Com. v. Smith, R., Jr.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: February 18, 2025
• Docket: 41 MDA 2024
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

J-A23031-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : RONALD TROY SMITH, JR. : : Appellant : No. 41 MDA 2024

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered December 11, 2023 In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Criminal Division at No: CP-67-CR-0003052-2023

BEFORE: BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and STABILE, J.

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FEBRUARY 18, 2025

Appellant, Ronald Troy Smith, Jr., seeks review of the judgment of

sentence entered by the Court of Common Pleas of York County (suppression

court). Following a non-jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of several DUI

offenses. He now argues in this appeal that the judgment of sentence must

be overturned because the suppression court erred in admitting the evidence

obtained during the investigative detention which immediately followed a

traffic stop of his vehicle. We affirm.

At about 10:45 p.m., on the evening of February 2, 2023, Officer Sean

Lake was parked in his patrol vehicle so that he could monitor passing traffic

for window tint violations. During that time, the officer observed a white truck

which appeared to be travelling over the speed limit; the officer also could not

see into the vehicle due to its dark tints. Office Lake looked up the vehicle’s J-A23031-24

registration and saw that it had expired the prior month. He then conducted

a traffic stop of the vehicle, which was being driven by Appellant.

Upon approaching the vehicle, the officer saw that Appellant was holding

a freshly lit cigarette. He noticed further that Appellant had “bloodshot” eyes.

Despite the smell of cigarette smoke, the officer could detect the “slight” odor

of burnt marijuana coming from inside the vehicle. N.T. Pretrial Hearing,

9/18/2023, at 8. There was one female passenger in the vehicle, so the officer

could not identify whether the smell of marijuana was coming from Appellant

or the other individual.

Officer Lake returned to his patrol vehicle to get the window tint meter

and to check whether Appellant’s driver's license was valid. The officer then

walked back to Appellant’s vehicle and measured the window tint. At

Appellant’s request, the officer showed him the meter’s reading, which

indicated a tint level that violated the Vehicle Code.

From there, Officer Lake transitioned to a DUI investigation. The officer

directed Appellant to exit his vehicle so that he could evaluate Appellant’s eyes

for symptoms of intoxication (horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN) and lack of

convergence), and have Appellant perform a series of field sobriety exercises

(Palm Pat and Finger to Nose). Appellant stepped out of the vehicle for that

purpose, but then went back inside it briefly to retrieve his glasses from the

center console. As Appellant did so, the officer saw a glass pipe in plain view.

Appellant admitted that the pipe belonged to him, and that it was used to

smoke marijuana.

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During the evaluation of Appellant’s eyes, he could not follow the

stimulus used by the officer to detect HGN, and the officer observed eye lid

tremors. Appellant was unable to touch the tip of his nose with his

outstretched fingers. The officer believed that Appellant’s performance of

these exercises indicated impairment from a controlled substance.

The officer went on to search Appellant’s vehicle. 1 No contraband was

found during that search, but the officer did retrieve a baggie of marijuana

from the female passenger’s person. See id., at 12-13. Officer Lake believed,

from his experience, that Appellant had lit his cigarette moments after being

pulled over to mask the odor of marijuana; the officer also knew from his

training and experience that bloodshot eyes may be a symptom of marijuana

use, and that the glass pipe he observed was used to smoke marijuana. See

id., at 11. About 10 minutes elapsed between the moment when Appellant

was pulled over, and his vehicle was searched. See id., at 12.

The Commonwealth later charged Appellant with seven misdemeanor

offenses – DUI General Impairment Incapable of Driving Safely, 1st Offense

(Count 1); Possession of Drug Paraphernalia (Count 2); Marijuana Possession

of a Small Amount, Personal Use (Count 3); DUI of Controlled Substance,

Schedule I, 1st Offense (Count 5); DUI of Controlled Substance, Metabolite,

1st Offense (Count 6); DUI of Alcohol or Controlled Substance, 1st Offense

____________________________________________

1 Appellant consented to this vehicle search after his detention began, and the

validity of his consent is not at issue in the present appeal, as no incriminating evidence against Appellant was obtained pursuant to that search.

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(Count 8); and DUI of Controlled Substance, Impaired Ability, 1st Offense

(Count 9). Appellant also was charged with the summary offenses of Driving

an Unregistered Vehicle (Count 4), and Improper Sunscreening (Count 7).

Prior to trial, Appellant moved to suppress the evidence obtained after

his vehicle was stopped. A suppression hearing was held on September 18,

2023, at which the Commonwealth presented the testimony of Officer Lake,

who recounted the above facts. The Commonwealth also introduced into

evidence a recording of the entire incident which had been taken by Officer

Lake’s body camera.

Officer Lake was the Commonwealth's only witness, and the suppression

court found him credible. The suppression court ruled that the officer had

probable cause for the initial traffic stop, and that the combination of the

officer’s training and experience; Appellant’s bloodshot eyes; his lit cigarette;

and the odor of burnt marijuana in the vehicle provided the officer with

reasonable suspicion of a DUI offense, justifying an investigative detention.

Appellant’s suppression motion was therefore denied.

A non-jury trial was scheduled for November 3, 2023. On that date, the

Commonwealth withdrew Counts 2, 3, 4, and 7, and the parties agreed to a

non-jury trial on the remaining charges. The Commonwealth then moved to

admit into evidence Officer Lake’s Affidavit of Probable Cause. The

suppression court admitted the Affidavit and relied on the facts contained

therein to find Appellant guilty as to Counts 1, 5, 6, and 8. See N.T. Trial,

11/3/2023, at 4. As to Count 8, Appellant was sentenced to a six-month term

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of supervised probation. The suppression court found that the remaining

counts merged with Count 8, and no further penalty was imposed.

Appellant filed a timely appeal, challenging the denial of his suppression

motion.2 He argues that all of the evidence obtained during his detention was

unlawfully obtained because, at the time the DUI investigation began, the

police had no reasonable suspicion that Appellant was an impaired driver, or

that he had otherwise committed a crime. According to Appellant, the mere

smell of marijuana was not enough to establish that he was impaired by the

substance to the extent that he could not operate his vehicle safely. The

officer observed no erratic driving or behavior on his part, and Appellant notes

that there was a passenger in his vehicle, preventing the officer from

identifying the source of the odor of marijuana. See Appellant’s Brief, at 16-

18.

When reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress evidence, this Court

must only consider “whether the suppression court's factual findings are

supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those

facts are correct.” Commonwealth v. Jones, 121 A.3d 524, 526 (Pa. Super.

2015). The evidence must be construed in favor of the party who prevailed

at trial (here, the Commonwealth), and where the record supports the

suppression court’s factual findings, those findings are binding on appeal. See

2 Both Appellant and the suppression court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

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id. The suppression court’s legal conclusions are afforded less deference, as

we may reverse such rulings to correct a misapplication of law. See id.

“Both the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and

Article 1, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution guarantee an individual's

freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures.” Commonwealth v.

Bostick, 958 A.2d 543, 550 (Pa. Super. 2008) (quoting Commonwealth v.

El, 933 A.2d 657, 660 (Pa. Super. 2007)). “To secure the right of citizens to

be free from such intrusions, courts in Pennsylvania require law enforcement

officers to demonstrate ascending levels of suspicion to justify their

interactions with citizens to the extent those interactions compromise

individual liberty.” Commonwealth v. Reppert, 814 A.2d 1196, 1201 (Pa.

Super. 2002) (citation omitted).

There are three recognized categories of police-citizen interactions:

The first of these is a “mere encounter” (or request for information) which need not be supported by any level of suspicion, but carries no official compulsion to stop or to respond. The second, an “investigative detention” must be supported by a reasonable suspicion; it subjects a suspect to a stop and a period of detention, but does not involve such coercive conditions as to constitute the functional equivalent of an arrest. Finally, an arrest or “custodial detention” must be supported by probable cause.

Commonwealth v. Way, 238 A.3d 515, 518 (Pa. Super. 2020) (quoting

Commonwealth v. Downey, 39 A.3d 401, 405 (Pa. Super. 2012)).

In the context of a traffic stop, motorists may be further detained for

reasons unconnected to a traffic violation where the officer has developed the

requisite level of suspicion that a crime has occurred:

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To establish grounds for “reasonable suspicion” . . . the officer must articulate specific observations which, in conjunction with reasonable inferences derived from these observations, led him reasonably to conclude, in light of his experience, that criminal activity was afoot and the person he stopped was involved in that activity.

In order to determine whether the police officer had reasonable suspicion, the totality of the circumstances must be considered. In making this determination, we must give due weight . . . to the specific reasonable inferences the police officer is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience. Also, the totality of the circumstances test does not limit our inquiry to an examination of only those facts that clearly indicate criminal conduct. Rather, even a combination of innocent facts, when taken together, may warrant further investigation by the police officer.

Commonwealth v. Sloan, 303 A.3d 155, 164 (Pa. Super. 2023) (quoting

Commonwealth v. Smith, 917 A.2d 848, 852 (Pa. Super. 2007)) (brackets

omitted, ellipses in original).

In the present case, the suppression court found that Officer Lake had

articulated specific observations which led him to reasonably believe that

Appellant had committed a DUI offense:

• The officer could detect the odor of marijuana coming from inside Appellant’s vehicle;

• Appellant was smoking a freshly lit cigarette at the time he was pulled over, suggesting to the officer that Appellant was trying to conceal the odor of marijuana.

• The officer observed that Appellant’s eyes were bloodshot; and

• Appellant’s vehicle was speeding just prior to the traffic stop.

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Suppression Court 1925(a) Opinion, 2/20/2024, at 9-10; see also Appellee’s

Brief, at 17-18.3

Although the Medical Marijuana Act4 eliminates the presumption that a

motorist’s mere possession of marijuana is illegal, medical marijuana remains

a Schedule I controlled substance, and the Vehicle Code “render[s] it illegal

to drive with any amount of a Schedule I controlled substance in one’s blood.”

Commonwealth v. Dabney, 274 A.3d 1283, 1291 (Pa. Super. 2022).

Accordingly, we have found in several recent and analogous cases that the

odor of marijuana in a motorist’s vehicle contributed to an officer’s reasonable

suspicion of impaired driving. See e.g., Commonwealth v. Clark, 326 A.3d

425 (Pa. Super. 2024) (unpublished memorandum) (investigative detention

following a traffic stop found lawful where officer smelled faint odor of burned

marijuana in defendant’s vehicle, defendant’s eyes were bloodshot and glassy,

and defendant behaved erratically); see also Commonwealth v. Sanchez,

3 Both the Commonwealth and the suppression court referred to the glass pipe

found in Appellant’s vehicle as a fact which established the officer’s reasonable suspicion of a DUI offense. However, that fact must be discounted for those purposes because the officer only observed the pipe after he had taken custody of Appellant by directing him to step out of his vehicle to complete sobriety exercises. The legality of the post-traffic stop detention hinged on whether the officer had reasonable suspicion prior to the moment when the DUI detention began. See Commonwealth v. Hicks, 208 A.3d 916, 932 (Pa. 2019) (explaining that an investigative detention must be “justified at its inception,” prior to the acquisition of evidence arising from that detention) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1964)).

4 The Medical Marijuana Act was enacted in 2016. See 35 P.S. §§ 10231.101- 10231.2110.

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No. 1680 MDA 2023 (Pa. Super. filed October 25, 2024) (same); Sloan, 303

A.3d at 166 (same); Dabney, 274 A.3d at 1292-93 (same).

There are no facts in the record which can materially distinguish the

present case from the above decisions in which we upheld the transition of a

traffic stop into an investigative detention. Thus, we find that the suppression

court did not err in determining that the circumstances of the present case

were sufficient to authorize the officer to investigate whether Appellant had

committed a DUI offense, and the judgment of sentence must stand.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 2/18/2025

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