Com. v. Taylor, W.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: July 15, 2025
• Docket: 1141 EDA 2024
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

J-S12021-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA Appellant : : : v. : : : WALTER TAYLOR : No. 1141 EDA 2024

Appeal from the Suppression Order Entered April 5, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0006795-2023

BEFORE: STABILE, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and BENDER, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.: FILED JULY 15, 2025

The Commonwealth appeals from the order granting Walter Taylor’s

motion to suppress. The Commonwealth maintains that the trial court erred

in granting the motion because officers had reasonable suspicion to conduct

an investigative detention of Taylor. We reverse and remand for further

proceedings.

This case arose from Taylor’s encounter with Officer Walter Jackson and

his partner. Following this encounter, officers recovered a firearm, and Taylor

was arrested and charged. Taylor moved to suppress claiming that officers did

not have reasonable suspicion or probable cause to detain or arrest him.

Omnibus Pre-Trial Motion, filed 11/7/23. He also maintained that officers

recovered the firearm from his person following his unconstitutional seizure.

N.T., Motion to Suppress, 4/5/24, at 5. J-S12021-25

At the hearing on the motion, Officer Walter Jackson testified that in

September 2023 around 5:57 p.m., he saw Taylor in the area of 6800 Dicks

Avenue in Philadelphia. Id. at 6. At the time, Officer Jackson and his partner

were in a patrol car. Id. at 10.1 Officer Jackson described this area as a

“problem area” due to it being a high-crime area. Id. at 8. He explained that

he was assigned to the Five Squad Tactical Group that “goes and surveys

problem areas” including the area where he first saw Taylor. Id. at 7, 8. He

testified that he had made many firearms arrests in that area during

pedestrian stops and, in his experience, common characteristics for stops that

involved firearms include an individual “carrying a gun in their waistband or

jacket pocket or hoodie pocket or some – sort of that way.” Id. at 8.

Officer Jackson testified that he saw Taylor crossing the street and

noticed a bulge in his front waistband. Id. at 10. Officer Jackson believed the

bulge was a firearm. Id. at 17. Officer Jackson’s partner was driving, and he

pulled the patrol car over and asked Taylor “if he had a permit to carry.” Id.

at 10, 11. Taylor responded, “What you talking about?” Id. at 11. Officer

Jackson’s partner then opened the door of the patrol car and Taylor ran. Id.

Both officers pursued Taylor on foot and ultimately detained him. Id. at 11-

12. While Taylor ran, he reached for his waistband. Id. at 12. Officer Jackson

recovered a firearm that fell from Taylor’s waistband. Id. at 12, 15.

____________________________________________

1 The record does not mention the name of Officer Jackson’s partner.

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The court granted the motion, and this timely appeal followed. Id. at

35. The Commonwealth raises the following question: “Did the lower court err

by suppressing [Taylor’s] illegally possessed gun where, after police observed

a bulge in his waistband and inquired if he had a permit, [Taylor] responded

by fleeing through a high[-]crime area?” Taylor’s Br. at 3 (answer of trial court

omitted).

When reviewing the grant of a motion to suppress we “consider only the

evidence from the defendant’s witnesses together with the evidence of the

prosecution that, when read in the context of the entire record, remains

uncontradicted.” Commonwealth v. Lyn, 316 A.3d 1055, 1057 (Pa.Super.

2024) (citation omitted). We are bound by the suppression court’s factual

findings supported by the record. See id. However, we are not bound by the

suppression court’s legal conclusions. See id.

“The law recognizes three distinct levels of interaction between police

officers and citizens: (1) a mere encounter; (2) an investigative detention,...;

and (3) a custodial detention.” Commonwealth v. Dix, 207 A.3d 383, 388

(Pa.Super. 2019) (quoting Commonwealth v. Mackey, 177 A.3d 221, 227

(Pa.Super. 2017) (footnote omitted)).

“A mere encounter can be any formal or informal interaction between

an officer and a citizen, but will normally be an inquiry by the officer of a

citizen.” Mackey, 177 A.3d at 227 (citation omitted). Such an encounter

“carries no official compulsion to stop or respond” and does not need to "be

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justified by any level of police suspicion.” Id. (citation omitted). In contrast,

a custodial detention requires probable cause. See id.

An investigative detention “has elements of official compulsion” and

therefore “requires reasonable suspicion of unlawful activity.” Id. (citation

omitted). An investigative detention “subjects a suspect to a stop and period

of detention, but does not involve such coercive conditions as to constitute

the functional equivalent of arrest.” Commonwealth v. Morrison, 166 A.3d

357, 364 (Pa.Super. 2017) (citation omitted). To determine whether

reasonable suspicion existed, we apply a totality of the circumstances

approach, which includes consideration of factors such as “tips, the reliability

of the informants, time, location, and suspicious activity, including flight.” Id.

at 364-65 (citation omitted). Merely being present in a high crime area does

not justify an investigative detention. Id. at 365. Similarly, “mere possession

of a firearm does not establish reasonable suspicion to allow an officer to

approach and detain an individual in order to investigate whether he or she

was properly licensed to carry a firearm in public.” Commonwealth v. Ross,

297 A.3d 787, 798 (Pa.Super. 2023) (citing Commonwealth v. Hicks, 208

A.3d 916, 936 (Pa. 2019)).

The Commonwealth suggests that Taylor’s initial encounter with police

amounted to a mere encounter. After he fled from police, it alleges that

officers had reasonable suspicion to seize Taylor based on the totality of the

circumstances. It notes that police saw a bulge in Taylor’s waistband, the

interaction occurred in a high crime area, and Taylor fled when asked whether

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he had a permit to carry. The Commonwealth directs us to Commonwealth

v. Jones, 266 A.3d 1090 (Pa.Super. 2021) and Commonwealth v. Barnes,

296 A.3d 52 (Pa.Super. 2023).

The trial court determined that the “facts support the conclusion that

the interaction was an ‘investigative detention,’ which ‘must be supported by

a reasonable suspicion.’” Rule 1925(a) Opinion, (“1925(a) Op.”), filed

6/14/24, at 7 (quoting Commonwealth v. McAdoo, 46 A.3d 781, 784

(Pa.Super. 2012)). The court concluded that officers did not have reasonable

suspicion to stop Taylor because there was no evidence “that [Taylor] had

committed or was committing a crime” before officers stopped him. Id. at 9.

It found that “Officer Jackson’s suspicion of a firearm was simply a hunch” and

distinguished the case from Barnes. Id. at 10, 12.

There are two key distinctions between the instant case and Barnes. First, in Barnes, the defendant was part of a group of people that dispersed after seeing the police vehicle. In the instant case, there is no evidence that [Taylor] was part of a group of people or that he started walking away after seeing the police vehicle. Second, in Barnes, the officer did not engage with the defendant before he fled. In the instant case, Officer Jackson’s partner pulled the police vehicle up to [Taylor] and then engaged with him by asking [Taylor] if he had a permit to carry a firearm. (N.T. at 11, 04/05/24.) After [Taylor] responded by saying “what are you talking about,” instead of asking the question again, Officer Jackson’s partner opened the vehicle door presumably to exit the vehicle and approach [Taylor]. (N.T. at 11, 04/05/24.) It was only then that [Taylor] fled.

Id. at 12-13.

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In Barnes, while on patrol in a high crime area, officers observed a

crowd of about five or six people. As they approached in their vehicle, the

crowd immediately dispersed. Police observed Barnes walking with another

male. One of the officers got out of the vehicle to see if someone had a firearm

or had discarded narcotics or a firearm. The officer saw Barnes walking and

used his flashlight to see if Barnes had anything on his person. In response,

Barnes fled, and the officer pursued him. Officers recovered a firearm in a bag

that Barnes was carrying. This Court determined that the officer’s interaction

with Barnes amounted to an investigative detention supported by reasonable

suspicion of criminal activity. We explained that the testimony of the officer

“established Barnes’s unprovoked flight, upon seeing Officer Kusowski, in a

high-crime area.” Barnes, 296 A.3d at 59.

In Jones, police observed Jones walking on the sidewalk, with an L-

shaped bulge in his jacket pocket that officers immediately recognized as a

firearm. Jones, 266 A.3d at 1092. Police drove past Jones, exited the vehicle,

and had a conversation with Jones, saying “[H]ey, what’s up,” and asked his

age. Id. We concluded that the officer’s statements to Jones “did not

transform the mere encounter into an investigatory detention” and that there

was an absence of evidence suggesting coercion by the officer. Id. at 1096.

We conclude that the officers’ initial interaction with Taylor was a mere

encounter, and although the encounter after Taylor fled was an investigative

detention, suppression was improper because police had reasonable suspicion.

The initial interaction involved no sign of coercion. The record shows that

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Taylor was walking in a high crime area with a bulge in his waistband that

officers believed, based on experience, to be a firearm. The officer merely

asked Taylor if he had a permit, without turning on the police vehicle’s

overhead lights or making any show of force. Taylor nonetheless fled, and his

unprovoked flight, in combination with the other factors, gave rise to

reasonable suspicion. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s grant of

suppression and remand for further proceedings. See Commonwealth v.

Rice, 304 A.3d 1255, 1262 (Pa.Super. 2023) (concluding officers had

reasonable suspicion to conduct investigative detention where officers

observed appellee in a high crime area with an “L” shaped bulge in his

waistband, and appellee turned and walked away from police when asked to

“come here”).

Order reversed. Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Date: 7/15/2025

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