Com. v. Steele, J.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: April 4, 2023
• Docket: 832 MDA 2022
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

J-S44018-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : JAMES CURTIS STEELE : : Appellant : No. 832 MDA 2022

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered December 27, 2021 In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-67-CR-0003076-2020

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.: FILED: APRIL 4, 2023

James Curtis Steele appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed

following his convictions for aggravated assault and simple assault.1 Steele

argues the court erred in admitting testimony that he had stolen the victim’s

cell phone prior to the assault. We affirm.

The victim testified at Steele’s jury trial that she and Steele had met

using an online dating application, met in person three times, and dated for

approximately three months. See N.T., 10/5/21, at 87-89, 113. The

Commonwealth asked the victim why she had ended the relationship with

Steele, and the victim answered, “Well, he stole my phone from out of my

house that was --.” Id. at 90.

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2702(a)(4) and 2701(a)(1), respectively. J-S44018-22

Steele’s counsel objected on the basis that the testimony referred to his

prior bad acts. Id. The court overruled the objection, agreeing with the

prosecutor’s argument that the testimony was admissible “to show [the

victim’s] course of conduct” and relevant to why the relationship had ended.

Id. at 91. The victim then repeated that Steele had stolen her phone and as

a result, she “didn’t want to be with him anymore” and “made him leave.” Id.

The victim testified that two days later, when she left her apartment at

10:00 a.m., Steele was waiting outside. He asked her to repay him for a

refrigerator he had purchased for her during the relationship. Id. at 89-92,

95. The victim told him, “No,” and began to walk to work. Id. at 92. The victim

testified that further along on her route to work, Steele “walked up to me,

and, like, grabbed me and just cut me.” Id. at 93. She said he cut her with a

small blade, first on the right side of her face and then again on the left side

of her face. Id. at 97-99, 105. The victim testified that she was 100% certain

that Steele was the person who assaulted her. Id. at 112.

Steele left the scene, and the victim put a rag on her face to stop the

bleeding. Id. at 97. When she arrived at work, her employer called the police.

Id. at 99. After talking to the police and telling them Steele had been her

assailant, the victim rode to the hospital in an ambulance. Id. at 99-100. The

victim received two shots in her face, and stitches. Id. at 100. The

Commonwealth introduced pictures of the victim’s injuries into evidence. Id.

at 102-04.

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On cross-examination, the victim testified that during the two days

between when Steele stole her phone and the assault, she got her phone back.

Id. at 113. She had not involved the police to recover her phone. Id.

Officer Tyler Zeller testified that he met the victim at her place of

employment following the assault and saw her holding a bloody rag to her

face. Id. at 118, 120-22. He testified that he saw lacerations on her face that

were 3 and 4 inches long, and that the cut on the right side of her face severed

her right ear. Id. at 122. He testified the victim told him that Steele had been

the perpetrator, and he was able to confirm Steele’s identity and locate him

using law enforcement databases. Id. at 120-22.

The jury returned verdicts of guilty. The court sentenced Steele to an

aggregate of four to eight years’ incarceration. Steele filed a post-sentence

motion, which the court denied.

Steele appealed, and raises the following issue:

The trial court erred when it permitted the victim to testify about [Steele]’s prior bad acts involving an alleged theft of the victim’s cell phone. The Commonwealth provided no prior notice to [Steele] of its intent to use this evidence. [Steele] was never charge with this offense. This evidence was not part of the res gestae of the case. The assault occurred, according to the victim, after she ended her relationship with [Steele] while the alleged theft of the phone occurred before. The theft, as a prior bad act, was more prejudicial than probative as to whether [Steele] was the individual who assaulted the victim.

Steele’s Br. at 4.

In its opinion, the trial court explained that it did not admit the evidence

related to the theft of the cell phone to prove Steele’s propensity for violence,

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but “as a mere explanation as to why the [v]ictim ended the relationship with

[Steele].” Trial Court Opinion, 6/6/22, at 2. The trial court elaborated that if

it erred in admitting the evidence, the error was harmless because any

prejudice was lessened by the victim’s testimony that she recovered her phone

without involving the police, and there was overwhelming other evidence that

Steele was guilty of assault. Id. at 3-4.

Steele argues the court abused its discretion in admitting the victim’s

testimony that she ended their relationship because he stole her phone,

because it was both unfairly prejudicial to him and irrelevant to the assault

charges. Steele posits that while the fact of the breakup itself was relevant,

the reasons for the breakup were not necessary for the jury to understand the

allegations of assault. He also argues that the testimony was not related to

the motive for the alleged confrontation, which was repayment for the

refrigerator. Steele argues that any probative value attributable to the

testimony related to the cell phone theft did not outweigh its prejudicial effect

of painting him in a negative light.

Steele further argues that the testimony was not harmless, as the

allegations of cell phone theft were not cumulative with the allegations of

assault but constituted a separate and distinct event. He contends the

evidence was not de minimis and was “sprung on Steele’s counsel during trial.”

Id. at 18. He also asserts that there was not overwhelming evidence of

Steele’s guilt, because the convictions were based solely on the victim’s

testimony; there were no other eyewitnesses. Had the jury not been

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prejudiced against Steele by the testimony related to the cell phone theft,

Steele argues, it might not have found the victim credible and him, guilty.

We review a trial court’s ruling on the admission of evidence under an

abuse of discretion standard. Commonwealth v. Brown, 52 A.3d 320, 325

(Pa.Super. 2012). “An abuse of discretion may not be found merely because

an appellate court might have reached a different conclusion, but requires a

result of manifest unreasonableness, or partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will,

or such lack of support so as to be clearly erroneous.” Commonwealth v.

Hairston, 84 A.3d 657, 664-65 (Pa. 2014).

Evidence of “any other crime, wrong, or act” – often referred to as “prior

bad acts” evidence – is not admissible to prove a person’s character. See

Pa.R.E. 404(b)(1). The same evidence may be admissible for another reason,

such as to prove “motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,

identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” Pa.R.E. 404(b)(2). Similarly,

the evidence may be admissible when the prior bad acts were part of the

“natural development” of the case and the evidence is needed to tell the

“complete story” of the crimes charged. Brown, 52 A.3d at 326 (quoting

Commonwealth v. Billa, 555 A.2d 835, 840 (Pa. 1989) and

Commonwealth v. Lark, 543 A.2d 491, 497 (Pa. 1988)). This is known as

the “res gestae” exception to the prohibition on prior bad acts evidence. Id.;

see also Commonwealth v. Crispell, 193 A.3d 919, 936 (Pa. 2018).

When evidence is to be used for any such reason, it is only admissible if

its probative value outweighs its potential for unfair prejudice. Pa.R.E.

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404(b)(2); Hairston, 84 A.3d at 665. “‘Unfair prejudice’ means a tendency to

suggest decision on an improper basis or to divert the jury’s attention away

from its duty of weighing the evidence impartially.” Pa.R.E. 403, Comment.

To determine whether res gestae evidence meets the threshold for

admissibility, a court must consider “the strength of the [prior bad acts]

evidence, the similarities between the crimes, the time lapse between crimes,

the need for the other crimes evidence, the efficacy of alternative proof of the

charged crime, and the degree to which the evidence probably will rouse the

jury to overmastering hostility.” Brown, 52 A.3d at 326 (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted).

The Commonwealth is required to provide reasonable written notice in

advance of trial of its intention to admit prior bad acts evidence. See Pa.R.E.

404(b)(3). However, the court may excuse its failure to do so “on good cause

shown.” Id.

In the instant case, the court did not abuse its discretion in admitting

the testimony under the res gestae exception. It was appropriate for the jury

to hear the reason for the breakup which led to the physical confrontation two

days later. The animosity surrounding the breakup was relevant to Steele’s

motive for the assault, despite that the victim testified that Steele had also

requested money from her.

Moreover, the fact of the cell phone theft was relatively insignificant in

relation to the testimony describing the assault, especially considering the

victim testified she recovered her phone within two days and without the

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involvement of law enforcement. While Steele argues the distinction between

the acts means the jury could have understood the mechanics of the assault

without hearing the testimony regarding the cell phone theft, the relative

insignificance of the theft also indicates this testimony was unlikely to “rouse

the jury to overmastering hostility” such that it would not be able to impartially

weigh the testimony describing the assault. Brown, 52 A.3d at 326; Pa.R.E.

403(b), Comment.

Although Steele argues the court should have excluded the testimony

due to the Commonwealth’s failure to provide pre-trial written notice under

Rule 404(b)(3), or a showing of good cause, Steele did not raise this objection

at the time of trial. Thus, it is waived. See Commonwealth v. Poplawski,

130 A.3d 697, 728, 729 (Pa. 2015) (objections to the admission of evidence

must be timely and specific).

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 4/4/2023

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