Com. v. Tisdall, M.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: August 16, 2024
• Docket: 2954 EDA 2023
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

J-S25041-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : MARTIN TISDALL : : Appellant : No. 2954 EDA 2023

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered October 24, 2023 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0308871-1998

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and BECK, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BECK, J.: FILED AUGUST 16, 2024

Martin Tisdall (“Tisdall”) appeals pro se from the order entered by the

Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas dismissing his fifth petition

pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). 1 Because Tisdall filed an

untimely PCRA petition and failed to establish an exception to the statutory

time-bar, we affirm.

In 1997, Tisdall and a co-conspirator robbed four Philadelphia retail

stores at gunpoint. On November 22, 1999, Tisdall entered an open guilty

plea to multiple counts of robbery, criminal conspiracy, and possessing an

instrument of crime. On March 1, 2000, the trial court sentenced Tisdall to

thirty-two and one-half to sixty-five years in prison, to be followed by sixty

____________________________________________

1 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. J-S25041-24

years of probation. Tisdall filed timely post-sentence motions. The trial court

denied these motions on May 3, 2000. Tisdall did not file a direct appeal.

Tisdall filed a timely first PCRA petition raising a single claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel. The PCRA court held a hearing, after which

it denied the petition. This Court affirmed. See Commonwealth v. Tisdall,

2997 EDA 2002 (Pa. Super. Aug. 20, 2003) (non-precedential decision).

Thereafter, Tisdall filed three PCRA petitions, all of which were dismissed. This

Court affirmed each dismissal. See Commonwealth v. Tisdall, 2071 EDA

2022 (Pa. Super. May 22, 2023) (non-precedential decision);

Commonwealth v. Tisdall, 2788 EDA 2017 (Pa. Super. Mar. 21, 2019) (non-

precedential decision), appeal denied, 218 A.3d 378 (Pa. 2019);

Commonwealth v. Tisdall, 2898 EDA 2014 (Pa. Super. Aug. 28, 2015) (non-

precedential decision), appeal denied, 131 A.3d 491 (Pa. 2016).

On July 5, 2023, Tisdall filed the pro se PCRA petition underlying this

appeal. The PCRA court issued a notice of its intent to dismiss the petition

without a hearing pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. Tisdall filed a response to

the notice. Thereafter, the PCRA court dismissed the petition. Tisdall filed a

timely appeal, presenting the following issue for our review: “Whether the

[PCRA] court erred in dismissing [Tisdall’s] post[-]conviction petition seeking

relief in the interest of justice where insufficient reason exist to support

differential treatment among individuals?” Tisdall’s Brief at 3 (unnecessary

capitalization omitted).

-2- J-S25041-24

“Crucial to the determination of any PCRA appeal is the timeliness of the

underlying petition. Thus, we must first determine whether the instant PCRA

petition was timely filed.” Commonwealth v. Brown, 141 A.3d 491, 499

(Pa. Super. 2016) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “The timeliness

requirement for PCRA petitions is mandatory and jurisdictional in nature, and

the court may not ignore it in order to reach the merits of the petition.” Id.

(quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Commonwealth

Fantauzzi, 275 A.3d 986, 994 (Pa. Super. 2022) (“the timeliness of a PCRA

petition is jurisdictional and [] if the petition is untimely, courts lack

jurisdiction over the petition and cannot grant relief”). “As the timeliness of

a PCRA petition is a question of law, our standard of review is de novo and

our scope of review is plenary.” Commonwealth v. Callahan, 101 A.3d 118,

121 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation omitted).

A petition for relief under the PCRA, including a second or subsequent

petition, must be filed within one year of the date the judgment of sentence

becomes final unless the petitioner pleads and proves that an exception to the

time limitation is met. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1). The exceptions to the one-

year time bar include:

(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of interference by government officials with the presentation of the claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States;

(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or

-3- J-S25041-24

(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and has been held by that court to apply retroactively.

Id. § 9545(b)(1)(i-iii). A PCRA petition invoking a statutory exception must

be filed within one year of the date the claim could have been presented.

Id. § 9545(b)(2).

Tisdall’s judgment of sentence became final on June 2, 2000, when the

time for filing a direct appeal expired. See Commonwealth v. Claffey, 80

A.3d 780, 783 (Pa. Super. 2013) (“[W]hen post-sentence motions are filed,

the judgment of sentence does not become final until those motions are

decided.”). As such, the instant PCRA petition, filed on July 5, 2023, is facially

untimely. See Tisdall’s Brief at 8 (recognizing the PCRA petition was untimely

filed).

Tisdall claims, however, that there was a breakdown in the PCRA court

when it did not properly advise him of his appellant rights following the denial

of his first PCRA petition. Tisdall’s Brief at 9-10. Tisdall argues that this case

therefore presents extraordinary circumstances warranting relief. Id. To

support his argument, Tisdall cites to Commonwealth v. Valentine, 287

A.3d 872 (Pa. Super. Oct. 18, 2022) (non-precedential decision) (vacating

dismissal of appellant’s second PCRA petition where the PCRA court

erroneously advised appellant of his appellate rights after the denial of his first

-4- J-S25041-24

PCRA petition, causing a breakdown of the judicial process). Tisdall’s Brief at

9.

Upon review, we conclude that Tisdall failed to invoke, let alone

establish, any exceptions to the one-year time bar. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1).

His citation to Valentine does not provide an avenue for relief, as the law is

clear he must establish an exception to the one-year time limit in order for

this Court (or any court) to have jurisdiction to decide the merits. Valentine

does not fall under any of the PCRA’s time-bar exceptions—it does not create

a new constitutional right or apply retroactively, nor does Tisdall make any

claim in support of such a finding.

Moreover, the facts and circumstances at issue in Valentine—wherein

the PCRA petitioner had been misinformed of his appellate rights, which

directly impacted the timeliness of his first PCRA petition—are not present

here. Tisdall does not dispute he filed a timely first PCRA petition, and a timely

appeal following its denial, which this Court affirmed.

The underlying PCRA petition was untimely, and Tisdall failed to plead

and prove that any exceptions apply. Accordingly, neither the PCRA court nor

this Court have jurisdiction to consider the merits of Tisdall’s claims. See

Commonwealth v. Derrickson, 923 A.2d 466, 468 (Pa. Super. 2007)

(“Without jurisdiction, we simply do not have the legal authority to address

the substantive claims.”) (citation omitted).

Order affirmed.

-5- J-S25041-24

Date: 8/16/2024

-6-