J-S25027-24
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : DAVID V. STEVENS : : Appellant : No. 3009 EDA 2023
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 30, 2023 In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-46-CR-0004691-2021
BEFORE: DUBOW, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and BECK, J.
MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.: FILED JANUARY 31, 2025
David V. Stevens appeals from the judgment of sentence entered
following his convictions for two counts of aggravated assault and two counts
of simple assault.1 The convictions stemmed from Stevens’ altercation with
two corrections officers, Corrections Officer Matthew Poplawski and
Corrections Officer Dominic Pennypacker. Stevens argues the evidence was
insufficient to sustain his conviction for aggravated assault of Officer
Pennypacker. We affirm.
The testimony at trial established the following. Corrections Officers
Pennypacker and Poplawski were performing cell inspections at Montgomery
County Correctional Facility, where Stevens was an inmate. Trial Court
Opinion, filed 1/2/24, at 2-3, 11. Officer Pennypacker stood by Stevens’ cell
____________________________________________
1 See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2702(a)(3) and 2701(a)(1), respectively. J-S25027-24
door while Officer Poplawski checked it for forbidden items. Id. at 3, 11. When
Officer Pennypacker asked Officer Poplawski to check Stevens’ bed, Stevens
suddenly punched Officer Poplawski twice in the face. Id. at 3, 6, 11.
Officer Pennypacker immediately tried to restrain Stevens. They both
fell to the floor, with Officer Pennypacker on his back and Stevens on top of
him. Id. at 3, 5-6, 12. Officer Poplawski placed his hand on Stevens’ shoulder,
and Stevens bit Officer Poplawski’s finger nearly to the bone, causing it to
gush blood, until Officer Pennypacker applied pressure to Stevens’ neck. Id.
at 4, 5, 68, 90. Stevens continued aggressively hitting and kicking “whoever
he could, trying to resist restraint.” Id. at 3-4, 6, 12. After several minutes,
and with the help of six others, the officers were able to maneuver Stevens’
arms behind his back. Id. at 3, 12. Portions of the incident were recorded by
Officer Pennypacker’s body camera and played for the jury. Id. at 5, 12.
After the altercation, Officer Pennypacker noticed he had injured his
hand by striking it on a metal bedpost and had twisted his right knee while
trying to take down Stevens. Id. at 4, 12. Officer Pennypacker obtained
medical treatment, which determined that his hand was bruised to the bone.
His knee injury prevented him from working for several months. Id. at 4-5,
12. Officer Poplawski sustained injuries to his head, finger, and knee. Id. at
6.
Stevens testified in his own defense. He said that he instinctively
punched Officer Poplawski out of fear for his own safety. He claimed that he
had not intended to injure either officer. Id. at 6-7, 12.
-2- J-S25027-24
The jury found Stevens guilty of aggravated assault and simple assault
of both officers. The court sentenced him to an aggregate of three to six years’
imprisonment. This appeal followed.
Stevens raises the following issue:
Was the evidence insufficient to sustain [Stevens’] conviction for Aggravated Assault (F2) at Count 1 (Complainant: Dominic Pennypacker) where the evidence failed to establish that the corrections officer’s injuries were knowingly or intentionally inflicted, since the injuries were sustained inadvertently when the officer was attempting to restrain [Stevens] during his scuffle with the corrections officer’s partner?
Stevens’ Br. at 3.2
2 After the appeal was commenced, Stevens sent several pro se letters to this
Court, raising issues related to the proceedings below and claims of trial and appellate counsel ineffectiveness. Six months after the parties submitted briefs, Stevens sent a letter to this Court requesting to proceed pro se. We remanded the case to the trial court to conduct a hearing pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 121 and Commonwealth v. Grazier, 713 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1998). The trial court scheduled a hearing, but Stevens refused to be transported to Montgomery County. In so doing, he forfeited his request to represent himself. Moreover, once appointed counsel has filed an appellate brief, a request to go pro se on appeal is untimely. Commonwealth v. Rogers, 645 A.2d 223, 224 (Pa. 1994); accord Commonwealth v. Cox, 204 A.3d 371, 391 n.23 (Pa. 2019). We therefore deny Stevens’ request to proceed pro se.
Furthermore, we cannot entertain any substantive issues Stevens has attempted to raise pro se, as pro se documents filed by an appellant represented by counsel are legal nullities. Commonwealth v. Williams, 151 A.3d 621, 623 (Pa.Super. 2016).
We also decline to consider any ineffectiveness claims at this juncture. Except under limited circumstances that are not present here, ineffectiveness claims must wait until collateral review. Commonwealth v. Watson, 310 A.3d 307, 310-11 (Pa.Super. 2024).
-3- J-S25027-24
We review a sufficiency challenge de novo. Commonwealth v. Hall,
199 A.3d 954, 960 (Pa.Super. 2018).
When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we must determine whether the evidence admitted at trial, and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, when viewed in a light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, support the conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. Where there is sufficient evidence to enable the trier of fact to find every element of the crime has been established beyond a reasonable doubt, the sufficiency of the evidence claim must fail. This standard applies equally where the Commonwealth’s evidence is circumstantial.
Commonwealth v. Griffith, 305 A.3d 573, 576 (Pa.Super. 2023) (quotation
marks and citations omitted), appeal denied, No. 67 MAL 2024, 2024 WL
2745472 (Pa. May 29, 2024).
Stevens argues that the evidence was insufficient to establish that he
intentionally or knowingly inflicted bodily injury on Officer Pennypacker. He
asserts that Officer Pennypacker inadvertently struck his hand on the bed and
twisted his knee while attempting to restrain Stevens. Stevens points out that
Officer Pennypacker was behind him, taking him to the ground, when the
officer’s injuries occurred.
A person is guilty of aggravated assault, under the subsection at issue,
if he “attempts to cause or intentionally or knowingly causes bodily injury to
any of the officers, agents, employees or other persons enumerated in
subsection (c), in the performance of duty.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(a)(3).
Persons enumerated in subsection (c) include the “[o]fficer[s] or employee[s]
of a correctional institution, county jail or prison[.]” Id. at § 2702(c)(9).
-4- J-S25027-24
Attempt requires proof of specific intent. See Commonwealth v.
Sinkiewicz, 293 A.3d 681, 688 (Pa.Super. 2023), appeal denied, 310 A.3d
720 (Pa. 2023). Specific intent exists regarding an element of a crime that
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J-S25027-24
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : DAVID V. STEVENS : : Appellant : No. 3009 EDA 2023
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 30, 2023 In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-46-CR-0004691-2021
BEFORE: DUBOW, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and BECK, J.
MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.: FILED JANUARY 31, 2025
David V. Stevens appeals from the judgment of sentence entered
following his convictions for two counts of aggravated assault and two counts
of simple assault.1 The convictions stemmed from Stevens’ altercation with
two corrections officers, Corrections Officer Matthew Poplawski and
Corrections Officer Dominic Pennypacker. Stevens argues the evidence was
insufficient to sustain his conviction for aggravated assault of Officer
Pennypacker. We affirm.
The testimony at trial established the following. Corrections Officers
Pennypacker and Poplawski were performing cell inspections at Montgomery
County Correctional Facility, where Stevens was an inmate. Trial Court
Opinion, filed 1/2/24, at 2-3, 11. Officer Pennypacker stood by Stevens’ cell
____________________________________________
1 See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2702(a)(3) and 2701(a)(1), respectively. J-S25027-24
door while Officer Poplawski checked it for forbidden items. Id. at 3, 11. When
Officer Pennypacker asked Officer Poplawski to check Stevens’ bed, Stevens
suddenly punched Officer Poplawski twice in the face. Id. at 3, 6, 11.
Officer Pennypacker immediately tried to restrain Stevens. They both
fell to the floor, with Officer Pennypacker on his back and Stevens on top of
him. Id. at 3, 5-6, 12. Officer Poplawski placed his hand on Stevens’ shoulder,
and Stevens bit Officer Poplawski’s finger nearly to the bone, causing it to
gush blood, until Officer Pennypacker applied pressure to Stevens’ neck. Id.
at 4, 5, 68, 90. Stevens continued aggressively hitting and kicking “whoever
he could, trying to resist restraint.” Id. at 3-4, 6, 12. After several minutes,
and with the help of six others, the officers were able to maneuver Stevens’
arms behind his back. Id. at 3, 12. Portions of the incident were recorded by
Officer Pennypacker’s body camera and played for the jury. Id. at 5, 12.
After the altercation, Officer Pennypacker noticed he had injured his
hand by striking it on a metal bedpost and had twisted his right knee while
trying to take down Stevens. Id. at 4, 12. Officer Pennypacker obtained
medical treatment, which determined that his hand was bruised to the bone.
His knee injury prevented him from working for several months. Id. at 4-5,
12. Officer Poplawski sustained injuries to his head, finger, and knee. Id. at
6.
Stevens testified in his own defense. He said that he instinctively
punched Officer Poplawski out of fear for his own safety. He claimed that he
had not intended to injure either officer. Id. at 6-7, 12.
-2- J-S25027-24
The jury found Stevens guilty of aggravated assault and simple assault
of both officers. The court sentenced him to an aggregate of three to six years’
imprisonment. This appeal followed.
Stevens raises the following issue:
Was the evidence insufficient to sustain [Stevens’] conviction for Aggravated Assault (F2) at Count 1 (Complainant: Dominic Pennypacker) where the evidence failed to establish that the corrections officer’s injuries were knowingly or intentionally inflicted, since the injuries were sustained inadvertently when the officer was attempting to restrain [Stevens] during his scuffle with the corrections officer’s partner?
Stevens’ Br. at 3.2
2 After the appeal was commenced, Stevens sent several pro se letters to this
Court, raising issues related to the proceedings below and claims of trial and appellate counsel ineffectiveness. Six months after the parties submitted briefs, Stevens sent a letter to this Court requesting to proceed pro se. We remanded the case to the trial court to conduct a hearing pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 121 and Commonwealth v. Grazier, 713 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1998). The trial court scheduled a hearing, but Stevens refused to be transported to Montgomery County. In so doing, he forfeited his request to represent himself. Moreover, once appointed counsel has filed an appellate brief, a request to go pro se on appeal is untimely. Commonwealth v. Rogers, 645 A.2d 223, 224 (Pa. 1994); accord Commonwealth v. Cox, 204 A.3d 371, 391 n.23 (Pa. 2019). We therefore deny Stevens’ request to proceed pro se.
Furthermore, we cannot entertain any substantive issues Stevens has attempted to raise pro se, as pro se documents filed by an appellant represented by counsel are legal nullities. Commonwealth v. Williams, 151 A.3d 621, 623 (Pa.Super. 2016).
We also decline to consider any ineffectiveness claims at this juncture. Except under limited circumstances that are not present here, ineffectiveness claims must wait until collateral review. Commonwealth v. Watson, 310 A.3d 307, 310-11 (Pa.Super. 2024).
-3- J-S25027-24
We review a sufficiency challenge de novo. Commonwealth v. Hall,
199 A.3d 954, 960 (Pa.Super. 2018).
When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we must determine whether the evidence admitted at trial, and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, when viewed in a light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, support the conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. Where there is sufficient evidence to enable the trier of fact to find every element of the crime has been established beyond a reasonable doubt, the sufficiency of the evidence claim must fail. This standard applies equally where the Commonwealth’s evidence is circumstantial.
Commonwealth v. Griffith, 305 A.3d 573, 576 (Pa.Super. 2023) (quotation
marks and citations omitted), appeal denied, No. 67 MAL 2024, 2024 WL
2745472 (Pa. May 29, 2024).
Stevens argues that the evidence was insufficient to establish that he
intentionally or knowingly inflicted bodily injury on Officer Pennypacker. He
asserts that Officer Pennypacker inadvertently struck his hand on the bed and
twisted his knee while attempting to restrain Stevens. Stevens points out that
Officer Pennypacker was behind him, taking him to the ground, when the
officer’s injuries occurred.
A person is guilty of aggravated assault, under the subsection at issue,
if he “attempts to cause or intentionally or knowingly causes bodily injury to
any of the officers, agents, employees or other persons enumerated in
subsection (c), in the performance of duty.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(a)(3).
Persons enumerated in subsection (c) include the “[o]fficer[s] or employee[s]
of a correctional institution, county jail or prison[.]” Id. at § 2702(c)(9).
-4- J-S25027-24
Attempt requires proof of specific intent. See Commonwealth v.
Sinkiewicz, 293 A.3d 681, 688 (Pa.Super. 2023), appeal denied, 310 A.3d
720 (Pa. 2023). Specific intent exists regarding an element of a crime that
“involves the nature of [the defendant’s] conduct or a result thereof,” where
“it is [the defendant’s] conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature
or to cause such a result[.]” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 302(b)(1)(i).
“A person acts knowingly with respect to a material element of an
offense” that “involves a result of his conduct,” where “he is aware that it is
practically certain that his conduct will cause such a result.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. §
302(b)(2)(ii).
Like any other element of a crime, the defendant’s intent may be
established by circumstantial evidence. Griffith, 305 A.3d at 576; see
Commonwealth v. Brown, 23 A.3d 544, 560 (Pa.Super. 2011) (en banc)
(stating a defendant’s intent to inflict bodily injury may be shown by the
circumstances). A defendant’s violent resistance to an arrest is sufficient to
prove the intent to cause injury to the arresting officers. See Commonwealth
v. Rahman, 75 A.3d 497, 502 (Pa.Super. 2013) (finding evidence was
sufficient to show defendant attempted to cause officer bodily injury where
defendant shoved and punched officer who was arresting him); Brown, 23
A.3d at 560 (finding evidence sufficient to prove that the defendant intended
to cause injury to arresting officers “by throwing [one officer] to the ground
and then striking [the other officer] repeatedly by wildly flailing his arms as
he resisted arrest”).
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Here, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the
evidence establishes that Stevens punched Officer Poplawski in the face. When
Officer Pennypacker attempted to restrain him, Stevens violently resisted by
toppling Officer Pennypacker, biting Officer Poplawski, and hitting and kicking
both officers for several minutes. The circumstances surrounding the incident
— especially Stevens’ violent response to the officers’ actions — were
sufficient to enable the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Stevens
had the specific intent to inflict bodily injury on Officer Pennypacker or
intentionally or knowingly caused bodily injury to him. See Rahman, 75 A.3d
at 502; Brown, 23 A.3d at 560.
Stevens likens his case to Commonwealth v. Wertelet, 696 A.2d 206
(Pa.Super. 1997), and Commonwealth v. Smith, 305 A.3d 1 (Pa.Super.
2023), appeal granted, No. 17 EAL 2024, 2024 WL 3506692 (Pa. July 23,
2024). He claims that in those cases, this Court found the evidence insufficient
to establish that the defendant knowingly or intentionally inflicted injuries
during the scuffle of an arrest.
Neither decision affords him relief. In Wertelet, we did not consider
whether there was sufficient evidence of intent, but whether there was
sufficient evidence of bodily injury. 696 A2d at 210-13. In Smith, we found
the specific evidence there failed to make out a prima facie case for simple
assault because it did not sufficiently show that the defendant, a police officer,
intentionally injured the victim while trying to arrest him. 305 A.3d at 11.
Here, in contrast, the evidence establishes that Stevens hit Officer Poplawski
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in the face and then engaged in a ferocious struggle with both Officer
Poplawski and Officer Pennypacker while trying to stop them from restraining
him. That evidence was sufficient circumstantial evidence to prove the mens
rea.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Date: 1/31/2025
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