Com. v. Taylor, C.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: May 14, 2025
• Docket: 967 EDA 2024
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

J-A12028-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : COREY TAYLOR : : Appellant : No. 967 EDA 2024

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered March 12, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0008064-2014

BEFORE: STABILE, J., DUBOW, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.: FILED MAY 14, 2025

Appellant, Corey Taylor, appeals pro se from the order dismissing his

second petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42

Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-46, as meritless. He asserts that the PCRA court erred in

denying him relief based on his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.

After careful review, we affirm, albeit on different grounds.

We glean the relevant procedural history from the PCRA court opinion.

On May 28, 2014, the Commonwealth arrested Appellant and charged him

with, inter alia, Rape of a Child, Unlawful Contact with a Minor, and Corruption

of Minors. After Appellant’s first trial ended in a mistrial, the jury in his second

trial convicted him of the above charges on December 13, 2016.

On June 23, 2017, the court sentenced Appellant to concurrent terms of

16 to 32 years’ incarceration for Unlawful Contact with a Minor and Rape of a

Child, as well as a concurrent term of 2 to 4 years’ incarceration for Corruption J-A12028-25

of Minors. This Court affirmed Appellant’s judgment of sentence on December

9, 2019. Commonwealth v. Taylor, 2019 WL 6705015 (Pa. Super. Dec. 9,

2019). Appellant filed a petition for allowance of appeal to the Pennsylvania

Supreme Court. His judgment of sentence became final when he voluntarily

discontinued the appeal on February 4, 2020.1

On April 10, 2020, Appellant filed a timely first PCRA petition alleging

several claims of ineffective assistance of his trial counsel, Olwyn Conway,

Esq., including the failure to argue that Appellant’s sentence for Unlawful

Contact with a Minor exceeded the statutory maximum. The PCRA court

appointed Stephen O’Hanlon, Esq., to represent Appellant. The PCRA court

granted relief on that claim and resentenced Appellant on his Unlawful Contact

with a Minor conviction only to 5 to 10 years’ incarceration, which did not

disturb the overall sentencing scheme. The court denied relief on Appellant’s

remaining claims. This Court affirmed on December 8, 2021, and our

Supreme Court denied his petition for allowance of appeal on April 19, 2022.

Commonwealth v. Taylor, 2021 WL 5826712 (Pa. Super. Dec. 8, 2021),

appeal denied, 277 A.3d 124 (Pa. 2022).

____________________________________________

1 An appellant’s judgment of sentence becomes “final when his direct appeal

[is] discontinued at his request.” Commonwealth v. Conway, 706 A.2d 1243, 1244 (Pa. Super. 1997).

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On March 21, 2023, Appellant pro se filed the instant PCRA petition, his

second,2 which asserted claims of ineffective assistance of both Attorney

Conway and Attorney O’Hanlon. PCRA Pet., 3/21/23, at 3; Attachment. He

also asserted that his petition was timely based on the newly-discovered fact,

governmental interference, and newly-recognized constitutional rights

exceptions to the PCRA’s time bar. Id. at 2. Appellant also pro se filed an

amended petition raising the same timeliness exceptions. Amended Pet.,

4/4/23, at 1.

The court appointed William Love, Esq. On February 5, 2024, Attorney

Love filed a Turner/ Finley3 no-merit letter, which concluded that Appellant’s

claims were meritless or had been previously litigated. Turner/Finley letter,

2/5/24, at 1-4. On February 9, 2024, the PCRA court issued a Pa.R.Crim.P.

907 Notice of Intent to Dismiss, stating that Appellant’s claims were

2 In Commonwealth v. McKeever, we explained that a “a successful first

PCRA petition does not ‘reset the clock’ for the calculation of the finality of the judgment of sentence for purposes of the PCRA where the relief granted in the first petition neither restored a petitioner’s direct appeal rights nor disturbed his conviction, but, rather, affected his sentence only.” 947 A.2d 782, 785 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citing Commonwealth v. Dehart, 730 A.2d 991, 994 n. 2 (Pa. Super. 1999)). Here, Appellant’s resentencing on his Unlawful Contact with a Minor conviction did not disturb his conviction or reinstate his direct appeal rights. Accordingly, Appellant’s partially successful first PCRA petition did not affect the finality of his sentence for his unaffected convictions and the instant PCRA is his second, not his first.

3 Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988); Commonwealth v.

Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988)(en banc).

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meritless.4 Rule 907 Notice, 2/9/24. The court then dismissed the petition

and permitted Attorney Love to withdraw on March 11, 2024.

Appellant pro se filed a timely notice of appeal. Both he and the PCRA

court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

1. Did the PCRA court err in dismissing Appellant’s PCRA petition because [p]ost-[c]onviction counsel Stephen O’Hanlon was ineffective for failing to effectively develop[] and argue a claim challenging trial counsel[’]s effectiveness for failure to object to [Appellant’s] presence at a critical/vital stage of trial?

2. Did the PCRA court err in dismissing Appellant’s PCRA petition because [p]ost-[c]onviction [counsel] Stephen O’Hanlon was ineffective for requesting a special jury interrogatory/special verdict, a practice that has been condemned in almost all jurisdictions.

3. Did the PCRA court err in dismissing Appellant’s PCRA petition because trial counsel Olwyn Conway and Post-Conviction counsel Stephen O’Hanlon w[ere] ineffective for not raising the claim that the trial court abused its discretion for not holding an evidentiary hearing to examine the circumstances surrounding and substance of the question presented during deliberation of [Appellant’s] prior conviction.

4. Did the PCRA court err in dismissing Appellant’s PCRA petition because [p]ost-[c]onviction counsel William Love was ineffective for filing a Finley letter and for failing to raise claims that had merit and would have granted [A]ppellant an evidentiary hearing.

Appellant’s Br. at 4.

***

4 Neither the Turner/Finley letter nor the Rule 907 Notice addressed timeliness.

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We review the denial of a PCRA petition to determine whether the record

supports the PCRA court’s findings and whether its order is otherwise free of

legal error. Commonwealth v. Fears, 86 A.3d 795, 803 (Pa. 2014). This

Court grants great deference to the findings of the PCRA court if they are

supported by the record. Commonwealth v. Boyd, 923 A.2d 513, 515 (Pa.

Super. 2007). “We give no such deference, however, to the court’s legal

conclusions.” Commonwealth v. Smith, 167 A.3d 782, 787 (Pa. Super.

2017).

As a preliminary matter, the timeliness of a PCRA petition is a

jurisdictional prerequisite. Commonwealth v. Hackett, 956 A.2d 978, 983

(Pa. 2008). Pennsylvania law is clear that no court has jurisdiction to hear an

untimely PCRA petition. Commonwealth v. Robinson, 837 A.2d 1157, 1161

(Pa. 2003). To obtain relief under the PCRA, a petition must be filed within

one year of the date the judgment of sentence became final. 42 Pa.C.S. §

9545(b)(1). Appellant’s petition, filed 3 years after his judgment of sentence

became final, is facially untimely.

Pennsylvania courts may consider an untimely PCRA petition, however,

if the petitioner pleads and proves one of the three exceptions to the time bar

set forth in Section 9545(b)(1)—the government interference, newly

discovered fact, and new constitutional right exceptions. Any petition invoking

a timeliness exception must be filed within one year of the date the claim

could have been presented. 42 Pa.C.S § 9545(b)(2). Finally, “[i]t is an

appellant’s burden to persuade this Court that the PCRA court erred, and that

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relief is due.” Commonwealth v. Feliciano, 69 A.3d 1270, 1275 (Pa. Super.

2013) (citation omitted).

*

In his petition, Appellant raised all three of the Section 9545(b)(1)

exceptions. We will address each exception in turn.

First, the government interference exception requires proof that “the

failure to raise the claim previously was the result of interference by

government officials[.]” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i); see also

Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 941 A.2d 1263, 1268 (Pa. 2008). This

requires the petitioner to show that, due to the interference of a government

official, he could not have filed his claim earlier. Commonwealth v. Vinson,

249 A.3d 1197, 1205 (Pa. Super. 2021). Importantly, “‘government officials’

shall not include defense counsel, whether appointed or retained.” 42 Pa.C.S.

§ 9545(b)(4).

In his petition, Appellant asserted that he met the government

interference exception because he “intend[ed] to prove [his] claim was late

due to governmental interference by showing: [o]nly the [p]ublic defender,

[t]he Commonwealth, and [t]he trial judge had knowledge of the claim at the

time of trial[,] all of whom are government officials.” PCRA Pet. at 2.

However, his defense counsel does not constitute a government official. 42

Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(4). Appellant also failed to put forth any argument

establishing how the Commonwealth or the trial judge prevented him from

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raising any of his claims earlier. Accordingly, he has failed to plead and prove

the applicability of the governmental interference exception to the time bar.

Appellant also asserts that his claims meet the newly-discovered fact

exception. PCRA Pet. at 2. To establish the newly-discovered facts exception

to the time bar, a petitioner must plead and prove that “the facts upon which

the claim is predicated were unknown to the petitioner and could not have

been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence.” 42 Pa.C.S. §

9545(b)(1)(ii).

Relevantly, “a petitioner’s belief that he has uncovered a colorable claim

of ineffectiveness by prior counsel does not entitle [him] to an exception to

the timeliness requirements.” Commonwealth v. Crews, 863 A.2d 498, 503

(Pa. 2004). Furthermore, our Court has held that decisional law does not

constitute a fact for the purpose of the newly-discovered fact exception.

Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 266 A.3d 1128, 1135 (Pa. Super. 2021).

Finally, our Supreme Court has held that Commonwealth v. Bradley, 261

A.3d 381 (Pa. 2021), which permitted petitioners to assert the ineffectiveness

of PCRA counsel for the first time on appeal, “did not create an exception to

the PCRA’s time-bar.” Commonwealth v. Laird, 331 A.3d 579, 598 (Pa.

2025).5

5 In Bradley, the Supreme Court also clarified that that “an approach favoring

the consideration of ineffectiveness claims of PCRA counsel ... does not sanction extra-statutory serial petitions.” Bradley, 261 A.3d at 403.

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Appellant claims that he has satisfied the newly-discovered facts

exception because “Post-Conviction Counsel’s ineffectiveness and the legal

right to challenge his ineffectiveness was unknown until now.” PCRA Pet. at

2. However, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel does not entitle a

petitioner to an exception to the time bar. Crews, 863 A.2d at 503.

Furthermore, decisional law, such as Bradley, cannot constitute a newly-

discovered fact, and Bradley did not create any other exceptions to the time

bar. Accordingly, Appellant has failed to plead and prove the newly-

discovered fact exception.

Finally, Appellant asserts that he has met the newly-recognized

constitutional right exception. PCRA Pet. at 2-3. The newly-recognized

constitutional right exception to the time bar requires that the newly

established constitutional right was recognized by the Supreme Court of the

United States or the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and “has been held” by that

court to apply retroactively. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(iii). Because “has been

held” is in the past tense, the legislature clearly intended that the right was

already recognized at the time the petition was filed, “i.e., that the court has

already held the new constitutional right to be retroactive to cases on collateral

review.” Commonwealth v. Spotz, 171 A.3d 675, 679 (Pa. 2017) (citation

and internal quotation marks omitted).

Appellant claims that he has satisfied the newly-recognized

constitutional right exception because

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[t]he Supreme Court of the United States or the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has recognized the following retroactive constitional [sic] rights after my period for filing: Commonwealth v. Bradley 261 A.3d 381 [(]2021[)]. The right to effective assistance of counsel on post-conviction. The right to file ineffectiveness on p[o]st-conviction counsel after the [t]en days or up to the one year, for subsequent post-conviction filings.

PCRA Pet. at 2-3.

Although this Court has not addressed the applicability of Bradley to

the newly recognized constitutional right exception in a published decision,

several unpublished decisions have rejected the argument. See

Commonwealth v. Ruiz-Figueroa, 2023 WL 4115626 at *2 (Pa. Super. filed

June 22, 2023) (collecting cases).6 This is consistent with our Supreme

Court’s holding that Bradley did not create any exceptions to the PCRA’s time-

bar. Laird, 331 A.3d at 598. Accordingly, Appellant’s invocation of Bradley

fails to satisfy the newly-recognized constitutional right exception to the time

bar.

Appellant has failed to plead and prove the applicability of any of the

statutory exceptions to the time bar in his PCRA petitions. Accordingly, we

are without jurisdiction to address his claims. We, thus, affirm the dismissal

of his second PCRA petition.7 ____________________________________________

6 See Pa.R.A.P. 126(b) (unpublished non-precedential decisions of the Superior Court filed after May 1, 2019, may be cited for their persuasive value).

7 In its opinion, the PCRA court did not address the timeliness of Appellant’s

petition—instead, it determined that Appellant’s claims were meritless, and that some were previously litigated. See generally, PCRA Ct. Op. However, (Footnote Continued Next Page)

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Order affirmed.

Date: 5/14/2025

an appellate court can affirm a valid judgment for any reason supported by the record. Commonwealth v. Conforti, 303 A.3d 715, 729 (Pa. 2023).

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