NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA
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v. :
:
:
STANLEY STURGIS :
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Appellant : No. 970 EDA 2025
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered March 20, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0003654-2024
BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., SULLIVAN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E. * MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, P.J.: FILED AUGUST 25, 2026 Stanley Sturgis appeals from the judgment of sentence, entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, following his convictions of knowing and intentional possession of a controlled substance 1 and possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver (PWID). 2 After careful review, we affirm.
The trial court sets forth the following relevant factual history:
On February 27, 2024, around 10:14 a.m., [Sturgis] reported to the parole office located at 334 E[.] Chelten Ave[.], in Philadelphia (the parole office). Prior to being admitted into the interview area of the parole office, [Sturgis] went through the routine security checkpoint, in which he emptied his pockets into the security drawer and walked through the metal detector. Anthony
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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1 35 P.S § 780-113(a)(16).
2 Id. at § 780-113(a)(30).
Chapman, Department of Corrections Field Services Parole Supervisor, observed a black digital scale amongst [Sturgis]’s pocket contents in the security drawer. In Agent Chapman’s experience[,] he kn[ew] digital scales to be associated with selling narcotics. [Sturgis] was then taken back to one of the office’s interview rooms, detained[ and] searched, and the black digital scale [was] recovered off his person.
State Parole Agent Alex Shehu testified that[,] on February 27, 2024, he parked outside the parole office[,] awaiting his appointment with [Sturgis]. While Agent Shehu was parked outside the office[,] he observed [Sturgis] park in front of the office in a white Ford Fusion, exit from the driver’s seat of the car, and proceed into the office building. This was not the first time Agent Shehu had seen [Sturgis] operating the white Ford Fusion.
Under the terms of his parole, [Sturgis] needed permission to drive a car; permission which he did not have.
Agent Shehu questioned [Sturgis] about the car[ and Sturgis]
replied that he drove it to the office. Agent Shehu asked [Sturgis]
if agents would find anything in the car if they searched it, to which [Sturgis] responded there was suboxone and marijuana inside the car. Agent Shehu then spoke with his supervisor, who informed him that it was appropriate to search [Sturgis]’s car. Agent Shehu stated that the basis for the car search was that [Sturgis] violated the conditions of his parole by: 1) possessing drug paraphernalia (the digital scale); 2) driving a car without approval from state parole; 3) driving a car with an expired license in violation of local ordinances; and 4) his statement as to [m]arijuana and Suboxone in the car.
Agent Shehu, [Agent] Brown[,3] and additional parole agents searched the car. They recovered Suboxone, [m]arijuana, a prescription bottle with the label removed containing Xanax, [Sturgis]’s debit card, and a treatment schedule from his parolereferred treatment provider with [Sturgis]’s name on it. After those items were recovered, Agent Shehu proceeded to [Sturgis]’s home-plan approved residence for an additional search of his bedroom.
At [Sturgis]’s residence, a K-9 search was conducted by parole [agents] of his bedroom. The K-9 indicated that drugs were present in several areas of the bedroom. Agent Shehu searched
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3 Agent Brown’s first name does not appear in the certified record.
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those areas. He also saw marijuana and mylar baggies on a black nightstand in plain view. Agent Shehu found [methamphetamine, m]arijuana, Suboxone, a prescription pill
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bottle with a ripped label containing Xanax, black rubber bands commonly associated with packaging narcotics, and [Sturgis]’s PA Department of Corrections Inmate ID card in the bedroom.
Trial Court Opinion, 7/2/25, at 2-4 (unpaginated).
Sturgis was arrested and charged with the above-mentioned offenses.
On September 5, 2024, Sturgis filed an omnibus pre-trial motion to suppress any statement he made to parole agents after his detention at the parole office and any evidence obtained by parole officers from his person, car, and home. Sturgis asserted parole officers lacked reasonable suspicion to believe he had violated the conditions of his parole, as required by the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article 1, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, and failed to Mirandize5 him after his detention in violation of his rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, rendering the subsequently recovered evidence inadmissible.
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4 Initially, the agents thought the tablets were “ecstasy,” but later lab testing
revealed that the tablets contained methamphetamine. However, the parties and the trial court refer interchangeably to the tablets as “methamphetamine” or “ecstasy.” See N.T. Waiver Trial, 11/15/24, at 29 ([Defense Counsel]: “[T]he Ecstasy essentially tested [in] the analysis as methamphetamine.”); see also Commonwealth’s Exhibit C-1B (numerous “blue-purple” and “red- pink” tablet fragments weighed and tested as methamphetamine). For the sake of accuracy, we refer to the narcotics as methamphetamine.
5 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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The trial court held a suppression hearing on November 14, 2024, at which time the Commonwealth called Agent Chapman and Agent Shehu, who testified about Sturgis’s detention and the searches of his vehicle and residence. On November 15, 2024, the trial court granted the motion to suppress as to the unmirandized statement Sturgis made to Agent Shehu and denied the motion as to all physical evidence recovered. Following this decision, both parties proceeded to a stipulated waiver trial on November 15, 2024. At trial, Sturgis’s Pennsylvania Parole Board “Conditions Governing Parole” form (parole form), which was signed by Sturgis on January 9, 2024, upon his release from incarceration, was introduced as Court Exhibit-1. See N.T. Waiver Trial, 11/15/24, at 4; see also Trial Court Opinion, 7/2/25, at 8 (unpaginated). The trial court found Sturgis guilty of PWID of the methamphetamine and Xanax and knowing and intentional possession of Suboxone and marijuana.
Sentencing was deferred for the preparation of a pre-sentence investigation report and forensic intensive recovery evaluation. On March 20, 2025, Sturgis was sentenced to 12 to 24 months incarceration with time served on the charge of PWID and no further penalty as to the knowing and intentional possession charge.
On April 14, 2025, Sturgis filed this timely appeal. Both Sturgis and the trial court complied with the requirements of Pa.R.A.P. 1925. Sturgis raises the following claims for our review:
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[1]. Did the lower court err in denying the motion to suppress physical evidence where parole agents searched [Sturgis’s] home without reasonable suspicion to believe they would recover evidence of a parole violation within?
[2]. Was the evidence insufficient to establish that [] Sturgis possessed controlled substances with the intent to deliver where the Commonwealth failed to prove that the controlled substances were not possessed for personal use only?
Appellant’s Brief, at 7.
In his first issue, Sturgis argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence recovered from his home. Id. at 12-15. Specifically, Sturgis argues the “constructive possession of drugs in a shared car” does not create reasonable suspicion to search a different location, i.e., his residence. Id. at 12.
We consider the applicable standard of review in addressing a challenge to the denial of a suppression motion:
[Our] standard of review . . . is limited to determining whether the suppression court’s factual findings are supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are correct. Because the Commonwealth prevailed before the suppression court, we may consider only the evidence of the Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as a whole. Where the suppression court’s factual findings are supported by the record, the appellate court is bound by those findings and may reverse only if the court’s legal conclusions are erroneous. Where the appeal of the determination of the suppression court turns on allegations of legal error, the suppression court’s legal conclusions are not binding on an appellate court, whose duty it is to determine if the suppression court properly applied the law to the facts. Thus, the conclusions of law of the courts below are subject to plenary review.
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Commonwealth v. McClellan, 178 A.3d 874, 880-81 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation omitted). “With respect to a suppression court’s factual findings, it is the sole province of the suppression court to weigh the credibility of the witnesses. Further, the suppression court judge is entitled to believe all, part[,] or none of the evidence presented.” Commonwealth v. Heidelberg, 267 A.3d 492, 499 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citation and internal quotations omitted).
With respect to searches of persons on parole, “a parole officer need not obtain a warrant based upon probable cause before conducting a search of a parolee.” Commonwealth v. Gould, 187 A.3d 927, 935 (Pa. Super. 2018).6 “A parolee has limited Fourth Amendment rights because of a diminished expectation of privacy.” McClellan, 178 A.3d at 881 (citations omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Curry, 900 A.2d 390, 394 (Pa. Super. 2006) (“[P]arolees agree to endure warrantless searches based only on reasonable suspicion in exchange for their early release from prison.”) (citation omitted and some formatting altered). This Court has explained:
[A] parole officer’s warrantless search of a parolee will be deemed reasonable, and the fruits of the search will be admissible in court, if the totality of the evidence demonstrates: (1) that the parole officer had a reasonable suspicion that the parolee had committed a parole violation, and (2) that the search was reasonably related to the parole officer’s duty.
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6 Both Gould and McClellan addressed the then-in-effect section 6153 of the
Prisons and Parole Code. See 61 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 101-7301 (repealed). In 2021, the legislature renumbered that statute to section 6182, with the same title and near-identical language.
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Gould, 187 A.3d at 935 (citations omitted and formatting altered).
“A property search may be conducted by an agent if there is reasonable suspicion to believe that the real or other property in the possession of or under the control of the department-supervised offender contains contraband or other evidence of violations of the conditions of supervision.” 61 Pa.C.S.A. § 6182(d)(2). “The existence of reasonable suspicion to search shall be determined in accordance with constitutional search and seizure provisions as applied by judicial decision.” Id. at § 6182(d)(4). Under section 6182, the following factors may be considered when determining whether reasonable suspicion existed:
(i) The observations of agents.
(ii) Information provided by others.
(iii) The activities of the department-supervised offender.
(iv) Information provided by the department-supervised offender.
(v) The experience of [the] agents with the department-
supervised offender.
(vi) The experience of [the] agents in similar circumstances.
(vii) The prior criminal and supervisory history of the department-
supervised offender.
(viii) The need to verify compliance with the conditions of supervision.
Id. at § 6182(d)(4)(i)-(viii).
Sturgis cites Commonwealth v. Johnson, 240 A.3d 575 (Pa. 2020), contending that the parole officers needed a specific nexus between the suspicion and the location to be searched to justify their search of that
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location. See Appellant’s Brief, at 11. In Johnson, a defendant was arrested for possession of drugs and guns and, after being placed under arrest, officers recovered two cellphones from him. Id. at 580. The officers obtained a search warrant for the cellphones, claiming the discovery of multiple cellphones on the defendant’s person while he was present in an apartment where drugs and guns are found, supported probable cause to search those cellphones. Id. at 587. Our Supreme Court held there was no probable cause to search the defendant’s cellphone for evidence of drug/gun-related crimes because there was no nexus between the cellphone and the drugs and guns beyond the statement that “persons involved in the trafficking of controlled substances regularly use cellular telephones to accomplish their trafficking activities.” Id. at 580. The majority opinion “reject[ed] the notion that, simply because there was probable cause to arrest [defendant] for constructively possessing the drugs and guns found in another’s apartment, there was necessarily probable cause to search his cell phone for evidence of those same offenses.” Id. at 588. Sturgis argues that, like Johnson, there is no specific nexus between Agent Shehu’s “hunch” that Sturgis possessed more drugs and the searched location—his residence—and, thus, the search cannot be justified. See Appellant’s Brief, at 13.
After careful review of the record, we determine the record supports the trial court’s ruling denying suppression of the evidence recovered from the search of Sturgis’s bedroom. Here, the trial court described the following
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factors that supported its finding that Agent Shehu had reasonable suspicion
to believe Sturgis was violating the terms of his parole agreement:
Parole Agent Shehu had reasonable suspicion to believe [Sturgis]
was violating the terms of his parole agreement when he observed [Sturgis] operating a car without parole’s permission and without a license. [In Sturgis’s parole form, Sturgis] acknowledged his obligation to “comply with all municipal, county, state, and federal criminal laws, as well as provisions of the [V]ehicle [C]ode.”
[Sturgis] agreed to and gave express consent to searches of his person, property, and residence, without a warrant. [Sturgis’s]
driving of a car without a valid license in violation of 75 [Pa.C.S.A.]
§ 1501(a), is a violation of his parole conditions.
***
[A]t the time Agent Shehu observed [Sturgis] driving the car without a valid license, he had reasonable suspicion to believe a violation of parole was occurring and had the lawful right to investigate. Agent Shehu took a team of agents to search the car, where he was immediately confronted with the smell of marijuana permeating through the car. [Sturgis’s] signed conditions of parole indicate in multiple places that the possession of any narcotics contained within the Controlled Substance Act is a violation of parole. A parole officer smelling marijuana gives rise to reasonable suspicion justifying a search. [Commonwealth] v.
Smith, 85 A.3d 530[, 537] (Pa. Super. 2014). Agent Shehu saw Appellant driving without permission or a valid license and smelled [m]arijuana within the car; this provided ample reasonable suspicion to believe [Sturgis] was violating the conditions of his parole.
Trial Court Opinion, 7/2/25, at 8-10 (unpaginated) (citations to the record omitted). Upon searching Sturgis’s vehicle, Agent Shehu recovered marijuana, Suboxone, and Xanax in the vehicle. Furthermore, Sturgis’s parole form stated possession of any narcotics contained within the Controlled Substance Act is a violation of parole and he consented to searches of his
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person, property, and residence. See id. at 10; N.T. Waiver Trial, 11/15/24, at 4.
We are unconvinced by Sturgis’s reliance on Johnson as the standard for probable cause is not applicable here. Notably, the defendant in Johnson was not a parolee and, therefore, not subjected to limited Fourth Amendment rights. The Johnson Court discussed the need for a nexus between the search and the crime to establish “probable cause” for a warrant. Id. at 580. However, here, the standard for a search is reasonable suspicion, because Sturgis is a parolee: “[]agents need not have probable cause to search a parolee or his property; instead, reasonable suspicion is sufficient to authorize a search.” Commonwealth v. Hunter, 963 A.2d 545, 551 (Pa. Super. 2008) (internal quotation omitted; emphasis added); see also 61 Pa.C.S.A. § 6182(d)(2) (“A property search may be conducted by an agent if there is reasonable suspicion to believe that the real or other property in the possession of the [parolee] contains contraband or other evidence of violations of the conditions of supervision.”). The nexus that must exist for a warrantless search of a parolee’s property is whether the parole officer had reasonable suspicion that a parolee is in violation of parole and whether that the search is connected to the parole officer’s duty. See Gould, supra.
Thus, contrary to Sturgis’s argument, Agent Shehu’s discovery of controlled substances in the vehicle Sturgis had driven that very morning, against his parole requirements, provided ample reasonable suspicion to investigate Sturgis’s compliance with parole conditions, and searching
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Sturgis’s bedroom in his parole-approved residence was reasonably related to that inquiry. See Gould, supra; see Commonwealth v. Parker, 152 A.3d 309, 322 (Pa. Super. 2016) (finding observations made by parole officers established reasonable suspicion to believe defendant had other contraband in residence and subsequent search of closed refrigerator was consistent with and reasonably related to their supervisory duties to confirm whether defendant possessed drugs or weapons in violation of parole regulations); see also 61 Pa.C.S.A. § 6182(d)(2). Accordingly, we find no error by the trial court and Sturgis is entitled to no relief. 7 In his next issue on appeal, Sturgis contends the evidence was insufficient to establish PWID because he did not have the requisite intent to deliver the controlled substance. See Appellant’s Brief, at 15-24. Rather, Sturgis argues that the evidence only established that all of the drugs found in Sturgis’s shared home and car could have been for personal use and, without knowing the strength of the pills, the amount of Xanax and
methamphetamine alone cannot prove intent to deliver. Id. at 17-18, citing
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7 To the extent Sturgis contends that the search of his home was “fruit of the
poisonous tree” from the unmirandized custodial statements that were properly suppressed by the court and there is “no reason to believe police would have otherwise recovered the drugs in [Strurgis’s] home,” see Appellant’s Brief, at 14-15, we find the trial court correctly determined that, regardless of Sturgis’s unmirandized statements, Agent Shehu still possessed lawful reasonable suspicion to investigate Sturgis’s parole violations of possession of the digital scale and driving a car without a license, which led to Agent Shehu’s discovery of drugs in the car Sturgis was driving, and provided him with the requisite reasonable suspicion to investigate Sturgis’s compliance with parole violations at his residence. See Trial Court Opinion, 7/2/25, at 13-14 (unpaginated).
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Commonwealth v. Jackson, 645 A.2d 1366, at 1368 (Pa. Super. 1994) (evidence insufficient to establish intent to deliver where defendant found with 17 ballons of fentanyl and ten-dollar bill because both expert and defendant testified to amount of heroin that could plausibly represent personal use and small amount of money did not contribute to finding of intent to distribute). He further argues that the pills and pill fragments were not recovered in packaging that suggested intent to distribute. Id. at 20. In reference to the scale, baggies, and plastic ties recovered from his possession, Sturgis contends that those items failed to establish intent to distribute because there was no drug residue on the scale, the scale had no other association with the specific drugs found on him, and the baggies and rubberbands recovered from his home were not associated with the pills or pill fragments. Id. at 22-23. He also argues that there was no expert testimony to properly establish an inference from the evidence that Sturgis intended to sell the drugs. Id. at 16, 29, 23, citing Commonwealth v. Kirkland, 831 A.2d 607, at 609-11 (Pa. Super. 2003) (evidence insufficient to establish intent to deliver where police found several grams of crack cocaine, razor blade with cocaine residue, and several unused ziplock packets in brown paper bag in defendant’s car, but defendant did not exhibit any behavior indicative of drug activity and was not seen engaging in any drug transactions, was not in area known for drug use, no scales or currency were found in car or on defendant’s person, and no expert testimony establishing value or volume of cocaine to disprove personal use).
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Our standard and scope review of a sufficiency challenge is well-settled:
Our applicable standard of review is whether the evidence admitted at trial, and all reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict-winner, was sufficient to enable the fact-finder to conclude that the Commonwealth established all of the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.
Additionally, when examining sufficiency issues, we bear in mind that: the Commonwealth’s burden may be sustained by means of wholly circumstantial evidence; the entire trial record is evaluated and all evidence received against the defendant considered; and the trier of fact is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence when evaluating witness credibility.
This standard is equally applicable to cases where the evidence is circumstantial rather than direct so long as the combination of the evidence links the accused to the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Although a conviction must be based on more than mere suspicion or conjecture, the Commonwealth need not establish guilt to a mathematical certainty.
Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 340 A.3d 334, 347 (Pa. Super. 2025) (citation omitted).
To find the evidence sufficient to sustain a PWID conviction, “[t]he Commonwealth must prove both the possession of the controlled substance and the intent to deliver the controlled substance.” Commonwealth v. Brown, 904 A.2d 925, 931 (Pa. Super. 2006). On appeal, Sturgis only contends the Commonwealth failed to establish the element of intent to deliver the controlled substances and, therefore, our analysis focuses on that element. With regard to establishing intent to deliver, “[i]t is well[-]settled that all the facts and circumstances surrounding possession are relevant in making a determination of whether contraband was possessed with intent to
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deliver.” Brown, 904 A.2d at 931. “The trier of fact may infer that the defendant intended to deliver a controlled substance from an examination of the facts and circumstances surrounding the case.” Kirkland, 831 A.2d at 611. While in some cases the quantity of contraband can be dispositive as to intent, when it is not, the court may look to other factors, such as “the manner in which the controlled substance was packaged, the behavior of the defendant, the presence of drug paraphernalia, and large[] sums of cash found in possession of the defendant.” Commonwealth v. Ratsamy, 934 A.2d 1233, 1237-38 (Pa. 2007), quoting Jackson, 645 A.2d at 1368.
Here, the trial court properly considered all the relevant facts and circumstances and reasonably concluded that Sturgis intended to distribute the controlled substances. Agent Shehu testified that, in the search of the vehicle, the agents recovered a prescription pill bottle containing 51 pills with a ripped label, which tested positive for Xanax, as well as Suboxone and marijuana. See N.T. Suppression Hearing, 11/12/24, at 20; see also Commonwealth’s Exhibit C-1B (lab report analyzing narcotics recovered from Sturgis’s vehicle and bedroom). Agent Shehu also testified that he recovered mylar baggies, black rubber bands, another pill bottle with a ripped label, containing 35 Xanax pills, and additional suboxone and marijuana. See N.T. Suppression Hearing, 11/12/24, at 21; see also Commonwealth’s Exhibit C- 1B. Additionally, the agents recovered about 5.7 grams of methamphetamine. See Commonwealth’s Exhibit C-1B (numerous “blue-purple” and “red-pink” tablet fragments weighed and tested as methamphetamine).
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Trial courts are permitted to consider the facts and circumstances surrounding possession when determining intent, see Brown, 904 A.2d at 931, and, here, the trial court considered the quantity of methamphetamine, about 5.7 grams, and the amount of Xanax recovered, a total of 86 pills, Sturgis’s possession of a digital scale, black rubber bands, and mylar baggies, and Agent Shehu’s testimony that, in his training and experience, the digital scale, the black rubber bands, and the mylar baggies were consistent with packaging of narcotics for sale. See N.T. Waiver Trial, 11/14/24, at 28-29; see also N.T. Suppression Hearing, 11/12/24, at 21; id. at 19, 21.8 While the trial court indicated that the possession of a scale alone was not enough to establish reasonable suspicion that an individual was engaged in illegal sales of narcotics, see N.T. Waiver Trial, 11/15/24, at 14, the trial court was within its discretion to consider Sturgis’s possession of the scale as part of the totality of circumstances in its analysis of Sturgis’s intent to deliver. See Trial Court Opinion, 7/2/25, at 18 (unpaginated); see also Ratsamy, 934 A.2d at 1237-38.
Unlike Jackson, there was no evidence presented that created a reasonable inference that the quantity of Xanax or methamphetamine could have been intended for personal use by Sturgis, and, instead, in conjunction with the scale, plastic ties, mylar baggies, and Agent Shehu’s testimony, the
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8 The Commonwealth entered all non-hearsay evidence into the record at trial without objection. See N.T. Waiver Trial, 11/15/24, at 23.
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evidence created a reasonable inference that he intended to distribute them. 9 See Commonwealth v. Bostick, 958 A.2d 543, 560 (Pa. Super. 2008) (“[O]ur Court is required to give the prosecution the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence.”) (internal citation omitted). In fact, the trial court did consider personal use when discussing the quantity of each controlled substance for personal use and noted that the Commonwealth’s evidence did not establish Sturgis’s intent to distribute the Suboxone or the marijuana because “[Sturgis] was in drug treatment and Suboxone is what people in drug treatment take” and both of these substances were in small quantities. N.T. Waiver Trial, 11/15/24, at 26, 28. In light of the foregoing, it then found the quantity of methamphetamine and Xanax were beyond the scope of personal use. Id. at 28-29; see Jackson, 645 A.2d at 1368 (fact-finder can use surrounding circumstances to determine whether controlled substances are being used for distribution versus “personal consumption”).
Additionally, Sturgis’s argument that the evidence proved the recovered drugs were equally as likely to be for personal use essentially asks us to re- weigh the evidence and disregard the evidence credited by the fact-finder. See Ratsamy, 934 A.2d at 1235, 1238 (upholding defendant’s PWID
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9 Additionally, we note that, while expert testimony may be a factor the trial
court can consider, it is by no means, required or dispositive. See Kirkland, 831 A.2d at 611 (noting “importance of expert testimony in drug cases where the other evidence does not overwhelmingly support the conclusion that the drugs were intended for distribution”).
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conviction, and reversing this Court’s contrary decision, where this Court erred by (1) disregarding opinion of Commonwealth’s expert, police officer who was qualified as “an expert in narcotics” and testified that defendant “possessed the drugs with the intent to deliver based upon the amount of cocaine in the form possessed by [the defendant], together with [] new and unused plastic bags recovered from [the defendant’s conspirator]”; and (2) “fail[ing] to afford the prevailing party[, the Commonwealth,] the full effect of its having prevailed upon an issue in the trial court”) (internal citation omitted). Thus, when viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, as we must, we are constrained to find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that, under the totality of the circumstances, the record supported a finding that Sturgis possessed the controlled substances with the intent to distribute. Accordingly, Sturgis is not entitled to relief.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Date: 8/25/2026