Com. v. Sporish, J.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania

Com. v. Sporish, J.

DecidedJanuary 11, 2019

Docket2326 EDA 2018

StatusUnpublished

This text of Com. v. Sporish, J. (Com. v. Sporish, J.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Com. v. Sporish, J., (Pa. Ct. App. 2019).

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Opinion

J-S74007-18

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : JAMES DANIEL SPORISH : : Appellant : No. 2326 EDA 2018

Appeal from the Order Entered July 3, 2018 In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-23-CR-0003043-2006

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., STABILE, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED JANUARY 11, 2019

James Daniel Sporish appeals, pro se, from the order of the Court of

Common Pleas of Delaware County denying his “Motion to Strike the Court

Clerk’s Cost Assessment.” After our review, we conclude the court of common

pleas lacked subject matter jurisdiction and, therefore, we vacate its order.1

On October 26, 2006, a jury found appellant guilty of rape, aggravated

assault, sexual assault, terroristic threats, simple assault, and indecent

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1 Although the court of common pleas lacked subject matter jurisdiction, this Court has appellate jurisdiction because the appeal is from a final order. See Pa.R.A.P. 341(a), (b)(1). “This situation is analogous to where the common pleas court has properly sustained preliminary objections to subject matter jurisdiction. An appeal to this Court is proper even though the lower court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, since otherwise, we could never (at least theoretically) review such an order.” Commonwealth v. Danysh, 833 A.2d 151, 152 n.1 (Pa. Super. 2003). See also Aronson v. Sprint Spectrum, L.P., 767 A.2d 564 (Pa. Super. 2001). J-S74007-18

assault in connection with a savage attack on his paramour. On February 20,

2007, the court sentenced Sporish to 210 to 540 months’ imprisonment (17½

to 45 years).2 The sentencing judge also imposed upon Sporish the costs of

prosecution. See Certificate of Imposition of Judgment of Sentence, 2/20/07.

On February 15, 2018, the Department of Corrections (DOC) informed

Sporish that, pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9728(b)(5), it would begin making

deductions from his inmate account to satisfy his obligations. This statute,

commonly referred to as Act 84, governs the collection of fines and costs, and

it authorizes the DOC to make monetary deductions from an inmate’s account

to pay court-ordered fines and costs. Id.

On June 17, 2018, Sporish filed a motion/complaint in mandamus

seeking to end the Act 84 deductions. The Honorable John P. Capozzi, Sr.,

denied Sporish’s motion. This appeal followed.

In Commonwealth v. Danysh, 833 A.2d 151 (Pa. Super. 2003), this

Court, addressing Danysh’s appeal from the trial court’s order denying his

motion to stop Act 84 deductions, stated:

The Commonwealth Court possesses both original and appellate jurisdiction. Its original jurisdiction is invoked in various classes of cases; relevant here is its original jurisdiction over civil suits against statewide governmental actors.[] See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 761(a); see, e.g., Harvey v. Department of Corrections, 823 A.2d 1106 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003) (exerting original jurisdiction over petition for review seeking injunction against DOC to stop Act 84 ____________________________________________

2On August 7, 2008, this Court affirmed Sporish’s judgment of sentence, and on July 22, 2009, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied allowance of appeal. See Commonwealth v. Sporish, 961 A.2d 1283 (Pa. Super. 2008) (unpublished memorandum), appeal denied, 981 A.2d 219 (Pa. 2009).

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deductions). Danysh’s civil action is against the Commonwealth government, as DOC falls within the jurisdictional statute’s definition of that term. DOC is an administrative agency within the Executive Branch, see 71 P.S. § 61 (creating DOC among other executive departments), and possesses authority to operate the State Correctional Institutions throughout the state. See 71 P.S. §§ 310-0, 310-1. As operator of the State Correctional Institutions, it has a wide range of responsibilities relating to the care and treatment of inmates and management of the state prisons. See, e.g., 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9718.1 (relating to developing treatment for sexual offenders), 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721 (giving DOC ultimate decision whether offender will be accepted to boot camp); 61 P.S. § 390.301 (authorizing DOC to lease or purchase three 1,000-cell prisons, two of which may be “anywhere in this Commonwealth”). Since DOC effectuates policy decisions throughout Pennsylvania, Danysh's claim against DOC “is an action against the Commonwealth government for the purposes of determining [Commonwealth Court's] original jurisdiction.” [State Board of Dentistry v.] Weltman, 649 A.2d 478, 479 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994) (holding court of common pleas lacked subject matter jurisdiction to grant injunction against agency with statewide authority).

Danysh, 833 A.2d at 153 (footnote omitted).

In relevant part, section 761(a) of the Judicial Code provides:

(a) General rule.--The Commonwealth Court shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions or proceedings:

(1) Against the Commonwealth government, including any officer thereof, acting in his official capacity[.]

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 761(a). Reasoning that Danysh had instituted a civil action

within the meaning of section 761(a), this Court determined that Danysh

should have brought his petition as a petition for review of a governmental

determination under Commonwealth Court’s original jurisdiction. Danysh,

833 A.2d at 153. See Pa.R.A.P. 1501-1561. We concluded that

Commonwealth Court had exclusive original jurisdiction and, therefore, the

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court of common pleas lacked subject matter jurisdiction and its order was

void.3 Id. at 154.4

In Commonwealth v. Jackson, 858 A.2d 627 (Pa. Super. 2004), this

Court, sitting en banc, reaffirmed Danysh. There, Jackson appealed from the

court of common pleas’ order that concluded it lacked jurisdiction to address

the merits of his petition to stop Act 84 deductions. Applying the Danysh

reasoning, the Jackson Court affirmed, stating, “[t]here is no evidence,

however, that these deductions are being made pursuant to a request by the

District Attorney of York County or pursuant to an enforcement order of the

trial court. Thus, the Commonwealth Court, not the trial court, had original

jurisdiction over [Jackson’s] petition.” 858 A.2d at 630, citing Danysh, 833

A.2d at 154. See also Commonwealth v. Parella, 834 A.2d 1253, 1255– ____________________________________________

3 In Danysh, we observed that in a limited class of cases, a defendant would properly seek the relief at issue in the common pleas court. We stated:

This situation would occur where the defendant was in a county prison. Because the county authorities would not have statewide jurisdiction, the matter would fall outside Commonwealth Court’s jurisdiction. That would leave it squarely within the courts of common pleas’ original jurisdiction.

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