Com. v. Stoops, R.

2023 Pa. Super. 21, 290 A.3d 721

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: February 14, 2023
• Docket: 459 MDA 2022
• Status: Published

Opinion

J-A27011-22

2023 PA Super 21

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : REX ALLEN STOOPS : : Appellant : No. 459 MDA 2022

Appeal from the Order Entered February 10, 2022 In the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-28-CR-0001017-2019

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and COLINS, J.*

CONCURRING OPINION BY COLINS, J.: FILED: FEBRUARY 14, 2023

I concur in the affirmance of the trial court’s February 10, 2022 order,

but I respectfully disagree with the Majority to the extent it relies solely on

the fact that “the damages [to the Waynesboro Police Department vehicles]

would not have occurred absent Appellant’s criminal conduct,” Majority

Opinion at 5, and ignores Appellant’s contention that the criminal episode had

ceased at the time of the impact between the police vehicles and his own.

See Appellant’s Brief at 13-14 (arguing that the “separate, intervening and

unnecessary decision by” the officer to ram his vehicle “caused the damage to

the [police] vehicles”). While this Court employs a “but-for” test to determine

the correct amount of restitution, Commonwealth v. Risoldi, 238 A.3d 434,

461 (Pa. Super. 2020), we further require that there be a “a direct nexus

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. J-A27011-22

between the restitution ordered and the crime for which the defendant was

convicted.” Commonwealth v. Solomon, 247 A.3d 1163, 1170 (Pa. Super.

2021) (en banc) (citation omitted); see also 18 Pa.C.S. § 1106(a)(1)

(requiring restitution as part of sentence for damage to victim’s property that

is “a direct result of the crime”); Risoldi, 238 A.3d at 461. Therefore,

restitution is proper only where the victim suffered “a loss that flows from the

conduct that forms the basis of the crime for which the defendant is

convicted.” Solomon, 247 A.3d at 1170 (citation omitted); see also Risoldi,

238 A.3d at 461. To the extent that the Majority suggests Appellant’s initial

flight from police is sufficient by itself to support restitution for the damage to

police vehicles, that would broaden the scope of restitution in future cases

beyond that permitted by the statute and our prior caselaw.

Nevertheless, the restitution award was well-supported by the cogent

analysis set forth by the trial court in its order denying Appellant’s request to

vacate the restitution portion of his sentence. The trial court reviewed the

motor vehicle recordings from the two damaged police vehicles and found that

Appellant had only stopped for “mere seconds” before the officer struck his

vehicle from behind. Order, 2/10/22, at 1, 3. In addition, the court noted

that Appellant never undertook any action that would have signaled his full

surrender to authorities, such as by placing his vehicle in park, turning off the

engine, and exiting at the same time as his passenger. Id. at 3. Therefore,

the court determined that at the time that Appellant’s vehicle was struck, it

was reasonable for the officers to believe that Appellant’s flight from

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apprehension had not yet concluded. Id. Having found that the events “set

in motion by [Appellant’s] initial flight were continuing” at the time of impact

between the vehicles, the court concluded that “the damage to the cruisers

was a direct result of the Waynesboro Police Department attempting to stop

[Appellant]’s vehicle after pursuit though the borough of Waynesboro.” Id.

The trial court’s analysis after its review of the evidence thus supports the

determination that there was a direct nexus between the damage to the police

vehicles and Appellant’s convictions for fleeing or attempting to elude a police

officer and recklessly endangering another person. See Solomon, 247 A.3d

at 1170; Risoldi, 238 A.3d at 461.

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