J-S34042-25
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : ROMELL THOMPSON : : Appellant : No. 419 MDA 2025
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered March 4, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-21-CR-0002705-2008
BEFORE: STABILE, J., SULLIVAN, J., and BENDER, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED DECEMBER 16, 2025
Appellant, Romell Thompson, appeals pro se from the post-conviction
court’s order denying, as untimely, his sixth petition filed under the Post
Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. After careful review,
we affirm.
The facts underlying Appellant’s conviction are not germane to our
disposition of his instant appeal. Procedurally, we need only note that on June
25, 2009, a jury convicted Appellant of two counts of possession with intent
to deliver (PWID) and one count of conspiracy to commit PWID. On August
25, 2009, Appellant was sentenced to an aggregate term of 10 to 20 years’
incarceration, which this Court affirmed on appeal. See Commonwealth v.
Thompson, 11 A.3d 1043 (Pa. Super. 2010) (unpublished memorandum).
Appellant did not file a petition for allowance of appeal with our Supreme
Court. J-S34042-25
Appellant thereafter litigated five unsuccessful PCRA petitions. We
affirmed the denials of two of those petitions on appeal. See
Commonwealth v. Thompson, 175 A.3d 1106 (Pa. Super. 2017)
(unpublished memorandum); Commonwealth v. Thompson, 105 A.3d 801
(Pa. Super. 2014) (unpublished memorandum), appeal denied, 104 A.3d 4
(Pa. 2014).
On March 3, 2025, Appellant filed a pro se “Motion to Open and Vacate
Sentence/Order Pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 5505,” which underlies his instant
appeal. Therein, Appellant alleged that “[f]raud upon the court” had occurred
when “the District Attorney’s Office … colluded and conspired with the court in
a deliberate[,] planned scheme to sentence [Appellant] under mandatory[-]
minimum laws which [have] been deemed unconstitutional with the passing
of … Alleyne….”1 Motion, 3/3/25, at 3 (unnumbered; unnecessary
capitalization omitted). On March 4, 2025, the court issued an order stating
that it was treating Appellant’s motion as a PCRA petition, and dismissing it
without a hearing on the basis that it was untimely.2 ____________________________________________
1 See Alleyne v. U.S., 570 U.S. 99, 116 (2013) (holding that facts, other than a prior conviction, which increase a mandatory-minimum sentence must be submitted to the fact-finder and found beyond a reasonable doubt).
2 There is no indication that the court provided a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of
its intent to dismiss Appellant’s PCRA petition before issuing its order dismissing it. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(1) (stating that if, after reviewing a PCRA petition, the judge is satisfied that no material issues are present and that the petitioner is not entitled to post-conviction relief, the judge “shall give notice to the parties of the intention to dismiss the petition and shall state in the (Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Appellant filed a timely, pro se notice of appeal.3 Herein, Appellant
states one issue for our review: “Did the [PCRA] court err as a matter of law
in failing to grant [A]ppellant’s motion [and] instead … interpretating it as a
PCRA [petition,] when fraud upon the court is not cognizable under the
PCRA…?” Appellant’s Brief at 7.
This Court’s standard of review regarding an order denying a petition
under the PCRA is whether the determination of the PCRA court is supported
by the evidence of record and is free of legal error. Commonwealth v.
Ragan, 923 A.2d 1169, 1170 (Pa. 2007). We must begin by addressing the
timeliness of Appellant’s petition, because the PCRA time limitations implicate ____________________________________________
notice the reasons for the dismissal”). However, Appellant does not raise any issue on appeal regarding the court’s failure to provide a Rule 907 notice, thereby waiving it for our review. See Commonwealth v. Taylor, 65 A.3d 462, 468 (Pa. Super. 2013) (holding that an appellant’s failure to challenge the absence of a Rule 907 notice on appeal constitutes waiver of the defect). Additionally, we have found that a PCRA court’s failure to issue a Rule 907 notice is not reversible error where the record is clear that the PCRA petition is untimely. See Commonwealth v. Zeigler, 148 A.3d 849, 851 n.2 (Pa. Super. 2016). For the reasons stated infra, Appellant’s petition is clearly untimely and, therefore, even if not waived, we would not reverse the court’s order dismissing his petition based on its failure to provide a Rule 907 notice.
3 We note that, on March 21, 2025, the PCRA court entered an order stating
that its March 4, 2025 PCRA order was returned by the Department of Corrections and, therefore, it was granting Appellant an additional 30 days to file an appeal. On March 28, 2025, Appellant filed the instant, pro se notice of appeal, stating that his appeal is “from the Order of Court entered in this matter on the 21[st] day of March 2025.” Notice of Appeal, 3/28/25, at 1 (single page). Although Appellant erroneously stated that his appeal lies from the March 21, 2025 order giving him an additional 30 days to file an appeal, it was clear that he intended to appeal from the court’s March 4, 2025 order dismissing his petition. Accordingly, the caption has been corrected to reflect that the appeal lies from the PCRA court’s order entered on March 4, 2025.
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our jurisdiction and may not be altered or disregarded in order to address the
merits of a petition. See Commonwealth v. Bennett, 930 A.2d 1264, 1267
(Pa. 2007). Under the PCRA, any petition for post-conviction relief, including
a second or subsequent one, must be filed within one year of the date the
judgment of sentence becomes final, unless one of the following exceptions
set forth in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii) applies:
(b) Time for filing petition.--
(1) Any petition under this subchapter, including a second or subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of the date the judgment becomes final, unless the petition alleges and the petitioner proves that:
(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of interference by government officials with the presentation of the claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States;
(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or
(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and has been held by that court to apply retroactively.
42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). Additionally, any petition attempting to
invoke one of these exceptions must “be filed within one year of the date the
claim could have been presented.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2).
Here, Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final on September 29,
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J-S34042-25
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : ROMELL THOMPSON : : Appellant : No. 419 MDA 2025
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered March 4, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-21-CR-0002705-2008
BEFORE: STABILE, J., SULLIVAN, J., and BENDER, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED DECEMBER 16, 2025
Appellant, Romell Thompson, appeals pro se from the post-conviction
court’s order denying, as untimely, his sixth petition filed under the Post
Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. After careful review,
we affirm.
The facts underlying Appellant’s conviction are not germane to our
disposition of his instant appeal. Procedurally, we need only note that on June
25, 2009, a jury convicted Appellant of two counts of possession with intent
to deliver (PWID) and one count of conspiracy to commit PWID. On August
25, 2009, Appellant was sentenced to an aggregate term of 10 to 20 years’
incarceration, which this Court affirmed on appeal. See Commonwealth v.
Thompson, 11 A.3d 1043 (Pa. Super. 2010) (unpublished memorandum).
Appellant did not file a petition for allowance of appeal with our Supreme
Court. J-S34042-25
Appellant thereafter litigated five unsuccessful PCRA petitions. We
affirmed the denials of two of those petitions on appeal. See
Commonwealth v. Thompson, 175 A.3d 1106 (Pa. Super. 2017)
(unpublished memorandum); Commonwealth v. Thompson, 105 A.3d 801
(Pa. Super. 2014) (unpublished memorandum), appeal denied, 104 A.3d 4
(Pa. 2014).
On March 3, 2025, Appellant filed a pro se “Motion to Open and Vacate
Sentence/Order Pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 5505,” which underlies his instant
appeal. Therein, Appellant alleged that “[f]raud upon the court” had occurred
when “the District Attorney’s Office … colluded and conspired with the court in
a deliberate[,] planned scheme to sentence [Appellant] under mandatory[-]
minimum laws which [have] been deemed unconstitutional with the passing
of … Alleyne….”1 Motion, 3/3/25, at 3 (unnumbered; unnecessary
capitalization omitted). On March 4, 2025, the court issued an order stating
that it was treating Appellant’s motion as a PCRA petition, and dismissing it
without a hearing on the basis that it was untimely.2 ____________________________________________
1 See Alleyne v. U.S., 570 U.S. 99, 116 (2013) (holding that facts, other than a prior conviction, which increase a mandatory-minimum sentence must be submitted to the fact-finder and found beyond a reasonable doubt).
2 There is no indication that the court provided a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of
its intent to dismiss Appellant’s PCRA petition before issuing its order dismissing it. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(1) (stating that if, after reviewing a PCRA petition, the judge is satisfied that no material issues are present and that the petitioner is not entitled to post-conviction relief, the judge “shall give notice to the parties of the intention to dismiss the petition and shall state in the (Footnote Continued Next Page)
-2- J-S34042-25
Appellant filed a timely, pro se notice of appeal.3 Herein, Appellant
states one issue for our review: “Did the [PCRA] court err as a matter of law
in failing to grant [A]ppellant’s motion [and] instead … interpretating it as a
PCRA [petition,] when fraud upon the court is not cognizable under the
PCRA…?” Appellant’s Brief at 7.
This Court’s standard of review regarding an order denying a petition
under the PCRA is whether the determination of the PCRA court is supported
by the evidence of record and is free of legal error. Commonwealth v.
Ragan, 923 A.2d 1169, 1170 (Pa. 2007). We must begin by addressing the
timeliness of Appellant’s petition, because the PCRA time limitations implicate ____________________________________________
notice the reasons for the dismissal”). However, Appellant does not raise any issue on appeal regarding the court’s failure to provide a Rule 907 notice, thereby waiving it for our review. See Commonwealth v. Taylor, 65 A.3d 462, 468 (Pa. Super. 2013) (holding that an appellant’s failure to challenge the absence of a Rule 907 notice on appeal constitutes waiver of the defect). Additionally, we have found that a PCRA court’s failure to issue a Rule 907 notice is not reversible error where the record is clear that the PCRA petition is untimely. See Commonwealth v. Zeigler, 148 A.3d 849, 851 n.2 (Pa. Super. 2016). For the reasons stated infra, Appellant’s petition is clearly untimely and, therefore, even if not waived, we would not reverse the court’s order dismissing his petition based on its failure to provide a Rule 907 notice.
3 We note that, on March 21, 2025, the PCRA court entered an order stating
that its March 4, 2025 PCRA order was returned by the Department of Corrections and, therefore, it was granting Appellant an additional 30 days to file an appeal. On March 28, 2025, Appellant filed the instant, pro se notice of appeal, stating that his appeal is “from the Order of Court entered in this matter on the 21[st] day of March 2025.” Notice of Appeal, 3/28/25, at 1 (single page). Although Appellant erroneously stated that his appeal lies from the March 21, 2025 order giving him an additional 30 days to file an appeal, it was clear that he intended to appeal from the court’s March 4, 2025 order dismissing his petition. Accordingly, the caption has been corrected to reflect that the appeal lies from the PCRA court’s order entered on March 4, 2025.
-3- J-S34042-25
our jurisdiction and may not be altered or disregarded in order to address the
merits of a petition. See Commonwealth v. Bennett, 930 A.2d 1264, 1267
(Pa. 2007). Under the PCRA, any petition for post-conviction relief, including
a second or subsequent one, must be filed within one year of the date the
judgment of sentence becomes final, unless one of the following exceptions
set forth in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii) applies:
(b) Time for filing petition.--
(1) Any petition under this subchapter, including a second or subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of the date the judgment becomes final, unless the petition alleges and the petitioner proves that:
(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of interference by government officials with the presentation of the claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States;
(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or
(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and has been held by that court to apply retroactively.
42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). Additionally, any petition attempting to
invoke one of these exceptions must “be filed within one year of the date the
claim could have been presented.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2).
Here, Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final on September 29,
2010, at the expiration of the thirty-day time-period for seeking review with
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the Pennsylvania Supreme Court from this Court’s August 30, 2010 decision
affirming his judgment of sentence. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3) (stating
that a judgment of sentence becomes final at the conclusion of direct review
or the expiration of the time for seeking the review); Pa.R.A.P. 1113(a)
(directing that “a petition for allowance of appeal shall be filed with the
Prothonotary of the Supreme Court within 30 days after the entry of the order
of the Superior Court … sought to be reviewed”). Thus, Appellant had until
September 29, 2011, to file a timely petition, making his instant petition filed
in 2025 patently untimely. Accordingly, for this Court to have jurisdiction to
review the merits thereof, Appellant must prove that he meets one of the
exceptions to the timeliness requirements set forth in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b).
Appellant fails to meet this burden, as he does not attempt to plead or
prove any timeliness exception. Instead, Appellant contends that his claim is
not cognizable under the PCRA or subject to its timeliness requirement. He
reasons that 42 Pa.C.S. § 5505 permits a court to “modify or rescind any order
within 30 days after its entry, notwithstanding the prior termination of any
term of court, if no appeal from such order has been taken or allowed.”
Appellant’s Brief at 10. Appellant then avers that section 5505 “does not
expressly limit the authority [of the court] after the 30[-]day period has
expired.” Id. at 11. Indeed, he insists that “section 5505 was never intended
to create a strict jurisdictional deadline for correcting orders where there is an
obvious illegality in the sentence.” Id. Appellant contends that, instead, the
court retains “the inherent power … to correct obvious and patent mistakes[,]”
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such as a “punishment procured by fraud….” Id. at 12. Because, here,
Appellant avers that his sentence was “obtained through the use of fraud[,]”
the court had the power to correct his illegal sentence outside the ambit of
the PCRA. Id.
We disagree. Although Appellant attempts to frame his allegation as
one of ‘fraud upon the court,’ his underlying assertion is that the sentence
imposed by the court is illegal pursuant to Alleyne. A challenge to the legality
of a sentence is cognizable under the PCRA. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2)(vii).
The PCRA unequivocally mandates that it “shall be the sole means of obtaining
collateral relief and encompass[] all other common law and statutory
remedies for the same purpose that exist when this subchapter takes effect,
including habeas corpus and coram nobis.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9542 (emphasis
added). Accordingly, Appellant can only obtain relief for his allegedly illegal
sentence via the PCRA, and he must demonstrate that he has met the
timeliness requirement of section 9545, or an exception thereto, to trigger the
court’s jurisdiction to consider his legality of sentencing claim. See
Commonwealth v. Jackson, 30 A.3d 516, 522 (Pa. Super. 2011)
(concluding that a claim that the trial court has the inherent authority to
correct an obvious error in a sentence is cognizable under the PCRA, and must
meet the jurisdictional requirements of section 9545 before the court can
consider it). Because Appellant’s petition is patently untimely, and he has not
pled or proven that any timeliness exception applies, the PCRA court lacked
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jurisdiction to correct his purportedly illegal sentence. Therefore, it did not
err in dismissing his petition.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq. Prothonotary
Date: 12/16/2025
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