Com. v. Stehley, T.

Opinion

J-A24029-20

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : TROY STEVEN STEHLEY : : Appellant : No. 1081 WDA 2019

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered May 16, 2019 In the Court of Common Pleas of Blair County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-07-CR-0000418-2016

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., McLAUGHLIN, J., and MUSMANNO, J.

MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.: FILED: AUGUST 9, 2021

Troy Steven Stehley appeals from the judgment of sentence entered

following his convictions for Fleeing or Attempting to Elude Police Officer, two

counts of Recklessly Endangering Another Person (“REAP”), Criminal Mischief,

Possession of a Controlled Substance (“Possession”), two counts of Possession

with Intent to Deliver (“PWID”), and Possession of Drug Paraphernalia.1

Stehley challenges the discretionary aspects of his sentence. We affirm.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth,

as verdict-winner, the facts and procedural history giving rise to this appeal

are as follows. On March 29, 2015 around 1 a.m., Corporal Derek Swope saw

a van “traveling at a high rate of speed. It was swerving back and forth and

then made a quick left-hand turn . . . in front of me.” N.T. Trial, 12/10/18, at ____________________________________________

1 See 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3733(a); 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2705, 3304(a)(2); 35 P.S. §§

780-113(a)(16), (a)(30), and (a)(32), respectively. J-A24029-20

72. Corporal Swope attempted to follow it with his lights and sirens on but

because “[the van] was traveling at such a high rate of speed, it was

disregarding stop signs that I quickly lost it.” Id. at 73. Corporal Swope

“radioed all of the other officers who were working that night” with a

description of the vehicle. Id.

Officer Matthew Angermeier saw a van fitting the description given over

police radio and began to follow it. See id. at 29. He saw it take “a wide right

turn coming towards a median on the left side of the road, almost striking that

median,” and kick[ing up] those rocks . . . that were very close to the median.”

Id. at 30. Eventually Officer Angermeier activated his lights and sirens and

the vehicle “began to pull off to the right side of the road.” Id. at 31, 32.

Although it paused for a moment, it then sped away again. Id. at 32. Officer

Angermeier continued to follow the vehicle as it traveled through an apartment

complex. “[T]he vehicle [then] stopped, the driver’s side door opened, a

person leaned out and [Officer Angermeier] gave a description of [the driver’s

clothing].” Id. at 32-33. The driver got back into the vehicle and “continued

at a high rate of speed away from [Officer Angermeier.]” Id. at 33. Officer

Angermeier estimated that the driver was traveling “anywhere upwards of

over 75 miles an hour” in a 25 miles per hour zone. Id. He also observed the

driver fail to “stop for multiple stop signs” and fail to use his turn signal. Id.

In an attempt to keep up with the driver, Officer Angermeier reached a speed

of over 70 miles an hour in his patrol vehicle. See id.

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The driver of the van continued traveling and after almost colliding with

another vehicle, he ultimately crashed and was ejected from the vehicle. See

id. at 111, 112, 121. Police later identified the driver of the vehicle as Stehley.

See id. at 112. Officers arriving at the scene shortly after the crash observed

Stehley lying on the ground unconscious and at trial described the van as

having its roof sheared off, the engine on fire, and several wheels ripped off.

See id. at 112, 118, 119-20, 121-22. A firearm was found near where Stehley

lay. Id. at 82.

At a nearby hospital, Stehley remained unconscious and medical

personnel cut his pants “to tend to his injuries.” Id. at 124. A police officer

saw “a multitude of controlled substances” and “a large amount of cash” fall

from Stehley’s pocket. Id. at 124, 132. Testing revealed the controlled

substances to be 14 bags of heroin, eight foil packets of synthetic cathinone

(so-called “bath salts”), and approximately 13 grams of cocaine. See id. at

161-63. A scale was also retrieved from his clothing. See id. at 163.

A woman residing near the crash site, Kathy Coleman, was awakened

by sirens in the early morning hours of the day in question. See id. at 138,

139. When she got up to check what was going on, she saw that her kitchen

back door was hanging off, “the outside door was off[,]” “the kitchen table

and chairs were ajar[,]” “there was glass all over the kitchen floor[,]” and

“there was a wheel in the kitchen.” Id. at 139.

The Commonwealth charged Stehley with PWID, multiple traffic

offenses, Fleeing or Attempting to Elude a Police Officer, and other offenses.

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Stehley proceeded with a jury trial and testified in his defense.2 See N.T. Trial,

12/11/18, at 105-35. He testified in part that he was hospitalized for

approximately one month after the crash and only remembered “bits and

pieces” about what happened that day. Id. at 114. He testified that he did not

own the van, he did not recognize the firearm found at the scene, and that

the officers were “mistaken” about him being the driver of the van. Id. at 115,

116, 127. He also testified that a man named “Dan D’Andrea” was the person

driving the van. Id. at 129. However, he admitted purchasing the drugs that

were found on him. See id. at 133.

The jury found Stehley guilty of the above-referenced offenses. The trial

court held a sentencing hearing where the trial court was given the

presentence investigation report (“PSI”) and also heard from Stehley. See

N.T. Sentencing, 5/16/19, 14-19, 27 (PSI marked as Court’s Exhibit A). Much

of his testimony to the court included accusations that the prosecutor was

“dishonest on record[.]” Id. at 14, 15, 17-18.

Prior to sentencing Stehley, the trial court noted that Stehley’s conduct

“put people at risk for their lives[.]” Id. at 19. It also noted that it “believed

the jury believed and I follow the jury’s verdict that Mr. Stehley was driving

____________________________________________

2 This appeal is limited to the above convictions referenced. A severed jury trial was held for firearms charges on June 6, 2018 and the jury found Stehley guilty on the charges. See Commonwealth v. Stehley, 248 A.3d 502 (Pa.Super. filed January 22, 2021) (unpublished memorandum). The court also found Stehley guilty of one DUI offense. See Order, 5/16/19, at 6. These additional charges all arise from the same facts referenced above.

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despite his remarks to the contrary.” Id. at 19-20. It then gave its

considerations for the sentence prior to imposing it:

Mr. Stehley, based on --- you may be fooling me. Who knows? But based on your acceptance of some responsibility here, I’ve actually downgraded. . . . I’ve reduced my --- gone a little lower than the range I anticipated going into based on what you’ve said to me today.

Mr. Stehley, let me say this to you though, sir. You didn’t help yourself with me with your accusations against [the Commonwealth]. We’re not buddies. [The prosecutor] and I have never seen each other outside the courthouse. We’re not friends. I don’t go to lunch with him. . . . .

The purpose of the sentence was I considered [Stehley’s] extensive prior record recognizing it’s incorporated in the prior record score and into the sentencing guidelines. The [c]ourt considered the sentencing guidelines. All of [Stehley’s] sentences will be within the standard guidelines. The [c]ourt recognizes [Stehley’s] achievements have been presented by [defense counsel] while he’s been incarcerated, but the [c]ourt also sees prior to that a failure to be amendable to treatment.

Id. at 20-21.

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The trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of 76 to 152 months’

incarceration.3 Stehley filed a post sentence motion, which the trial court

denied. This timely appeal followed.4

3 The trial court sentenced Stehley to a term of 24 to 48 months of incarceration for fleeing; 12 to 24 months for each REAP count, concurrent with each other and consecutive to the incarceration for fleeing; 40 to 80 months for possession of cocaine, concurrent with 24 to 28 months for possession of bath salts, with possession counts imposed consecutive to the other incarceration; and 2 days to 6 months for DUI imposed concurrent with the other incarceration. The remaining charges were either merged for sentencing, or no further penalty was imposed. See N.T. Sentencing, 5/16/19, at 22-27.

4 The trial court ordered that Stehley file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of errors complained of on appeal. Stehley did not comply and, in turn, the trial court did not file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion, but asked that this Court dismiss the appeal. We remanded to the trial court for Stehley to file a counseled Rule 1925(b) statement and for the trial court to submit an updated Rule 1925(a) opinion. See Commonwealth v. Stehley, 248 A.3d 456 (Pa.Super. filed January 4, 2021) (unpublished memorandum). Counsel filed a statement of errors complained of on appeal on January 20, 2021. However, the trial court did not file its 1925(a) opinion. Having not received the opinion, we assumed that the statement of errors had not been filed and drafted an order directing the court to appoint counsel. See Order, 4/21/21. Stehley’s counsel responded to this order with a letter attaching a copy of his filed statement of errors. The trial court filed an order on April 23, 2021, in which it addressed Stehley’s claim that the trial court abused its discretion when it sentenced Stehley. See 1925(b) Order, 4/23/21.

On June 7, 2021, the trial court issued an additional order explaining some issues it encountered while appointing new counsel, and directing the court administration to appoint Stehley a new attorney to represent him. However, as discussed above, because Stehley’s counsel did file a concise statement of errors, and the trial court filed its opinion addressing the claim raised in that statement, Rule 1925 has been complied with and we are able to address the merits of the issue raised in this appeal.

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Stehley raises one issue before this Court: “Did the trial court abuse its

discretion in imposing a sentence which was overly harsh given the facts of

the case?” Stehley’s Br. at 5.

As stated, Stehley’s claim challenges the discretionary aspects of his

sentence. For such a claim there is no automatic right to appeal. See

Commonwealth v. Disalvo, 70 A.3d 900, 902 (Pa.Super. 2013). Instead,

this Court must inquire first whether: (1) the appeal is timely; (2) the issue is

preserved; (3) appellant’s brief includes a Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) statement; and

(4) the appellant raises a substantial question. See id. If all four of these

requirements are satisfied then we may proceed to review the merits of

appellant’s claim.

A substantial question exists “when the appellant advances a colorable

argument that the sentencing judge’s actions were either: (1) inconsistent

with a specific provision of the Sentencing Code; or (2) contrary to the

fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing process.” Commonwealth

v. Phillips, 946 A.2d 103, 112 (Pa.Super. 2008) (citation omitted). Whether

a particular issue raises a substantial question is a case by case determination.

See Commonwealth v. Cunningham, 805 A.2d 566, 574 (Pa.Super. 2002).

Additionally, we do not look beyond the statement of questions presented and

appellant’s Rule 2119(f) statement to determine if a substantial question

exists. See Commonwealth v. Radecki, 180 A.3d 441, 468 (Pa.Super.

2018).

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Here, Stehley has satisfied all four prerequisites to our reaching the

merits of his issue. His appeal was timely, he preserved his sentencing issue,

his brief includes a Rule 2119(f) statement, and he has stated a substantial

question. He claims in his Rule 2119(f) statement that the trial court “failed

to consider the pain and suffering he experienced from the crash of the van

and his long recovery from his injuries” and that his sentence was “harsh.”

Stehley’s Br. at 7; see also Commonwealth v. Raven, 97 A.3d 1244, 1253

(Pa.Super. 2014) (“[T]his Court has held that an excessive sentence claim—

in conjunction with an assertion that the court failed to consider mitigating

factors—raises a substantial question.”).

We review challenges to discretionary aspects of a sentence for abuse

of discretion. This requires the appellant to establish, by reference to the

record, that the sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its

judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or arrived at a

manifestly unreasonable decision.” Disalvo, 70 A.3d at 903.

Stehley maintains that the trial court ought to have given him a lesser

sentence because he was “the only person who was really harmed or

injured[.]” Stehley’s Br. at 8. He adds that in his view, the sentence for REAP

was too steep because there was “no actual impact on the life of a victim,”

claiming that Kathy Coleman did not “seem to be too upset or concerned

about” the wheel of his car crashing through her kitchen door. Id. at 9. He

also challenges his sentence as longer than that needed for his rehabilitation,

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and contends his PWID sentence is improper because despite his lengthy

criminal history, he has never been convicted of drug delivery.

Stehley’s sentence is not an abuse of discretion. His characterization of

the facts is inapt. While he may have been the only person in the case who

sustained injuries, as the trial court pointed out, Stehley most certainly “put

people at risk for their lives[,]” including the officers involved in pursuing him

as well as Coleman. N.T. Sentencing, 5/16/19, at 19.

His additional claim that the absence of a prior conviction for drug

delivery somehow renders his sentence for PWID inappropriate holds no

water. This is a non-sequitur – the conclusion does not flow from the premise.

Regardless of his prior criminal history, he has now been convicted of PWID

and his prior record does not in and of itself render his sentence for the instant

PWID conviction improper.

Moreover, prior to imposing sentence, the trial court considered the

information included in the PSI as well as Stehley’s achievements while

incarcerated and his acceptance of responsibility. See Commonwealth v.

Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 175 (Pa.Super. 2010) (stating where court has benefit

of PSI, this Court presumes that “the court was aware of and weighed

information concerning [a]ppellant’s character when making its sentencing

decision”). Thus, in imposing sentence, the trial court adhered to the

requirements of the Sentencing Code and took into account “the protection of

the public, the gravity of offense as it relates to the impact on the life of the

victim and on the community, and the rehabilitative needs of the defendant.”

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42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b). Finally, where, as here, “a sentence is within the

standard range of the guidelines, Pennsylvania law views the sentence as

appropriate under the Sentencing Code.” Moury, 992 A.2d at 171 (citation

omitted). Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of sentence.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 08/09/2021

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