J-S14008-20
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : CARLOS TORRES : : Appellant : No. 1759 EDA 2019
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered May 31, 2019 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0003340-2017
BEFORE: BOWES, J., KING, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED MAY 26, 2020
Carlos Torres appeals from his judgment of sentence of twenty to forty
years of imprisonment imposed after he was convicted of third-degree murder
and conspiracy. We affirm.
Succinctly, the underlying facts are as follows. Appellant was in a long-
term relationship with Carmen Ramos that ended in early 2017. A few weeks
later, Ms. Ramos began dating Francisco Velazquez (“the victim”). Appellant
sent text messages to Ms. Ramos threatening the victim. When Appellant
encountered the victim at Hoagie City shortly thereafter while on a phone call,
Appellant confronted him, left the store, and waited outside for the victim to
exit. Appellant attacked the victim when he exited Hoagie City, then pursued
the victim when he fled. Appellant reinitiated the attack joined by his friend,
Timothy Walker. Appellant and Walker proceeded to beat the victim to death. J-S14008-20
All of this was captured on video. Appellant made another call from the back
of the police car, to his friend Walker.
Appellant was arrested and charged with murder, conspiracy, and
possessing an instrument of crime (“PIC”). Appellant elected to waive his
right to a jury trial, and proceeded to a bench trial on January 22 and 23,
2019. The trial court found Appellant guilty of third-degree murder and
conspiracy, but acquitted him of PIC, and ultimately imposed concurrent
sentences of twenty to forty years of incarceration on the two convictions. 1
Appellant timely appealed, and both Appellant and the trial court complied
with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
Appellant presents the following questions, which we have re-numbered
for ease of disposition:
1. Was the evidence presented at trial insufficient to support a conviction for third degree murder and conspiracy where the Commonwealth failed to prove an agreement between the Appellant and his co-defendant?
2. Notwithstanding all the facts, did the trial court err in convicting the Appellant of third degree murder and conspiracy where the trial court placed too much weight on a phone call between the Appellant and his co-defendant in order to find a criminal agreement to assault the victim. . . ?
3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by imposing a manifestly excessive and unreasonable sentence of 20 to 40 years’ incarceration for third degree murder and conspiracy which was above the sentencing guidelines without adequately considering the co-defendant’s . . . sentence, the Commonwealth’s ____________________________________________
1Appellant filed a timely post-sentence motion challenging, inter alia, the weight of the evidence and the discretionary aspects of his sentence.
-2- J-S14008-20
recommended sentence and Appellant’s role in the offense, history, background and remorse in violation of the sentencing code?
4. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by imposing a manifestly excessive and unreasonable sentence of 20 to 40 years’ incarceration for third degree murder and conspiracy which was above the sentencing guidelines without considering and providing adequate reasons on the record for the deviation from the sentencing code?
Appellant’s brief at 5-6 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).
The following informs our review of Appellant’s claims of error. As to
Appellant’s sufficiency challenge, we bear in mind:
Because a determination of evidentiary sufficiency presents a question of law, our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we must determine whether the evidence admitted at trial and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, were sufficient to prove every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. [T]he facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of innocence. It is within the province of the fact-finder to determine the weight to be accorded to each witness’s testimony and to believe all, part, or none of the evidence. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, as an appellate court, we may not re-weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the fact- finder.
Commonwealth v. Williams, 176 A.3d 298, 305-06 (Pa.Super. 2017)
(citations and quotation marks omitted).
Appellant’s claim that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence
is governed by the following principles.
Appellate review of a weight claim is a review of the [trial court’s] exercise of discretion, not of the underlying question of whether
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the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. Because the trial judge has had the opportunity to hear and see the evidence presented, an appellate court will give the gravest consideration to the findings and reasons advanced by the trial judge when reviewing a trial court’s determination [of whether] the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. One of the least assailable reasons for granting or denying a new trial is the lower court’s conviction that the verdict was or was not against the weight of the evidence and that a new trial should be granted in the interest of justice.
Commonwealth v. Clay, 64 A.3d 1049, 1054-55 (Pa. 2013).2
As to review of Appellant’s sentencing challenge, we observe:3
Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an abuse of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment. Rather, the appellant must establish, by reference to the record, that the sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.
When imposing sentence, a court is required to consider the particular circumstances of the offense and the character of the defendant. In considering these factors, the court should refer to ____________________________________________
2The same standard applies where, as in the case sub judice, the trial court considering the motion was the fact-finder at trial. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Lineman, 219 A.3d 684, 689 (Pa.Super. 2019), appeal granted in part on other grounds, 223 A.3d 669 (Pa. 2020).
3 Appellant challenged the discretionary aspects of his sentence in his post- sentence motion, and his brief includes a statement pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) wherein he asserts that his claim presents a substantial question that the court violated the sentencing code. See Appellant’s brief at 13. We agree. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Mastromarino, 2 A.3d 581, 589 (Pa.Super. 2010) (finding substantial question raised by unexplained disparity between codefendants’ sentences); Commonwealth v. Sheller, 961 A.2d 187, 190 (Pa.Super. 2008) (“We find that Appellant’s contention that the sentencing court exceeded the recommended range in the Sentencing Guidelines without an adequate basis raises a substantial question for this Court to review.”).
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the defendant’s prior criminal record, age, personal characteristics and potential for rehabilitation.
Commonwealth v. Kitchen, 162 A.3d 1140, 1146 (Pa.Super. 2017)
(cleaned up). Additionally, we note that where, as in the instant case, the
trial court had the benefit of a presentence investigation report, it is presumed
to have considered all the relevant sentencing factors. See, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Clemat, 218 A.3d 944, 960 (Pa.Super. 2019).
After a thorough review of the certified record, the parties’ briefs and
the pertinent law, we discern no error of law or abuse of discretion on the part
of the trial court as to the issues raised by Appellant, and we affirm the
judgment of sentence for reasons stated in the cogent and well-reasoned
opinion that Honorable J. Scott O’Keefe entered on August 12, 2019.
Specifically, Judge O’Keefe observed that the law and the evidence,
including reasonable inferences therefrom viewed in the light most favorable
to the Commonwealth, supported the finding Appellant and Walker acted with
shared criminal intent when they jointly attacked the cornered victim, rather
than independent of one another,4 and that their concerted beating resulted
____________________________________________
4Compare Commonwealth v. Thomas, 65 A.3d 939, 946 (Pa.Super. 2013) (deeming the evidence of conspiracy to commit aggravated assault sufficient where the defendant “was with a group of four other individuals who repeatedly kicked and punched the victim, causing her to collapse to the ground, where they continued their attack”), with Commonwealth v. Chambers, 188 A.3d 400, 412 (Pa. 2018) (finding insufficient evidence of conspiracy where none of the defendant’s cohorts became involved in his one-
-5- J-S14008-20
in his death. See Trial Court Opinion, 8/12/19, at 6-10. The trial court
likewise properly considered Appellant’s weight-of-the-evidence challenge and
acted within its discretion in concluding that the verdict was not shocking to
the conscience. Id. at 12. Finally, Judge O’Keefe supported the propriety of
Appellant’s sentence5 by discussing how he reviewed and considered the
relevant information, including the presentence report, Appellant’s
background and rehabilitative needs, and Appellant’s increasingly serious
criminal violence, and imposed a sentence that was within (albeit at the top
of) the guideline recommendations.6 Id. at 14-15. As to the foregoing points,
we adopt Judge O’Keefe’s reasoning as our own.
on-one battle with the victim until the victim’s girlfriend intervened on his behalf, and the defendant's cohorts got involved to try to break up the fight).
5We do not adopt Judge O’Keefe ‘s opinion to the extent that it suggests that Appellant failed to raise a substantial question. See Trial Court Opinion, 8/12/19, at 13.
6 Appellant acknowledged that, with a prior record score of three, and the offense gravity score was fourteen, the guidelines recommended a sentence of 120 months to the statutory maximum. See N.T. Sentencing, 5/31/19, at 7. See also 204 Pa. Code § 303.16(a) (indicating standard range sentence for Appellant is 120 months to the statutory limit). The statutory maximum for Appellant’s murder and conspiracy convictions was twenty to forty years of imprisonment. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 1102(c), (d). Hence, Appellant’s claim that the trial court sentenced outside the guidelines is belied by the record.
Furthermore, as the trial court noted, the evidence showed or suggested that it was Appellant who was jealous of the victim, who planned the attack, and who contacted his codefendant to coordinate the assault. See N.T. Sentencing, 5/31/19, at 25. As such, Appellant’s complaint that the trial court failed to consider Appellant’s role in the offense and impose an individualized
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Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary
Date: 5/26/2020
sentence is likewise unsupported by the record—the imposition of a greater sentence than that of his codefendant is the epitome of individualized sentencing. Accord Commonwealth v. Ali, 197 A.3d 742, 765 (Pa.Super. 2018) (holding record reflected that the trial court offered sufficient reasons for the defendant’s sentence and justification for disparity from those of codefendant).
-7- Circulated 04/30/2020 05:12 PM
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF PHILADELPHIA COUNTY LL FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA CRIMINAL TRIAL DIVISION
Vs. 1759 EDA 2019
CARLOS TORRES CP-51-CR-0003340-2017
OPINION O'KEEFE, J.
Carlos Torres appeals his sentence of twenty to forty years' incarceration following his
convictions of third degree murder and criminal conspiracy. The defendant contends that there
was insufficient evidence presented at his jury trial, that the verdict was against the weight of the
evidence and that the sentence was excessive.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY:
On March 2, 2017, the defendant was arrested and charged with murder, criminal conspir-
acy and possessing an instrument of crime. Appellant was bound over for trial on all charges
following an April 28, 2017 preliminary hearing. A bench trial commenced on January 23, 2019,
with Torres being convicted of murder of the third degree and criminal conspiracy but acquitted
of the charge of possessing the instrument of a crime. The defendant was sentenced to a concurrent
term of twenty to forty years' incarceration, for both murder of the third degree and conspiracy,
the subject of this appeal. STANDARD OF REVIEW:
For a claim of insufficiency of the evidence an appellate court must view the evidence in a
light most favorable to the Commonwealth as the verdict winner and determine whether the evi-
dence presented at trial, including all reasonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom, was
sufficient to prove all of the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See Commonwealth
v. McCalman, 795 A.2d 412 (Pa.Super. 2002).
A claim that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence requires that the court examine
the record to determine whether the fact finder's verdict was so contrary to the evidence as to
shock one's sense of justice and thereby mandate the granting of a new trial. Commonwealth v.
Habay, 934 A.2d 732 (Pa.Super. 2007), appeal denied, 954 A.2d 575 (Pa. 2008). Whether or not
a new trial should be granted on the grounds that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence
is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, whose decision will not be reversed absent a
showing of an abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. Widmer, 560 Pa. 308, 744 A.2d 745 (2000);
Commonwealth v. Brown, 538 Pa. 410, 648 A.2d 1177 (1994).
When reviewing a claim of an improper or excessive sentence, the standard of review is
that Isjentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the sentencing judge, and will not
be disturbed on appeal absent a manifest abuse of discretion." Commonwealth v. Johnson, 446
Pa.Super. 192, 197, 666 A.2d 690, 693 (1995) (quoting Commonwealth v. Dotter, 403 Pa.Super.
507, 516, 589 A.2d 726 (1991)).
FACTS:
For eight years, the defendant, Carlos Torres, and Carmen Ratnos lived together in an inti-
mate relationship, which terminated in late January, early February of 2017. (N.T. 1-22-2019, pp.
11-18). Around mid -February Ms. Ramos began seeing Francisco Velazquez. (N.T. 1-22-2019,
2 pp. 17-18). When the appellant discovered that his former paramour was dating Mr. Velazquez
he became extremely upset. (N.T. 1-22-2019, pp. 18-20). In the early afternoon of March 2"d, the
defendant and Carlos Velazquez ran into each other inside Hoagie City, a local hang-out located
at 5th and Lehigh Streets in Philadelphia. (N.T. 1-22-2019, pp. 22-23, 30-32). About three hours
later, Velazquez and Ms. Ramos were back in the area of 5h1 and Lehigh when the decedent got
out of Ramos' car and returned to Hoagie City. (N.T. 1-22-2019, pp. 18-20, 53-54). Surveillance
of the events that occurred inside and outside Hoagie City as well as other businesses in the im-
mediate area was presented in the defendant's trial. The video clearly depicts the defendant con-
fronting Velazquez inside Hoagie City where a short verbal exchange ensues. (N.T. 1-22-2019,
pp. 44-45, 55-58). Torres then leaves the store, waiting outside for Velazquez to exit. The dece-
dent is hesitant to go out the door, but eventually departs. Upon leaving, Velazquez is attacked by
the defendant. Velazquez tries to leave the area, but is pursued for two blocks by the defendant,
heading west on Lehigh Avenue, across 5111 Street up to the corner of Fairhill and Lehigh Streets,
where Velazquez is physically attacked by the defendant. (N.T. 1-22-2019, pp. 44-46, 56-61).
While the two are brawling, Timothy Walker joins in the beating, grabbing and slamming Ve-
lazquez twice with a barricade. (N.T. 1-22-2019, pp. 58-61). Velazquez falls to the ground and
while there, this defendant continues beating the decedent, punching and kicking Velazquez in the
head. After this defendant delivers a vicious kick to the decedent's head, Velazquez stops any
movement, just lying on the ground, while being further beaten by Torres. (N.T. 1-22-2019, pp.
61-65).
Officer Todd Gittel responded to a radio call about the fight, finding Francisco Velazquez
lying on the ground, fading in and out of consciousness, unable to talk. (N.T. 1-22-2019, pp. 65-
66). After calling rescue to attend to the victim, the officer put the defendant in the back of his
3 patrol car. Officer Gittel testified that heard the defendant talking on his cell phone, saying "Tim,
don't let me go down for this, you got to come back." (N.T. 1-22-2019, p. 66). Officer Juan
Fernandez testified that several days later, he attempted to serve an arrest warrant on the defendant
for this case and that when he knocked on the defendant's door, Torres jumped out the back win-
dow and unsuccessfully tried to run away, travelling east on York Street. (N.T. 1-23-2019, pp. 8-
11, 17-18). The officer further testified that while transporting the defendant to the police station,
Torres told the officers that "I didn't do all the damage. It was my friend, Timothy Walker." (N.T.
1-23-2019, pp. 13-16). In addition, Assistant Medical Examiner Victoria Sorokin testified that
Francisco Velazquez died of blunt impact injury to the head and the manner of death was homicide.
(NT. 1-23-2019, pp. 21-30).
Detective Thorsten Lucke was presented during the trial, testifying that he recovered the
video from Hoagie City as well as several businesses along Lehigh Avenue. (N.T. 1-22-2019, pp.
42-45, C- 51, 52, 77). The entire beating of Mr. Velazquez, from inside Hoagie City to out the
front door and west on Lehigh Avenue was captured on video and admitted into evidence during
Torres' trial. Additionally, Detective Lucke testified that he performed a cellphone extraction
from the phone with the number that was attributed to Ms. Ramos. Included in the extraction were
text messages from a cell phone bearing the number 215-800-3174, which Ramos' phone associ-
ated with the name "Carlos". (MT. 1-22-2019, pp. 47-52). The relevant testimony concerning the
texts from March 2" 2017 are: "Your Honor, Fin starting from the top. Again, these are all from March 2", 2017. Start with the first message at 12:54 p.m. Content is, "How can you hurt me like that, drive down Lawrence Street with him. You know I'm right" - I'm going to read it out, so I apologize for my language - "fuck this bullshit. You really got that, but I still love you regardless. Enjoy." Next message in this report, Your Honor, at 3:45 p.m. "You got fucking balls, Linda, but I will catch him. Trust me. Nothing
4 but respect. Not about you. Fuck. You live yours. I live mine. Fuck you. I've had it." 3:53 p.m., Your Honor. "You're a liar. That's why you do- ing what you doing. I'll go look Gail (phonetic), but with respect." 4:05 p.m. "Why he not here. What's up? What, he's scared to fight like a man? I right (sic) for mine, but I forgot you're not mine anymore." 4:21 p.m. "Tell him to come get your IR." 6:24 p.m. "Keep calling him. He laid out." 6:27 p.m. "Don't call me. I'm going to jail beating his ass. He swung first" (N.T. 1-22-2019, pp. 51-52).
LEGAL DISCUSSION:
Insufficiency of the Evidence
Appellant's first claim of error is that there was insufficient evidence presented at trial to
find him guilty of any of the charges to which he was convicted. When evaluating a claim of
insufficiency of the evidence, we must determine "whether the evidence is sufficient to prove every
element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Commonwealth v. Hughes, 521 Pa. 423, 555
A.2d 1264, 1267 (1989). Further, the evidence must be viewed "in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth as the verdict winner, and accept as true all evidence and all reasonable inferences
therefrom upon which, if believed, the fact finder properly could have based its verdict." Id "Any
doubts regarding a defendant's guilt may be resolved by the fact -finder unless the evidence is so
weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be drawn from the com-
bined circumstances." Commonwealth v. Thomas, 65 A.3d 939, 943 (Pa.Super. 2013) (citing Com-
monwealth v. Ratsamy, 594 Pa. 176, 934 A.2d 1233, 1236 n. 2 (2007)).
Under a sufficiency of the evidence claim, "the Commonwealth may sustain its burden by
5 means of wholly circumstantial evidence; the entire trial record should be evaluated and all evi-
dence received considered, whether or not the trial court's rulings thereon were correct; and the
trier of fact, while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the proof, is free to
believe all, part, or none of the evidence." Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 585 Pa. 547, 889 A.2d 501,
517 (2005) (quoting Commonwealth v. Watkins, 577 Pa. 194, 843 A.2d 1203, 1211 (2003)). "Ad-
ditionally, the evidence at trial need not preclude every possibility of innocence, and the fact -finder
is free to resolve any doubts regarding a defendant's guilt unless the evidence is so weak and
inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be drawn from the combined cir-
cumstances " Commonwealth v. Bohonyi, 900 A.2d 877, 881-882 (Pa.Super. 2006) (quoting Com-
monwealth v. Love, 896 A.2d 1276, 1283 (Pa.Super. 2006)). However, if the evidence "is in con-
tradiction to the physical facts, in contravention to human experience and the laws of nature, then
the evidence is insufficient as a matter of law." Commonwealth v. Heater, 899 A.2d 1126, 1131
(Pa.Super.2006) (quoting Commonwealth v. Widmer, 560 Pa. 308, 319, 744 A.2d 745, 751 (2000)).
To sustain a conviction for third-degree murder, the Commonwealth need only prove that
the defendant killed another person with malice aforethought, that the defendant recklessly, know-
ingly or intentionally caused the victim's death. "This Court has long held that malice compre-
hends not only a particular ill -will, but ... [also al wickedness of disposition, hardness of heart,
recklessness of consequences, and a mind regardless of social duty, although a particular person
may not be intended to be injured." Commonwealth v. Fisher, 622 Pa. 366, 375, 80 A.3d 1186,
1191 (2013) (citing Commonwealth v. Santos, 583 Pa. 96, 876 A.2d 360, 363 (2005); Common-
wealth v. Drum, 58 Pa. 9, 15 (1868)). Third degree murder "is an intentional act, characterized by
malice, that results in death, intended or not." Commonwealth v. Fisher, supra, 622 Pa. at 376, 80
6 A.3d at 1191. Furthermore, the fact -finder may infer malice by considering the totality of the
circumstances. Commonwealth v. Thomas, 440 Pa.Super, 564, 656 A.2d 514, 516 (1995).
In order to sustain a conviction for criminal conspiracy, the prosecution must establish that
the defendant entered into an agreement to commit or aid in an unlawful act with another person(s)
with the shared criminal intent and an overt act was done in furtherance of the conspiracy. Com-
monwealth v. Fisher, supra (quoting Commonwealth v. Rios, 546 Pa. 271, 684 A.2d 1025, 1030
(1996)). The agreement necessary for a conspiracy need not be stated in words, it may be unspo-
ken, but acknowledged. Therefore, a conspiracy conviction will be sustained if the Common-
wealth established that the defendant entered into an agreement to commit or aid in an unlawful
act with another person with a shared criminal intent and an overt act was done in furtherance of
the conspiracy. Commonwealth v. Lambert, 795 A.2d 1010, 1016 (Pa.Super.2002), app. denied,
569 Pa. 701, 805 A.2d 521 (2002) (citing Commonwealth v. Rios, 546 Pa. 271, 684 A.2d 1025,
1030 (1996)). "The essence of a criminal conspiracy is the common understanding that a particular
criminal objective is to be accomplished." Commonwealth v. Lambert, supra, 795 A.2d at 1016
(citing Commonwealth v. Keefer, 338 Pa.Super. 184, 487 A.2d 915, 918 (1985)). "Mere associa-
tion with the perpetrators, mere presence at the scene, or mere knowledge of the crime is insuffi-
cient." Id. Rather, the Commonwealth must prove that the defendant shared the criminal intent;
that he was "an active participant in the criminal enterprise and that he had knowledge of the
conspiratorial agreement." Commonwealth v. Lambert, supra, 795 A.2d at 1016 (quoting Com-
monwealth v. Hennigan, 753 A.2d 245, 253 (Pa.Super.2000)). The defendant himself does not
need to commit the overt act, rather the overt act could be committed by a co-conspirator. Com-
monwealth v. Lambert; supra, 795 A.2d at 1016 (citing Commonwealth v. Johnson, 719 A.2d 778,
784 (Pa.Super.1998) (en Banc), app. denied, 559 Pa. 689, 739 A.2d 1056 (1999)).
7 Circumstantial evidence is almost always used to prove a conspiracy. Commonwealth v.
Lambert, supra, 795 A.2d at 1016 (citing Commonwealth v. Swerdlow, 431 Pa.Super. 453, 636
A.2d 1173, 1176 (1994)). "The conduct of the parties and the circumstances surrounding their
conduct may create 'a web of evidence' linking the accused to the alleged conspiracy beyond a
reasonable doubt" Commonwealth v. Lambert, supra, 795 A.2d at 1016 (quoting Commonwealth
v. Johnson, supra, 719 A.2d at 785). "The evidence must, however, 'rise above mere suspicion or
possibility of guilty collusion.'" Lambert, supra, 795 A.2d at 1016 (quoting Commonwealth v.
Swerdlow, 636 A.2d at 1177). The Pennsylvania Superior Court has identified factors to be con-
sidered when examining a conspiracy charge as follows:
Among the circumstances which are relevant, but not suffi- cient by themselves, to prove a corrupt confederation are: (1) an as- sociation between alleged conspirators; (2) knowledge of the com- mission of the crime; (3) presence at the scene of the crime; and (4) in some situations, participation in the object of the conspiracy. The presence of such circumstances may furnish a web of evidence link- ing an accused to an alleged conspiracy beyond a reasonable doubt when viewed in conjunction with each other and in the context in which they occurred.
Commonwealth v. Lambert; supra, 795 A.2d at 1016 (quoting Commonwealth v. Olds, 322
Pa.Super. 442, 469 A.2d 1072, 1075 (1983)) (internal citations omitted).
If there is evidence of the presence of a conspiracy to commit a crime, conspirators are
liable for acts of their co-conspirators committed in the furtherance of the conspiracy. Common-
wealth v. Lambert, supra, 795 A.2d at 1016 (citing Commonwealth v. Stocker, 424 Pa.Super. 189,
622 A.2d 333, 342 (1993)). Even if a conspirator did not act as a principal in committing the
underlying crime, he will still be criminally liable for the actions of the co-conspirators taken in
furtherance of the conspiracy. Commonwealth v. Lambert, supra, 795 A.2d at 1016 (citing Com-
monwealth v. Soto, 693 A.2d 226, 2929-230 (Pa.Super.1997), app. denied, 550 Pa. 704, 705 A.2d
8 1308 (1997)). The general rule of law relating to the culpability of conspirators to commit a crime
is that each individual member of the conspiracy is criminally responsible for the acts of his co-
conspirators committed in furtherance of the conspiracy. The co-conspirator rule assigns legal
culpability equally to all members of the conspiracy and all co-conspirators are responsible for
actions undertaken in furtherance of the conspiracy regardless of their individual knowledge of
such actions and regardless of which member of the conspiracy undertook the action. Common-
wealth v. Lambert, supra, 795 A.2d at 1016-1017 {quoting Commonwealth v. Galindes, 786 A.2d
1004, 1011 (Pa.Super.2001)). "The premise of the rule is that the conspirators have formed to-
gether for an unlawful purpose, and thus, they share the intent to commit any acts undertaken in
order to achieve that purpose, regardless of whether they actually intended any distinct act under-
taken in furtherance of the object of the conspiracy. It is the existence of shared criminal intent
that is the sine qua non of a conspiracy."' Commonwealth v. Lambert, supra, 795 A.2d at 1017
(citing Commonwealth v. Wayne, 553 Pa. 614, 720 A.2d 456, 463-464 (Pa. 1998), cert. denied,
528 U.S. 834, 120 S.Ct. 94, 145 L.Ed.2d 80 (1999)).
It is clear that a conspiracy existed in the current case from the relationship between the
co-conspirators, the acts of both individuals in the coordinated attack on the decedent as well as
the circumstances surrounding the incident, and that conclusion was beyond a reasonable doubt.
This defendant was talking on his phone with someone while in Hoagie City. After the confron-
tation, this defendant waited outside the eatery for the decedent to come out. Another confronta-
tion occurred outside of the shop, but then, Torres followed the decedent two blocks and only
moved in to attack Velazquez when he got to Lehigh and Fairhill Streets, where Mr. Walker was
already situated. Torres and Walker then committed a coordinated attack upon Velazquez, Walker
9 hitting him with the barricade while the defendant was punching and kicking the decedent. Addi-
tionally, the officer who detained the defendant testified that this defendant called his co-conspira-
tor - Timothy Walker after the killing of the decedent and told Walker to come back and take
responsibility for the assault. It was crystal clear that this defendant and Timothy Walker con-
spired to attack Mr. Velazquez and as such there was more than sufficient evidence upon which to
find this defendant guilty of both murder of the third degree and criminal conspiracy. Both men
agreed to engage in the intentional, malicious attack upon Velazquez, without regard to the conse-
quences of that attack. As their actions resulted in Velazquez's death, the convictions for both
third degree murder and conspiracy were appropriate. Accordingly, this claim of the appellant
must fail.
Weight of the Evidence
A claim that the verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence concedes that there is
sufficient evidence to sustain the verdict. Commonwealth v. Widmer, 560 Pa. 308, 744 A.2d 745
(2000). "[T]he weight of the evidence is exclusively for the finder of fact who is free to believe
all, part, or none of the evidence and to determine the credibility of the witnesses." Commonwealth
v. Marks, 704 A.2d 1095, 1098 (Pa. Super. 1997) (citing Commonwealth v. Simmons, 541 Pa. 211,
229, 662 A.2d 621, 630 (1995)). A defendant's request for a new trial based on the argument that
the verdict was against the weight of the evidence will only be granted when the verdict is so
contrary to the evidence as to make the award of a new trial imperative. Commonwealth v. Mason,
559 Pa. 500, 513, 741 A.2d 708, 715 (1999); Commonwealth v. Auker, 545 Pa. 521, 541, 681 A.2d
1305, 1316 (1996).
Addressing the defendant's weight of the evidence argument, it must be noted that "An
allegation that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence is addressed to the discretion of the
10 trial court" Commonwealth v. Rossetti, 863 A.2d 1185, 1191 (Pa.Super.2004) (quoting Common-
wealth v. Widmer, 560 Pa. 308, 744 A.2d 745, 751-752 (2000)). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
has explained that appellate review of a weight of the evidence claim is a review of the exercise of
discretion, not a review of the underlying question of whether the verdict is against the weight of
the evidence. Id. "A motion for a new trial on the grounds that the verdict is contrary to the weight
of the evidence, concedes that there is sufficient evidence to sustain the verdict. Thus, the trial
court is under no obligation to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict winner."
Commonwealth v. Dupre, 866 A.2d 1089, 1101 (Pa.Super.2005) (quoting Commonwealth v. Sul-
livan, 820 A.2d 795, 805-806 (Pa.Super.2003), app. denied, 574 Pa. 773, 833 A.2d 143 (2003)
(emphasis omitted). A new trial should be awarded when the trial court believes the verdict was
against the weight of the evidence and resulted in a miscarriage ofjustice. Commonwealth v. Lloyd,
878 A.2d 867, 872 (Pa.Super.2005) (citing Thompson v. City of Philadelphia, 507 Pa. 592, 598,
493 A.2d 669, 672 (Pa 1985)). "Although a new trial should not be granted because of a mere
conflict in testimony or because the trial judge on the same facts would have arrived at a different
conclusion, a new trial should be awarded when the jury's verdict is so contrary to the evidence as
to shock one's sense of justice and the award of a new trial is imperative so that right may be given
another opportunity to prevail." Id. (emphasis omitted). Stated another way, "the evidence must
be so tenuous, vague and uncertain that the verdict shocks the conscience of the court" Common-
wealth v. Dupre, supra, 866 A.2d at 1102 (quoting Commonwealth v. Sullivan, supra, 820 A.2d at
805-806). "The question the trial court must answer, in the sound exercise of its discretion, is
whether 'notwithstanding all the facts, certain facts are so clearly of greater weight that to ignore
them or to give them equal weight with all the facts is to deny justice'" Id. (citing Commonwealth
v. Widmer, supra, 744 A.2d at 752). Because the trial judge heard and saw the evidence presented,
11 an appellate court will give the gravest consideration to the findings and reasons advanced by the
trial court concerning a weight of the evidence determination. Commonwealth v. Dupre, supra,
866 A.2d at 1102 (citing Commonwealth v. Widmer, supra, 744 A.2d at 753). "A trial court's
exercise of discretion in finding that a verdict is or is not against the weight of the evidence is 'one
of the least assailable reasons for granting or denying a new trial.'" Commonwealth v. Dupre,
supra, 866 A.2d at 1102 {citing Commonwealth v. Sullivan, supra, 820 A.2d at 806; Common-
wealth v. Widmer, supra, 744 A.2d at 753). When the weight of the evidence challenge is predi-
cated on the credibility of testimony presented at trial, appellate review of the trial court's decision
is extremely limited. Commonwealth v. Rossetti, supra, 863 A.2d at 1191 (quoting Commonwealth
v. Hunter, 381 Pa.Super. 606, 554 A.2d 550, 555 (1989)). "Generally, unless the evidence is so
unreliable and/or contradictory as to make any verdict based thereon pure conjecture, these types
of claims are not cognizable on appellate review." Id
This court applied the appropriate standards when reviewing Defendant's claim that the
verdict was against the weight of the evidence. Having reviewed the entire record, including a
thorough reading of the trial transcripts and admitted exhibits, this court concludes that the verdict
was not so contrary to the evidence as to shock one's sense of justice. The evidence was not so
tenuous, vague and uncertain that the verdict shocks the conscience of the court. To the contrary,
the evidence in this case was compelling and substantial, and strongly supported the verdict. The
vast majority of the incident was caught on surveillance video, including the entirety of the fatal
attack at Fairhill and Lehigh Streets. Accordingly, this claim of the defendant is without merit.
12 Excessive Sentence
Defendant asserts that his sentence was 'manifestly excessive, above the guidelines and the
consecutive/aggregate sentence failed to take into consideration necessary sentencing factors in-
cluding mitigation including but not limited to the Defendant's role in the offense, the pre-sentence
investigation report, the Pennsylvania Sentencing Guidelines, the Defendant's background and
remorse, his family support and the sentence of his co-defendant.' (Defendant's Statement of
Matters Complained of on Appeal, p. 5). The law is clear that mere assertions of excessiveness do
not raise a substantial question for review. Commonwealth v. Zeigler, 112 A.3d 656 (Pa.Super.
2015); Commonwealth v. Dodge, 77 A.2d 1263, 1269-1270 (Pa.Super. 2013); Commonwealth v.
Koehler, 558 Pa. 334, 737 A.2d 225 (1999); Commonwealth v. Ahmed, 961 A.2d 884 (Pa.Super.
2008); Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 171-172 (Pa.Super. 2010). Although a determi-
nation of what constitutes a substantial question must be evaluated on a case -by -ease basis, a sub-
stantial question exists only when the defendant advances a colorable argument that the sentence
was inconsistent with a specific provision of the sentencing code or contrary to the fundamental
norms which underlie the sentencing process. Commonwealth v. Caldwell, 117 A.3d 763, 768
(Pa.Super. 2015).
Addressing the issue on the merits, it is well -settled that "[sjentencing is a matter vested in
the sound discretion of the sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal absent
a manifest abuse of discretion." Commonwealth v. Johnson, 446 Pa.Super. 192, 197, 666 A.2d
690, 693 (1995) (quoting Commonwealth v. Dotter, 403 Pa.Super. 507, 516, 589 A.2d 726 (1991)).
"To be a manifest abuse of discretion, a sentence must either exceed the statutory limits or be
manifestly excessive. The discretion of a trial judge must be accorded great weight because he is
in the best position to weigh such factors as the nature of the crime, the defendant's character, and
13 the defendant's displays of remorse, defiance, or indifference." Commonwealth v. Minnott, 395
Pa.Super. 552, 554, 577 A.2d 928, 929 (1990). "Our Supreme Court has held that where a pre -
sentence report exists, we shall 'presume that the sentencing judge was aware of the relevant in-
formation regarding the defendant's character and weighed those considerations along with the
mitigating statutory factors.'" Commonwealth v. McKiel, 427 Pa.Super. 561, 565, 629 A.2d 1012,
1013-14 (1993) (quoting Commonwealth v. Devers , 519 Pa. 88, 101-102, 546 A.2d 12, 18 (1988)).
"Having been fully informed by the presentence report, the sentencing court's discretion should
not be disturbed." Id.
The undersigned reviewed the pre-sentence reports on the defendant, along with all of the
evidence presented, and considered numerous factors, such as the nature of the crime, the defend-
ant's background, the likelihood of rehabilitation and the need for the public to be protected from
this behavior by the defendant again. The sentence imposed on appellant took into account all of
those considerations. See Commonwealth v. Cunningham, 805 A.2d 566, 575 (Pa.Super. 2002);
Commonwealth v. Burkholder, 719 A.2d 346, 350 (Pa.Super. 1998). After reviewing the pre -
sentence investigation reports, this court sentenced the defendant to an aggregate sentence of
twenty to forty years' incarceration with both the murder and conspiracy sentences running con-
currently. Torres produced no evidence that the sentence imposed was either inconsistent with a
specific provision of the sentencing code or contrary to the fundamental norms which underlie the
sentencing process and as such, there is no substantial question. Commonwealth v. Sierra, 752
A.2d 910, 912 (Pa.Super. 2000). This court examined the defendant's background, character and
rehabilitative needs, and the pre -sentence investigation report detailed the relevant information
regarding these factors, all of which was considered.
A look at Torres' past criminal conduct is clearly in order. As a juvenile, the defendant
14 had two juvenile adjudications. As an adult, Mr. Torres has seven arrests with five convictions
and at the time of this murder, he was on probation for simple assault and enrolled in anger man-
agement classes as a condition of that probation. The defendant's prior record score was a four,
making the guideline minimum range sentence for both the third degree murder and the conspiracy
one hundred sixty-eight to two hundred and forty months, plus or minus twelve months. Mr.
Torres was sentenced within the guideline range.
As noted earlier, the sentencing court will only be reversed upon a showing of manifest
abuse of that discretion. Commonwealth v. Reyes -Rodriguez, 111 A.3d 775, 784-85 (Pa.Super.
2015); Commonwealth v. Raven, 97 A.3d 1244, 1253 (Pa.Super. 2014). An abuse of discretion in
sentencing "is not shown merely by an error in judgment. Rather, the appellant must establish, by
reference to the record, that the sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its judg-
ment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or arrived at a manifestly unreasonable
decision." Commonwealth v. Raven, supra at 1253 (quoting Commonwealth v. Shugars, 895 A.2d
1270, 1275 (Pa.Super. 2006)). The court reviewed the presentence investigation report, considered
all of the testimony and arguments of counsel and imposed a sentence within the applicable guide-
line range and as such the defendant's claim is without merit.
Accordingly, the judgment of sentence of this court should be affirmed.
BY THE COURT:
Date: August 9, 2019
15 IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF PHILADELPHIA COUNTY FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : CRIMINAL TRIAL DIVISION
Proof of Service
I hereby certify that I am on this day serving the foregoing Court's Opinion upon the per- son(s), and in the manner indicated below, which service satisfies the requirements of Pa.R.Crim.P. 114:
Defense Attorney: Michael N. Huff, Esquire 1333 Race Street Philadelphia, PA 19107
Type of Service: ( ) Personal (X) First Class Mail ( ) Interoffice ( ) Other, please specify
District Attorney: Lawrence Jonathan Goode, Esquire Chief Appeals Division District Attorney's Office 3 South Penn Square Philadelphia, PA 19107-3499
Type of Service: ( ) Personal ( ) First Class Mail (X) Interoffice ( ) Other, please specify
Date: August 12, 2019 Allison M. O'Keefe, Law Clerk