J-S43035-22
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : ELIJAH GILBERT THOMPSON : : Appellant : No. 1466 EDA 2022
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered May 5, 2022 In the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-48-CR-0001901-2019
BEFORE: DUBOW, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and NICHOLS, J.
MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED JANUARY 9, 2023
Appellant Elijah Gilbert Thompson appeals from the May 5, 2022 order
which notified Appellant that the court intended to dismiss his second Post
Conviction Relief Act1 (PCRA) petition. Appellant’s PCRA counsel, Matthew J.
Deschler, Esq., has filed a petition to withdraw as counsel and a
Turner/Finley2 brief. We conclude that the PCRA court lacked jurisdiction to
enter this order; therefore, we quash.
As we write for the parties, we need not set forth a detailed recitation
of the factual and procedural history. Briefly, Appellant entered a negotiated
guilty plea to resisting arrest and disorderly conduct on August 28, 2019. That
____________________________________________
1 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.
2Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988); Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc). J-S43035-22
same day, the trial court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate term of three
to twelve months’ incarceration. Appellant did not file a direct appeal.
Appellant filed his first pro se PCRA petition on March 23, 2021. The
PCRA court appointed Brian Monahan, Esq. to represent Appellant. On June
17, 2021, Attorney Monahan filed a Turner/Finley no-merit letter. Appellant
filed a pro se objection to Attorney Monahan’s Turner/Finley letter and a
second pro se PCRA petition3 on October 5, 2021. The PCRA court then
appointed Robert Patterson, Esq. to replace Attorney Monahan as Appellant’s
counsel.
On February 22, 2022,4 the PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s first PCRA
petition without a hearing. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on
February 24, 2022, which this Court docketed at 853 EDA 2022.
3 Appellant captioned his second PCRA petition as a “motion to amend” his first pro se PCRA petition. The PCRA court did not grant Appellant permission to amend his first PCRA petition. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 905(A). Therefore, the PCRA court properly treated Appellant’s October 5, 2021 “motion to amend petition” as a second pro se PCRA petition instead of as an amended first PCRA petition. See Commonwealth v. Porter, 35 A.3d 4, 12 (Pa. 2012).
4 We note that although the PCRA court’s order dismissing Appellant’s first PCRA petition was time-stamped and entered on the docket on February 16, 2022, the docket entries reflect that the PCRA court served Appellant with a copy of this order on February 22, 2022. See Commonwealth v. Jerman, 762 A.2d 366, 368 (Pa. Super. 2000) (stating that “[i]n a criminal case, the date of entry of an order is the date the clerk of courts enters the order on the docket, furnishes a copy of the order to the parties, and records the time and manner of notice on the docket” (citations omitted)); see also Pa.R.Crim.P. 114(C)(2)(c); Pa.R.A.P. 108(a)(1), (d)(1).
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Attorney Patterson filed a Turner/Finley brief and a supplemental brief
with the PCRA court on April 28, 2022. On May 5, 2022,5 the PCRA court
issued a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of intent to dismiss Appellant’s second PCRA
petition without a hearing. Appellant filed a pro se notice of appeal6 from the
Rule 907 notice on May 10, 2022.7 This Court docketed the instant appeal at
1466 EDA 2022. Appellant filed a pro se court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)
statement. The PCRA court filed a Rule 1925(a) opinion concluding that this
appeal should be quashed as interlocutory. See PCRA Ct. Op., 7/8/22, at 7.
On July 21, 2021, the PCRA court appointed Attorney Deschler as PCRA
5 Although the PCRA court’s Rule 907 notice was time-stamped and marked on the docket on April 28, 2022, the docket entries reflect that the trial court served Appellant’s counsel on May 5, 2022. See Jerman, 762 A.2d at 368; Pa.R.Crim.P. 114(C)(2)(c); Pa.R.A.P. 108(a)(1), (d)(1). We have amended the caption accordingly.
6 Although Appellant was represented by counsel when he filed his pro se notice of appeal, the general prohibition against hybrid representation does not apply to a timely pro se notice of appeal. See Commonwealth v. Williams, 151 A.3d 621 (Pa. Super. 2016) (explaining that because a notice of appeal protects constitutional rights, it is distinguishable from other filings that require counsel, and this Court is required to docket a pro se notice of appeal despite the appellant being represented by counsel).
7 Subsequently, in an order dated July 6, 2022, and entered on July 11, 2022, the PCRA court purported to dismiss Appellant’s second PCRA petition. Appellant filed a notice of appeal from that order, which this Court docketed at 1859 EDA 2022. In a separate memorandum we also quash Appellant’s appeal at 1859 EDA 2022.
-3- J-S43035-22
On October 14, 2022, Attorney Deschler filed a Turner/Finley brief and
a petition to withdraw with this Court. On October 27, 2022, Appellant filed a
pro se response to Attorney Deschler’s Turner/Finley brief.
Before we address Attorney Deschler’s petition to withdraw, we must
consider whether the PCRA court had jurisdiction to enter the order being
appealed, which we may raise sua sponte. See, e.g., Commonwealth v.
Arcelay, 190 A.3d 609, 614 (Pa. Super. 2018). Our standard of review is de
novo, and our scope of review is plenary. Id.
“Any act taken by a court without proper jurisdiction is null and void.”
Commonwealth v. Harris, 230 A.3d 1124, 1127 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citation
and quotation marks omitted). This Court has recognized that “PCRA courts
are not jurisdictionally barred from considering multiple PCRA petitions
relating to the same judgment of sentence at the same time unless the PCRA
court’s order regarding a previously filed petition is on appeal and, therefore,
not yet final.” Commonwealth v. Montgomery, 181 A.3d 359, 365 (Pa.
Super. 2018) (en banc) (footnote omitted).
This Court has further explained that
Pennsylvania law makes clear the trial court has no jurisdiction to consider a subsequent PCRA petition while an appeal from the denial of the petitioner’s prior PCRA petition in the same case is still pending on appeal. Commonwealth v. Lark, [746 A.2d 585, 588 (Pa. 2000), overruled on other grounds by Commonwealth v. Small, 238 A.3d 1267 (Pa. 2020)]. See also [Montgomery, 181 A.3d at 364] (reaffirming that Lark precludes consideration of subsequent PCRA petition while appeal of prior PCRA petition is still pending).
-4- J-S43035-22
Commonwealth v. Beatty, 207 A.3d 957, 961 (Pa. Super. 2019).
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J-S43035-22
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : ELIJAH GILBERT THOMPSON : : Appellant : No. 1466 EDA 2022
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered May 5, 2022 In the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-48-CR-0001901-2019
BEFORE: DUBOW, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and NICHOLS, J.
MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED JANUARY 9, 2023
Appellant Elijah Gilbert Thompson appeals from the May 5, 2022 order
which notified Appellant that the court intended to dismiss his second Post
Conviction Relief Act1 (PCRA) petition. Appellant’s PCRA counsel, Matthew J.
Deschler, Esq., has filed a petition to withdraw as counsel and a
Turner/Finley2 brief. We conclude that the PCRA court lacked jurisdiction to
enter this order; therefore, we quash.
As we write for the parties, we need not set forth a detailed recitation
of the factual and procedural history. Briefly, Appellant entered a negotiated
guilty plea to resisting arrest and disorderly conduct on August 28, 2019. That
____________________________________________
1 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.
2Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988); Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc). J-S43035-22
same day, the trial court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate term of three
to twelve months’ incarceration. Appellant did not file a direct appeal.
Appellant filed his first pro se PCRA petition on March 23, 2021. The
PCRA court appointed Brian Monahan, Esq. to represent Appellant. On June
17, 2021, Attorney Monahan filed a Turner/Finley no-merit letter. Appellant
filed a pro se objection to Attorney Monahan’s Turner/Finley letter and a
second pro se PCRA petition3 on October 5, 2021. The PCRA court then
appointed Robert Patterson, Esq. to replace Attorney Monahan as Appellant’s
counsel.
On February 22, 2022,4 the PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s first PCRA
petition without a hearing. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on
February 24, 2022, which this Court docketed at 853 EDA 2022.
3 Appellant captioned his second PCRA petition as a “motion to amend” his first pro se PCRA petition. The PCRA court did not grant Appellant permission to amend his first PCRA petition. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 905(A). Therefore, the PCRA court properly treated Appellant’s October 5, 2021 “motion to amend petition” as a second pro se PCRA petition instead of as an amended first PCRA petition. See Commonwealth v. Porter, 35 A.3d 4, 12 (Pa. 2012).
4 We note that although the PCRA court’s order dismissing Appellant’s first PCRA petition was time-stamped and entered on the docket on February 16, 2022, the docket entries reflect that the PCRA court served Appellant with a copy of this order on February 22, 2022. See Commonwealth v. Jerman, 762 A.2d 366, 368 (Pa. Super. 2000) (stating that “[i]n a criminal case, the date of entry of an order is the date the clerk of courts enters the order on the docket, furnishes a copy of the order to the parties, and records the time and manner of notice on the docket” (citations omitted)); see also Pa.R.Crim.P. 114(C)(2)(c); Pa.R.A.P. 108(a)(1), (d)(1).
-2- J-S43035-22
Attorney Patterson filed a Turner/Finley brief and a supplemental brief
with the PCRA court on April 28, 2022. On May 5, 2022,5 the PCRA court
issued a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of intent to dismiss Appellant’s second PCRA
petition without a hearing. Appellant filed a pro se notice of appeal6 from the
Rule 907 notice on May 10, 2022.7 This Court docketed the instant appeal at
1466 EDA 2022. Appellant filed a pro se court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)
statement. The PCRA court filed a Rule 1925(a) opinion concluding that this
appeal should be quashed as interlocutory. See PCRA Ct. Op., 7/8/22, at 7.
On July 21, 2021, the PCRA court appointed Attorney Deschler as PCRA
5 Although the PCRA court’s Rule 907 notice was time-stamped and marked on the docket on April 28, 2022, the docket entries reflect that the trial court served Appellant’s counsel on May 5, 2022. See Jerman, 762 A.2d at 368; Pa.R.Crim.P. 114(C)(2)(c); Pa.R.A.P. 108(a)(1), (d)(1). We have amended the caption accordingly.
6 Although Appellant was represented by counsel when he filed his pro se notice of appeal, the general prohibition against hybrid representation does not apply to a timely pro se notice of appeal. See Commonwealth v. Williams, 151 A.3d 621 (Pa. Super. 2016) (explaining that because a notice of appeal protects constitutional rights, it is distinguishable from other filings that require counsel, and this Court is required to docket a pro se notice of appeal despite the appellant being represented by counsel).
7 Subsequently, in an order dated July 6, 2022, and entered on July 11, 2022, the PCRA court purported to dismiss Appellant’s second PCRA petition. Appellant filed a notice of appeal from that order, which this Court docketed at 1859 EDA 2022. In a separate memorandum we also quash Appellant’s appeal at 1859 EDA 2022.
-3- J-S43035-22
On October 14, 2022, Attorney Deschler filed a Turner/Finley brief and
a petition to withdraw with this Court. On October 27, 2022, Appellant filed a
pro se response to Attorney Deschler’s Turner/Finley brief.
Before we address Attorney Deschler’s petition to withdraw, we must
consider whether the PCRA court had jurisdiction to enter the order being
appealed, which we may raise sua sponte. See, e.g., Commonwealth v.
Arcelay, 190 A.3d 609, 614 (Pa. Super. 2018). Our standard of review is de
novo, and our scope of review is plenary. Id.
“Any act taken by a court without proper jurisdiction is null and void.”
Commonwealth v. Harris, 230 A.3d 1124, 1127 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citation
and quotation marks omitted). This Court has recognized that “PCRA courts
are not jurisdictionally barred from considering multiple PCRA petitions
relating to the same judgment of sentence at the same time unless the PCRA
court’s order regarding a previously filed petition is on appeal and, therefore,
not yet final.” Commonwealth v. Montgomery, 181 A.3d 359, 365 (Pa.
Super. 2018) (en banc) (footnote omitted).
This Court has further explained that
Pennsylvania law makes clear the trial court has no jurisdiction to consider a subsequent PCRA petition while an appeal from the denial of the petitioner’s prior PCRA petition in the same case is still pending on appeal. Commonwealth v. Lark, [746 A.2d 585, 588 (Pa. 2000), overruled on other grounds by Commonwealth v. Small, 238 A.3d 1267 (Pa. 2020)]. See also [Montgomery, 181 A.3d at 364] (reaffirming that Lark precludes consideration of subsequent PCRA petition while appeal of prior PCRA petition is still pending).
-4- J-S43035-22
Commonwealth v. Beatty, 207 A.3d 957, 961 (Pa. Super. 2019).
Further, Rule of Appellate Procedure 1701 states, in relevant part, that
“[e]xcept as otherwise prescribed by these rules, after an appeal is taken . . .
the trial court . . . may no longer proceed further in the matter.” Pa.R.A.P.
1701(a); see also Harris, 230 A.3d at 1126 (noting that under Rule 1701(a)
“the filing of a notice of appeal divests the trial court of jurisdiction” (citations
omitted)).
Here, the PCRA court concluded that this appeal should be quashed as
interlocutory because it was not taken from a final order. See PCRA Ct. Op.,
7/8/22, at 7. In the alternative, the PCRA court found that Appellant’s second
PCRA petition was untimely filed. See id. at 7-8. However, the PCRA court
did not address whether it had jurisdiction to consider Appellant’s second PCRA
petition after Appellant filed the appeal at 853 EDA 2022.
Our review of the record indicates that Appellant’s appeal at 853 EDA
2022 was pending when the PCRA court issued its Rule 907 notice on May 5,
2022, which Appellant purports to challenge in the instant appeal. Therefore,
the PCRA court lacked jurisdiction to consider Appellant’s second PCRA
petition, even though it had been filed before Appellant appealed the dismissal
of his first PCRA petition. See Montgomery, 181 A.3d at 364-65; Beatty,
207 A.3d at 961; see also Pa.R.A.P. 1701(a). Because the PCRA court lacked
jurisdiction to enter its May 5, 2022 order, that order is a legal nullity. See
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Harris, 230 A.3d at 1127. Accordingly, we quash this appeal.8
Appeal quashed. Petition to withdraw as counsel dismissed as moot.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary
Date: 1/9/2023
8Based upon our disposition of this appeal, Attorney Deschler’s petition to withdraw as counsel is dismissed as moot.
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