Officer

McDonald’s questions, Appellant said he had not taken any alcohol or drugs

and had no medical concerns.

Concerned that Appellant was passed out with the window open on a

cold rainy day, Officer McDonald asked Appellant to step out of the car. While

doing a pat down, the officer asked if Appellant had any firearms on his

person, and Appellant stated that he did not. The officer then asked Appellant

if he knew what time of day it was, and he responded that he thought it was

afternoon even though it was actually 8:45 in the morning. Throughout this

questioning, more police officers arrived at the scene.

During further questioning, Appellant stated that he had taken suboxone

“before he got there” and told Officer McDonald that he had a prescription for

it. N.T. Suppression, 10/5/23, at 21. After expressing concern for Appellant’s

health and safety, Officer McDonald administered several field sobriety tests,

which Appellant did not perform successfully. Appellant declined Officer

McDonald’s request to submit to a chemical blood test. Officer McDonald

placed him under arrest for suspicion of driving under the influence of a

controlled substance.

During a search incident to arrest, Officer McDonald recovered drug

paraphernalia in Appellant’s overcoat. At the Haverford Police Station, a police

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officer conducted a second search incident to arrest and recovered a handgun

from an inside pocket of Appellant’s overcoat. Appellant did not have a

firearms license and is a person prohibited from possessing a firearm.

The Commonwealth charged Appellant with the above firearm

violations, as well as Driving Under the Influence and various drug offenses.

Appellant filed a motion to suppress asserting that the encounter with the

police officers was not supported by reasonable suspicion or probable cause.

On October 5, 2023, the suppression court held a hearing at which

Officer McDonald testified consistently with the above facts. The court

admitted the video recording obtained from the officer’s body camera. On

November 20, 2023, the court denied the suppression motion.

Appellant proceeded to a stipulated bench trial on April 1, 2024, on the

firearms offenses.2 The court found him guilty, deferred sentencing, and

ordered a pre-sentence investigation report (“PSI”). On May 28, 2024, the

court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate term of 36 to 84 months’

incarceration.

Appellant timely appealed and filed a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P 1925(b)

Statement. The court submitted a responsive Rule 1925(a) Opinion.

Appellant presents the following issues for our review:

1. Whether the lower court erred by denying [Appellant’s] suppression motion, where the police subjected him to an unlawful investigative detention when, with ____________________________________________

2 The Commonwealth withdrew the DUI and drug related offenses prior to the

stipulated bench trial. N.T.-Trial, 4/1/24, at 4.

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emergency lights activated, police officers pulled alongside, in front of, and behind his legally parked vehicle.

2. Whether the lower court erred by denying [Appellant’s] suppression motion, where, though a police officer did not have reasonable suspicion that [Appellant] drove, operated, or was in actual physical control of the movement of the vehicle, the officer subjected him to an unlawful investigative detention by administering field sobriety tests.

Appellant’s Br. at 2-3.

In his first issue, Appellant contends that the court erred in denying his

suppression motion because “the police initiated an investigative detention”

that “was unsupported by a reasonable, articulable belief that he was engaged

in criminal activity.” Appellant’s Br. at 13-14. He also contends that the

encounter cannot be excused by the community caretaking exception to our

search and seizure laws because “the police officers’ level of intrusion was not

commensurate with the perceived need for assistance.” Id. at 17-18.

Our review of a challenge to the denial of a motion to suppress “is limited

to determining whether the suppression court’s factual findings are supported

by the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are

correct.” Commonwealth v. Stem, 96 A.3d 407, 409 (Pa. Super. 2014)

(citation omitted). “[O]ur scope of review is limited to the factual findings and

legal conclusions of the suppression court.” In re L.J., 79 A.3d 1073, 1080

(Pa. 2013). We defer to the suppression court, “as factfinder[,] to pass on

the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony.”

Commonwealth v. Elmobdy, 823 A.2d 180, 183 (Pa. Super. 2003).

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“[H]owever, we maintain de novo review over the suppression court’s legal

conclusions.” Commonwealth v. Brown, 996 A.2d 473, 476 (Pa. 2010).

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1,

Section 8 of our state Constitution “protect citizens from unreasonable

searches and seizures.” In re D.M., 781 A.2d 1161, 1163 (Pa. 2001). “To

secure the right of citizens to be free from [unreasonable searches and

seizures], courts in Pennsylvania require law enforcement officers to

demonstrate ascending levels of suspicion to justify their interactions with

citizens as those interactions become more intrusive.” Commonwealth v.

Beasley, 761 A.2d 621, 624 (Pa. Super. 2000). We, thus, categorize

encounters as follows: (1) mere encounters, which require no suspicion that

criminal activity is afoot; (2) investigative detentions, which require

reasonable suspicion; and (3) custodial detentions, which require probable

cause. See Commonwealth v. Collins, 950 A.2d 1041, 1046 (Pa. Super.

2008) (en banc). An investigative detention must be supported by

“reasonable suspicion of unlawful activity.” Commonwealth v. Thran, 185

A.3d 1041, 1044 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation omitted).

However, one exception to this requirement is embodied in the

community caretaking doctrine. Commonwealth v. Livingstone, 174 A.3d

609, 625-27 (Pa. 2017). The community caretaking doctrine includes the

following three exceptions: “the emergency aid exception; the automobile

impoundment/inventory exception; and the public servant exception, also

sometimes referred to as the public safety exception.” Id. at 626-27. “[T]he

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community caretaker exception is only invoked when the police are not

engaged in crime-solving activities. With respect to Fourth Amendment

guaranties, this is the key distinction: the defining characteristic of community

caretaking functions is that they are totally unrelated to the criminal

investigation duties of the police.” Id. at 627 n.12 (quotation marks and

citations omitted). Thus, actions taken to render aid “do not offend

constitutional principles, because police are motivated by a ‘desire to render

aid or assistance, rather than the investigation of criminal activity.’”

Commonwealth v. Hall, 305 A.3d 1026, 1034 (Pa. Super. 2023),

reargument denied (Pa. Super. 2024), allocatur denied, 323 A.3d 588 (Pa.

2024)(citations omitted).

For an officer’s conduct to fall within the community caretaking

exception, the following must be true:

(1) the officer must point to specific, objective, and articulable facts which would reasonably suggest to an experienced officer that assistance was needed; (2) the police action must be independent from the detection, investigation, and acquisition of criminal evidence; and, (3) based on a consideration of the surrounding circumstances, the action taken by police must be tailored to rendering assistance or mitigating the peril. Once assistance has been provided or the peril mitigated, further police action will be evaluated under traditional Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.

Commonwealth v. Ward, 318 A.3d 410, 414 (Pa. Super. 2024) (citation

omitted). Accordingly, “when the community caretaking exception is involved

to validate a search or seizure, courts must meticulously consider the facts

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and carefully apply the exception in a manner that mitigates the risk of abuse.”

Id. at 415 (citation omitted).

Here, the suppression court concluded that Appellant’s initial encounter

with police fell within the community caretaking function. Tr. Ct. Op.,

10/8/24, at 4. Specifically, the court observed that, as a result of the radio

dispatch of an unconscious man in the driver’s seat of a running vehicle,

“several officers were alerted to the case and arrived on the scene.” Id.

Indeed, when Officer McDonald arrived first on the scene with sirens and lights

flashing, Appellant was slumped down and unconscious in the driver’s seat

and did not awaken until the officer reached into the car to turn off the ignition.

Although the other officers arrived on the scene simultaneously and after

Appellant exited the vehicle, there is no evidence they were responding for

any reason other than as part of their caretaking function. 3

Based on our review, we agree that the police officers were responding

to a radio dispatch of a man in possible medical distress, not to reports of

criminal activity. Accordingly, we conclude that the suppression court did not

err in concluding that the initial encounter fell within the community

caretaking exception to our search and seizure law.

In his second issue, Appellant argues that “Officer McDonald did not

have reasonable suspicion of criminal activity necessary to subject [Appellant]

to field sobriety tests [and, c]onsequently, the [C]ourt must vacate the ____________________________________________

3 Officer McDonald was the only police officer to testify at the suppression hearing.

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judgment of sentence.” Appellant’s Br. at 19. He contends that there was no

testimony that Appellant’s speech was “slurred,” as the suppression court

noted, and the officer had no evidence that Appellant had been driving,

operating, or in control of his vehicle prior to his encounter with Officer

McDonald so as to support the administration of the field sobriety tests. Id.

at 20-23 (relying on Bold v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Licensing, 320

A.3d 1185 (Pa. 2024)). We disagree. 4

In Bold, our Supreme Court addressed Section 1547 of our Vehicle

Code, which provides for the suspension of an individual’s driving privileges if

the person had refused to submit to chemical testing when “an officer ha[d]

reasonable grounds to believe the person to have been driving, operating or

in actual physical control of the movement of a vehicle” while under the

influence of alcohol or a controlled substance. 75 Pa.C.S. § 1547. In so doing,

it reaffirmed its holding in Banner v. Commonwealth Dep’t of

Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 737 A.2d 1203 (Pa. 1999),

that there must be some evidence that the driver had actually driven the car

in order for the implied consent statute to be applicable. Specifically, the Bold

Court reiterated:

4 Appellant also argues that the reasoning of Bold should be applied to “the

DUI crimes that [Appellant] was convicted of[.]” Appellant’s Br. at 23. In fact, as noted above, Appellant was not convicted of DUI because the Commonwealth withdrew those charges before trial. N.T. Trial, 4/1/24, at 4.

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In determining whether an officer had reasonable grounds to believe that a motorist was in actual physical control of a vehicle, the court must consider the totality of the circumstances, including the location of the vehicle, whether the engine was running and whether there was other evidence indicating that the motorist had driven the vehicle at some point prior to the arrival of the police.

Bold, 320 A.3d at 1201 (citation omitted).

In Commonwealth v. Dirosa, 249 A3d 586, 589 (Pa. Super. 2021),

this Court determined that the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence

that the appellant “drove, operated, or was in actual physical control of the

vehicle” so as to support the appellant’s DUI conviction. We noted

it is undisputed that officers discovered Appellant's vehicle outside a Wawa at approximately 2:30 a.m. in which Appellant had failed to maneuver his vehicle between the clearly marked lines of the handicapped parking spaces in front of the store. Appellant, who was slumped over in the driver's seat of the running vehicle, was initially unresponsive when officers tried to wake him up. When Appellant eventually awoke, he admitted to the officers that he had consumed ‘three shots before leaving home.’

Id. at 590 (citation omitted). The Court concluded that, based on the

evidence, it was reasonable for the fact-finder to infer that the appellant was

intoxicated when he drove. Id.

Applying the holding of Bold and the reasoning of DiRosa, we cannot

agree with Appellant’s claim that the officer’s administration of the field

sobriety tests was unlawful. Here, Officer McDonald first encountered

Appellant on a cold and rainy day passed out in the driver’s seat of the pickup

truck with his window down and the ignition running. Like the appellant in

DiRosa, Appellant was initially unresponsive, despite the presence of sirens

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and flashing lights. Moreover, when he was standing outside the vehicle and

Officer McDonald had remarked on his sluggish demeanor and unusually sized

pupils, he told Officer McDonald that he had taken suboxone “just before he

got there.” N.T. Suppression, at 21. Based on the totality of the

circumstances, including Appellant’s demeanor and physical appearance, we

conclude that Officer McDonald properly administered the field sobriety tests

as part of his investigative detention that was based on reasonable suspicion

that Appellant had driven under the influence of a alcohol or a controlled

substance. N.T. Suppression at 17-19. Accordingly, Appellant’s second issue

garners no relief.

In sum, the police officers responded to the radio dispatch of a man

unconscious and slumped over the steering wheel of his car as part of their

community caretaking function. Thereafter, based on Officer McDonald’s

observations of Appellant’s appearance and demeanor, the officer developed

reasonable suspicion that Appellant had driven under the influence which

supported further investigation, including the administration of field sobriety

tests. Appellant’s challenge to the denial of his suppression motion, thus,

fails, and we affirm his judgment of sentence.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

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Date: 9/12/2025

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