J. A02005/14
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA v. : : ERVIN SPURIEL, : No. 603 EDA 2013 : Appellant :
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence, January 11, 2013, in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No. CP-51-CR-0001983-2011
BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., OTT AND STRASSBURGER,* JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.:FILED SEPTEMBER 08, 2014
Ervin Spuriel appeals from the judgment of sentence entered on
January 11, 2013, in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
following his convictions of first-degree murder, criminal conspiracy, and
The facts, as summarized by the trial court, are as follows:
On July 10, 2010, at approximately 10:18 p.m., Jamal Parker was driving down 21st Street towards Mifflin Street in South Philadelphia. Mr. Parker saw a friend, Marquis Gilliard, walking down the street, and stopped his car briefly to talk to him. Mr. Parker then continued driving down the block and got out of the car. Mr. Parker approached a group of men that included defendant and co-defendant [Chaz] Henry, who had sold drugs for Mr. Parker, along with Andrew Fairey, Antione Smith, and [co- brother Devon Henry. [Co-defendant Henry] called over to Mr. Parker and acted as though he was going
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. J. A02005/14
to give Mr. Parker money. Co-defendant Henry then pulled a gun from his waist and began chasing Mr. Parker, shooting him. Defendant approached Mr. Parker and also shot him, after which Mr. Parker collapsed to the ground. Defendant continued to shoot Mr. Parker in the back after he fell. Defendant, co-defendant Henry, Mr. Henry, Mr. Fairey, and Mr. Smith all fled the scene.
Police arrived and transported Mr. Parker to the University of Pennsylvania Hospital, where he was pronounced dead at 10:28 p.m. He had been shot nine times, once each in the head, neck, arm, hip, buttock, thigh, and leg, and twice in the back. The police recovered 11 fired cartridge casings from the scene, eight of which had been fired from the same .40 caliber handgun and three of which had been fired from the same .45 caliber handgun. Two .40 caliber bullets were recovered from jaw and throat, and one .45 caliber bullet was recovered from his back. The weapons used in the shooting were not recovered.
Marquis Gilliard was questioned by homicide detectives. He identified defendant and co-defendant Henry, both of whom he knew personally, as the people who shot and killed Mr. Parker. Mr. Gilliard told police that the murder was over money, as both defendant and co-defendant Henry owed Mr. Parker money for drugs. Devon Henry was also questioned by the police and told police that he had witnessed the shooting. He also told police that defendant and co-defendant Henry had talked to him about the shooting after it happened, and that the murder was committed over drug money that they both owed to Mr. Parker.[1] Detectives questioned David Marks, a friend of Mr. Parker, who told them that on the night
1 At trial, Devon claimed that he could not recall giving a statement to the police and disavowed nearly all of the averments in the statement. (Notes of testimony, 12/18/12 at 109- was admitted into evidence at trial through the testimony of Detective James Crone. (Notes of testimony, 12/19/12 at 7-22.)
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of the shooting, defendant told him that he had killed Mr. Parker.
Police recovered two cell phones from the scene of the shooting, both of which belonged to Mr. Parker. From one of these phones, they recovered several confrontational text message exchanges between defendant and Mr. Parker, one of
done. One minute you act like my man then you act
Mr. Parker had also called defendant two times immediately prior to the shooting, once at 10:13 p.m. and once at 10:14 p.m. Defendant and co-defendant Henry were arrested.
Trial court opinion, 5/23/13 at 2-4 (citations to the record omitted). The
Commonwealth also introduced the testimony of Officer Margaret McGrory
investigation was still open, and appellant had not been convicted of any
crime. (Notes of testimony, 12/19/12 at 75-87.) She detailed six separate
purchases orchestrated by a confidential informant, which occurred
approximately four months prior to the murder.
C
him to deflect attention from themselves. Appellant testified that he bought
crack in bulk, cooked it, and sold it for profit. (Notes of testimony, 12/20/12
at 141-142.) He denied that he bought crack from Parker and denied that
he was in debt to Parker, with the exception of one point in time when he
owed Parker $175 for a YMCA membership. (Id. at 142-146.) Appellant
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made for
him referred to marijuana business he sent to Parker. (Id. at 146.)
Appellant denied shooting the victim and testified that he was at a cookout a
block away from the murder and could not get any of the approximately
15 people who were with him to testify on his behalf. (Id. at 163-170.) The
parties stipulated that appellant had two prior adjudications of delinquency
for crimen falsi offenses. (Id. at 206.) The parties also stipulated that
neither appellant nor co-defendant Henry was licensed to carry a firearm and
that co-defendant Henry had been convicted for selling drugs.
Following a jury trial, appellant was convicted of the above-stated
charges on December 21, 2012. On January 11, 2013, appellant was
sentenced to a mandatory term of life imprisonment for first-degree murder
and a cumulative concurrent sentence of 21 to 42 years for the other
offenses.2 This timely appeal followed. The following issues have been
presented for our review:
I. Did the trial court erroneously permit the Commonwealth to introduce extensive evidence regarding a prior narcotics investigation which resulted in the arrest of Appellant for PWID, where this charge remained open at the time of the instant proceeding and where the prejudicial impact
2 Co-defendant Henry was convicted of the same crimes and sentenced to a mandatory term of life imprisonment for first-degree murder and a cumulative concurrent sentence of 21 to 45 years for the remaining offenses. A panel of this court affirmed the judgment of sentence on direct appeal. Commonwealth v. Henry, No. 202 EDA 2013, unpublished memorandum (Pa.Super. filed May 16, 2014).
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outweighed the probative value of this detailed description of a month long series of prior bad acts?
II. Did the trial court erroneously permit the Commonwealth to question witness Marquis
from cross-examining Gilliard regarding (1) his motive to testify falsely to curry favor with the Commonwealth, (2) whether he sold drugs for the decedent, and (3) whether he was aware
III. Did the trial court erroneously sustain the
conditions under which the police questioned witness Fairey, prior to securing a statement from Mr. Fairey that inculpated Appellant?
IV. Did the C statements contain unfairly prejudicial
due process right to a fair trial?
discretion
trial-within-a-
described her month-long investigation of appellant, which occurred four
months prior to the murder. Appellant contends that there is no factual
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drug debt
allegedly owed by appellant to the victim. We disagree.3
Admission of evidence rests within the discretion of the trial court, and
we will not reverse absent an abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v.
Washington, 63 A.2d 797, 805 (Pa.Super. 201
when the course pursued represents not merely an error of judgment, but
where the judgment is manifestly unreasonable or where the law is not
applied or where the record shows that the action is a result of partiality,
prejudice, Commonwealth v. Martinez, 917 A.2d 856, 859
(Pa.Super. 2007).
logically tends to establish a material fact in the case, tends to make a fact
at issue more or less probable or supports a reasonable inference or
Commonwealth v. Williams, 896
A.2d 523, 539 (Pa. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1213 (2007);
Pa.R.E. 402. It is settled law in this Commonwealth that other bad acts
3 We disagree with the trial court that this claim is waived. (Trial court opinion, 5/23/13 at 6.) Appellant filed a pre-trial motion in limine and objected to the introduction of this evidence for the same reasons outlined in his brief. Further, at the conclusion of his argument, trial counsel specifically asked the court to note his objection to the admission of the evidence, and the court stated the issue was preserved. (Notes of testimony, 12/17/12 at 11.)
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Commonwealth v. Brookins, 10 A.3d 1251, 1256 (Pa.Super. 2010),
appeal denied, 22 A.3d 1033 (Pa. 2011).
Nonetheless, bad acts evidence may be introduced for other limited
purposes. Instantly, the Commonwealth argued, and the trial court agreed,
that the evidence was admissible as evidence of motive under
Pa.R.E.
act and the crime at issue
Commonwealth v. Ross, 57 A.3d 85, 100 (Pa.Super. 2012), appeal
denied, 72 A.3d 603 (Pa. 2013) (citation omitted). This evidence is
admissible only if the probative value of the evidence outweighs its potential
for unfair prejudice. Pa.R.E. Rule 404(b)(3).
It has been succinctly stated that (t)he purpose of this rule is to prevent the conviction of an accused for one crime by the use of evidence that he has committed other unrelated crimes, and to preclude the inference that because he has committed other crimes he was more likely to commit that crime for which he is being tried. The presumed effect of such evidence is to predispose the minds of the jurors to believe the accused guilty, and thus effectually to strip him of the presumption of innocence.
Commonwealth v. Spruill, 391 A.2d 1048, 1049 (Pa. 1978).
At the hearing on appell in limine, the Commonwealth
explained that its theory was the victim was murdered because appellant
and his conspirator owed the victim money for drugs the victim gave them
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to sell. (Notes of testimony, 12/17/12 at 4.) The Commonwealth explained
that in order to corroborate this motive, it wished to present evidence that
for approximately five months prior to the murder, in the same area where
the murder occurred, appellant was seen selling drugs. Additionally, when a
search warrant was exec
packaging materials. The trial court granted the motion and permitted the
evidence to be introduced solely on the issue of motive and found the
probative value of the evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect. (Id. at 8.)
After review, we find the court did not err in admitting the other acts
evidence, that appellant had been investigated for selling drugs to a
confidential informant on six separate occasions prior to the murder, as it
was relevant to show motive. This evidence was probative of his status as a
victim over a drug debt. Thus, the evidence of drug-related activity was
properly admitted to show that the killing did not occur in a vacuum. See,
e.g., Commonwealth v. Hall, 565 A.2d 144, 149 (Pa. 1989) (evidence of
past drug dealings admissible to demonstrate motive for murder). We
conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that
the probative value of the evidence outweighed any prospect for prejudice
and was integral to the case.
objections to questions asked of Marquis Gilliard. Appellant claims that it
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nce to the defense to question Gilliard regarding the
details of his relationship to [the victim] and his subjective fears regarding
Appellant first claims that the court abused its discretion in preventing
him from questioning Gilliard about his possible connection to the
subsequent murders of two prospective witnesses, Eric Whittaker and
Stephen Hamilton. Appellant sought to question Gilliard about whether he
was afraid that he would be charged with murder and whether, as a result of
this fear, he was tailoring his testimony to gain favorable treatment by the
No relief is due.
As a general rule, the scope and manner of cross-examination are within the sound discretion of the trial court. Absent a finding that the court abused its discretion, this Court will not disturb the
Commonwealth v. Rickabaugh, 706 A.2d 826, 839 (Pa.Super. 1997),
appeal denied, 736 A.2d 604 (Pa. 1999).
Counsel may cross-examine a witness subject to the usual limitations:
-examination may be employed to test a
Commonwealth v. Robinson, 507 Pa. 522, 526,
cross-examined as to any matter tending to show
Commonwealth v. Nolen, 535 Pa. 77, 83, 634
tha
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or innocence is dependent upon the credibility of a prosecution witness, an adequate opportunity [must] be afforded to demonstrate through cross- Commonwealth v. Birch, 532 Pa. 563, 566, 616 A.2d 977, 978 (1992).
Commonwealth v. Hyland, 875 A.2d 1175, 1186 (Pa.Super. 2005),
appeal denied
allow cross-examination to become a fishing expedition, where the examiner
may ask questions based on a subjective hunch, or worse, based on nothing
In interest of M.M., 653 A.2d 1271, 1277 (Pa.Super. 1995).
-examination, the trial
court relies upon our supreme Commonwealth v. Evans,
512 A.2d 626 (Pa. 1986). In Evans
prosecution witness may be biased in favor of the prosecution because of
outstanding criminal charges or because of any non-final criminal disposition
against him within the same jurisdiction, that possible bias, in fairness, must
Id. at 631. The Evans court also explained
that even if the prosecution has made no direct promises, the witness might
hope for favorable treatment in lieu of his testimony. Id. at 631-632.
Mr. Gilliard, and no information in the police paperwork that Mr. Gilliard was
arguing for permission to cross-examine Mr. Gilliard about being a suspect in
various homicides, defense counsel merely offered his unsupported
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believe [Mr.
Id., citing notes of testimony, 12/20/12 at
7.)
Appellant cites no supporting case law and we know of no such
statement of the law which would permit the cross-examination of a witness
as to his perceived bias when based on unsupported assertions that the
witness was suspected of being involved in a crime. Appellant, however,
attempts to persuade us that the principle enunciated in Commonwealth v.
Nolen, 634 A.2d 192 (Pa. 1993), should be applied.
In Nolen, our supreme court held it was error to preclude defense
counsel from cross-examining a witness about the fact that various charges
were pending against him both in Pennsylvania and Virginia at the time he
agreed to testify for the Commonwealth, although not at the time of trial.
when he was called to testify at trial was that they had been resolved in the
charges by dismissal and the Pennsylvania
charges by payment of a fine to a reduced offense. The Nolen panel held
the potential for bias continued beyond the closure of those cases, and thus
remained a proper subject of cross-examination, since the favorable
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he might be charged, in the future with two murders, might tailor his
testimony for the identical rea
trial court properly concluded that questioning Gilliard about unrelated
be prejudicial.
See Commonwealth v. Whiting, 668 A.2d 151 (Pa.Super. 1995) (when
defense counsel attempted to cross-examine witness regarding her being
inadmissible as she was never convicted of a crime); Commonwealth v.
Fuller
not be impeached by prior acts of misconduct which have not led to
convictions). Clearly, as there were no open criminal charges filed against
cross-examination.
testimony concern whether the trial court abused its discretion in precluding
the defense from questioning Gilliard about whether he worked as a drug
violence. (See
entitled to probe the relationship Gilliard had with Parker, especially in light
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to fabricate.
employed violence in the past to collect drug debts . . . this information
Id. at
43.)
In conducting our review, we find that the Honorable Glenn B. Bronson
concerning these claims in his Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion. We, therefore,
adopt and incorporate this portion of Judge Bron
(See trial court opinion, 5/23/13 at 9-10.) Moreover, we note that before
violence, defense counsel had already asked several questions concerning
the victi
pursue money that was owed to him for drug sales. (See notes of
testimony, 12/20/12 at 92-93.)
Appellant also argues that during the direct examination of Gilliard, the
Commonwealth aske
He argues that there was no evidence to suggest appellant had tried to
Id. at 44.) Again, we find that
Judge
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concerning these claim in his Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion. We incorporate this
See trial court opinion,
5/23/13 at 8-9.)
We now turn to the issue concerning whether the trial court
-statement
custody. Appellant claims potentially coercive conditions were employed
prior to securing a statement from Fairey that inculpated appellant.
duplicative and cumulative of questions asked of Detective Charles Grebloski
Detective Grebloski had been extensively cross-examined concerning the
conditions under which Fairey gave his statement to the police. (Notes of
testimony, 12/18/12 at 257-260.) Thus, we agree that the trial court
properly sustained the objection.
The final question presented is whether
and closing statements contained unfairly prejudicial arguments, which
compromise
The standard for granting a new trial because of the comments of a prosecutor is a high one. Generally,
for the granting of a new trial unless the unavoidable effect of such comments would be to prejudice the jury, forming in their minds fixed bias and hostility
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towards the accused which would prevent them from properly weighing the evidence and rendering a true verdict. This standard permits us to grant a new trial based on the comments of a prosecutor only if the unavoidable effect of the comments prevented the jury from considering the evidence. A prosecutor must have reasonable latitude in fairly presenting a case to the jury and must be free to present his or her arguments with logical force and vigor.
Commonwealth v. Poplawski, 852 A.2d 323, 327 (Pa.Super. 2004)
(citation omitted). See also Commonwealth v. Hood, 872 A.2d 175, 185
(Pa.Super. 2005).
Appellant raises a series of assertions of prosecutorial misconduct.
First, he claims that the prosecutor committed misconduct by referring to
the fact that the victim had family and that his mother had to identify his
-49.) We cannot find that the trial court erred
in finding that the prosecution was attempting to avoid jury nullification
-dealing activities. The prosecutor was
reminding the jury that the victim was human and such fell within the
reference to irrelevant matters should
be avoided, we note that murder victims are not simply props or
irrelevancies in a murder prosecution, and innocuous references to victims
Commonwealth v.
Freeman, 827 A.2d 385, 415 (Pa. 2003). See also Commonwealth v.
Rios
have the right to have all evidence presented against him at trial sanitized of
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anything that could cause jurors to sympathize with the victim or his
4 Gilliard during his testimony constituted
brief at 49-51.) We cannot find that this single
remark deprived the jury of its ability to return a fair verdict. As the trial
court notes in its opinion, it did not appear that the jurors understood what
, 5/23/13 at 12.) The jury
evidence. (Notes of testimony, 12/17/12 at 32, 34.) See Commonwealth
v. Simmons, 662 A.2d 621, 639-640 (Pa. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S.
1128 (1996) (where jury is cautioned that arguments are not evidence and
that their recollection of the facts controls, any alleged prejudice from the
been hoping that Gilliard was not going to come to court was groundless and
51.)5 No relief is due; this remark was a fair inference that appellant could
scare, or confront. 5 We disagree with the Commonwealth that defense counsel did not object to this remark; the record demonstrates an objection was lodged and overruled. (Notes of testimony, 12/21/12 at 68.)
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not have been pleased by the appearance of Gilliard, who identified him as a
murderer.
Appellant also claims that misconduct occurred when the prosecutor
say -- rectly
counsel objected before the prosecutor was even able to state her
unwarranted.
Finally, appellant avers that the trial court erred in failing to provide
-54.) Appellant does not direct
us to the place in the record where such a request can be found, and the
Commonwealth asserts that appellant did not request specific curative
instructions. Indeed, our review of the record indicates that trial counsel
never requested such a remedy, and thus, this assertion is waived. See
Pa.R.A.P. 2119(e) (statement of place of raising or preservation of issues);
Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (issues not raised in the lower court are waived and cannot
be raised for the first time on appeal); Commonwealth v. Johnson,
42 A.3d 1017, 1026 (Pa. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S.Ct. 1795 (2013)
emporaneous
limiting instruction. Insofar as appellant complains about the lack of a
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contemporaneous instruction, he waived this claim by failing to request a
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary
Date: 9/8/2014
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