J-A07026-24
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : DEBORAH ANN STEPHENS : : Appellant : No. 658 MDA 2023
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered April 6, 2023 In the Court of Common Pleas of Adams County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-01-CR-0001094-2018
BEFORE: STABILE, J., SULLIVAN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY SULLIVAN, J.: FILED MAY 15, 2026
Deborah Ann Stephens (“Stephens”) appeals from the order dismissing
her first, counseled petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act
(“PCRA”).1 After careful review, we determine trial counsel, Attorney Steve
Rice (“Attorney Rice”), was ineffective for failing to ensure a knowing,
intelligent, and voluntary guilty plea. Accordingly, we reverse, vacate the
judgment of sentence, and remand for further proceedings consistent with
this memorandum.
After two adverse motion in limine rulings prior to trial, Stephens
entered a conditional, open guilty plea to third-degree murder for hitting her
husband, James (“James” or “victim”), at least thirty-six times with a baseball
____________________________________________
* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1 See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. J-A07026-24
bat, causing his death. See Commonwealth v. Stephens, 249 A.3d 1168
(Pa. Super. 2021) (unpublished memorandum, at *1).
The facts relevant to the guilty plea are as follows. The Commonwealth
charged Stephens with first-degree and third-degree murder. Prior to trial,
Stephens filed a motion in limine to preclude evidence of the text message
James sent their son concerning her alleged threat of violence.2 The trial court
denied this motion. In August 2019, the Commonwealth filed a motion in
limine seeking to preclude evidence of James’s marital infidelity. The trial
court granted the motion as to many of the communications between James
and his paramour but stated evidence close in time to the date of the murder
might be admissible to show provocation. See Order, 9/23/19 at 1
(unnumbered). Attorney Rice did not file a motion in limine to admit evidence
of James’s decades-long physical and psychological abuse of Stephens,
despite the significant evidence of that abuse as detailed infra, which failed to
establish pre-trial a factual basis for a self-defense claim namely battered
2 Nine days before the victim’s death, the victim sent a text message to their
son wherein he claimed Stephens had threatened to kill him with a baseball bat because he was having an affair, the text message was not sent or received by Stephens. See Commonwealth v. Stephens, 249 A.3d 1168 (Pa. Super. 2021) (unpublished memorandum, at *1).
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woman’s syndrome. See e.g. Commonwealth v. Otero-Velez, 341 A.3d
67, *3 (Pa. Super. 2025) (unpublished memorandum).3
In October 2019, following the trial court’s unfavorable in limine rulings,
Stephens entered a “conditional” open guilty plea to third-degree murder,
which limited to Stephens to one issue on direct appeal, namely whether the
text messages regarding the victim’s infidelity were erroneously precluded. As
a result, Stephens was barred from bringing any other challenge on direct
appeal, including other evidentiary rulings and even the discretionary aspects
of the sentence. See N.T. Guilty Plea, 10/30/19, at 1-12; Written Guilty Plea
Colloquy, 10/30/19, at 1-11 (unnumbered).
The first ten pages of the written guilty plea colloquy appear to be the
standard form written guilty plea colloquy where Stephens initialed and signed
all of the rights she was waiving in exchange for a plea. The colloquy included
the usual information that Stephens could file a post-trial motion and appeal
on the basis that her plea was not voluntary and/or seek to modify her
sentence. See id. at 9 (unnumbered). However, attached to the standard
colloquy is a single typewritten sheet of paper that appears to be added by
counsel, and is unsigned, undated, and with no initials and is obviously not a
part of the standard written colloquy. See id. at 11 (unnumbered) (“page
3 The information of long-term physical and psychological abuse was not mentioned until sentencing on January 3, 2020. Sentencing 1/16/2020, at 6, 17, 19.
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11”). This unsigned, undated sheet bearing no initials (contrary to the other
pages of the colloquy) went to the core terms of the “conditional” plea
including Stephens’s inability to challenge her sentence. See id. (“If the
[c]ourt’s ruling is upheld, the [o]rder of sentence will stand.”); see also N.T.
Guilty Plea, 10/30/19, at 3. Furthermore, the only place where the term
“conditional” appeared in the standard portion of the written colloquy was on
the cover page, where it was hand-written and squeezed between the words
“Guilty” and “to”, this handwriting is not initialed or dated. Id. at 1
(unnumbered). The non-standard attachment that went to the core of the
conditional portion of the plea was likewise not discussed at all with Stephens
by the plea court during the oral colloquy.
Turning to the oral colloquy conducted on October 30, 2019, although
the written colloquy was handed to the court for review, the plea court did not
review it in any depth with Stephens during the oral colloquy. The court asked
if she read it, initialed it, and signed it, but little else. Id. at 4. The word
“conditional” is stated six times during the colloquy but used only once by the
plea court and not in the context of what a conditional plea is or the specific
limitations thereof. In fact, during the oral colloquy no one put forth any
explanation of what the term “conditional” meant to Stephens, if she had even
seen page 11, or how it limited her trial and appeal rights.
It is obvious from the review of the testimony that Stephens did not
understand the limitations of the conditional plea in the context of giving up
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her right to a trial. During the oral guilty plea colloquy, the following exchange
occurred between Stephens and the trial court:
[The trial court]: You are presumed to be innocent. The Commonwealth bears the burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. You’re entitled to a jury trial, but if you plead guilty today[,] you’re giving up your right to have that trial; do you understand that?
[Stephens]: For that much of it, but I can appeal it?
[The trial court]: You can appeal.
[Stephens]: Okay. Yes, sir.
[The trial court]: But you’re giving up your right to have a trial in this case; do you understand that?
[Stephens]: For this time, yes.
Id. at 4-5 (emphasis added). Although Stephens’s two non-responsive
answers suggested she did not understand the rights she permanently
surrendered by pleading guilty, and despite these unclear responses that
indicate she thought she would get a trial at some point, Attorney Rice did not
seek to clarify Stephens’s confusion with any follow up questions to clarify her
understanding or ask the court to do so even though her answers were not
responsive or clear. The trial court also failed to discuss Stephens’s post-
sentence or appellate rights, and Attorney Rice did not ask the court to do so.
See id. at 1-12.
These non-responsive answers, however, did not go unnoticed by either
counsel. In fact, later in the oral colloquy the Commonwealth, presumably to
protect the record, asked the plea court to go over the written colloquy in
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detail to make sure “she read it and understood everything.” Id. at 11. The
Commonwealth’s language is telling and clearly reveals a concern about
Stephens’s understanding of the conditional plea. The Commonwealth
indicates “given the way this unfolded, I don’t recall the Court actually going
over the written colloquy with the Defendant . . .” Id. The trial court stated,
incorrectly and without defense objection, that it had done so. See id.
The record is clear that Attorney Rice was also wary of Stephens’s
responses as he followed up with a similarly concerning request, “would the
Court be willing to entertain at the time of sentencing at least being a little
more particular and in a way that is consistent with Attorney Sinnett’s
summary . . . just so . . . [when] Ms. Stephens does appeal there isn’t an
issue about what the condition actually was?” The plea court again responded
that it did read it from the draft colloquy. Id. It is clear from both attorneys’
requests that it was not the reading they were worried about, it was the
understanding that concerned them. The plea court did not follow up with
Stephens after their respective requests.
Sentencing took place in January 2020.4 At sentencing, it was again
clear that Stephens was not aware she had been precluded from taking her
case to trial. When she spoke at sentencing to the court, she indicated “thank
4 The record reflects that Stephens referred to sentencing as a “sentencing
trial.” N.T. Sentencing, 1/16/2020, at 16.
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you for having my sentencing trial today,” and “Thank you for having this trial
today.” N.T. Sentencing, 1/16/2020, at 16-17.
The trial court ordered a pre-sentence investigation report (“PSI”),
which by statute is intended to inform the court of the circumstances of the
offense and the defendant’s character to aid in sentencing. See Pa.R.Crim.P.
702(A)(3). The trial court did not order, nor did Attorney Rice ask for any
psychological evaluations pursuant to Rule 702.5 The PSI in this case
consisted solely of a single “Face Sheet” of basic biographical data and a letter
the arresting officer wrote offering his opinion that Stephens should receive
the statutory maximum sentence. See PSI, 12/2/19, at 1-2 (unnumbered).6
The PSI contains no interviews with other relatives, friends, or even her pastor
all of whom spoke at sentencing to understand “the circumstances of the
offense and the character of the defendant sufficient to assist the judge in
determining sentence.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 702 (a)(3).
5 Although Rule 702 does not require psychological evaluations, it is common
in murder cases to request them at sentencing, especially given the facts involved here where you have a criminal defendant that has no prior record, is indicating she “lost it” and struck her husband of many years with a baseball bat multiple times.
6 Although Pa.R.Crim.P. 702(A)(4) allows for the inclusion of a victim impact
statement, nothing in Rule 702 allows the admission of the investigating officer’s opinion about a defendant’s alleged lack of remorse or the officer’s sentencing recommendation. Notwithstanding the exclusion of necessary information from the PSI and the inclusion of inadmissible material, Attorney Rice failed to object to the deficiency of the PSI.
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At sentencing, the Commonwealth offered the arresting officer’s
sentencing recommendation and argued, contrary to Stephens’s plea to third-
degree murder, “it’s obvious this was an intentional killing. . .. [E]vidence of
intent . . . I think is without question exist[ed] here.” N.T. Sentencing,
1/16/2020, at 3-4. Further, the Commonwealth falsely asserted Stephens
had told her son, James “Jimmy” Stephens, she was going to hit James in the
head with a baseball bat. See id. at 4.7 The Commonwealth also affirmatively
declared, “[T]here is no evidence of any history of abuse in this particular
relationship,” and asserted Stephens committed any violence that occured in
the marriage, although, to be clear, Attorney Rice failed to make any reference
to long-term physical and mental abuse until sentencing. See id. at 5.
Attorney Rice offered the following account of the killing. On that day,
James came out of the bathroom naked, threw a pair of excrement-smeared
pants at Stephens, and an argument ensued. See id. at 14. Stephens
destroyed a picture of James’s mistress Alexandra Liam, a woman he met
online, whose photograph James had displayed in their home.8 James shoved
7 In fact, it is the victim that made this assertion in a text to his son, not the
defendant. The Commonwealth was well aware of this important distinction as they argued a motion in limine regarding this text message.
8 Stephens’s and James’s son, Jimmy, testified that in the months before the
killing, James told Stephens he was involved with Liam, and taunted her about Liam’s sexual attributes. See N.T., Sentencing, 1/16/20, at 10-14.
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Stephens. See id. Stephens then grabbed a baseball bat and hit the victim
repeatedly, killing him. See id. at 14-15.
For the first time at sentencing, Attorney Rice presented evidence James
had physically and psychologically abused Stephens for over forty years during
their marriage. Jimmy Stephens testified to Stephens’s good character and
stated James had been abusive to Stephens, but she chose to keep silent and
preserve the family unit to her own detriment. See id. at 18-19. Jimmy also
described James’s psychological abuse of Stephens, and told the court,
“[T]here’s so much to this whole story that people don’t know,” and “[T]here
was a lot that led up to [the killing] that made her[,] I think[,] just snap. I
mean, I’m sorry, you can only take so much.” See id. at 19-20. For the first
time at sentencing, Attorney Rice introduced letters and testimony from family
members and friends showing James had abused Stephens. See N.T.
Sentencing, 1/16/20, at 8, 14; Defense Exhibit 4, Sentencing. Attorney Rice
also introduced medical records from an event approximately one week
before the killing when Stephens underwent treatment and testing at
Gettysburg Hospital following James’s assault of her. See Defense Exhibit 4B.
In her allocution, Stephens apologized to James’s friends and family. She
referenced the lengthy history of physical and psychological abuse James had
inflicted on her and explained she “snapped” on the day of the killing. N.T.
Sentencing, 1/16/20, at 17.
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Knowing Stephens pled to third-degree murder, the sentencing court
specifically found, without a defense objection, “significant evidence that
suggested this was a premeditated and intentional killing,” id. at 21, even
though third-degree murder involves a non-intentional killing. See
Commonwealth v. Geiger, 944 A.2d 85, 90 (Pa. Super. 2008). Contrary to
the elements of the crime to which Stephens pled, the court repeatedly, and
at length, characterized the killing as premeditated murder, referring to “the
intent of [Stephens] to commit this killing,” see N.T. Sentencing, 1/16/20, at
22, and asserting Stephens “carried out a killing . . . in a premeditated fashion
with the intent to kill,” see id. at 23. The court also made extensive reference
to the hearsay evidence of James’s text to Jimmy about Stephens’s alleged
threats to hit him with a baseball bat. See id. at 22-23 (referring at length
to James’s text to Jimmy as both predictive of the killing and relevant to rebut
a possible heat of passion defense, in combination with evidence Stephens
had known from a period of time about James’s affair and had a “cooling off”
period).
The court then went on to diminish and mischaracterize James’s abuse
as largely confined to social media:
It’s unfortunate that we live in a society where people can be mean, disrespectful, discourteous and downright hateful in [sic] times on social media and on other platforms for whatever reason, but that’s the society that we live in. Society cannot condone taking matters into our own hands because you don’t like the way somebody has been acting toward you on social media and comments made to you and beat them to death striking them
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dozens of times with a baseball bat. Society simply can’t tolerate that and won’t tolerate that.
Id. at 22-23.
On the other hand, the court also faulted Attorney Rice for not raising
evidence of James’s abuse of Stephens before sentencing, stating, “[the]
[d]efense had an opportunity to raise a lot of this prior to today, [and] for
various reasons declined to do so. It was presented for the first time today.”
Id. at 26. The court concluded evidence of James’s abuse was not only
presented belatedly but constituted “character assassination,” and expressed
its “umbrage” that James had “no chance to defend himself. . ..” See id. at
26-27. The trial court then imposed a statutory maximum sentence of twenty
to forty years in prison on Stephens, who was in her mid-sixties.
On direct appeal, in accordance with the terms of the plea agreement,
Stephens was limited to challenging only the preclusion of evidence of marital
infidelity prior to the date of the killing, arguing its exclusion prevented her
from raising a heat of passion defense. See Commonwealth v. Stephens,
249 A.3d 1168 (unpublished memorandum, at *3). Relying on settled law,
and long-standing precedent, this Court explained that a heat of passion
defense could only succeed if the victim was uncontrollably compelled by
passion at the time of the murder—and that a killing will not be deemed to
have occurred under the heat of passion where there was sufficient time for
cooling off after provocation. Id. at *4 (emphasis in original, internal
quotation marks and citations omitted). In rejecting Stephens’s appellate
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claim outright, this Court explicitly noted that evidence of long-standing abuse
(which Attorney Rice possessed but did not introduce until sentencing) actually
would have supported a heat of passion defense:
This is not a case where Stephens proffered a theory of self- defense, or one in which the victim had physically and psychologically abused her for years leading up to his death. In such a case, we agree that the prior history of Stephens’[s] marital discord with the victim might be relevant to establish the quantum of provocation needed to prove such a heat of passion defense.
See Stephens at *4-5 (emphasis added).9
In August 2021, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Stephens’s
petition for leave to appeal. See Commonwealth v. Stephens, 261 A.3d
1031 (Pa. 2021).
In May 2022, Stephens filed a timely pro se PCRA petition.10 The PCRA
court appointed counsel, Attorney Paul Royer (“Attorney Royer”), who filed an
amended PCRA petition in November 2022.11 The PCRA court held an
9 Although not relevant to the voluntariness of a plea, Attorney Rice clearly
had information that Stephens suffered years of physical and psychological abuse at the hands of her husband, but he sat on it until the day of sentencing. A cursory review of Pennsylvania case law would have revealed the ability to argue heat of passion based on the grounds of long-term abuse.
10 While the PCRA petition is entitled “Counseled Petition,” it is not signed by an attorney and Stephens states she is proceeding pro se. See PCRA Petition, 5/27/22, at 1, 4.
11 Stephens’s pro se petition included a claim that Attorney Rice was ineffective at sentencing. See PCRA Petition , 5/27/22, at 3. Attorney Royer did not include this claim in the amended PCRA petition. See Amended PCRA (Footnote Continued Next Page)
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evidentiary hearing on the claim, at which Stephens testified she spoke with
Attorney Rice once or twice prior to the entry of the guilty plea. See N.T.,
Petition, 11/1/22, at 1-7 (unnumbered). For reasons which are not apparent, in December 2022, Attorney Royer filed a Turner/Finley letter explaining his reasons for withdrawing this individual claim. See Turner/Finley Letter, 12/16/22, at 1-7 (unnumbered).
Although a defendant cannot compel counsel to raise issues on direct appeal counsel deems frivolous, see Commonwealth v. Morrison, 173 A.3d 286, 293 (Pa. Super. 2017), counsel may not file a “quasi-Anders brief” arguing certain issues are frivolous but others are meritorious. See id. In two unpublished memoranda, we have applied this rationale to Turner/Finley letters, holding counsel may not file a partial Turner/Finley letter, but must file either an amended PCRA or a motion to withdraw as counsel. See Commonwealth v. Demora, 313 A.3d 201 (Pa. Super. 2024) (unpublished memorandum at *10 n. 8); Commonwealth v. Plummer, 236 A.3d 1069 (Pa. Super. 2020) (unpublished memorandum at *6); see also Pa.R.A.P. 126(b) (unpublished non-precedential memoranda decision of Superior Court filed after May 1, 2019, may be cited for persuasive value). Thus, Attorney Royer should not have filed a Turner/Finley letter concerning what he believed to be a single, non-meritorious issue in Stephens’s PCRA petition.
The PCRA court’s response of issuing a partial Rule 907 notice, was equally problematic. See Order, 12/19/22, at 1 (unnumbered). That Rule 907 notice directed Stephens, a represented PCRA petitioner, to file a pro se response if she objected to the dismissal without a hearing of her claim of counsel’s ineffectiveness. Such a directive clearly sought a violation of our Supreme Court’s prohibition of hybrid representation. See Commonwealth v. Jette, 23 A.3d 1032, 1036-37 (Pa. 2011).
Based on our review of the record, as discussed infra, we do not agree with the PCRA court that a claim of ineffective assistance at sentencing would be wholly meritless. We note, inter alia, Attorney Rice’s failure to object to the sentencing court’s explicit reliance on its belief that the murder was premeditated in sentencing Stephens, even though Stephens pled guilty to third-degree murder, which does not involve the intent to kill, and counsel’s failure to object to the deficient PSI or the admission of the arresting officer’s sentencing preference. However, because we conclude Attorney Rice was ineffective in inducing Stephens’s guilty plea, we need not decide his ineffectiveness at sentencing.
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PCRA Hearing, 1/23/23, at 5. Stephens repeatedly stated that when she pled
guilty, she believed that after her plea a different court would determine her
guilt, see id. at 6, and she “would get a hearing and that [she] would be
allowed to present what happened up to the event and [she] would get [her]
side of the story out.” Id. at 5; see also 6, 9, 12, 14-15 (asserting her belief
she would testify during the appeal). Stephens testified Attorney Rice never
talked to her about a “conditional” plea, and when asked to explain what such
a plea entailed or why trial counsel recommended it, was unable to do so.
See id. at 5-6, 8. Stephens offered the unintelligible assertion Attorney Rice
was appealing the case because “he couldn’t defend me the way we were right
now if we were that way. He said he had to do it in the higher court.” Id. at
6. Stephens acknowledged signing the standard written guilty plea colloquy
but did not remember seeing the appended last page which modified the
colloquy and explained her plea’s conditional nature. See id. at 7. Stephens
did not recall Attorney Rice ever discussing which issues he would raise on
appeal, the possibility of going to trial, or the possibility of a stipulated trial.
See id. at 7-8. On cross-examination, Stephens explained she was unaware
the document she filed in this case was a PCRA and did not recall writing it.
See id. at 10, 17. Lastly, Stephens was unable to explain the difference
between an appeal and a trial. See id. at 14-16.
In his testimony, Attorney Rice admitted he discussed the details of the
conditional guilty plea more with Stephens’s family than Stephens. See id.
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at 25, 27, 33-34. Attorney Rice testified he followed this course because
Stephens’s “understanding of things is sometimes on a more simple level[;]”
and her conception of the law was only “basic.” Id. Although Attorney Rice
testified he did not believe Stephens was incompetent,12 he acknowledged she
had a “more basic understanding of things” and that while he did the best he
could to explain things to her, “there are limits to what you can achieve.” Id.
at 26. Attorney Rice admitted there were “concerns” about whether Stephens
“was comfortable” with the guilty plea and did not disagree with Attorney
Royer’s characterization of Stephens’s desire for a jury trial as “strong.” Id.
at 28, 37. Attorney Rice commented he doubted Stephens would be able to
recount what was said in either the oral or written guilty plea colloquy.13 See
id. at 27. Attorney Rice could not remember if Stephens had ever sought to
12 Notably, despite Stephens’s incomprehension about the nature of the guilty
plea expressed at the plea and in her PCRA testimony, there is no evidence Attorney Rice had Stephens examined by a psychologist or tested for dementia, Alzheimer’s disease, or traumatic brain injury. Such a course would have been reasonable given Attorney Rice’s low opinion of Stephens’s intellectual capability, as well as Stephens’s age, her statements that the victim had previously hit her in the head with objects, and the out-of-character nature of her actions.
13 Attorney Rice testified “everything was explained to her in the colloquy.”
Id. at 37. However, as mentioned above, the trial court did not review the written colloquy with Stephens at the plea hearing despite the Commonwealth’s urging, and the oral colloquy strongly suggests Stephens did not understand the nature of the plea or the rights she was surrendering by pleading guilty, as her PCRA testimony makes manifestly clear.
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withdraw her guilty plea but stated even if she had requested to withdraw her
guilty plea, he would not have permitted her to do so. See id. at 27, 30-32.
Attorney Rice, who was called by the Commonwealth as a witness on
Stephens’s PCRA petition, testified the trial court’s ruling barring evidence of
James’s infidelity “eviscerated” his entire trial strategy and he “didn’t know
what to do[.]” Id. at 30; see also id. at 26-30, 36, 38. Attorney Rice testified
that the conditional plea was his idea. See id. at 31-32. Attorney Rice noted
he agreed as part of the conditional guilty plea that if the appeal failed, the
sentence would stand. See id. at 36. Attorney Rice could not and did not
explain why he believed he had a chance of prevailing on an appeal of the
court’s ruling on the admissibility of earlier evidence of marital infidelity, why
he did not file a motion in limine to admit evidence of James’s longstanding
abuse, or why he did not negotiate to preserve an appeal of the admission of
James’s text concerning prior threat of violence.14 See id. at 20-39.
In April 2023, the PCRA court issued an opinion denying Stephens’s
PCRA petition. This appeal followed.15
On appeal, Stephens raises two questions:
14 Attorney Royer attempted to question Attorney Rice as to why he chose to
only appeal the ruling on marital infidelity and not the ruling on the prior threat of violence. See id. at 38. However, the Commonwealth objected to the testimony as outside the scope of its direct examination and the PCRA court sustained the objection. See id.
15 Stephens and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
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I. Whether the [PCRA] court erred in not finding that trial counsel was ineffective for advising [Stephens] to enter into a conditional plea agreement?
II. Whether the [PCRA] court erred in not finding trial counsel ineffective for advising [Stephens] to enter into a conditional plea agreement that did not include an additional appellate issue concerning the trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of text messages containing prior threats of violence?
Stephens’s Brief at 6 (capitalization and punctuation regularized).
This Court’s standard for reviewing the dismissal of PCRA relief is well-
settled:
Our review of a PCRA court’s decision is limited to examining whether the PCRA court’s findings of fact are supported by the record, and whether its conclusions of law are free from legal error. We view the record in the light most favorable to the prevailing party in the PCRA court. We are bound by any credibility determinations made by the PCRA court where they are supported by the record. However, we review the PCRA court’s legal conclusions de novo.
Commonwealth v. Staton, 184 A.3d 949, 954 (Pa. 2018) (citations and
quotation marks omitted).
Both of Stephens’s interrelated issues16 challenge the effectiveness of
guilty plea counsel. To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,
an appellant must establish that:
(1) the underlying claim has arguable merit; (2) no reasonable basis existed for counsel’s action or failure to act; and (3) the petitioner suffered prejudice as a result of counsel’s error, with prejudice measured by whether there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different. If a claim fails under any required element . . . the court may dismiss ____________________________________________
16 Because Stephens’s issues are interrelated, we discuss them together.
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on that basis. Counsel is presumed to be effective, and the burden of demonstrating ineffectiveness rests on the appellant.
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 236 A.3d 63, 68 (Pa. Super. 2020) (en banc)
(citations omitted). A failure to satisfy any prong of the ineffectiveness test
requires rejection of the claim. See Commonwealth v. Brown, 196 A.3d
130, 151 (Pa. 2018)
“A criminal defendant has the right to effective counsel during a plea
process as well as during trial.” Commonwealth v. Rathfon, 899 A.2d 365,
369 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citation omitted). Further, “[a]llegations of
ineffectiveness in connection with the entry of a guilty plea will serve as a
basis for relief . . . if the ineffectiveness caused the defendant to enter an
involuntary or unknowing plea.” Commonwealth v. Hickman, 799 A.2d
136, 141 (Pa. Super. 2002) (citation omitted). Also, “[w]here the defendant
enters his plea on the advice of counsel, the voluntariness of the plea depends
upon whether counsel’s advice was within the range of competence demanded
of attorneys in criminal cases.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted). Where a defendant has pleaded guilty, to satisfy the prejudice
requirement of the ineffectiveness test, he must show “there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and
would have insisted on going to trial.” Rathfon, 899 A.2d at 370 (citation
omitted). Where the record clearly shows the trial court conducted a thorough
plea colloquy and the defendant understood his rights and the nature of the
charges against him, the plea is voluntary. See Commonwealth v.
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McCauley, 797 A.2d 920, 922 (Pa. Super. 2001). In examining whether the
defendant understood the nature and consequences of his plea, we look to the
totality of the circumstances surrounding the plea. See id. At a minimum,
the trial court must inquire into the following six areas:
(1) Does the defendant understand the nature of the charges to which [s]he is pleading guilty?
(2) Is there a factual basis for the plea?
(3) Does the defendant understand that [s]he has a right to trial by jury?
(4) Does the defendant understand that [s]he is presumed innocent until [s]he is found guilty?
(5) Is the defendant aware of the permissible ranges of sentences and/or fines for the offenses charged?
(6) Is the defendant aware that the judge is not bound by the terms of any plea agreement tendered unless the judge accepts such agreement?
Id. (citation omitted); see also Pa.R.Crim.P. 590, Comment.
However, a guilty plea is not a cursory, “check the boxes” formality.
“The entry of a guilty plea is a protracted and comprehensive proceeding
wherein the court is obliged to make a specific determination after extensive
colloquy on the record that a plea is voluntarily and understandingly
tendered.” Commonwealth v. Yeomans, 24 A.3d 1044, 1047 (Pa. Super.
2011). Thus, “[i[n order for a guilty plea to be constitutionally valid, the guilty
plea colloquy must affirmatively show that the defendant understood what the
plea connoted and its consequences.” Id. at 1046 (citation omitted).
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Common sense dictates that where there is an uncommon complexity added
to the standard plea bargain that precludes certain rights like the conditional
plea in the instant matter, it is imperative the defendant understand not only
what they are agreeing to but also what rights they are waiving as a result.
Further, our Supreme Court has long held that a guilty plea must be
“the personal and voluntary decision of the accused[.]” Commonwealth v.
Forbes, 299 A.2d 268, 271 (Pa. 1973). Our conclusion that Attorney Rice
coerced Stephens into entering an unknowing and involuntary guilty plea is
supported by Stephens’s demonstrated limited understanding of her plea and
buttressed by the inadequacies of the plea colloquies and Attorney Rice’s
failure to ameliorate those deficiencies. In a recent decision,
Commonwealth v. Bradley, 326 A.3d 982, 987-88 (Pa. Super. 2024), direct
appeal counseled filed an Anders brief and sought leave to withdraw because
the only non-frivolous issues concerned ineffective assistance of counsel in
the entry of a nolo contendere plea. See id. at 988. This Court denied counsel
leave to withdraw, finding a colorable claim of ineffective assistance where
plea counsel allowed the defendant to enter the plea despite knowing the
defendant wished to raise a constitutional challenge to Pennsylvania’s wiretap
laws, and did not explain to defendant he was waiving that right by entering
the plea. See id. at 987-88.
Stephens contends Attorney Rice was ineffective for allowing her to
enter a conditional guilty plea. See Stephens’s Brief at 11-18. Stephens
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maintains her testimony at the PCRA hearing demonstrates she did not
understand she was entering a conditional guilty plea. See id. at 12. To that
end, Stephens highlights Attorney Rice’s testimony at the PCRA hearing that
her level of understanding was “simple.” Id. Stephens notes she did not sign
the appended page to the written plea colloquy, which was the only page that
set forth the unusual conditions of the plea. See id. at 13. Moreover,
Stephens argues Attorney Rice had no reasonable strategic basis for the
conditional plea because the law on marital infidelity and heat of passion is
long-settled and given this, the chances of succeeding on appeal were “slim-
to-none.”17 Id. Moreover, Stephens claims an appellate challenge to the
admissibility of James’s text concerning Stephens’s alleged threat presented
a far better likelihood of success, and no reasonable basis existed for his
failure to include this evidentiary ruling in the conditions. In this regard
Stephens notes that in 2021, our Supreme Court decided Commonwealth v.
Fitzpatrick, 255 A.3d 452 (Pa. 2021), which reversed the Superior Court
decision relied upon by the trial court in admitting the threats of violence
17 This point is particularly notable when juxtaposed with the sua sponte dicta
in this Court’s decision on direct appeal that suggested that were Stephens to have, “proffered a theory of self-defense, or one in which the victim had physically and psychologically abused her for years leading up to his death[, the court may have] . . . agree[d] that the prior history of Stephens[’s] marital discord with the victim might be relevant to establish the quantum of provocation needed to prove such a heat of passion defense.” Stephens, 261 A.3d 1031 *4.
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emails under Pa.R.E. 803(3) concerning the victim’s state of mind. See
Stephens’s Brief at 17.
In two brief opinions with no specific citations to the record, the PCRA
court disagreed. The court held Stephens entered a knowing and voluntary
plea after “lengthy pretrial preparation.” PCRA Court Opinion, 4/6/23, at 2
(unnumbered). The PCRA court also held Attorney Royer failed to “articulate
how Attorney Rice acted unreasonably[18] under the circumstances[.]”
1925(a) Opinion, 6/12/23, at 3. As discussed below, the PCRA court’s opinion
is unsupported by both the law and the factual record.
Our decision in this matter is informed by the relatively uncommon
circumstances surrounding the guilty plea in the instant matter. The analysis
warrants a detailed review at both the written and oral colloquy not only
individually, but in combination with one another to determine whether
Stephens’s plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.
First, we turn to Stephens’s statements at the guilty plea hearing,
sentencing, and the PCRA hearing, which support both Attorney Rice’s and
Attorney Royer’s statements regarding her complete lack of familiarity with
and understanding of the legal system, and her limited cognitive and
18 We believe the PCRA court intended to indicate that Attorney Rice had a
reasonable basis for his actions or omissions, which is the standard for prong two of ineffective assistance of counsel. See e.g., Johnson, 236 A.3d at 68. It is not a blanket “unreasonableness” standard; rather, it is whether a reasonable basis existed for counsel’s actions/inactions.
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intellectual ability. Attorney Rice described that in explaining to Stephens the
process of the conditional plea “he did the best he could,” but her limited
cognitive ability caused Attorney Rice to consult mostly, by his own admission,
with her family rather than with Stephens herself. See N.T., PCRA Hearing,
1/23/23, at 25, 27, 33-34.
Next, we turn to a record review, including the guilty plea hearing,
sentencing, and the PCRA hearing, as stated supra, each hearing consistently
shows that Stephens wanted to go to trial to tell her side of the story. See
N.T. Guilty Plea, 10/30/19, at 4-5; N.T. Sentencing, 1/16/20, at 17, 19; N.T.
PCRA Hearing, 1/23/23, at 5-7, 28, 37. The record also demonstrates
Stephens’s understanding of the legal system was minimal and she appeared
to have limited intellectual capacity. See N.T. Guilty Plea, 10/30/2019, at 4-
5; N.T. Sentencing, 1/16/2020, at 16; N.T. PCRA Hearing, 1/23/2023, at 5-
10, 12, 14-17, 25-27, 33-34. Of particular concern to this Court are
Stephens’s non-responsive statements to the plea court that she was only
pleading guilty and giving up her right to trial “for that much of it" and that
she was giving up her right to a trial “for this time.” N.T. Guilty Plea,
10/30/2019, at 4-5. Those statements clearly show Stephens did not
understand the rights she permanently surrendered by entering into a
conditional guilty plea and were entirely consistent with her PCRA testimony
she was temporarily pleading guilty but would receive a trial after her appeal.
See N.T. PCRA Hearing, 1/23/2023, at 5-6, 9, 12, 14-15. Even though it was
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clear that these replies to the plea court’s questions were almost nonsensical,
the plea court did not pause to clarify the non-responsive statements, nor did
Attorney Rice ask for clarification. It was apparent to the Commonwealth,
however, because the record shows that the prosecutor asked for the plea
court to go over the written colloquy line by line “given the way this [oral
colloquy] unfolded.” N.T. Guilty Plea, 10/30/19, at 11. However, in response
to the prosecutor’s request “to make sure she read it and understood
everything” the plea court doubled down and insisted it had gone through the
written colloquy in detail. Id.
Here, Stephens’s non-responsive comments indicated she believed her
guilty plea was temporary, yet neither Attorney Rice nor the trial court paused
the colloquy to explain to Stephens this was not a temporary plea and that,
unless the appeal was successful (something highly unlikely given our
deferential standard of review of a trial court’s evidentiary rulings and the
weakness of the preserved appellate claim), she would not have a trial.
Further, during the oral colloquy the trial court did not explain Stephens’s
post-sentence and appellate rights or tell her that because of the agreed
conditions of this particular plea, she was effectively giving up her right to
challenge both the voluntariness of the plea and the discretionary aspects of
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her sentence.19 See N.T. Guilty Plea, 10/30/2019, at 3; Written Guilty Plea
Colloquy, 10/30/19, at 9, 11 (unnumbered); N.T. PCRA Hearing, 1/23/2023,
at 27, 30-32.
In combination with the actual written guilty plea colloquy, which
contains an unsigned, uninitialed, non-standard attachment, which basically
terminated her ability to appeal her sentence in any meaningful way there is
little, if any, chance Stephens understood that she was pleading guilty to a
charge and precluding herself from raising any legitimate issues on appeal.
Next, the plea court failed to review the written colloquy and Attorney
Rice failed to challenge the trial court’s assertion that it had already reviewed
the written guilty plea colloquy with Stephens. Had Attorney Rice done so,
the court could have reviewed the written plea colloquy and addressed with
Stephens the contradictions between the standard written guilty plea colloquy
and the unsigned, undated conditions appended to it, as well as explored her
ambiguous answers to the oral guilty plea colloquy. See id.
Stephens’s lack of understanding of the meaning of a conditional guilty
plea, her strong desire to go to trial, Attorney Rice’s conditioning her guilty
19 We are unable to discern any strategic basis for Attorney Rice’s decision to
agree to let whatever sentence the trial court imposed “stand,” particularly in light of the Commonwealth’s improper argument at sentencing that this was a pre-meditated killing consistent with first-degree murder, and the sentencing court’s adoption of the Commonwealth’s argument that despite a clear plea to third-degree murder, Stephens committed premeditated murder (first degree).
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plea on an appeal that had no realistic possibility of success, and the failure
of both Attorney Rice and the court to ensure Stephens clearly understood the
consequences of the plea, demonstrate her plea was not knowing, intelligent,
and voluntary and Attorney Rice was ineffective. See Commonwealth v.
Ramirez-Contreras, 320 A.3d 756, 763-65 (Pa. Super. 2024) (holding this
Court has “not hesitated to grant PCRA relief where counsel has misled a client
during the plea process[;]” and granting PCRA relief and vacating the
judgment of sentence where neither plea counsel nor the trial court sufficiently
explained to the defendant that he could face deportation because of his guilty
plea).
Moreover, our review of the record also demonstrates Attorney Rice had
no reasonable strategic basis for his decisions to suggest a conditional guilty
plea to solely preserve the infidelity text messages for appeal and not the
texts regarding the alleged threat of violence, or to litigate pre-trial the
admissibility of James’s prior physical, psychological, and mental abuse of
Stephens in support of a self-defense/heat of passion defense. Although
Attorney Rice testified to his shock at the trial court’s decision to exclude all
evidence of prior infidelity except those events which occurred on the day of
the murder, he never explained the basis for that shock. See N.T. PCRA
Hearing, 1/23/2023, at 26-30, 36, 38. It is well-settled law in Pennsylvania
that dated evidence of infidelity does not constitute sufficient provocation for
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a heat of passion defense.20 See Commonwealth v. Mason, 130 A.3d 601,
628-29 (Pa. 2015); see also Stephens, supra at *4. Because the law on the
issue was settled, there was no reasonable basis for Attorney Rice’s decision
to not also raise the issue of the long-standing physical and psychological
abuse Stephens, her son, and the couple’s friends observed. As we opined on
direct appeal, had Stephens raised the history of abuse in defending the
Commonwealth’s motion in limine, the evidence of the couple’s tumultuous
marriage, the alleged long-term abuse, and the infidelity would have been
admissible based on a heat of passion defense. See Stephens, supra at *4.
Pennsylvania courts have long held counsel is ineffective for advising a
defendant to plead guilty based on counsel’s misunderstanding of the law.
This Court has stated when counsel’s advice is “based on an ignorance of
relevant . . . law,” the “advice was legally unsound and devoid of any
reasonable basis designed to effectuate Appellant’s interests.” Hickman, 799
A.2d at 141. See also Commonwealth v. Barndt, 74 A.3d 185, 196 (Pa.
2013) (holding that “counsel’s assistance is constitutionally ineffective when
counsel misapprehends the consequences of a given plea and misleads his
client accordingly about those consequences[.]”); Commonwealth v.
20 Attorney Rice acknowledged at the PCRA hearing that absent evidence of
the history of the parties’ relationship and the months of taunting inflicted on Stephens by James, he did not believe that the evidence of the events of the morning of the murder was sufficient to show heat of passion. See N.T. PCRA Hearing, 1/23/2023, at 30, 35-36.
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Nelson, 574 A.2d 1107, 1114-15 (Pa. Super. 1990) (affirming a trial court’s
decision to allow defendant to withdraw a guilty plea based upon ineffective
assistance of counsel where counsel advised the defendant to plead guilty
because of a confession without filing a motion to suppress or researching the
issue of the lawfulness of the confession).
Further, Attorney Rice’s actions appear at odds with his testimony at the
PCRA hearing that he was concerned Stephens would be convicted of murder
in the first degree and receive a life sentence. See N.T. PCRA Hearing, at 30,
36. Firstly, the Commonwealth’s theory regarding premeditation had nothing
to do with the issue of infidelity but rested squarely on the trial court’s decision
to admit the text message between the victim and his son (not Stephens),
which contained hearsay statements regarding an alleged threat of violence
allegedly made by Stephens. The court acknowledged its decision to admit
the communications was based on a then-recent decision by this Court in
Commonwealth v. Fitzpatrick, 204 A.3d 527 (Pa. Super. 2019). See
1925(a) Opinion, 7/12/23, at 3. At the time of the entry of the conditional
guilty plea, Fitzpatrick had been appealed, and the Supreme Court later ruled
that a victim’s statement of mind is not admissible under Pa.R.E. 803(3) to
prove a defendant’s guilt of a crime the victim predicted. See Fitzpatrick,
255 A.3d at 483. Because the decision to admit the text message rested on
far weaker legal grounds than the trial court’s decision regarding the history
of infidelity, and was central to premeditation – and Attorney Rice’s expressed
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concerns about a conviction for murder in the first degree – Attorney Rice
lacked a reasonably strategic basis for failing to preserve this issue for appeal
as part of his conditional guilty plea.21 As Attorney Rice admitted, Stephens
received a de facto life sentence. See N.T. PCRA Hearing, 1/23/2023, at 36.
Attorney Rice offered no explanation why he waived Stephens’s right to
challenge the discretionary aspects of sentence on appeal, did not clarify the
non-responsive answers Stephens gave at her guilty plea, did not have her
sign and initial the additional page of the written colloquy that clarified the
additional conditions of the plea, did not offer the evidence regarding long-
term abuse earlier in the proceedings, and failed to object to a clearly deficient
PSI, misstatements by the Commonwealth at sentencing, and the trial court’s
consideration of premeditation in imposing sentence. Rather, it appears to
this Court that, as Attorney Rice testified, he devised the idea of a conditional
guilty plea because he was surprised by a ruling that was squarely in-line with
well-established caselaw and unprepared to go to trial. See N.T. PCRA
Hearing, 1/23/2023, at 26-30, 36, 38. Thus, we conclude Attorney Rice’s
21 As noted above, our review of this issue is hampered by the PCRA court’s
inexplicable decision to disallow questioning on this issue. Attorney Royer clearly raised the claim that counsel had appealed the wrong issue in the amended PCRA petition. The issue was of extreme importance to Stephens’s claim of ineffective assistance of plea counsel. To disallow all testimony about it on the grounds that it was beyond the scope of the Commonwealth’s direct examination while ultimately holding that PCRA counsel had not met the burden of proof runs perilously close to constituting a violation of Stephens’s due process rights.
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advice was unsound and not designed to advance his client’s interests. See
Barndt, supra; Hickman, supra; Nelson, supra.
Lastly, the record clearly demonstrates that, but for Attorney Rice’s
advice, Stephens would not have pleaded guilty. Her testimony throughout
these proceedings, as well as the testimony of her family was that she wanted
to go to trial and have a chance to present her story. Thus, we conclude
Attorney Rice’s actions prejudiced Stephens. See Ramirez-Contreras, supra
at 766 (“concluding that where defendant testified he only pleaded guilty
because of counsel’s incorrect advice his plea was involuntary and
unknowing).
In conclusion, we find the PCRA court erred when it denied Stephens’s
claim that plea counsel’s ineffective assistance invalidated her guilty plea. We
reverse the order denying Stephens’s PCRA petition, vacate the judgment of
sentence, and remand this case so that Stephens may withdraw her guilty
plea.
Order reversed. Judgment of sentence vacated. Case remanded for
further proceedings consistent with this decision. Jurisdiction relinquished.
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Judgment Entered.
Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq. Prothonotary
Date: 05/15/2026
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