Com. v. Stalford, D.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: April 20, 2026
• Docket: 416 MDA 2025
• Status: Unpublished
• Author: Dubow

Opinion

J-A07024-26

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : DERRICK ALLEN STALFORD : : Appellant : No. 416 MDA 2025

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered March 18, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Adams County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-01-CR-0000382-2024

BEFORE: BOWES, J., DUBOW, J., and NEUMAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.: FILED: APRIL 20, 2026

Appellant, Derrick Allen Stalford, appeals from the March 18, 2025,

judgment of sentence entered in the Adams County Court of Common Pleas

following his conviction of three counts of Driving Under the Influence

(“DUI”).1 Appellant challenges the denial of his motion to suppress. After

careful review, we affirm.

The relevant facts and procedural history are as follows. On January

23, 2024, Trooper Dillon Tamecki observed Appellant’s white van exceeding

the maximum speed limit and effectuated a traffic stop.2 Appellant was the

driver and sole occupant of the vehicle. While speaking with Appellant,

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1 75 Pa.C.S. §§ 3802(d)(1)(i), (iii), and (d)(2). The court also convicted Appellant of the summary traffic offense of Exceeding Maximum Speed Limits. Id. at § 3362(a)(2). 2 Appellant does not contest the legality of the initial traffic stop. J-A07024-26

Trooper Tamecki smelled the odor of burnt marijuana emanating from the

vehicle and noticed that Appellant had bloodshot and glassy eyes. Trooper

Tamecki asked Appellant to step out of the vehicle to conduct field sobriety

testing. Once outside the vehicle, Appellant admitted that he had recently

smoked marijuana. As Appellant showed signs of impairment during the field

sobriety tests, Trooper Tamecki arrested him for suspicion of DUI and

transported him to the hospital for a blood draw.

Before trial, Appellant filed a pre-trial motion to suppress, arguing that

Trooper Tamecki unjustifiably extended the traffic stop to conduct field

sobriety testing and that the court should, therefore, suppress all evidence

obtained after that unlawful detention. On September 23, 2024, the court

held a suppression hearing. Trooper Tamecki testified, inter alia, that he could

discern the difference between the smell of raw and burnt marijuana and that

Appellant’s car smelled of burnt marijuana. Trooper Tamecki also testified

that based upon the strong odor of burnt marijuana and Appellant’s bloodshot

and glassy eyes, he had reasonable suspicion that Appellant was driving under

the influence of a controlled substance and was therefore justified in

prolonging the motor vehicle stop to conduct field sobriety testing.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the court denied Appellant’s motion to

suppress.

On December 10, 2024, following a stipulated bench trial, the court

found Appellant guilty of the above offenses. On March 18, 2025, the court

sentenced Appellant to 6 months of probation.

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This timely appeal followed. Appellant and the trial court complied with

Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

Appellant raises the following issue for our review: “Whether the [t]rial

[c]ourt erred in finding that there was reasonable suspicion to detain

[Appellant] for [DUI] where the only evidence of DUI was that he had

bloodshot or glassy eyes and that there was a smell of burnt marijuana flower,

oil, or wax[?]” Appellant’s Br. at 4.

Appellant concedes that the initial traffic stop was legal but argues that

Trooper Tamecki did not have reasonable suspicion of DUI required to prolong

the traffic stop and conduct field sobriety testing. Id. at 10-13. Appellant

argues that Trooper Tamecki could not rely on the odor of burnt marijuana to

justify his reasonable suspicion of DUI because individuals with a medical

marijuana card can legally consume oil and wax marijuana with a vaporizer,

which could have produced the burnt odor. Id. at 11. Appellant cites to

Trooper Tamecki’s testimony at the suppression hearing where Trooper

Tamecki defined “burnt marijuana” as odor from either burnt flower “and/or

THC wax or oil.” Id. (citing N.T. Supp. Hr’g at 10).

“Our standard of review for the denial of a suppression motion is de

novo and is limited to determining whether the suppression court's factual

findings are supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn

from those facts are correct.” Commonwealth v. Ochoa, 304 A.3d 390, 396

(Pa. Super. 2023) (citation omitted). “Our scope of review is to consider only

the evidence of the Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the

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defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the

suppression record as a whole.” Id. (citation omitted). “When the sole issue

on appeal relates to a suppression ruling, our review includes only the

suppression hearing record and excludes from consideration evidence elicited

at trial.” Id. (citation omitted).

“The tolerable duration of police inquiries in the traffic-stop context is

determined by the seizure’s ‘mission’ - to address the traffic violation that

warranted the stop and attend to related safety concerns.” Commonwealth

v. Sloan, 303 A. 3d 155, 163 (Pa. Super. 2023) (citation omitted). However,

an officer may develop suspicions of additional criminal activity before the

initial traffic stop’s purpose has been fulfilled and, in that case, “detention may

be permissible to investigate the new suspicions.” Id. (citation omitted).

“The ‘new detention’ must be supported by reasonable suspicion.” Id.

at 164. “To establish grounds for ‘reasonable suspicion’ . . . the officer must

articulate specific observations which, in conjunction with reasonable

inferences derived from these observations, led him reasonably to conclude,

in light of his experience, that criminal activity was afoot and the person he

stopped was involved in that activity.” Id. (citation omitted).

In Sloan, this Court held that because it is unlawful to smoke medical

marijuana in Pennsylvania, an officer may have reasonable suspicion that

marijuana was being illegally ingested if the officer smells burnt marijuana

during a traffic stop. Id. at 165. Further, unlike alcohol, “[b]ecause

marijuana is a Schedule I controlled substance, the Vehicle Code prohibits an

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individual from operating a vehicle after consuming any amount of

marijuana.” Commonwealth v. Jones, 121 A.3d 524, 529 (Pa. Super.

2015).

Here, the trial court found that before the initial stop’s purpose had been

fulfilled, “Trooper Tamecki formed reasonable suspicion permitting him to

investigate whether Appellant was DUI[,]” specifically when Trooper Tamecki

smelled the odor of burnt marijuana and observed Appellant, who had been

driving, with bloodshot and glassy eyes. Trial Ct. Op. at 6. That reasonable

suspicion justified his extension of the original motor vehicle stop into a

secondary DUI investigation.

We conclude that the trial court did not err or abuse its discretion in

denying Appellant’s motion to suppress. Pursuant to Sloan, supra, when

Trooper Tamecki smelled the burnt marijuana odor and observed Appellant’s

bloodshot and glassy eyes, he had reasonable suspicion to justify further

investigation of the suspected DUI. While Appellant asserts that Trooper

Tamecki could have smelled burning oil or wax, medical marijuana users

cannot operate a vehicle after consuming any amount of marijuana,

regardless of the method of consumption. See Jones, 121 A.3d at 529.

Accordingly, Trooper Tamecki had reasonable suspicion of DUI and could

prolong the traffic stop to investigate that new suspicion. We, therefore,

conclude that the trial court did not err in denying Appellant’s motion to

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Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 4/20/2026

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