Com. v. Valentin, N.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: August 22, 2023
• Docket: 3125 EDA 2022
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

J-A12045-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : NEFTALI VALENTIN : : Appellant : No. 3125 EDA 2022

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered November 21, 2022 In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-15-CR-0000957-2006

BEFORE: OLSON, J., NICHOLS, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.: FILED AUGUST 22, 2023

Neftali Valentin appeals the dismissal of his request for relief under the

Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”) as untimely. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-

9546. He argues that the court erred in rejecting his claim that he pleaded

guilty to an offense that does not exist. We affirm.

Valentin entered an open guilty plea in October 2006 to two counts of

attempted criminal homicide, 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 901(a), 2501(a), and one count

of arson endangering persons, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3301(a)(1)(i). He was

sentenced in February 2007 to an aggregate term of 21 to 42 years in prison.

His post-sentence motion was denied by operation of law on July 6, 2007. See

Notice of Intent to Dismiss PCRA Petition Pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(1),

filed 10/28/22, at 1 n.1 (unpaginated). Valentin did not file a direct appeal.

On February 12, 2021, Valentin filed what he styled as a “Petition for

Habeas Corpus Relief Pursuant to Article I, § 14 of the Pennsylvania J-A12045-23

Constitution.” He claimed that he was “illegally confined on the basis of a guilty

plea to two counts of criminal attempt 18 Pa.C.S. § 901(a), first degree 18

Pa.C.S. § 2502(a) that do not exist because the Pennsylvania General

Assembly never enacted any such criminal statute to define the conduct which

constitutes the offense.” Pet. for Habeas Corpus Relief, filed 2/12/21, at 2.

The court treated the petition as a PCRA petition and appointed counsel.1 See

Order, filed 1/19/22, at ¶ 2, n.1. Valentin’s petition did not address the PCRA’s

time-bar, nor did it reference any time-bar exception.

Counsel filed a Turner/Finley letter, concluding that Valentin’s petition

was untimely, and he requested to withdraw as counsel.2 See Appl. to

Withdraw as Counsel of R., filed 9/19/22, at Ex. A. The PCRA court issued

notice of its intent to dismiss the petition without a hearing. It concluded that

the petition was facially untimely, and Valentin had failed to plead any time-

bar exception. See Notice of Intent to Dismiss at 1 n.1 (unpaginated). Valentin

filed a response stating “[a] petition raising the fact that an offense does not

exist should not be barred on the grounds that it is untimely[.]” Answer to

Ct.’s Notice of Intent to Dismiss, filed 11/9/22, at ¶ 6. Valentin’s response did

____________________________________________

1 We conclude that the PCRA court properly treated Valentin’s “Petition for Habeas Corpus Relief Pursuant to Article I, § 14 of the Pennsylvania Constitution” as a PCRA petition. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9542 (stating PCRA encompasses all other remedies including habeas corpus).

2 See Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988); Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa.Super. 1988) (en banc).

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not address any time-bar exception. The court denied Valentin’s petition and

granted counsel’s motion to withdraw. See Order, filed 11/21/22.

Valentin presents the following issue: “Whether the Trial Court abused

its discretion in dismissing [Valentin’s] Petition for Habeas Corpus Relief

alleging he is illegally confined on the basis of a Guilty Plea to two counts of

Criminal Attempt 18 Pa.C.S. § 901(a), First Degree 18 Pa.C.S. § 2502(a) that

do not exist[?]” Valentin’s Br. at 3.

When reviewing the denial or grant of relief under the PCRA, this Court

must determine “whether the PCRA court's findings of fact are supported by

the record, and whether its conclusions of law are free of legal error.”

Commonwealth v. Small, 238 A.3d 1267, 1280 (Pa. 2020).

We do not address the merits of Valentin’s claims because his petition

was properly subject to the strictures of the PCRA and Valentin failed to meet

the PCRA’s time requirements. See Commonwealth v. Pursell, 749 A.2d

911, 913-14 (Pa. 2000). The thrust of Valentin’s claim is that there was no

statutory support for the crimes to which he pleaded guilty. Such a claim goes

to the legality of the sentence. See Commonwealth v. Prinkey, 277 A.3d

554, 563 (Pa. 2022). Challenges to the legality of a sentence are cognizable

under the PCRA. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543. They are therefore subject to the

PCRA’s time restrictions. See Commonwealth v. Fahy, 737 A.2d 214, 223

(Pa. 1999) (concluding that “[a]lthough legality of sentence is always subject

to review within the PCRA, claims must still first satisfy the PCRA time limits

or one of the exceptions thereto”).

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The PCRA’s time limitations are jurisdictional in nature. See

Commonwealth v. Miller, 102 A.3d 988, 992 (Pa.Super. 2014). A petitioner

has one year after the judgment of sentence becomes final to seek relief that

is cognizable under the PCRA. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). A judgment of

sentence becomes final “at the conclusion of direct review, including

discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the United States and the

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking the

review.” Id. at § 9545(b)(3). If a petition seeks PCRA relief beyond that

deadline, the petitioner must plead and prove at least one of the PCRA's time-

bar exceptions. These exceptions include:

(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of interference by government officials with the presentation of the claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States;

(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or

(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and has been held by that court to apply retroactively.

Id. at § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii).

Valentin’s judgment of sentence became final on August 6, 2007, when

the time to file a direct appeal expired. See Commonwealth v. Borrero, 692

A.2d 158, 159 (Pa.Super. 1997) (stating judgment of sentence does not

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become final until the disposition of post-sentence motion or the denial of it

by operation of law); 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1908 (providing that when last day of

period of time set forth in statute falls on Saturday or Sunday, that day is

excluded from computation). Therefore, the one-year deadline elapsed on

August 6, 2008, and the instant petition, which Valentin filed in February

2021, is facially untimely. Thus, the PCRA court lacked jurisdiction unless

Valentin pleaded and proved at least one of the time-bar exceptions. See

Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 994 A.2d 1091, 1093 (Pa. 2010).

Valentin did not attempt to raise any time-bar exception before the

PCRA court. The PCRA court properly determined that the petition was

untimely and that it lacked jurisdiction. Furthermore, even if Valentin’s

petition were timely, his claim is meritless. He pleaded guilty to criminal

attempt, which is a codified crime embodied in a statute setting forth the

elements of the offense. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 901. We affirm the order of the

PCRA court.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 8/22/2023

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