Com. v. Thomas, R.

Opinion

J-A14007-26

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : RAHIDYAH S. THOMAS : : Appellant : No. 1035 EDA 2025

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered March 26, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0001032-2023

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., NICHOLS, J., and MURRAY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.: FILED JULY 24, 2026

Appellant, Rahidyah S. Thomas, appeals from the March 25, 2025

judgment of sentence of, inter alia, 3½ to 7 years of incarceration followed by

2 years of probation entered in the Philadelphia County Court of Common

Pleas following her non-jury conviction of Robbery 1 and related offenses.

Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for her robbery conviction

and the legality of her sentence. After careful review, we find that because

the Commonwealth charged Appellant with committing a robbery that

included the element of infliction of serious bodily injury on the victim but did

not present any evidence that the victim suffered serious bodily injury, we are

constrained to vacate the robbery conviction. We, therefore, remand with

instructions.

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1 18 Pa.C.S. § 3701(a)(1)(i). J-A14007-26

The relevant facts and procedural history are as follows. On January

20, 2023, as the victim, a food delivery driver, left a North Philadelphia

Chinese restaurant with an order, a tall dark-skinned man wearing a black ski

mask grabbed him from behind and instructed Appellant to grab the victim’s

gun from his pants pocket. The victim and Appellant struggled for the gun

and then fell to the ground. About three or four additional people rushed

inside the restaurant and began hitting the victim. The tall dark-skinned man

wearing the ski mask pried the gun from the victim’s hand and pointed it at

him. The group of assailants, including Appellant, then fled the restaurant

and ran down the street. Police apprehended Appellant shortly thereafter and

took her into custody.

The following day, the Commonwealth filed a criminal complaint alleging

that Appellant had committed, inter alia, Aggravated Assault and Robbery

when she, “in concert with others and in the course of committing a theft, []

threatened or intentionally put another in fear of serious bodily injury by

approaching [the victim], and struck [the victim] numerous time with hands

and feet including while [the victim] was being held from behind by another

person.” Criminal Complaint, 1/21/23. The Criminal Complaint did not,

however, cite any specific provision of the Crimes Code, including, most

relevant to our analysis, the provision that provides that the defendant, while

committing a robbery, threatened to inflict serious bodily injury.

Following Appellant’s February 6, 2023 preliminary hearing at which the

trial court dismissed the Aggravated Assault charge, the Commonwealth filed

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a criminal information (“Information”) formally charging Appellant with, inter

alia, Robbery—Inflict Serious Bodily Injury (“Inflict SBI”) under 18 Pa.C.S. §

3701(a)(1)(i) and Conspiracy. 2 The Commonwealth did not include the

robbery charge for threatening to inflict serious bodily injury pursuant to 18

Pa.C.S. § 3701(a)(1)(iii) (“Threat of SBI”).

On May 15, 2023, Appellant filed a motion to quash requesting

that the trial court dismiss the Robbery—Inflict SBI charge because at the

preliminary hearing, the Commonwealth failed to present any evidence that

the victim was injured, let alone suffered serious bodily injury. Appellant

further argued that this failure was confirmed by the fact that the Municipal

Court judge dismissed the Aggravated Assault charge.3 Motion, 5/15/23, at

¶¶ 8-9. Counsel also argued that the Commonwealth should amend the

Information to include the charge of Robbery—Threat of SBI. Id. at ¶ 12.

The Commonwealth did not do so.

The trial court subsequently conducted a two-day waiver trial at which,

inter alia, the victim testified. Notably, the victim did not offer any testimony

indicating he had suffered any injuries as a result of the incident.

Nevertheless, immediately following the trial, the court convicted Appellant of ____________________________________________

2 The Information also charged Appellant at Count 3 with Theft by Unlawful

Taking, at Count 4 with Receiving Stolen Property, at Count 5 with Simple Assault, and at Count 6 with Recklessly Endangering Another Person. Appellant has not challenged the disposition of any of these charges on appeal. 3 The trial court never ruled on the motion to quash.

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“Counts 1 through 5” which included the Robbery—Inflict SBI. The trial court

found Appellant not guilty of Recklessly Endangering Another Person, Count

Six.4 N.T. Trial, 10/4/24, at 65.

At the commencement of Appellant’s March 26, 2025 sentencing

hearing, Appellant’s counsel made an oral motion for judgment of acquittal

arguing that the Commonwealth had failed to prove Robbery—Inflict SBI

because it presented no evidence that the victim suffered any injuries. The

Commonwealth objected and argued that the court could uphold Appellant’s

conviction for Robbery—Threat of SBI because that charge is a lesser-included

offense of Robbery—Inflict SBI. Id. at 5. The trial court denied Appellant’s

motion for judgment of acquittal and declined Appellant’s request to clarify

under which subsection of the robbery statute it had convicted Appellant,

explaining only that the court found “that robbery of the first degree was made

out during the course of the trial.” Id. at 7. The court then sentenced

Appellant to term of 3½ to 7 years of incarceration followed by 2 years of

probation for the robbery conviction, and a concurrent term of 2 to 4 years

4 The convictions announced in open court conflict with the docketed “Trial Disposition and Dismissal Form” which indicates the court convicted Appellant of four offenses—Conspiracy to Commit Robbery—Inflict SBI, Theft by Unlawful Taking, Receiving Stolen Property, and Simple Assault—acquitted her of REAP, and nolle prossed the Conspiracy charge. The trial court clarified on the record at Appellant’s sentencing hearing that it had convicted Appellant of Robbery—Inflict SBI and not of Conspiracy to Commit Robbery—Inflict SBI and agreed to Appellant’s unopposed request to correct Count 1 as listed on the “Trial Disposition and Dismissal Form.” N.T. Sentencing Hr’g, 3/26/25, at 4-5.

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and 1 to 2 years of incarceration for the Theft and Simple Assault convictions,

respectively.5

The court further ordered as conditions of Appellant’s probation that

she: (1) be subject to a personal search or search of her property at the

discretion of probation, and (2) participate in mental health and drug and

alcohol treatment, a victim awareness class, and an anti-violence program.

Sentencing Order, 3/26/25. Appellant did not file a post-sentence motion.

This timely appeal followed. Both Appellant and the trial court complied

with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

Appellant raises the following three issues on appeal:

1. Whether the evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction of [Robbery—Inflict SBI] under 18 Pa.C.S. § 3701(a)(1)(i), where the Commonwealth presented no evidence that [Appellant] inflicted serious bodily injury upon another, no other subsection of the [R]obbery statute was charged in the [I]nformation, § 3701(a)(1)(ii) is not a lesser included offense of § 3701(a)(1)(i), and the conviction cannot be supported under any theory of vicarious liability?

2. Whether the lower court imposed an illegal sentence when it ordered that [Appellant] is “subject to undergo a personal search or search of [her] property at the discretion of probation,” as the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that such a condition of supervision is illegal?

3. Whether the lower court illegally imposed nonconfinement conditions as part of [Appellant’s] state confinement sentence, because these conditions are left to the exclusive authority of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections and [the] Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole?

5 The court imposed no further sentence for the Receiving Stolen Property conviction.

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Appellant’s Br. at 3-4.

Appellant’s first issue challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in

support of her conviction of Robbery—Inflict SBI as codified in Section

3701(a)(1)(i) of the Crimes Code. Our standard of review for challenges to

sufficiency of the evidence is well-settled. “A claim challenging the sufficiency

of the evidence is a question of law.” Commonwealth v. Widmer, 744 A.2d

745, 751 (Pa. 2000). When reviewing sufficiency challenges, we evaluate the

record in the light most favorable to the verdict-winner, giving the

Commonwealth the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the

evidence. Commonwealth v. Trinidad, 96 A.3d 1031, 1038 (Pa. Super.

2014). This Court will not disturb a verdict when “there is sufficient evidence

to enable the factfinder to find every element of the crime beyond a

reasonable doubt.” Commonwealth v. Sipps, 225 A.3d 1110, 1113 (Pa.

Super. 2019) (citation omitted). The Commonwealth can establish these

elements using solely circumstantial evidence. Id. Furthermore, the

factfinder is “entitled to draw reasonable inferences from the facts presented,

resolve any issues of credibility and believe all, part or none of the evidence.”

Commonwealth v. Hankerson, 444 A.2d 727, 728 (Pa. Super. 1982).

The Crimes Code has defined the offense of Robbery—Inflict SBI as

follows:

(a) Offense defined.—

(1) A person is guilty of robbery if, in the course of committing a theft, [s]he:

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(i) inflicts serious bodily injury upon another[.]

18 Pa.C.S. § 3701(a)(1)(i) (emphasis added). 6 “Serious bodily injury” means

“[b]odily injury which creates a substantial risk of death or which causes

serious, permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the

function of any bodily member or organ.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 2301.

Here, the record is clear, and the Commonwealth does not dispute, that

the Commonwealth did not present any evidence that the victim suffered any

actual injury, let alone serious bodily injury. Accordingly, the Commonwealth

did not prove that Appellant committed the charged offense of Robbery—

Inflict SBI. We, therefore, vacate Appellant’s conviction of Robbery charged

under Section 3701(a)(1)(i).

The Commonwealth argues that this Court should uphold Appellant’s

conviction notwithstanding the lack of evidence that the victim suffered a

serious bodily injury because Appellant was on notice that the Commonwealth

intended to pursue a conviction for the charge of threat of serious bodily

injury. To support this argument, the Commonwealth relies on the language

in the Criminal Complaint and Appellant’s own contention in the motion to

quash that, based on the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing, the

Commonwealth should amend the Information to include a charge of

Robbery—Threat of SBI. ____________________________________________

6 In contrast, a defendant commits Robbery—Threat of SBI if, in the course

of committing a theft, the defendant “threatens another with or intentionally puts him in fear of immediate serious bodily injury.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 3701(a)(1)(ii).

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The Commonwealth, however, has failed to provide us with any legal

authority, and we have found none, to support the contention that the

Commonwealth’s allegation in a criminal complaint supersedes the specific

charges in the Information so that it is the allegations in the Criminal

Complaint that provide the basis for a conviction rather than the specific

charges in the Information.

Additionally, we observe that by failing to amend the Information to

include Robbery—Threat of SBI, the Commonwealth did, in fact, put Appellant

on notice—notice that it was only pursing a conviction of Robbery—Inflict SBI

and not of Robbery—Threat of SBI. Moreover, the Commonwealth’s argument

that Appellant had notice of the appropriate charge because its counsel

suggested that the Commonwealth amend the Information defies logic. It is

the Commonwealth that determines which charges to pursue and, thus, which

charges to include in the Information; defense counsel’s knowledge of the

defect with the Information does not constitute appropriate notice of a charge

not listed in the Information and does not eliminate the Commonwealth’s

obligation to provide notice of the charges it has chosen to pursue.

In her remaining issues, Appellant asserts that her sentence is illegal

because the trial court exceeded its authority when it imposed supervisory

conditions as part of the sentence, including that she “be subject to a personal

search or search of her property at the discretion of probation” and participate

in various treatment programs. Appellant’s Br. at 52-62.

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A defendant who is sentenced to a maximum term of five or more years

of total or partial confinement “shall be committed to the Department of

Corrections for confinement.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9762(b)(1). When a defendant is

imprisoned in a state correctional institution pursuant to the above provision,

the state board of probation and parole “shall have exclusive power” to parole

and reparole the defendant, commit and recommit him for violations of parole,

and “[t]o establish special conditions of supervision for paroled offenders.” 61

Pa.C.S. § 6132(a)(1)(i), (3). A judge may make “a recommendation” to the

board of probation and parole regarding the term of imprisonment the

defendant should serve before parole is granted and regarding the terms of

parole. Id. at § 6134(1), (2). However, any such recommendations “shall be

advisory only” and are not “binding” on the board or the department of

corrections. Id. at § 6134(2).

In this case, the trial court sentenced Appellant to a term of

incarceration of 3½ to 7 years. Accordingly, the court imposed a state prison

sentence, and it is within the purview of the state board of probation and

parole, and not the trial court, to determine whether and when Appellant

should be paroled and the supervisory conditions of that parole that are

appropriate. While the sentencing court may provide recommendations to the

board regarding these matters, it did not have authority to order that they be

implemented. See Commonwealth v. Merced, 308 A.3d 1277, 1284 (Pa.

Super. 2024) (holding that the sentencing court lacked the authority to impose

conditions on its state sentence; while the court could recommend those

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conditions, it was up to the Department of Corrections and Board of Probation

and Parole to establish the conditions of his incarceration and parole)

Commonwealth v. Coulverson, 34 A.3d 135, 141-42 (Pa. Super. 2011)

(same).

In sum, we vacate Appellant’s judgment of sentence and her conviction

of Robbery—Inflict SBI. We affirm Appellant’s convictions of Theft, Simple

Assault, and Receiving Stolen Property, and remand for the court to reimpose

sentences for those convictions.

Judgment of sentence vacated. Robbery conviction vacated. Case

remanded with instructions. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Date: 7/24/2026

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