Com. v. Strok, P.

CourtSuperior Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedOctober 18, 2024
Docket959 MDA 2023
StatusUnpublished

This text of Com. v. Strok, P. (Com. v. Strok, P.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Com. v. Strok, P., (Pa. Ct. App. 2024).

Opinion

J-S14023-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : PAUL STROK : : Appellant : No. 959 MDA 2023

Appeal from the Order Entered June 13, 2023 In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-40-CR-0003348-2022

BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., PANELLA, P.J.E., and MURRAY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.E.: FILED: OCTOBER 18, 2024

Paul Strok appeals from the order entered in the Luzerne County Court

of Common Pleas denying his motion to dismiss on the basis of the compulsory

joinder rule.

On October 5, 2022, the Commonwealth executed a search warrant at

Strok’s residence to investigate suspected child pornography. Based on that

search, the Commonwealth arrested Strok that day. The Commonwealth

charged Strok with two counts of sexual abuse of children.1 The charges

related to Strok’s dissemination and possession of child pornography between

June 6, 2022, and October 5, 2022.

____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6312(c), (d). J-S14023-24

Strok filed a motion to dismiss the child pornography charges on April

12, 2023. As set forth in the motion to dismiss, the Commonwealth also had

recovered methamphetamine and hypodermic needles while executing the

search warrant. The Commonwealth separately charged Strok on the drug

charges, and Strok entered a guilty plea. Strok argued that, due to this plea,

Pennsylvania’s compulsory joinder statute, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 110, barred the

Commonwealth from proceeding on the child pornography charges in this

matter.

The trial court denied the motion and certified that the claim was non-

frivolous, which gives this Court jurisdiction to review the interlocutory order.2

Strok raises one issue for our review:

1. Did the trial court err as a matter of law or abuse its discretion in failing to dismiss the charges in the present matter where [Strok] had been prosecuted for and convicted of a criminal offense that was based upon the same criminal conduct or arising from the same criminal episode which was known to the prosecuting officer in the same judicial district as those in the present matter in violation of the compulsory joinder rule under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 110(1)(i) & (ii)?

Appellant’s brief, at 4.

2 “It is well settled in Pennsylvania that a defendant is entitled to an immediate

interlocutory appeal as of right from an order denying a non-frivolous motion to dismiss on state or federal double jeopardy grounds.” Commonwealth v. Barber, 940 A.2d 369, 376 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citation omitted). While section 110 offers a statutory basis for relief, we may review it as implicating a double jeopardy concept. See Commonwealth v. Dozier, 482 A.2d 236, 238 (Pa. Super. 1984) (accepting interlocutory appeal of order denying dismissal under § 110). We commend the trial court for taking this cautionary step. Having established our jurisdiction, we turn to the sole claim raised by Strok.

-2- J-S14023-24

“Where the relevant facts are undisputed, the question of whether

prosecution is barred by the compulsory joinder rule, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 110, is

subject to plenary and de novo review.” Commonwealth v. Brown, 212 A.3d

1076, 1082 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation omitted). The compulsory joinder

statute states, in pertinent part:

Although a prosecution is for a violation of a different provision of the statutes than a former prosecution or is based on different facts, it is barred by such former prosecution under the following circumstances:

(1) The former prosecution resulted in an acquittal or in a conviction as defined in section 109 of this title (relating to when prosecution barred by former prosecution for the same offense) and the subsequent prosecution is for:

(i) any offense of which the defendant could have been convicted on the first prosecution;

(ii) any offense based on the same conduct or arising from the same criminal episode, if such offense was known to the appropriate prosecuting officer at the time of the commencement of the first trial and occurred within the same judicial district as the former prosecution unless the court ordered a separate trial of the charge of such offense or the offense of which the defendant was formerly convicted or acquitted was a summary offense or a summary traffic offense; or

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 110(1)(i)-(ii).

Section 110 offers statutory protection in the successive prosecution

scenario. The critical question in a successive prosecution claim is whether the

separate offenses are part of the same “criminal episode,” a term which “can

be amorphous and troublesome to apply.” Commonwealth v. Bracalielly,

658 A.2d 755, 761 (Pa. 1995). It is well-settled, however, that “charges which

-3- J-S14023-24

are based upon the same conduct or arise from the same criminal episode or

transaction” must be consolidated for trial. Commonwealth v. Tarver, 357

A.2d 539, 540-41 (Pa. 1976).

Section 110(1)(ii) requires compulsory joinder where:

(1) the former prosecutions resulted in an acquittal or in a conviction; (2) the instant prosecutions are based on the same criminal conduct or arose from the same criminal episode as the former prosecutions; (3) the prosecutor was aware of the instant charges before the commencement of the trials on the former charges; and (4) the instant charges and the former charges were within the jurisdiction of a single court.

Bracalielly, 658 A.2d at 760 (citation omitted). “Each prong of this test must

be met for compulsory joinder to apply.” Commonwealth v. Fithian, 961

A.2d 66, 72 (Pa. 2008). Because we conclude that the second requirement is

dispositive of our review, we focus on that requisite element.3

3 We briefly address the other three prongs. Beginning with the first, the Commonwealth’s brief claims that the “former prosecution” is the current docket because those charges were first in time. See Commonwealth’s Brief, at 7 (“Here, [Strok] has yet to be convicted or acquitted on the former prosecution. It is undisputed that the above captioned docket was filed first in time on October 5, 2022, with docket MJ-11201-CR-008-2023 being filed later on January 27, 2023.”). We can find no authority to establish that the “former prosecution” is defined by reference to which case was filed first in time. The statute defines “former prosecution” with respect to the result of the case, not the chronological order in which it was filed. Section 110 bars a successive prosecution if the “former prosecution resulted in an acquittal or in a conviction ….”. 18 Pa.C.S. § 110(1). There is no dispute that the drug offense resulted in an earlier conviction. Accordingly, the resolved drug case is the “former prosecution” with respect to Strok’s claim that this successive prosecution is barred.

(Footnote Continued Next Page)

-4- J-S14023-24

Generally, charges against a defendant are clearly related in time and require little analysis to determine that a single criminal episode exists. However, in defining what acts constitute a single criminal episode, not only is the temporal sequence of events important, but also the logical relationship between the acts must be considered.

Commonwealth v. Hude, 458 A.2d 177, 181 (Pa. 1983).

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Related

Commonwealth v. Fithian
961 A.2d 66 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 2008)
Commonwealth v. Bracalielly
658 A.2d 755 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1995)
Commonwealth v. Stewart
425 A.2d 346 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1981)
Commonwealth v. Hude
458 A.2d 177 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1983)
Commonwealth v. Dozier
482 A.2d 236 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1984)
Commonwealth v. Stewart
473 A.2d 161 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1984)
Commonwealth v. Tarver
357 A.2d 539 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1976)
Commonwealth v. Brown
212 A.3d 1076 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 2019)
Commonwealth v. Barber
940 A.2d 369 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 2007)

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Bluebook (online)
Com. v. Strok, P., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/com-v-strok-p-pasuperct-2024.