Com. v. Stanford, R.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania

Com. v. Stanford, R.

DecidedJanuary 20, 2015

Docket1513 WDA 2013

StatusUnpublished

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Com. v. Stanford, R., (Pa. Ct. App. 2015).

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Opinion

J-A35007-14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellee

v.

RONALD STANFORD,

Appellant No. 1513 WDA 2013

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered August 22, 2013 In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0002099-2012

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., BOWES, J., and ALLEN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED JANUARY 20, 2015

Appellant, Ronald Standford, appeals from the judgment of sentence

of five to ten years’ incarceration, imposed after a jury convicted him of

possession of a controlled substance (cocaine), and possession with intent to

deliver (PWID) a controlled substance (cocaine). Appellant challenges the

sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his PWID conviction, as well as the

legality of his mandatory minimum sentence imposed pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S.

§ 7508. After careful review, we affirm Appellant’s conviction, but vacate his

judgment of sentence and remand for resentencing.

The trial court summarized the facts of this case as follows:

On September 2, 2011, at approximately 5:00 PM, City of Pittsburgh police were working in plain clothes in the Homewood neighborhood of Pittsburgh. Their attention was drawn to a Hyundai Sonata automobile because they saw it: travel at a high rate of speed; fail to use a turn signal when it swerved to the side of the road; and[] park on the sidewalk in front of a housing J-A35007-14

complex which is well-known for violent drug activity. As a result, the police pulled behind the Sonata and activated their lights and siren to execute a traffic stop. [Appellant] … who was the front seat passenger, exited the vehicle and began to walk away. When he was ordered back to the car, he became extremely confrontational. The police looked into the vehicle and saw, right in the middle of the front passenger seat, a large piece of crack cocaine. The cocaine weighed 12.81 grams. [Appellant] was searched and a cell phone and $516.00 was found on his person. No use paraphernalia was found for the ingestion of the crack cocaine. After [Appellant] was [1] Mirandize[d], he admitted that the crack cocaine was his, and reported [that] he was unemployed. An expert testified at trial that, with the facts as described above, [Appellant] possessed the cocaine with the intent to deliver it.

Trial Court Opinion (TCO), 6/3/14, at 1.

Based on these facts, Appellant was convicted of the above-stated

offenses. On August 22, 2013, the court sentenced him to a mandatory

term of five to ten years’ incarceration pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. §

7508(a)(3)(ii). Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal, as well as a timely

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal.

Herein, he presents two questions for our review:

I. Was the trial court’s imposition of the mandatory minimum sentence under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 7508(a)(3)(ii) illegal when the factfinder never found the facts necessary beyond a reasonable doubt for the imposition of the mandatory minimum, as required by the United States Supreme Court in Alleyne v. United States, 133 S.Ct. 2151 (2013)?

II. Was the evidence insufficient to prove [PWID] beyond a reasonable doubt when the evidence merely showed that [Appellant] was only in possession of the drugs, not that he intended to distribute them? ____________________________________________

1 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

-2- J-A35007-14

Appellant’s Brief at 5 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

For ease of disposition, we will address Appellant’s challenge to the

sufficiency of the evidence first. To begin, we note our standard of review of

a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence:

In reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we must determine whether the evidence admitted at trial, as well as all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, are sufficient to support all elements of the offense. Commonwealth v. Moreno, 14 A.3d 133 (Pa. Super. 2011). Additionally, we may not reweigh the evidence or substitute our own judgment for that of the fact finder. Commonwealth v. Hartzell, 988 A.2d 141 (Pa. Super. 2009). The evidence may be entirely circumstantial as long as it links the accused to the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreno, supra at 136.

Commonwealth v. Koch, 39 A.3d 996, 1001 (Pa. Super. 2011).

Here, Appellant solely challenges his conviction for PWID, arguing that

the Commonwealth failed to proffer sufficient proof that he possessed the

crack cocaine with the intent to deliver it. Appellant argues that the jury

should have believed his testimony that he possessed the cocaine for

personal use, based on the following facts: (1) the 12.81 grams of cocaine

“was not an enormous amount[,]” (2) the Commonwealth’s expert testified

that it was possible to possess that much cocaine for personal use, (3) the

drugs were not packaged for sale and there was no drug distribution

paraphernalia recovered, (4) he testified that he possessed $516 from his

monthly Social Security disability check and was planning to use that money

to buy a “bulk amount” of crack cocaine for his personal use, (6) no police

-3- J-A35007-14

officer witnessed Appellant sell drugs or was informed that Appellant sold

drugs, and (7) Appellant did not admit to selling drugs. See Appellant’s

Brief at 25-31.

Appellant essentially asks this Court to view the evidence in the light

most favorable to him, and to make credibility determinations different from

those reached by the jury. Our standard of review does not permit this

Court to do either. See Koch, 39 A.3d at 1001; Commonwealth v.

Shaver, 460 A.2d 742, 745 (Pa. 1983) (citations omitted) (“It is solely the

province of the trier of fact to pass upon the credibility of witnesses and to

give it such weight as may be accorded to the evidence therein produced.

The factfinder is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.”).

Instead, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

Commonwealth, as we must, we conclude that it was reasonable for the jury

to infer that Appellant intended to sell the crack cocaine. Namely, Appellant

was stopped in an area known for drug activity and immediately became

confrontational when approached by police. In his possession, Appellant had

a large quantity of cash ($516), yet admitted to the officers that he did not

have a job. Appellant also possessed 12.81 grams of crack cocaine. The

Commonwealth’s expert in narcotics trafficking testified that such a large

amount of cocaine indicated that Appellant intended to sell the drugs. N.T.

-4- J-A35007-14

Trial, 5/28/13-5/30/13, at 94-95.2 Moreover, while the drugs were not

packaged in a manner typical for sale, Appellant had no use paraphernalia in

his possession, and he did not appear to the arresting officers to be under

the influence of any drugs. Id. at 80. We conclude that these facts were

sufficient to permit the jury to infer that Appellant possessed the crack

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