NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA
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v. :
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RAYFIQ TIGGLE :
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Appellant : No. 3232 EDA 2024
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered November 15, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0001752-2023
BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., SULLIVAN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E. * MEMORANDUM BY SULLIVAN, J.: FILED AUGUST 26, 2026 Rayfiq Tiggle (“Tiggle”) appeals from the judgment of sentence following his convictions for two counts of first-degree murder, and single counts of conspiracy to commit murder and possessing an instrument of crime (“PIC”). 1 Because there is no merit to Tiggle’s claims that the trial court erred by denying his motion in limine and that the Commonwealth presented insufficient evidence, and he waived his claim that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence is waived, we affirm.
In early June 2021, Isaiah Jones’s (“Jones”) younger brother was shot and killed. See N.T., 11/8/24, at 94. Jones and Tariq Chambers
(“Chambers”) are cousins. Approximately one week later, Chambers drove
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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1 See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502(a), 903(a), 907(a).
Jones and Tiggle, in a white car, to 55th and Arch Streets in Philadelphia. Nasire Brooks (“Brooks”) and Steven Griffin (“Griffin”, collectively, “the victims”) were walking down the street when Tiggle and Jones got out of the car and fired sixteen shots at them, striking them ten times and killing them. See N.T. 11/6/24, at 142, 147. Tiggle and Jones reentered the car, and Chambers drove them from the scene. See N.T., 11/7/24, at 107–17. The police located the car, registered to Chambers’s girlfriend, less than a mile away. See N.T. 11/6/24, at 59-60, 65-66; N.T., 11/8/24, at 83. Later investigation disclosed the presence of masks and Tiggle’s fingerprints inside the car. See Trial Court Opinion, 6/30/25, at 2.
Surveillance camera footage from eight minutes after the shooting revealed four men2 running up the street away from the car in which Chambers and his co-conspirators fled. See N.T., 11/7/24, at 107–17. Three of the men then entered an alley that led to Chambers’s back door. See id. at 113-14. The fourth man continued on the street. It was later determined he was neither a shooter nor the driver of the car. See Trial Court Opinion, 6/30/25, at 2.
At trial, Detective Mikal Carr (“Detective Carr”) identified Chambers and Tiggle from the video footage after having worked in the area for seven years and observed Chambers with Tiggle “50 to 100 times.” N.T. 11/6/24, 167–
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2 Police later determined the car had a fourth occupant, Hamza Ruley (“Ruley”). See N.T., 11/8/24, 88.
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73. Detective Robert Lamanna (“Detective Lamanna”) also testified that Chambers and Tiggle appeared in the surveillance footage. See N.T., 11/6/24, at 149-50.
The same day as the shooting, Dwayne Campbell (“Campbell”)
identified Jones as one of the individuals involved in the shooting. See id. at 3. He told police the homicide was motivated by the recent killing of Jones’s younger brother, and that Jones had told Campbell that he and his brother had got “him.” See id. Campbell also reported Jones showed him a firearm and stated it had “two bodies on it.” N.T. 11/7/24, at 42.
Shortly before trial, Tiggle made an oral motion in limine to exclude identification of Tiggle made by a police officer. See N.T., 11/4/24, at 7-8. Assuming that the witness would be Officer Carr, Tiggle moved to exclude his testimony as to his identification. See id. at 8. The trial court denied the motion. See Order, 11/4/24.
In November 2024, a jury convicted Chambers, Jones, and Tiggle of two counts of first-degree murder and conspiracy to commit murder. Jones and Tiggle were also found guilty of possession of an instrument of crime.
Before sentencing, Tiggle made an oral motion nominally challenging the weight of the evidence pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 607, but seeking judgment of acquittal, and was ultimately rephrased to challenge the “insufficiency of the weight of the evidence . . . .” N.T., 11/15/24, at 22. The trial court interpreted this as a sufficiency claim. It denied the motion on the basis that the evidence was sufficient, the weight was ample, and the verdict
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did not shock the Court’s conscience. See id. at 23. No other post-sentence motions appear in the record.
Tiggle was sentenced to consecutive sentences of life imprisonment for both murder convictions and concurrent sentences for conspiracy and PIC. Tiggle timely appealed, and he and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
Tiggle raises the following issues for our review:
1. Whether the trial court erred, abused its discretion and denied [Tiggle] a fair trial in denying [Tiggle’s] motion in limine to exclude identification testimony from Detectives Lamanna and Carr who identified [Tiggle] from crime scene videos and photos based on their past observations of [Tiggle] thereby providing improper opinion testimony and inadmissible evidence?
2. Whether there was insufficient evidence to support [Tiggle’s]
conviction for two counts of first-degree murder, criminal conspiracy to commit murder, and possession of an instrument of crime?
3. Whether the trial court erred in denying [Tiggle’s] motion to vacate his conviction for two counts of first-degree murder, criminal conspiracy to commit murder, and possession of an instrument of crime as being against the weight of the evidence?
Tiggle’s Brief at 5.
In his first issue, Tiggle asserts the trial court improperly admitted police officer lay witness testimony that identified him as one of the people in the crime scene videos. Our standard of review for evidentiary issues is as follows:
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The admission of evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will be reversed only upon a showing that the trial court clearly abused its discretion. Accordingly, a ruling admitting evidence will not be disturbed on appeal unless that ruling reflects manifest unreasonableness, or partiality, prejudice, bias, or illwill , or such lack of support to be clearly erroneous.
Commonwealth v. Berry, 172 A.3d 1, 3 (Pa. Super. 2017) (internal citations, quotations, and brackets omitted).
Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 701 addresses the admission of opinion testimony by lay witnesses and provides:
If a witness is not testifying as an expert, testimony in the form of an opinion is limited to one that is:
(a) rationally based on the witness’s perception;
(b) helpful to clearly understanding the witness’s testimony or to determining a fact in issue; and
(c) not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702.
Pa.R.E. 701.
This Court has explained that lay witnesses are generally permitted to express opinions related to their observations on a range of subject areas based on their personal experiences that are helpful to the factfinder; pursuant to Rule of Evidence 104(a), the trial court uses its discretion to determine whether the lay opinion is helpful to the factfinder. See Berry, 172 A.3d at 3-4. Thus, police officers who have the requisite personal experience, may offer lay testimony identifying a defendant in video footage. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Palmer, 192 A.3d 85, 100-01 (Pa. Super. 2018) (holding detective’s lay opinion testimony identifying the appellant as
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the shooter depicted in surveillance videos was properly admitted because the testimony was based on the officer’s perceptions and was “helpful in allowing the jury to reach a clear understanding of all his testimony”); Commonwealth v. Hassinger, No. 168 MDA 2020, 2021 WL 2904754 at *8 (Pa. Super. July 9, 2021) (non-precedential memorandum) (discerning no abuse of discretion where trial court admitted lay witness opinion testimony of officers identifying the appellant from a surveillance video where those officers had previously interacted with him); Commonwealth v. Malcolm, No. 954 EDA 2022, 2023 WL 7548788 at *16 (Pa. Super. Nov. 14, 2023) (non- precedential memorandum) (agreeing with trial court’s analysis that police officer’s lay testimony identifying the appellant in surveillance video was admissible because the officer had prior interactions with the appellant, even where the video was not totally clear at times”). 3 Tiggle does not contest that police officers may offer lay opinion identification testimony and Tiggle himself cites Palmer, Hassinger, and Malcolm. See Tiggle’s Brief at 15-16. However, he asserts these cases are inapposite for the following reasons: the testimony that he was seen with Chambers 50 to 100 times was used to portray him as a constant subject of police investigation and amounted to improper character evidence; the only
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3See Pa.R.A.P. 126(b) (non-precedential memoranda decision of Superior Court filed after May 1, 2019, may be cited for persuasive value).
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distinctive feature used to identify him was his hair; and the officers improperly stated he was the person in the video. See id. at 17-20.
The trial court concluded Tiggle’s claim merited no relief. It explained that Detectives Lamanna and Carr were sufficiently familiar with Tiggle (and Chambers), were able to identify Tiggle based on “the blond twisty style hair he had at the time,” and the fact he had the same build and skin complexion as the person in the video, as well as his proximity to areas they frequented, and his known companionship with Chambers. Id. at 6-8.
We discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s ruling admitting the officers’ testimony identifying Tiggle from the surveillance footage. Detectives Lamanna’s and Carr’s identification of Tiggle was rationally based on their perception of Tiggle from multiple prior interactions with him. See N.T., 11/6/24, at 149-50, 168 (Detectives Lamanna and Carr testifying that they had been aware of Tiggle for years, and Detective Carr had seen Tiggle 50- 100 times). Their testimony was helpful to identify Tiggle at the scene. See Palmer, 192 A.3d 85, 100-01. The jury was free to believe or disbelieve their testimony. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Detective Lamanna and Detective Carr’s lay witness identification testimony.
To the extent Tiggle claims the officers’ testimony amounted to improper character evidence, Tiggle was required to make a timely and specific objection to that effect before or during trial. See Commonwealth v. Sauers, 159 A.3d 1, 8-9 (Pa. Super. 2017). Tiggle has not stated if and where he preserved this evidentiary objection, and after an independent
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review of the record, we are unable to find whether he asserted an objection on that basis.4 Further, Tiggle’s claim that the detectives conclusively identified him as the individual in the video is underdeveloped for this Court to review. Tiggle does not specify where in the record the detectives allegedly made these statements, reference or explain which cases support his assertion, and fails to connect the testimony at trial with case law. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a), (c) (providing that the argument must be followed by discussion and citation of pertinent authorities and references to the record must set forth where in the record the matter appears). Therefore, Tiggle waived this portion of his challenge. Finally, Tiggle’s claim that his only distinctive feature was his hair does not align with the testimony at trial, which established his blond dreadlocks were one, but not the only, factor used to identify him. See N.T., 11/6/24, at 156-57, 163. Thus, Tiggle’s argument that his case materially differs from other cases where this Court has found that a police officer’s lay testimony identifying an appellant in a video is unavailing.
In his second issue, Tiggle asserts the Commonwealth failed to present sufficient evidence to support his convictions. To preserve a sufficiency claim, an appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement “must specify the element or elements
upon which the evidence was insufficient.” Commonwealth v. Widger, 237
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4 Moreover, Tiggle offers neither case law nor argument to establish that the
officers’ testimony they saw him 50-100 times with another man was proof of criminality or bad character.
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A.3d 1151, 1156 (Pa. Super. 2020). If an appellant does not specify such elements, he waives his sufficiency claim. See Commonwealth v. Roche, 153 A.3d 1063, 1072 (Pa. Super. 2017).
Preliminarily, we note that Tiggle’s Rule 1925(b) statement broadly states there was insufficient evidence to support all of his convictions; he generally contests the sufficiency of the evidence to show he was present in the car and at the scene, intended to join and committed an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy, possessed a firearm at the time of the murders, and intended to cause death or serious bodily injury. See Tiggle’s Rule 1925(b) Statement, 4/17/25, at 1-2. On appeal, Tiggle contests the evidence identifying him as one of the perpetrators as the basis to support his convictions. See Tiggle’s Brief at 21-26. Therefore, we review the sufficiency of the evidence on that basis only.
In any prosecution, the Commonwealth must establish the identity of the defendant as the perpetrator of the offenses beyond a reasonable doubt. See Commonwealth v. Smyser, 195 A.3d 912, 915 (Pa. Super. 2018). Generally, any indefiniteness or uncertainty in the identification evidence goes to the weight of the evidence, not sufficiency. See Commonwealth v. Orr, 38 A.3d 868, 874 (Pa. Super. 2011) (en banc). As with any element of an offense, the Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving the defendant’s identity as the perpetrator of the offenses by circumstantial evidence. See Smyser, 195 A.3d at 915.
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Tiggle asserts the Commonwealth failed to prove he was one of the two individuals who got out of Chambers’s car and shot the victims. See Tiggle’s Brief at 23. He argues there were no eyewitnesses or identification of the perpetrators during the crime itself. See id. He asserts Detectives Lamanna’s and Carr’s testimony identifying him as the person on the surveillance videos was insufficient to establish he conspired to kill, and did kill, the victims. See id. at 25.
The trial court disagreed and explained that the testimony established Tiggle, Chambers, and Jones waited for the victims, and Tiggle and Jones got out of the car and shot at the victims at least sixteen times. See Trial Court Opinion, 6/30/25, at 9. The trial court explained the evidence established Jones “committed the crimes of which he was convicted.” Id. at 10.
After careful review, we agree with the trial court that there was sufficient evidence identifying Tiggle as one of the men who murdered the victims. Although there were no eyewitnesses at the shooting, Detectives Lamanna and Carr identified Tiggle in surveillance video running away from the car used in the shooting, captured about eight minutes later. See N.T., 11/6/24, at 152-59, 168-72; N.T. 11/8/24, at 139. Tiggle’s fingerprints were also recovered from inside the passenger door of the car and cellphone location data connected him—as well as Chambers and Jones, who had an established motive—to the area at the time of the shooting. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving Tiggle’s identity by circumstantial evidence. See Smyser, 195 A.3d at 915. There was sufficient
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circumstantial evidence for the jury to find that he was a perpetrator of the offenses. See id. Therefore, Tiggle’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is meritless.5 In his third and final claim, Tiggle asserts all of his convictions were against the weight of the evidence. Tiggle failed to preserve his weight claim for appellate review by conflating a weight claim with a sufficiency claim.
To preserve a weight claim for appellate review, an appellant must make a motion for a new trial (1) orally, on the record, before sentencing, (2) by written motion before sentencing, or (3) in a post-sentence motion. Pa.R.Crim.P 607(A)(1)-(3); Commonwealth v. Rivera, 238 A.3d 482, 497 (Pa. Super. 2020). A weight claim that has not been properly preserved is waived, even if the trial court addresses the issue in its Rule 1925(a) Opinion. See id.
Simply asserting the verdict was against the weight of the evidence does not preserve a weight claim unless it specifies why the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. See id. at 496-97. Boilerplate motions include those that simply assert “the verdict was against the weight of the evidence[.]” Id. at 497 (citing Commonwealth v. Holmes, 461 A.2d 1268, 1273 (Pa. Super. 1983) (en banc)). Such a motion fails to preserve an issue
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5 To the extent that Tiggle again challenges Detective Lamanna’s testimony
as impermissible character testimony, his claim is waived for failure to specifically object on that basis before or at trial. See Sauers, 159 A.3d at 8-9.
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for appellate review unless it specifies “why the verdict was against the weight of the evidence.” Id. (citing Holmes, 461 A.2d at 1270) (emphasis removed)).
While it would appear Tiggle technically complied with Pa.R.Crim.P 607(A)(1), the substance of his oral motion failed to preserve his issue for appellate review. Tiggle’s counsel stated the following prior to sentencing:
Thank you, Your Honor. On behalf of [] Tiggle prior to the imposition of sentence here today, [] Tiggle would like to, pursuant to Pennsylvania [R]ules of [C]riminal [P]rocedure [R]ule 607 [(pertaining to challenges to the weight of the evidence)] and 608 [(pertaining to motions for a judgment of acquittal)] make an oral motion to this Court for judgment of acquittal, Your Honor, using as the basis the insufficiency and the—the insufficiency of the weight of the evidence that was presented to the jury in this matter which was ultimately used by the jury to enter a verdict of guilty against [] Tiggle.
N.T., 11/15/24, at 22.
The trial court, after allowing the Commonwealth to respond, denied the motion on the basis that “the evidence in this case was not only sufficient to support the verdicts, but that the weight of it was more than ample and in no way does it shock [the trial court’s] conscience.” Id. at 24.
Tiggle continues to conflate a claim challenging the sufficiency of the evidence with a claim challenging the weight of the evidence. For example, his requested relief, a judgment of acquittal, pertains to challenges to sufficiency. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 606. He has further merged these claims by basing his argument on the “insufficiency of the weight of the evidence[.]” N.T., 11/15/24, at 22. A claim challenging the weight of the evidence is
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distinct from a claim challenging the sufficiency of the evidence; notably, a claim challenging the weight of the evidence concedes sufficient evidence was presented to sustain the verdict. See Commonwealth v. Widmer, 744 A.2d 745, 751 (Pa. 2000). Further, his boilerplate statement preserved no issue for appellate review by failing to explain why the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. See Rivera, 238 A.3d at 497. While the trial court addressed Tiggle’s oral motion as implicating both the sufficiency and weight of the evidence, and addressed his weight claim on appeal, his claim is waived for appellate review. See id.6 Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Date: 8/26/2026
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6 Even if Tiggle had properly preserved his claim, it would merit no relief. “Relief on a weight of the evidence claim is reserved for extraordinary circumstances, when the [fact-finder’s] verdict is so contrary to the evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice and the award of a new trial is imperative so that right may be given another opportunity to prevail.” Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 36 A.3d 24, 39 (Pa. 2011) (internal citation and quotations omitted). The trial court did not abuse its discretion by determining that, in light of the witnesses and other evidence of guilt, the jury’s verdict did not shock the conscience. See Trial Court Opinion, 6/30/25, at 11. Moreover, to the extent that Tiggle again contests identification evidence, we have addressed that claim in his first and second issue.