Com. v. Stanley, C.

Opinion

J-S05024-26

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : CHARLES SHARIFF STANLEY : : Appellant : No. 817 EDA 2025

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered December 30, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-23-CR-0001143-2023

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., KING, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E. *

MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.: FILED JULY 17, 2026

Appellant, Charles Shariff Stanley, appeals from the judgment of

sentence entered in the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas, following

his jury trial convictions for firearms not be carried without a license and

possession of a firearm by a prohibited person.1 We affirm Appellant’s

convictions but vacate the judgment of sentence and remand for resentencing.

The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows. On

March 20, 2022, a criminal complaint and an associated arrest warrant were

filed. The criminal complaint charged Appellant with receiving stolen property,

firearms not to be carried without a license, possession of a firearm by a

prohibited person, possession of a controlled substance with intent to

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6106(a) and 6105(a), respectively. J-S05024-26

manufacture or deliver, possession of a controlled substance, and possession

of drug paraphernalia. Appellant was not arrested until November 29, 2022.

Appellant filed an omnibus pretrial motion on May 26, 2023. Appellant sought

to suppress physical evidence, alleging that the officer did not have probable

cause to stop Appellant’s vehicle. Appellant further alleged that the search

warrant issued to search Appellant’s vehicle lacked sufficient probable cause.

The court conducted a hearing on the motion to suppress on July 31,

2023. Pennsylvania State Trooper, Francis Vanore, testified that he was on

patrol on the evening of March 19, 2022 and observed a Dodge Challenger,

driven by Appellant, traveling at approximately 40 mph in a 25 mph zone.

Trooper Vanore explained that he confirmed the speed of Appellant’s vehicle

with the speedometer in his patrol vehicle for over 3/10 th of a mile. Trooper

Vanore further explained that the speedometer in his vehicle is regularly

calibrated by a third-party company to ensure its accuracy. During cross

examination, Trooper Vanore acknowledged that he did not know the exact

date when the speedometer in his vehicle was calibrated prior to March 19,

2022. When Trooper Vanore was behind Appellant’s vehicle, he could also see

that the seat belts of both the driver and passenger seats were not properly

fastened because the strap was visible behind the headrest of both seats. At

this point, Trooper Vanore activated his overhead lights and initiated a traffic

stop. Appellant’s vehicle pulled into a well-lit gas station parking lot and

stopped.

Trooper Vanore approached the driver’s side. Appellant informed

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Trooper Vanore that the vehicle was a rental and provided him with the

documentation. While they were conversing, Trooper Vanore observed what

appeared to be raw marijuana on the lap of the passenger and the floorboard

of the vehicle on the passenger side. Trooper Vanore also noticed a strong

odor of alcohol and marijuana emanating from the vehicle. Trooper Vanore

further testified that he observed a police radio scanner in the cup holder of

the passenger side door. Based on his observations, Trooper Vanore asked

Appellant to exit the vehicle to undergo field sobriety testing. Appellant denied

consuming alcohol or marijuana prior to driving.

Trooper Vanore obtained identification from Appellant while Trooper

Vanore’s partner, Trooper Ross Greenwood, questioned and obtained

identification from the passenger. The passenger’s driver’s license identified

him as Dante Sharpe. Appellant remained calm throughout the interaction,

but Mr. Sharpe appeared very nervous, pacing and looking around as the

Troopers gathered information. Trooper Vanore ran Appellant and Mr.

Sharpe’s information and learned that Mr. Sharpe had a warrant out for his

arrest. As Trooper Vanore exited his vehicle again, Mr. Sharpe fled on foot

and Trooper Greenwood gave chase. As Mr. Sharpe was running, a firearm

fell out of his waistband. Trooper Greenwood recovered the firearm.

Thereafter, Trooper Vanore asked Appellant for consent to search his

vehicle, which Appellant denied. Trooper Vanore towed the vehicle to the

barracks while awaiting approval of a search warrant. After obtaining a search

warrant, Trooper Vanore searched Appellant’s vehicle and recovered a firearm

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from under the driver’s seat and a backpack containing narcotics from the

trunk.

At the conclusion of the suppression hearing, the court took the matter

under advisement. On November 8, 2023, the court denied Appellant’s motion

to suppress, finding that the traffic stop was lawful and the search warrant

was supported by sufficient probable cause.

A jury trial was scheduled to commence on November 12, 2024. That

morning, prior to jury selection, Appellant filed a motion to dismiss pursuant

to Pa.R.Crim.P. 600. On November 13, 2024, the court conducted a hearing

on the motion outside of the presence of the jury. Appellant submitted an

exhibit outlining the proceedings in this case and setting forth the reasons for

any continuances. The court reviewed the dates with the parties. Appellant

indicated that a continuance from April 1, 2024 until May 20, 2024 was

required because there was outstanding DNA evidence that the

Commonwealth had not provided to Appellant. The court noted that its file

contained documentation, which was signed by Appellant’s counsel, which

listed this period as a defense request for continuance. Appellant’s counsel

acknowledged his signature on the form indicating that the continuance was

a defense request but maintained that the continuance was because there was

outstanding discovery that the Commonwealth needed to provide.

Trooper Vanore testified that an arrest warrant for Appellant was issued

on March 20, 2022, the same date that the criminal complaint was filed.

Trooper Vanore entered the warrant into the National Crime Information

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Center database. Trooper Vanore also contacted Appellant’s probation officer,

who issued a warrant for Appellant’s arrest for violating his parole. Trooper

Vanore personally went to Appellant’s last known address several times in an

attempt to apprehend Appellant. Trooper Vanore also referred the warrant to

the Philadelphia Police Department and the United States Marshals Service

Fugitive Task Force for assistance in apprehending Appellant. Trooper Vanore

testified that he reached out to these law enforcement agencies multiple times

at different time periods to follow up on the search for Appellant. On cross

examination, Trooper Vanore stated that he did not know exactly what steps

the probation and parole office, the Philadelphia Police Department, and the

Marshals Service undertook to locate Appellant. Nevertheless, Trooper Vanore

testified that he was aware that the Marshals Service had access to data

sources that it was actively using to locate Appellant. He further testified that

the Philadelphia Police Department went to several different areas to search

for Appellant. Trooper Vanore also testified that during this time period, he

identified Appellant as the perpetrator in an unrelated criminal incident in

Philadelphia, which helped narrow down Appellant’s location.

The court denied Appellant’s Rule 600 motion, relying in part on the

signed continuance documentation in its file. The court further found that

Trooper Vanore’s credible testimony established that he exhibited due

diligence in attempting to apprehend Appellant.

During the jury selection process, following group voir dire, Appellant

requested to ask juror number six additional questions because that juror

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indicated on his written questionnaire that he would be more likely to believe

the testimony of a police officer. The court denied the request, noting that

juror number six did not stand up when the court raised the same inquiry

during group voir dire. Juror number six was ultimately selected as a juror in

Appellant’s trial.

On November 13, 2024, the jury convicted Appellant of firearms not to

be carried without a license and possession of a firearm by a prohibited

person. The jury acquitted Appellant of the remaining charges. On December

30, 2024, the court sentenced Appellant to three to fifteen years’ incarceration

for the firearms not to be carried without a license conviction and six and a

half to twenty years’ incarceration for the possession of a firearm by a

prohibited person conviction, to be served consecutively. On January 3, 2025,

Appellant timely filed a post-sentence motion, which the court denied on

March 12, 2025. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on March 27, 2025.

On April 8, 2025, the court ordered Appellant to file a concise statement of

errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), and Appellant

timely complied on April 28, 2025.

Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

Did the trial court err by denying Appellant’s motion to suppress where the Commonwealth did not have probable cause to stop and search Appellant’s vehicle, and where the trial court relied on information at the suppression hearing that was not included in the written search warrant?

Did the trial court err by denying Appellant’s motion to dismiss pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 600, where the Commonwealth did not demonstrate due

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diligence and there were delays caused by outstanding discovery and police officer unavailability?

Did the trial court abuse its discretion by declining to recall Juror #6 for further questioning after he had indicated in his written questionnaire that he was more likely to believe a police officer’s testimony?

Did the trial court impose an illegal sentence on the charge of possession of a firearm without a license, 18 Pa.C.S. § 6106?

Did the trial court abuse its discretion by sentencing Appellant to an illegal, consecutive, and grossly disproportionate sentence for the conduct in question?

(Appellant’s Brief at 4) (reordered for purposes of disposition).

In his first issue, Appellant argues that Trooper Vanore’s testimony was

insufficient to establish probable cause to stop Appellant’s vehicle. Appellant

claims that Trooper Vanore’s testimony failed to establish that Appellant was

speeding because he could not recall where the 25 mph zone began and/or

ended. Appellant also argues that Trooper Vanore’s testimony that Appellant

was traveling at a speed of 40 mph was insufficient because Trooper Vanore

did not produce any proof that the speedometer in his vehicle was properly

calibrated. Appellant further contends that Trooper Vanore’s testimony that

he observed Appellant’s unfastened seatbelt “lacks all indicia of credibility”

because the traffic stop occurred at night. (Id. at 24).

Regarding the search warrant, Appellant claims that the affidavit of

probable cause included observations of contraband on only Mr. Sharpe’s

person or outside of the vehicle. Appellant argues that “[b]ecause Trooper

Vanore could not articulate any probable cause that directly pertained to

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Appellant or his vehicle, the warrant lacked a substantial nexus” between the

criminal activity and the vehicle. (Id. at 27). Appellant further claims that

the court improperly considered evidence that was not included in the affidavit

of probable cause, including Trooper Vanore’s testimony that he observed a

police scanner in the vehicle. Appellant concludes that the court erred in

denying his motion to suppress physical evidence on these grounds, and this

Court must grant relief. We disagree.

The following principles govern our review of an order denying a motion

to suppress:

An appellate court’s standard of review in addressing a challenge to the denial of a suppression motion is limited to determining whether the suppression court’s factual findings are supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are correct. Because the Commonwealth prevailed before the suppression court, we may consider only the evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as a whole. Where the suppression court’s factual findings are supported by the record, the appellate court is bound by those findings and may reverse only if the court’s legal conclusions are erroneous. Where the appeal of the determination of the suppression court turns on allegations of legal error, the suppression court’s legal conclusions are not binding on an appellate court, whose duty it is to determine if the suppression court properly applied the law to the facts. Thus, the conclusions of law of the courts below are subject to plenary review.

Commonwealth v. Ford, 175 A.3d 985, 989 (Pa.Super. 2017), appeal

denied, 647 Pa. 522, 190 A.3d 580 (2018). Additionally, “[w]ith respect to

the suppression court’s factual findings, it is the sole province of the

suppression court to weigh the credibility of the witnesses. Further, the

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suppression court judge is entitled to believe all, part[,] or none of the

evidence presented[.]” Commonwealth v. Easter, 331 A.3d 675, 679

(Pa.Super. 2025), appeal denied, ___ Pa. ___, 345 A.3d 1199 (2025) (citation

omitted).

A police officer has the authority to stop a vehicle when he or she has reasonable suspicion that a violation of the vehicle code has taken place, for the purpose of obtaining necessary information to enforce the provisions of the code. 75 Pa.C.S. § 6308(b). However, if the violation is such that it requires no additional investigation, the officer must have probable cause to initiate the stop.

Put another way, if the officer has a legitimate expectation of investigatory results, the existence of reasonable suspicion will allow the stop—if the officer has no such expectations of learning additional relevant information concerning the suspected criminal activity, the stop cannot be constitutionally permitted on the basis of mere suspicion.

Commonwealth v. Brown, 64 A.3d 1101, 1105 (Pa.Super. 2013) (internal

citations and quotations omitted) (emphasis in original). See also

Commonwealth v. Gurung, 239 A.3d 187, 191 (Pa.Super. 2020) (noting

that where stop is based on observed violation of Vehicle Code or otherwise

non-investigable offense, officer must have probable cause to make

constitutional traffic stop). A “police officer has probable cause to stop a motor

vehicle if the officer observes a traffic code violation, even if it is a minor

offense.” Id.

Further:

[T]he Vehicle Code provides that “[t]he rate of speed of any vehicle may be timed on any highway by a police officer using a motor vehicle equipped with a speedometer. In

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ascertaining the speed of a vehicle by the use of a speedometer, the speed shall be timed for a distance of not less than three-tenths of a mile.” 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3368(a). Speedometers must be periodically calibrated for accuracy. 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3368(d); Commonwealth v. Kaufman, 849 A.2d 1258, 1259 (Pa.Super. 2004). Proof of calibration is necessary to obtain a conviction for speeding. [Id.] at 1259. The law does not require calibration to rely on a speedometer for a vehicle stop. “[C]riterion of admissibility in evidence, to prove the accused’s guilt, should not be applied to the facts relied upon to show probable cause.” Commonwealth v. Weaver, 76 A.3d 562, 567 (Pa.Super. 2013) (citing Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 172, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949)), affirmed, 629 Pa. 313, 105 A.3d 656 (2014). Thus, … [a] certification [of calibration] of [a Trooper’s] speedometer [is] unnecessary to support a stop for speeding.

Commonwealth v. Johnson, T., 202 A.3d 125, 129 (Pa.Super. 2019)

(emphasis in original).

Additionally, the following principles apply to our review of claims

involving search warrants:

Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution ensures that citizens of this Commonwealth are protected from unreasonable searches and seizures by requiring that warrants: (1) describe the place to be searched and the items to be seized with specificity and (2) be supported by probable cause to believe that the items sought will provide evidence of a crime.

Commonwealth v. Johnson, L., 662 Pa. 691, 706, 240 A.3d 575, 584

(2020) (internal citations and footnote omitted).

Probable cause exists where the facts and circumstances within the affiant’s knowledge and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that a search should be conducted.

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Commonwealth v. Green, 204 A.3d 469, 482 (Pa.Super. 2019), aff’d, 671

Pa. 1, 265 A.3d 541 (2021) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).

“The task of the magistrate acting as the issuing authority is to make a

practical, common sense assessment of whether, given all the circumstances

set forth in the affidavit, a fair probability exists that contraband or evidence

of a crime will be found in a particular place.” Commonwealth v. Fletcher,

307 A.3d 742, 746 (Pa.Super. 2023), appeal denied, ___ Pa. ___, 318 A.3d

384 (2024) (quoting Commonwealth v. Harlan, 208 A.3d 497, 505

(Pa.Super. 2019)). “In reviewing an issuing authority’s decision to issue a

warrant, a suppression court must affirm unless the issuing authority had no

substantial basis for its decision.” Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Lyons,

622 Pa. 91, 110, 79 A.3d 1053, 1064 (2013)). Further, at a hearing on a

motion to suppress evidence obtained pursuant to a search warrant, the court

may only consider the affidavit of probable cause to determine whether

sufficient cause exists to support the search warrant. See Pa.R.Crim.P.

203(D).

Instantly, the trial court found that Trooper Vanore credibly testified that

Appellant was driving 40 mph in a 25 mph zone. Although Trooper Vanore

stated during cross examination that he could not recall the exact location

where the 25 mph zone began and ended, Trooper Vanore definitively testified

that Appellant was driving in a 25 mph zone when he observed Appellant

driving at 40 mph. Trooper Vanore also testified that Appellant drove past a

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posted sign stating that the speed limit was 25 mph. Additionally, Trooper

Vanore testified that the speedometer in his vehicle was regularly calibrated

by a third-party company to ensure accuracy. Notably, Trooper Vanore did

not need to provide a certification of calibration to support his testimony to

demonstrate that he had probable cause to stop Appellant’s vehicle for

speeding. See Johnson, T., supra. As such, we reject Appellant’s claim that

Trooper Vanore’s testimony was insufficient to establish that Appellant was

speeding, in violation of the Vehicle Code. Therefore, we discern no error in

the court’s determination that Trooper Vanore had probable cause to stop

Appellant’s vehicle for speeding.2 See Gurung, supra; Ford, supra.

Regarding the search warrant, contrary to Appellant’s assertion, there

is no indication in the record that the court considered any evidence that was

not included in the affidavit of probable cause in determining whether there

was sufficient probable cause to support the search warrant. At the

suppression hearing, Appellant argued to the court that Trooper Vanore did

not state in the affidavit of probable cause that he observed a police scanner

in the vehicle and marijuana on the floorboard of the vehicle. The

Commonwealth argued that Trooper Vanore did state in the application that

2 The trial court did not cite Trooper Vanore’s testimony that he observed Appellant driving without his seat belt fastened as a basis for probable cause to justify the vehicle stop. As such, it is unclear from the record whether the court found this testimony credible. Nevertheless, as the court’s finding that Appellant was speeding is sufficient to establish probable cause, we need not address Appellant’s argument regarding the seat belt violation any further.

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he observed marijuana in the vehicle. The court did not disregard Appellant’s

argument but stated that it would “have to read [the affidavit of probable

cause] pretty closely” prior to making a decision. (See N.T. Suppression

Hearing, 7/31/23, at 52). Additionally, in the order denying Appellant’s

motion to suppress, the court expressly stated that it found that the search

warrant was sufficient because “within the four corners of the search warrant,

more than once, there were specific references to plain view marijuana in the

vehicle.” (See Suppression Order, filed 11/8/23).

Further, the record supports the court’s determination that the

averments in the affidavit sufficiently established probable cause to support

the issuance of the search warrant. The affidavit of probable cause states that

Trooper Vanore smelled a strong odor of alcohol and marijuana emanating

from the vehicle. It also states that Mr. Sharpe had a warrant out for his

arrest. Further, it states that Trooper Vanore ran the serial number of the

firearm that Mr. Sharpe dropped as he fled and learned that it was stolen. The

affidavit states that Trooper Vanore towed the vehicle “due to the firearm

located on [Mr.] Shape’s person and the marijuana in the vehicle and on

[Mr.] Sharpe’s person[.]” (See Suppression Hearing- Commonwealth Exhibit

1, filed 7/31/23, at 2) (emphasis added). Additionally, the affidavit states

that the search warrant was being sought “[b]ased on viewing suspected raw

marijuana in plain view on the person/in the Dodge and the stolen firearm

located on [Mr.] Sharpe’s person and in the above vehicle[.]” (Id.)

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(emphasis added). Although the affidavit does not specify that Trooper

Vanore saw marijuana on the passenger side floorboard of the vehicle, it

sufficiently sets forth that Trooper Vanore observed marijuana both on Mr.

Sharpe’s person and in the vehicle. Further, a common sense reading of the

facts in the affidavit demonstrates that Mr. Sharpe, who was a passenger in

the vehicle immediately before he fled from the scene, possessed the stolen

firearm and marijuana that was on his person while he was in the vehicle

before he exited and fled. See Fletcher, supra. As such, the affidavit of

probable cause sufficiently sets forth that marijuana and a stolen firearm were

in the vehicle. On this record, we discern no error in the court’s determination

that the search warrant was properly supported by probable cause. See

Green, supra. See also Commonwealth v. Barr, 671 Pa. 275, 307, 266

A.3d 25, 44 (2021) (holding that although possession and/or odor of

marijuana alone does not amount to probable cause to search vehicle, it may

be considered as factor in examining totality of circumstances);

Commonwealth v. Barba, 460 A.2d 1103, 1106 (Pa.Super. 1983)

(concluding that there was probable cause for search warrant of house where

affidavit stated that officer observed stolen firearm and other stolen

merchandise in house).

In his second issue, Appellant asserts that the court erred in concluding

that the Commonwealth exercised due diligence in attempting to locate

Appellant during the period of pre-arrest delay. Appellant argues that

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although Trooper Vanore testified that he contacted multiple law enforcement

agencies to assist him in locating Appellant, he could not verify any steps that

those agencies undertook to locate Appellant. As such, Appellant maintains

that the only action that Trooper Vanore could verify was his own trip to

Appellant’s last known address, which is insufficient to establish the requisite

due diligence. Appellant further contends that the court erred in concluding

that the delay from April 1, 2024 to May 20, 2024 was attributable to

Appellant. Appellant argues that this delay was due to a continuance request

for outstanding discovery and should be charged to the Commonwealth

regardless of whether the continuance request was marked as a defense

continuance. Appellant further argues that there is no evidence that the

Commonwealth exercised due diligence during this time period to retrieve the

DNA lab results that were outstanding. Appellant concludes that the court

erred in denying his motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 600, and this Court

should dismiss all charges. We disagree.

The following principles apply to our review of a Rule 600 claim:

Our standard of review in evaluating speedy trial issues is whether the trial court abused its discretion, and our scope of review is limited to the trial court’s findings and the evidence on the record, viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party. An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment, but if in reaching a conclusion the law is overridden or misapplied, or the judgment exercised is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will ... discretion is abused.

[Our Supreme] Court has previously explained that Rule 600 was adopted in order to protect defendants’ constitutional

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rights to a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, in response to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972). [Our Supreme Court has] also recognized that Rule 600 has the dual purpose of both protecting a defendant’s constitutional speedy trial rights and protecting society’s right to effective prosecution in criminal cases. In determining whether an accused’s right to a speedy trial has been violated, consideration must be given to society’s right to effective prosecution of criminal cases, both to restrain those guilty of crime and to deter those contemplating it.

Commonwealth v. Mullen, 341 A.3d 799, 803 (Pa.Super. 2025) (quoting

Commonwealth v. Womack, __ Pa. __, ___, 315 A.3d 1229, 1237 (2024)).

Rule 600 provides, in pertinent part:

Rule 600. Prompt Trial

(A) Commencement of Trial; Time for Trial

* * *

(2) Trial shall commence within the following time periods.

(a) Trial in a court case in which a written complaint is filed against the defendant shall commence within 365 days from the date on which the complaint is filed.

(C) Computation of Time

(1) For purposes of paragraph (A), periods of delay at any stage of the proceedings caused by the Commonwealth when the Commonwealth has failed to exercise due diligence shall be included in the computation of the time within which trial must commence. Any other periods of delay shall be excluded from the computation.

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Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(A)(2)(a), (C)(1).

Due diligence is a fact-specific concept that must be determined on a case-by-case basis. Due diligence does not require perfect vigilance and punctilious care, but rather a showing by the Commonwealth that a reasonable effort has been put forth. Due diligence includes, inter alia, listing a case for trial prior to the run date, preparedness for trial within the run date, and keeping adequate records to ensure compliance with Rule 600. Periods of delay caused by the Commonwealth’s failure to exercise due diligence must be included in the computation of time within which trial must commence.

Commonwealth v. Martz, 232 A.3d 801, 810-11 (Pa.Super. 2020) (citations

and quotation marks omitted).

“To decide whether the rule was violated, a court must first calculate

the ‘mechanical run date,’ which is 365 days after the complaint was filed, and

then must account for any ‘excludable time.’” Commonwealth v. Lear, ___

Pa. ___, ___, 325 A.3d 552, 560 (2024) (citations and quotation marks

omitted). “Second, we determine whether any excludable time exists

pursuant to Rule 600(C). We add the amount of excludable time, if any, to

the mechanical run date to arrive at an adjusted run date.” Commonwealth

v. Graves, 328 A.3d 1005, 1009 (Pa.Super. 2024).

“[W]e may … exclude all periods of delay from the applicable date,

except for those chargeable to the Commonwealth where it has failed to act

diligently.” Commonwealth v. Dunmore, 324 A.3d 1, 7 (Pa.Super. 2024).

“[T]he period of time between the filing of the written complaint and the

defendant’s arrest, provided that the defendant could not be apprehended

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because his or her whereabouts were unknown and could not be determined

by due diligence” is excludable time. Pa.R.Crim.P. 600, Comment.

Additionally, any “period of delay at any stage of the proceedings as results

from … any continuance granted at the request of the defendant or the

defendant’s attorney” is also excludable. Id. Further, “if the defense …

indicates[s] approval or acceptance of [a] continuance, the time associated

with the continuance is excludable under Rule 600 as a defense request.”

Commonwealth v. Hunt, 858 A.2d 1234, 1241 (Pa.Super. 2004).

Here, the criminal complaint was filed on March 20, 2022. Therefore,

the mechanical run date was March 20, 2023. See Lear, supra. At the Rule

600 hearing, Appellant submitted an exhibit listing the procedural history of

this case and conceded that 342 days of delay were attributable to Appellant.

(See Rule 600 Hearing- Defense Exhibit 1, filed 11/13/24). In addition, the

court also found that the delay between April 1, 2024 and May 20, 2024 was

attributable to Appellant. Specifically, the court noted that Appellant’s counsel

signed a continuance sheet indicating that this delay was due to a defense

continuance request. When the court showed Appellant’s counsel the

continuance form, counsel acknowledged that the form was signed and listed

this period as a defense continuance request. Appellant now claims that this

period should have been considered a Commonwealth request because the

continuance was required due to outstanding discovery. Nevertheless,

regardless of Appellant’s assertion after the fact, the record demonstrates that

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this continuance was a defense request, or at the very least, that Appellant

approved or joined in the request. As such, we discern no error in the court’s

conclusion that the 49 days of delay between April 1, 2024 and May 20, 2024

was excludable time as a defense request for continuance. See Hunt, supra.

Further, the trial court excluded the 254 days that elapsed between

when the criminal information was filed and Appellant was arrested. The court

determined that Appellant’s whereabouts were unknown and the

Commonwealth exhibited due diligence in attempting to locate and apprehend

Appellant. Appellant’s argument that Trooper Vanore’s testimony was

insufficient to establish due diligence is belied by the record. Trooper Vanore

testified that he reached out to Appellant’s probation office, the Philadelphia

Police Department and the Marshals Service. Contrary to Appellant’s

assertion, Trooper Vanore provided testimony regarding the efforts these law

enforcement agencies undertook to locate Appellant. Specifically, Trooper

Vanore testified that the Marshals Service used databases to which they had

access to try to locate Appellant. Trooper Vanore also testified that the

Philadelphia Police Department went to multiple areas in the city in an attempt

to find Appellant and communicated about an unrelated offense that Appellant

was suspected to have committed. Trooper Vanore further testified that he

personally went to Appellant’s last known address multiple times. On this

record, we discern no error in the court’s conclusion that the pre-arrest delay

between March 20, 2022 and November 29, 2022 was excludable delay. See

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Pa.R.Crim.P. 600, Comment; Dunmore, supra.

Therefore, the 342 days conceded by Appellant, the 49 days between

April 1, 2024 and May 24, 2024, and the 254 days between the filing of the

criminal complaint and Appellant’s arrest are all excludable. This results in a

total of 645 days of excludable time, making the adjusted run date December

24, 2024. See Graves, supra. Appellant’s trial commenced on November

12, 2024, prior to the adjusted run date. As such, the court did not err in

denying Appellant’s motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 600. 3 See Mullen,

supra.

In his third issue, Appellant asserts that juror number six indicated on

his written questionnaire that he was more likely to believe the testimony of

a police officer. Appellant claims that “[i]t strains belief that the trial court

can be assured of a juror’s impartiality simply because they do not stand in

response to the same question that was in the written questionnaire.”

(Appellant’s Brief at 15). Appellant argues that “many jurors do not pay

attention during the lengthy proceedings or are concerned about expressing

their biased viewpoints in full view of everyone.” (Id.) Appellant maintains

3 The court further found that the time between December 20, 2022 and February 20, 2023 was excusable because Trooper Vanore, a key Commonwealth witness, was on paternity leave. Appellant disputes this finding, claiming that there was no support in the record for the court’s conclusion. Nevertheless, as we have determined that Appellant’s Rule 600 claim fails even if this time period was not excluded from the Rule 600 calculation, we need not address Appellant’s argument further.

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that he was prejudiced because the Commonwealth’s case hinged entirely on

the credibility of the testifying police officers. Appellant concludes that the

court erred in denying Appellant’s request to ask further questions of juror

number six, and this Court must grant him a new trial. We disagree.

Appellate review of the jury selection process implicates the following

principles:

The process of selecting a jury is committed to the sound discretion of the trial judge and will be reversed only where the record indicates an abuse of discretion, and the appellant carries the burden of showing that the jury was not impartial.

Commonwealth v. Noel, 629 Pa. 100, 121, 104 A.3d 1156, 1169 (2014).

“[I]t is only when the court permits the jury selection process to impugn the

fundamental qualities of competence, fairness and impartiality that we may

conclude that a palpable abuse of discretion has been committed.” Id. at 123,

104 A.3d at 1171 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).

“The purpose of voir dire is to ensure the empaneling of a fair and

impartial jury capable of following the instructions on the law as provided by

the trial court.” Id. at 120, 104 A.3d at 1168. “[Voir dire] is not intended to

provide appellant with a better basis upon which to utilize his peremptory

challenges. The inquiry should be strictly confined to disclosing qualifications

or lack of qualifications and should focus on whether a juror has formed a

fixed opinion as to an accused’s guilt or innocence.” Commonwealth v.

Hathaway, 500 A.2d 443, 447 (Pa.Super. 1985).

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The Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure govern the examination

of prospective jurors as follows:

Rule 631. Examination and Challenges of Trial Jurors

(F) In capital cases, the individual voir dire method must be used, unless the defendant waives that alternative. In non- capital cases, the trial judge shall select one of the following alternative methods of voir dire, which shall apply to the selection of both jurors and alternates:

(1) Individual Voir Dire and Challenge System

(a) Voir dire of prospective jurors shall be conducted individually and may be conducted beyond the hearing and presence of other jurors.

(2) List System of Challenges

(a) A list of prospective jurors shall be prepared. The list shall contain a sufficient number of prospective jurors to total at least 12, plus the number of alternates to be selected, plus the total number of peremptory challenges (including alternates).

(b) Prospective jurors may be examined collectively or individually regarding their qualifications. If the jurors are examined individually, the examination may be conducted beyond the hearing and presence of other jurors.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 631(F). Accordingly, individual voir dire is only required in

capital cases. In all non-capital cases, the trial court has discretion to

determine who will ask questions of the jurors and whether the jurors will be

questioned individually or collectively. See id. See also Hathaway, supra

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at 144-45.

Here, the court asked the following question to the jury during group

voir dire:

Another instruction I’ll give you is the following. The testimony of a police officer must not be given any more weight nor any less weight than the testimony of any other witnesses simply because he or she is a police officer. You are not to show any bias for or favoritism for a police officer strictly because he or she is a police officer. You’re to evaluate their testimony the same as any other witness. If you cannot or will not follow that instruction, please stand.

(N.T. Trial, 11/12/24, at 20-21). In response, several jurors stood up but

juror number six did not. As such, despite juror number six’s initial indication

on the written questionnaire that he was more likely to believe the testimony

of a police officer, juror number six did not reaffirm any such bias after hearing

the court’s more detailed instruction.

Further, Appellant’s assertion that juror number six may not have been

paying attention or was nervous about expressing his opinion in a group

setting is merely speculation. There is no indication in the record that juror

number six was inattentive during group voir dire. Additionally, the record

shows that several other jurors stood in response to this question. As such,

juror number six would not have been the only individual to express this

opinion in the group setting if he wished to do so. On this record, we cannot

say that the court abused its discretion in denying Appellant’s request to

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individually voir dire juror number six.4 See Noel, supra.

In his fourth issue, Appellant asserts that he was convicted of possession

of a firearm without a license, graded as a felony of the third-degree.

Appellant claims that a felony of the third degree carries a maximum sentence

of seven years. Appellant concludes that the court imposed an illegal sentence

by sentencing Appellant to three to fifteen years’ incarceration on his

possession of a firearm without a license conviction. We agree.

A challenge to the legality of a sentence raises a question of law. See

Commonwealth v. Smith, 956 A.2d 1029, 1033 (Pa.Super. 2008) (en banc).

In reviewing this type of claim, our standard of review is de novo and our

scope of review is plenary. Commonwealth v. Childs, 63 A.3d 323, 325

(Pa.Super. 2013). “An illegal sentence must be vacated[.]” Commonwealth

v. Ramos, 197 A.3d 766, 769 (Pa.Super. 2018) (citation and quotation marks

omitted). Moreover, assuming jurisdiction is proper, “a challenge to the

legality of the sentence can never be waived and may be raised by this Court

sua sponte.” Commonwealth v. Wolfe, 106 A.3d 800, 801 (Pa.Super. 2014)

4 Appellant cites to Commonwealth v. Penn, 132 A.3d 498 (Pa.Super. 2016)

to support his argument. Nevertheless, Penn is not applicable here. Penn addresses a challenge to the trial court’s denial of a motion to strike a juror for cause. Here, Appellant did not move to strike juror number six for cause. Further, Penn is materially distinguishable. The juror in question in Penn not only indicated in her written questionnaire that she was biased towards police testimony but also “unequivocally testified during voir dire that she would be more likely to believe the testimony of a police officer[.]” Id. at 504 (quotation marks omitted). Such was not the case here. Juror number six did not continue to assert a bias towards police testimony during voir dire.

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(citation omitted).

A claim that implicates the fundamental legal authority of the court to impose a particular sentence constitutes a challenge to the legality of the sentence. If no statutory authorization exists for a particular sentence, that sentence is illegal and subject to correction. An illegal sentence must be vacated. Likewise, a sentence that exceeds the statutory maximum is illegal. If a court imposes a sentence outside of the legal parameters prescribed by the applicable statute, the sentence is illegal and should be remanded for correction.

Commonwealth v. Infante, 63 A.3d 358, 363 (Pa.Super. 2013) (citations

Instantly, the Commonwealth agrees that the sentence imposed for

Appellant’s possession of a firearm without a license conviction exceeded the

statutory maximum for a felony of the third degree. 5 See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1103

(stating that court may not impose term of imprisonment for felony of third

degree that is more than seven years). As such, the court’s sentence of three

to fifteen years’ incarceration for Appellant’s possession of a firearm without

a license conviction is illegal and must be vacated. See Infante, supra. The

court imposed consecutive sentences for Appellant’s possession of a firearm

without a license and possession of a firearm by a prohibited person

convictions. As such, our disposition disrupts the court’s overall sentencing

5 The trial court did not address this issue because Appellant raised it for the

first time on appeal. Nevertheless, as a challenge to the legality of a sentence is not waivable so long as jurisdiction is proper, we may address Appellant’s claim. See Wolfe, supra.

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scheme, and we must vacate Appellant’s judgment of sentence in its entirety.

See Commonwealth v. Thur, 906 A.2d 552, 569 (Pa.Super. 2006), appeal

denied, 596 Pa. 745, 946 A.2d 687 (2008) (stating: “If our disposition upsets

the overall sentencing scheme of the trial court, we must remand so that the

court can restructure its sentence plan”). 6 Accordingly, we affirm Appellant’s

convictions but vacate his judgment of sentence and remand for resentencing.

Convictions affirmed. Judgment of sentence vacated. Case remanded

for resentencing. Jurisdiction is relinquished.

Date: 7/17/2026

6 Based on our disposition, Appellant’s fifth issue challenging the discretionary

aspects of his sentence is moot.

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