Com. v. Sullivan, B.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: October 25, 2024
• Docket: 2380 EDA 2023
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

J-S23012-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA Appellant : : : v. : : : BRIAN SULLIVAN : No. 2380 EDA 2023

Appeal from the Order Entered August 28, 2023 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No: CP-51-CR-0000975-2023

BEFORE: STABILE, J., KING, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED OCTOBER 25, 2024

The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania appeals from the August 28, 2023,

order granting Appellee Brian Sullivan’s motion to suppress evidence. Upon

review, we reverse and remand.

The trial court summarized the facts adduced at the suppression hearing

as follows:

Philadelphia Police Officer Dave Dohan (hereinafter “Officer Dohan”) testified at the suppression hearing. Officer Dohan indicated on December 8, 2022, at about 7:30pm, he encountered a black Dodge Durango being operated in the area of Stenton Avenue and Johnson Street of Philadelphia, PA. Upon initial observation, the Officer noted only “just that it was occupied; two occupants … one driver, one passenger.” Officer Dohan further testified a Bureau of Motor Vehicles (BMV) check of the license plate was run that revealed the registered owner of the Durango had a suspended license and the vehicle registration expired at the end of November. ____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. J-S23012-24

When the police vehicle’s lights and sirens were activated to effectuate the stop, the Durango initially pulled over, but then drove away within seconds. A car chase ensued, and while Officer Dohan called for backup over police radio, he lost sight of the vehicle. Eventually, he encountered the Durango again, stopped by plain clothes police units, when Appellee exited the passenger side door and fled on foot. Officer Dohan joined the pedestrian chase but did not catch up with Appellee until the other officers had him in custody.

Officer Raheem Williams testified that he was working in plain clothes on the night of the incident when he responded as backup to a call regarding a Black Dodge Durango. The Durango collided with his unmarked police vehicle and Appellee exited from the passenger side, then fled on foot. Officer Williams chased Appellee and testified: “I could see that he had … something in his hand that was flashing in his hand as he’s running … on the sidewalk I got close to him where I could almost grab him … I realized he had a gun with a flashlight flashing on.” The Officer saw Appellee toss the gun, which hit a fence and fell to the ground. Appellee was subsequently apprehended, and the gun was recovered with the flashlight still flashing on it.

Suppression Court Opinion, 10/20/23, at 2-3 (footnote and citations to record

omitted). Appellant challenged the legality of the traffic stop in an omnibus

motion that sought, inter alia, to suppress physical evidence seized where the

only basis for the stop was information possessed by the police that the owner

of the vehicle had a suspended license. See Omnibus Pretrial Motion,

3/13/231; N.T., Suppression Hearing 8/28/23, at 6.

____________________________________________

1 It is not entirely clear from a review of Appellant’s Omnibus Pretrial Motion

that Appellant was challenging the legality of the initial traffic stop. Regardless, at a hearing, counsel stated for the record that the basis for suppression was that the stop was illegal based upon the officers only possessing information that the owner of the vehicle had a suspended license. N.T., 8/28/23, at 6.

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After a hearing, the court granted Appellee’s motion and suppressed all

evidence as fruit of the poisonous tree. N.T., Suppression, at 66. Despite the

Commonwealth presenting officer testimony at the suppression hearing that

the basis for the stop was that the owner had a suspended license, and that

the vehicle was not registered, the suppression court did not find the entirety

of this testimony to be credible. Id. The suppression court found that the

only basis for the stop was that the owner had a suspended license. Id. This

timely interlocutory appeal followed.2

On appeal, the Commonwealth raises a sole issue for our review: “Did

the lower court err by suppressing evidence where police lawfully stopped a

car for investigation after determining that the owner of the vehicle had a

suspended license?” Commonwealth’s Brief at 3.

When faced with a challenge to the grant of a suppression motion, our

standard of review is well-settled:

When the Commonwealth appeals from a suppression order, we follow a clearly defined standard of review and consider only the evidence from the defendant’s witnesses together with the evidence of the prosecution that, when read in the context of the entire record, remains uncontradicted. The suppression court’s findings of fact bind an appellate court if the record supports those findings. The suppression court’s conclusions of law, however, are not binding on an appellate court, whose duty is to determine if the suppression court properly applied the law to the facts.

2 The Commonwealth certified that the August 28, 2023, order granting Appellee’s motion to suppress will terminate or substantially handicap the prosecution in accordance with Pa.R.A.P. 311(d).

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Commonwealth v. Korn, 139 A.3d 249, 252-53 (Pa. Super. 2016), appeal

denied, 159 A.3d 933 (Pa. 2016) (citation omitted).

After having his memory refreshed by the Commonwealth using BMV

information, Officer Dohan testified at the suppression hearing that the reason

he effectuated the car stop was "the registered owner had a suspended license

and . . . the registration had expired at the end of November." N.T.,

Suppression, at 9 (emphasis added). Other documents entered into evidence

indicated the stop was based only upon the owner having a suspended license.

After “carefully” weighing the testimony of Officer Dohan, the suppression

court determined that the true basis for the car stop was the suspended

license of the registered owner of the vehicle, and not that the stop was based

upon both a suspended license and an expired vehicle registration.

The suppression court found it odd that the "response information"

provided for the witness to review and subsequently submitted into evidence

failed to reflect the actual date of the incident (12/08/22), but instead, at the

top of each page reflected a date of December 27, 2022, some 18 days later.

Trial Court Opinion, 10/20/23, at 5. As a result, the suppression court found

that “Officer Dohan was without a legitimate reason at the time of the

questioned stop, which would provide probable cause to believe the vehicle or

driver was in violation of the vehicle code.” Id. at 7.

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In reaching its decision, the suppression court in its opinion 3 relied on

this Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Andersen, 753 A.2d 1289 (Pa.

Super. 2000). In Andersen we concluded

that the knowledge a vehicle is owned by an individual whose driving privileges are suspended coupled with the mere assumption that the owner is driving the vehicle, does not give rise to articulable and reasonable grounds to suspect that a violation of the Vehicle Code is occurring every time this vehicle is operated during the owner’s suspension.

Id. at 1294 (emphasis in the original). Unfortunately, our decision in

Andersen no longer is good law.

In Kansas v. Glover, 589 U.S. 376 (2020), the Supreme Court of the

United States reviewed “whether a police officer violates the Fourth

Amendment by initiating an investigative traffic stop after running a vehicle’s

license plate and learning that the registered owner has a revoked driver’s

license.” Id. at 378. The Supreme Court held “that when the officer lacks

information negating an inference that the owner is the driver of the vehicle,

the stop is reasonable.” Id. However, the presence of additional facts might

negate the officer’s reasonable suspicion:

For example, if an officer knows that the registered owner of the vehicle is in his mid-sixties but observes that the driver is in her mid-twenties, then the totality of the circumstances would not

3 At the hearing, the suppression court referenced both Andersen and Commonwealth v. Jefferson, 256 A.3d 1242 (Pa. Super. 2021), as legal authority to grant suppression. N.T., Suppression, at 64. As explained, infra, Jefferson held that Andersen has been overruled by Kansas v. Glover, 589 U.S. 376, 378 (2020).

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raise a suspicion that the particular individual being stopped is engaged in wrongdoing.

Id. at 386 (citation and quotation marks omitted).

Thereafter, this Court, sitting en banc, applied Glover in

Commonwealth v. Jefferson, 256 A.3d 1242 (Pa. Super. 2021). There,

officers on routine patrol ran the license plates of various vehicles and

determined that the registered owner of one of the vehicles had an open

warrant. Id. at 1245. While the officers were attempting to validate the

warrant, the vehicle pulled over, and the officers pulled behind it and activated

a spotlight. Id. at 1245-46. The purpose of the stop was for officers “to

identify the driver and to investigate whether he was the registered owner of

the vehicle, and thus the person for whom there was an arrest warrant.” Id.

at 1246.

This Court concluded that the defendant’s Fourth Amendment challenge

to the legality of the traffic stop failed under Glover. See id. at 1248-51. We

noted that there were no additional factors to negate the officer’s reasonable

suspicion that the owner of the vehicle was also the driver of the vehicle. Id.

at 1250. After extensive analysis, we also concluded that Glover is consistent

with Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, and that Article I,

Section 8 does not provide greater protection than the Fourth Amendment

standard established in Glover. See id. at 1251-1260.

Of importance, we noted,

Andersen specifically raised the question of whether Section 8 provided greater protection than the Fourth Amendment. However, the Andersen Court never reached that specific claim.

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As it granted relief under the Fourth Amendment, it was unnecessary for the Court to consider whether greater protection existed under the Pennsylvania Constitution. As Andersen can only be understood to reflect this Court’s interpretation of Fourth Amendment standards, we must conclude that [Andersen] has been overruled by Glover, and provides no support for the notion that Section 8 provides greater protection than the Fourth Amendment in these circumstances.

Jefferson, 256 A.3d at 1255 (emphasis added). Thus, Andersen no longer

is good law, and the suppression court’s reliance on it was in error.

Here, Officer Dohan conducted a traffic stop based on information

obtained during a BMV records check that the registered owner of the vehicle

had a suspended license. There was no additional information to negate the

inference that the registered owner of the vehicle was the driver of the vehicle.

See Glover, Salter, supra. Officer Dohan had reasonable suspicion to

conduct a traffic stop to determine whether the registered owner who had a

suspended license was the person driving the vehicle. Accordingly, we

conclude the court’s suppression of evidence based upon its reliance on

Andersen was an error of law. We therefore reverse the order of the

suppression court and remand for further proceedings.

Order reversed. Case remanded for further proceedings. Jurisdiction

relinquished.

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Date: 10/25/2024

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