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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
CARL SMITH Appellant No. 2178 EDA 2013
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence March 25, 2013 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0008870-2011
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., PANELLA, J., and STABILE, J. MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 16, 2014 Appellant, Carl Smith, appeals from the judgment of sentence entered in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, following his jury trial convictions for first-degree murder, firearms not to be carried without a license, carrying firearms on public streets in Philadelphia, and possessing instruments of crime;1 and bench trial conviction for persons not to possess firearms.2 We affirm.
In its opinion, the trial court fully and correctly sets forth the relevant facts of this case. Therefore, we have no reason to restate them.
Procedurally, the Commonwealth charged Appellant with murder, attempted
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1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502(a); 6106(a)(1); 6108; 907(a), respectively.
2 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105.
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murder, aggravated assault, recklessly endangering another person, persons not to possess firearms, firearms not to be carried without a license, carrying firearms on public streets in Philadelphia, and possessing instruments of crime. Appellant retained private counsel to represent Appellant at his preliminary hearing. Following the preliminary hearing, however, Appellant lacked funds to retain private counsel for trial.
Appointed counsel represented Appellant through all pre-trial proceedings since his appointment.
On February date of March 18, 2013, private counsel appeared before the court at a status listing conference and informed the court Appellant had retained him as counsel for trial. Nevertheless, private counsel stated he was unable to proceed to trial as scheduled, due to his caseload. The court told private counsel that trial would not be delayed, and private counsel should enter his appearance only if he would be ready for trial as scheduled. Private counsel did not enter his appearance. Meanwhile, appointed counsel continued to represent Appellant until the scheduled trial date. Between the status listing conference and trial, Appellant made no further attempts to secure private counsel for trial.
On March 18, 2013, the first day of trial, private counsel and
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request to go forward with private counsel. The court asked private counsel if he was prepared to begin trial that day, and private counsel said he was not. Consequently, the court told the parties that trial would begin as scheduled, and Appellant commenced trial with appointed counsel.
On March 25, 2013, the jury convicted Appellant of first-degree murder, firearms not to be carried without a license, carrying firearms on public streets in Philadelphia, and possessing instruments of crime; and the court convicted Appellant of persons not to possess firearms.3 That same day, the court sentenced Appellant to life imprisonment for the first-degree murder conviction and imposed no further penalty for the remaining convictions. Appellant timely filed post-sentence motions on March 28, 2013, which he amended on June 27, 2013.4 post-sentence motions by operation of law on July 29, 2013, and Appellant timely filed his notice of appeal that same day. On August 2, 2013, the court ordered Appellant to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal, pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Appellant timely filed his concise statement on August 7, 2013.
Appellant raises the following issues for our review:
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3 The court entered nolle prosequi on the remaining charges at the
4 Private counsel represented Appellant for post-sentence motion filings and continues to represent Appellant on appeal.
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WAS THE EVIDENCE INSUFFICIENT AS A MATTER OF LAW TO SUPPORT A CONVICTION INSOMUCH AS THE COMMONWEALTH DID NOT OFFER RELIABLE, BELIEVABLE EVIDENCE THAT [APPELLANT] HAD THE REQUISITE INTENT TO COMMIT A MURDER IN THE FIRST DEGREE?
WAS THE VERDICT AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE FOR THE REASONS DISCUSSED IN [ISSUE ONE] AND WAS THE VERDICT AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE BECAUSE NO REASONABLE JURY WOULD
DID THE COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY PREVENTING [APPELLANT] FROM HAVING THE LAWYER OF HIS CHOOSING BY FAILING TO GRANT A TIMELY, REASONABLE, AND UNOPPOSED CONTINUANCE REQUEST AND INSTEAD FORCING [APPELLANT] TO GO TO TRIAL WITH A COURT-APPOINTED LAWYER?
DID THE COURT ERR BY FAILING TO SCHEDULE AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING SO THAT THE NATURE AND
COULD BE ADDITIONALLY FLESHED OUT ON THE RECORD AND SO THAT [APPELLANT] COULD PUT EVIDENCE ON THE RECORD THAT THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BECAUSE HAD THE CONTINUANCE BEEN GRANTED, THE COURT WOULD HAVE BEEN ABLE TO HANDLE OTHER CASES?
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After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, the applicable law, and the well-reasoned opinion of the Honorable Lillian H. Ranso relief. The trial court opinion comprehensively discusses and properly
disposes of those questions. (See Trial Court Opinion, filed December 24,
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2013, at 4-9) (finding: (1) Commonwealth presented testimony from several witnesses who identified Appellant as person who killed Victim; Julian Morales gave signed statement to police stating he heard argument in
Morales ide brother, testified he broke up fight between Appellant and Victim several days before shooting; Mr. Claude and Victim saw Appellant with gun on day of shooting, and Victim told Appellant to put gun down and fight him; Mr. Claude witnessed Appellant open fire on Victim; Mr. Claude gave police description of Appellant and told police that Appellant shot Victim in head; Detective Grebolski testified that U.S. Marshals apprehended Appellant in Macon, Georgia four days after shooting, and Appellant supplied authorities with false name when taken into custody; viewing evidence in light most favorable to Commonwealth as verdict winner, evidence was sufficient to -degree murder conviction; (2) jury was free to
issues for purposes of
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disposition. Appellant argues the court failed to explain its reasons for
Appellant asserts the court did not conduct an inquiry into the disputes between Appellant and appointed counsel or give Appellant a deadline for retaining private counsel. Appellant insists the court made no mention of whether a continuance would delay the swift administration of justice in this case. Appellant also complains the court improperly used the amount of time appointed counsel had represented Appellant prior to trial to justify the
a continuance to ensure he would have competent representation at trial,
continuance request deprived Appellant of his right to counsel of his choosing.
Alternatively, Appellant claims the court erred by denying his post-
sentence motion for an ev request to go forward with private counsel was timely and the circumstances
February 19, 2013 proceeding (where private counsel initially appeared before the court) was not transcribed. Appellant emphasizes the Commonwealth made no objection to his request to proceed with private
objection because the February 19, 2013 proceeding was not transcribed.
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Appellant avers he wrote three letters to the court complaining about appointed counsel, some of which are missing from the certified record. Due to these deficiencies, Appellant contends the record was inadequate to deny -sentence motion without a hearing. Appellant concludes
alternatively, remand for a hearing so Appellant can supplement the record with regard to this issue.6 We disagree.
Our standard of review is as follows:
The grant or denial of a motion for a continuance is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will be reversed only upon a showing of an abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment; rather discretion is abused when the law is overridden or misapplied, or the judgment exercised is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will, as shown by the evidence or the record.
Commonwealth v. Antidormi, 84 A.3d 736, 745 (Pa.Super. 2014), appeal denied, ___ Pa. ___, ___ A.3d ___ (July 7, 2014) (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted).
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6 The Commonwealth argues Appellant waived his third and fourth issues on appeal because he did not formally request a continuance. Because the February 19, 2013 proceeding was not transcribed, we are unable to verify whether private counsel made an oral motion for a continuance on
request to proceed with private counsel as a motion for a continuance, as a logical extension of private coun to proceed at trial as scheduled. The record makes clear Appellant preserved these issues in his post-sentence motions and in his Rule 1925(b) statement. Thus, we decline to waive the issues and will treat Appe claims in the context of a denial of a continuance request.
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With respect to the right to counsel, our Supreme Court has stated:
The right to counsel is guaranteed by both the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and by Article I, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. In addition to guaranteeing representation for the indigent, these constitutional rights entitle an accused to choose at his own cost and expense any lawyer he may desire. The
significant because an individual facing criminal sanctions should have great confidence in his attorney.
Commonwealth v. McAleer, 561 Pa. 129, 136, 748 A.2d 670, 673 (2000) (internal citations, quotation marks, and footnote omitted). Nevertheless:
not absolute. Rather, the right of the accused to choose his own clients, must be weighed against and may be
and efficient administration of criminal justice. Thus, this Court has explained that while defendants are entitled to choose their own counsel, they should not be permitted to unreasonably clog the machinery of justice or hamper and
Commonwealth v. Randolph, 582 Pa. 576, 584, 873 A.2d 1277, 1282 (2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1058, 126 S.Ct. 1659, 164 L.Ed.2d 402 (2006) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
Additionally, a defendant has no absolute right to a particular counsel, so a request for continuance to secure the services of a particular counsel Commonwealth v. Thomas, 879 A.2d 246, 261 (Pa.Super. 2005). When considering whether to grant or
courts have looked to, inter alia
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current counsel constitutes irreconcilable differences, the number of prior
request, whether private counsel was actually retained, and the readiness of private counsel to proceed in a reasonable amount of time. Commonwealth v. Prysock, 972 A.2d 539 (Pa.Super. 2009). See also Commonwealth v. Brewington, 740 A.2d 247 (Pa.Super. 1999), appeal denied, 563 Pa. 626, 758 A.2d 660 (2000) (holding court acted within its
counsel, where court had previously granted ten defense continuances and further delay would hinder swift administration of justice); Commonwealth v. Gray continuance request to retain private counsel was proper, where appointed counsel represented defendant for almost two years, defendant did not request private counsel until four days before jury selection, and private
-defendants, as well as trial witnesses; court did not totally preclude defendant from exercising right to counsel of his choosing where court informed private counsel he could enter his appearance if he was ready to proceed after voir dire was complete, but private counsel declined; it was
of prosecution at which defendant made request to change counsel and burden to efficient administration of justice that continuance at that juncture
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would cause); Commonwealth v. Boettcher, 459 A.2d 806 (Pa.Super.
proceed with private counsel, where defendant made request on day of trial, appointed counsel was well-prepared to represent defendant at trial, and when private counsel appeared in courtroom during jury selection, court advised counsel he could begin participation in trial immediately but private counsel declined to do so).
Instantly, the trial court explained continuance request as follows:
In the instant matter, [appointed] counsel entered his appearance on August 30, 2011. On February 1, 2012, this case was listed for a status hearing on February 15, 2013, and listed for a five (5) day jury trial scheduled for March 18, 2013. On February 15, 2013, the matter was continued until February 19, 2013, at which point [private counsel] appeared before this [c]ourt on behalf of Appellant. [Private counsel] advised this [c]ourt that he had been retained to represent Appellant but would be unavailable to go forward to trial on March 18, 2013.
[Private counsel] again appeared before this [c]ourt on the trial date, March 18, 2013, and requested a continuance which was properly denied.
At the time of trial, [appointed counsel] had been assigned -half (1½)
years. This [c]ourt was satisfied that [appointed] counsel was prepared to provide Appellant effective assistance of counsel. This [c]ourt did receive letters regarding
ineffective assistance of counsel. However, this [c]ourt also received a letter on November 7, 2012, claiming that [private counsel, who had initially represented Appellant at the preliminary hearing], was also ineffective. Appellant claimed that [private counsel] had previously failed to advise Appellant regarding the filing of a Motion to Quash
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that would have been beneficial to Appellant at his Preliminary Hearing. Based on this finding and this
continuance and proceeded with trial.
(Trial Court Opinion at 10) (internal footnote omitted). We agree.
The record reveals the following chronology of events. Appointed counsel represented Appellant throughout the pre-trial proceedings since his appointment on August 30, 2011. At a scheduling conference on February 1, 2012, the court put Appellant on notice that trial would begin on March 18, 2013. During 2012, Appellant wrote two letters to the court complaining about appointed counsel. In the two letters mentioning appointed counsel, Appellant requested the appointment of new counsel but did not indicate that he planned to retain private counsel.7 Appellant likewise wrote letters
in a letter to the court dated October 31, 2012, Appellant complained private counsel had failed to advise Appellant about a motion to quash. In another
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appointed counsel are missing from the certified record, the record contains two letters from Appellant discussing appointed counsel. Appellant claims he wrote the court a third letter specifically stating his intention to retain private counsel. Nevertheless, this letter is not in the certified record; and it he wants this
Court to review are included in the certified record. See Commonwealth v. Manley, 985 A.2d 256 (Pa.Super. 2009), appeal denied, 606 Pa. 671, 996 A.2d 491 (2010) (stating appellant has duty to ensure all documents essential to his case are included in certified record; otherwise, this Court cannot consider those documents).
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alleged private counsel incorrectly informed Appellant that he was facing a capital charge.
On February 19, 2013, over a year after the scheduling conference, private counsel appeared before the court, stating Appellant wished to retain
would allow private counsel to enter his appearance if he could proceed on the scheduled trial date. Private counsel stated he was unable to do so due to preparation for another case. Private counsel did not enter his appearance. Additionally, Appellant made no formal request for a continuance at that time. Between February 19, 2013 and March 18, 2013, Appellant made no attempts to secure a continuance and sent no additional letters to the court complaining about appointed counsel or asking permission to proceed with private counsel at trial.
On March 18, 2013, appointed counsel and private counsel appeared before the court on the scheduled trial date. At that time, private counsel again requested to represent Appellant at trial. The court informed private counsel that trial was ready to begin, but the court would allow private counsel to enter his appearance if he was ready to try the case. Private counsel stated he was still unprepared to go forward and gave no indication as to when he would be prepared for trial. Consequently, trial began as scheduled with appointed counsel representing Appellant.
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Under the facts of this case, Appellant failed to exercise his right to counsel of his choosing within a reasonable time. Appellant was fully aware of the scheduled trial date as of February 1, 2012, yet he waited until one month before trial to express his desire to retain private counsel. Moreover, the court did not completely preclude Appellant from exercising his right to counsel of his choosing, where it informed private counsel he could enter his appearance if he was ready to proceed with trial as scheduled, but private counsel failed to do so. See Gray, supra. Notably, private counsel made
counsel knew on February 19, 2013, that the court intended to proceed with trial as scheduled, yet private counsel failed to prepare for trial over the next month and did nothing more to demonstrate his intent to represent Appellant at trial as scheduled. Instead, private counsel appeared in court on the day of trial to request a continuance. The court reasonably denied the request under these circumstances.8 See Antidormi, supra. See also
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8 Appellant relies on Prysock, supra. The facts of Prysock, however, are distinguishable from the current case because the record in Prysock
handling of the suppression hearing, jury selection, questioning of witnesses at trial, and refusal to call requested character witnesses. In Prysock, each
intervention, side-bar conferences, recesses, and consultations by both the Commonwealth and appointed counsel with their respective senior colleagues. See id. at 545. Thus, this Court determined the trial court had
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Randolph, supra; Gray, supra; Boettcher, supra. The record supports t a transcript from the February 19, 2013
merit no relief. Accordingly, we affirm.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary
Date: 9/16/2014
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(Footnote Continued)
continuance to proceed with private counsel. Id. Given the stark differences between Prysock and the present case, Prysock is not dispositive.
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