Com. v. Vargas-Rivera, J.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania

Com. v. Vargas-Rivera, J.

DecidedSeptember 28, 2021

Docket668 EDA 2020

StatusUnpublished

This text of Com. v. Vargas-Rivera, J. (Com. v. Vargas-Rivera, J.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Com. v. Vargas-Rivera, J., (Pa. Ct. App. 2021).

Pincite

Opinion

J-A15020-21

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellee

v.

JEFFERY VARGAS-RIVERA

Appellant No. 668 EDA 2020

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence entered January 27, 2020 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No: CP-51-CR-0007133-2017

BEFORE: BOWES, J., STABILE, J., and MUSMANNO, J.

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 28, 2021

Appellant, Jeffery Vargas-Rivera, appeals from the judgment of

sentence entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County on

January 27, 2020, following his conviction of involuntary deviate sexual

intercourse (“IDSI”) with a child; unlawful contact with a minor—sexual

offenses; endangering the welfare of children (“EWOC”)—

parent/guardian/others; corruption of a minor—defendant age 18 or above;

rape of child; and indecent assault on a person less than 16 years of age, all

with respect to offenses committed against his stepdaughter, D.S., beginning

when she was ten years old and continuing until she was approximately 15 J-A15020-21

years old.1 Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it

denied a for-cause challenge to a juror (“Juror 26”). Because we agree the

court abused its discretion by denying the for-cause challenge, we vacate

Appellant’s judgment of sentence and remand for a new trial.

The trial court provided a detailed summary of the facts elicited at trial.

See Trial Court Opinion, 11/20/20, at 2-6. For our purposes, it is sufficient to

note that D.S., an individual diagnosed with high functioning autism, testified

as to the multiple assaults committed by Appellant at various locations,

including in the home D.S. shared with her mother, her sister, and Appellant;

in Appellant’s truck; in Appellant’s one-room rental; and in a residence D.S.

later shared with her mother and her sister. Id. On November 1, 2019, at

the conclusion of the trial, the jury convicted Appellant of the crimes identified

above. On January 27, 2020, the trial court sentenced Appellant to an

aggregate term of 15 to 30 years’ imprisonment, followed by 24 years of

reporting sex offender probation. Appellant filed a timely appeal. Both

Appellant and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

Appellant presents two issues for our consideration.

I. Did the lower court abuse its discretion by refusing to grant Appellant’s challenge for cause as to [Juror 26] such that a new trial is now required in the interest of justice?

II. Did the trial court abuse[] its discretion in restricting direct examination of the Appellant who wanted to testify that the ____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2123(b), 6318(a)(1), 4304(a)(1), 6301(a)(1)(ii), 3121(c), and 3126(a)(8), respectively.

-2- J-A15020-21

mother of the complainant told him that she would have him prosecuted as a result of their domestic dispute which was relevant to her corrupt motive and the credibility of the [complainant]?

Appellant’s Brief at 3.

In another case involving the denial of a for-cause challenge,

Commonwealth v. Penn, 132 A.3d 498 (Pa. Super. 2016), this Court looked

to our Supreme Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Ingber, 531 A.2d

1101 (Pa. 1987), in which the Supreme Court explained:

A criminal defendant’s right to an impartial jury is explicitly guaranteed by Article I, section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. The jury selection process is crucial to the preservation of that right. . . . It must be remembered the purpose of the voir dire examination is to provide an opportunity to counsel to assess the qualifications of prospective jurors to serve. It is therefore appropriate to use such an examination to disclose fixed opinions or to expose other reasons for disqualification. Thus the inquiry must be directed at ascertaining whether the venireperson is competent and capable of rendering a fair, impartial and unbiased verdict. The law also recognizes that prospective jurors were not cultivated in hermetically sealed environments free of all beliefs, conceptions and views. The question relevant to a determination of qualification is whether any biases or prejudices can be put aside upon the proper instruction of the court. A challenge for cause to service by a prospective juror should be sustained and that juror excused where that juror demonstrates through his conduct and answers a likelihood of prejudice. The decision whether to disqualify a venireman is within the discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent a palpable abuse of that discretion.

Id. at 502 (quoting Ingber, 531 A.2d at 1102-03) (internal quotations and

citations omitted).

-3- J-A15020-21

In Penn, as in the present case, the defendant was forced to use one

of his peremptory challenges when the trial court denied a challenge for cause.

He eventually exhausted all of his peremptory challenges, as did Appellant,

before the jury was seated. Penn argued the trial court abused its discretion

by denying his challenge for cause. We agreed and granted a new trial.

In Penn, this Court reviewed the answer provided by the juror in

response to written voir dire along with the subsequent oral voir dire

conducted to assess the prospective juror’s connection with law enforcement

personnel and her proclivity to give credence to the testimony of law

enforcement personnel. Because of the juror’s own history and her

connections with law enforcement personnel, the juror indicated she would be

more inclined to believe the testimony of law enforcement personnel.

However, she then indicated she could follow the court’s instructions and

thought she could be fair and impartial, acknowledging that it all comes down

to the evidence. Nevertheless, she still suggested she would be inclined to

believe law enforcement personnel. Defense counsel’s challenge for cause

was denied. Counsel used a peremptory challenge, and ultimately exhausted

his peremptory challenges.

The Commonwealth’s case consisted of the testimony of two police

detectives. The jury convicted Penn. On appeal, Penn challenged the trial

court’s denial of the for-cause challenge. As stated above, this Court

-4- J-A15020-21

determined the trial court abused its discretion, vacated the judgment of

sentence, and remanded for a new trial.

In the instant case, the transcript reflects the following examination of

Juror 26 and the subsequent exchange between the trial court and counsel:

COURT CRIER: No. 26 raised their card for the nature of the charges. No. 26. Have a seat right there on the end, please.

...

THE COURT: You indicated that you didn’t think you could be fair because of the nature of the charges; is that correct?

[JUROR 26]: Correct.

THE COURT: When I read a list of names from the potential witness list or names that will be used throughout this trial, did you recognize any of those names?

[JUROR 26]: No.

THE COURT: Do you know the defendant?

THE COURT: Do you know anyone involved in this case, any of the parties in this case?

THE COURT: So you’re able to come in here with an open mind and render a fair and impartial verdict based on the evidence presented in this courtroom only, correct?

[JUROR 26]: I don’t know if I could do that.

THE COURT: Why is that?

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI