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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA
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v. :
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LARRY ALLEN SLEDGE :
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Appellant : No. 138 WDA 2026
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered December 22, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County Criminal Division at No(s):
CP-25-CR-0000722-2020
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA
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v. :
:
:
LARRY ALLEN SLEDGE :
:
Appellant : No. 139 WDA 2026
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered December 22, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County Criminal Division at No(s):
CP-25-CR-0000388-2020
BEFORE: SULLIVAN, J., NEUMAN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.* MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED: AUGUST 18, 2026 In these consolidated appeals,1 Larry Allen Sledge appeals from the December 22, 2025 order dismissing his petition filed pursuant to the Post
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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1 Appellant’s appeals at Nos. 138 WDA 2025 and 139 WDA 2025 were consolidated by per curiam order of this Court on February 17, 2026.
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Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. After careful review, we affirm.
This case stems from an incident that occurred on January 14, 2020, wherein Appellant repeatedly threatened to kill Jessica Crouch (“Victim”), pistol-whipped her in the face, and ultimately shot her twice in her head, leaving her partially blind in one eye. A prior panel of this Court summarized the relevant procedural history of this case as follows:
On January 14, 2020, Appellant shot [Victim] in the head. When police responded, Victim identified Appellant as the shooter.
In January 2020, the Commonwealth filed a criminal complaint against Appellant at Docket Number 388 of 2020 (“Docket 388”), charging him with attempted homicide and related crimes.
In February 2020, Victim reported receiving a letter from the Erie County Prison asking her to drop the charges against Appellant. While the letter contained the signature of an inmate other than Appellant and a third inmate’s identification number, Victim identified the handwriting as Appellant’s handwriting.
Accordingly, in March 2020, the Commonwealth charged Appellant at Docket Number 722 of 2020 (“Docket 722”) with intimidation of a witness.
On December 28, 2021, following delays related to the COVID-19 pandemic and several continuances, the trial court granted Appellant’s request to proceed pro se with standby counsel.
On June 6, 2022, Appellant filed pro se a “Habeas Corpus Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P.
600[.]” On June 9, 2022, the trial court stamped the motion “denied,” without scheduling a hearing or providing analysis.
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On July 11, 2022, Appellant filed a “Motion for Case Dismissal/Nominal Bond Pursuant to Rule 600[.]” The trial court, again, denied the motion without a hearing or analysis on August 8, 2022, the first day of Appellant’s trial.
On August 12, 2022, the jury convicted Appellant of Attempted Homicide and related charges, at Docket 388, and Intimidation of a Witness, at Docket 722.
On October 31, 2022, following the appointment of counsel, the trial court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate term of 20 to 40 years of incarceration at Docket 388 and a consecutive term of 6 to 12 years of incarceration at Docket 722
On March 5, 2024, following reinstatement of his appellate rights nunc pro tunc, this Court affirmed the judgments of sentence. Commonwealth v.
Sledge, 2024 WL 940118 (Pa.Super. filed March 5, 2024) (unpublished decision). Notably, this Court rejected Appellant’s Rule 600 claim, concluding that Appellant’s counseled brief “failed to preserve his Rule 600 challenge for appellate review” based upon lack of compliance with Pa.R.A.P. 2117(c) and 2119(e), which required him to cite to the location in the record where he preserved the issue before the trial court.
Id. at *3.
On April 16, 2024. Appellant filed [a] pro se [] PCRA petition, and appointed PCRA counsel filed a supplement on June 28, 2024, presenting several issues including a claim of ineffective assistance of direct appeal counsel for failure to preserve Appellant’s Rule 600 claim.
On August 20, 2024, the PCRA court issued a Rule 907 Notice of Intent to Dismiss Without a Hearing. The court dismissed the petition on September 24, 2024.
Commonwealth v. Sledge, 348 A.3d 717 (Pa.Super. 2025) (unpublished memorandum at *1-2) (footnote and some citations omitted).
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On September 12, 2025, a panel this Court vacated the PCRA court’s September 24, 2024 order dismissing his PCRA Petition, and remanded this matter for the PCRA court to hold an evidentiary hearing on Appellant’s Rule 600 claims. See id. The PCRA conducted hearings on October 28 and November 21, 2025. Thereafter, on December 22, 2025, the PCRA court issued an opinion and order finding that Appellant’s Rule 600 claim meritless and dismissing his PCRA petition. This timely appeal followed.2 Appellant raises the following issues for our review:
A. Whether the trial and ensuing convictions are rendered void in that there was a rule 600 violation that was not duly litigated and adjudicated in that prior court review of this claim has proceeded under the misapprehension and miscalculation of the accurate time period and further compounded by the [PCRA] court’s treatment and adjudication of this claim on remand?
B. Whether the [PCRA] court abused its discretion in permitting [Appellant] to proceed pro se wherein any cursory evaluation of his mental competency to act in that capacity would have disclosed a lengthy and significant mental health history precluding that measure, which prejudice was further exacberbated (sic) by appointing stand-by counsel who possessed competency impediments as well given a patent conflict of interest thereby combining to deprive [Appellant] of his fundamental right to counsel or a legal predicate for a cognizable waiver of that right?
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2 Appellant and the PCRA court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
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C. Whether [Appellant] was afforded ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to pursue and preserve a suppression claim predicated on a material gap in the chain of custody pertaining to critical physical evidence in the custody of the police subsequent t[o] arrest thereby compromising the ability of the Commonwealth to lay a proper foundation for the admission of the evidence relating to forensic testing[]?
D. Whether the [PCRA] court abused its discretion and committed legal error and failing to accept and consider the police misconduct alleged as per [Appellant’s] proffering of a claim of afterdiscovered evidence in the nature of a witness affidavit presented to the [PCRA] court reciting the affiant’s knowledge of a statement by the police implicating them in the fabrication of evidence and further corroborating the former claim rendering suspect the proper chain of custody of the physical evidence?
E. Whether [Appellant] was afforded ineffective assistance of counsel in that defense counsel failed to assert and preserve a claim of prosecutorial misconduct relating to the Commonwealth’s making personal commentary and conclusions as to the guilty (sic) of [Appellant] during closing argument and in purposely or recklessly (sic) making false statements or mischaracterization of the results of forensic testing offered into evidence?
F. Whether [Appellant] was afforded ineffective assistance of counsel in that defense counsel failed to present and preserve a challenge to the testimony relating to a purported positive GSR test result in the Commonmwealth’s (sic) casein -chief wherein there was no proof or proper foundation laid as to any such test ever being performed?
G. Whether [Appellant] was afforded ineffective assistance of counsel in that appellate counsel
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failed to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence as to docket number 722 of 202 as t[h]e evidence offered at trial did not provide a factual and legal predicate for conspiracy to support a conviction?
Appellant’s brief at 2-3 (extraneous capitalization omitted).
Proper appellate review of a PCRA court’s dismissal of a PCRA petition is limited to the examination of “whether the PCRA court’s determination is supported by the record and free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Miller, 102 A.3d 988, 992 (Pa.Super. 2014) (citation omitted). “The PCRA court’s findings will not be disturbed unless there is no support for the findings in the certified record.” Commonwealth v. Lawson, 90 A.3d 1, 4 (Pa.Super. 2014) (citations omitted). “This Court grants great deference to the findings of the PCRA court, and we will not disturb those findings merely because the record could support a contrary holding.” Commonwealth v. Hickman, 799 A.2d 136, 140 (Pa.Super. 2002) (citation omitted).
In his first claim, Appellant challenges the PCRA court’s dismissal of his claim based on Rule 600. Appellant’s brief at 11-27.
Rule 600 serves the dual purpose of both protecting a defendants constitutional speedy trial rights and protecting society’s right to effective prosecution in criminal cases. In determining whether an accused’s right to a speedy trial has been violated, consideration must be given to society’s right to effective prosecution of criminal cases, both to restrain those guilty of crime and to deter those contemplating it.
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Commonwealth v. Speed, 323 A.3d 850, 855 (Pa.Super. 2024) (citations omitted).
Rule 600 mandates that “[t]rial in a court case in which a written complaint is filed against the defendant shall commence within 365 days from the date on which the complaint is filed.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(A)(2)(a). Rule 600(C) provides that “periods of delay at any stage of the proceedings caused by the Commonwealth when the Commonwealth has failed to exercise due diligence shall be included in the computation of the time within which trial must commence. Any other periods of delay shall be excluded from the computation.” Id. at 600(C)(1). The remedy for a violation of Rule 600(A) is the dismissal of the relevant charges with prejudice. Id. at 600(D)(1). In setting forth the remedy, the Rule mandates that “[t]he judge shall conduct a hearing on the motion” and that the Commonwealth “shall be served” with the motion “concurrently with the filing.” Id.
Following a thorough review of the record, including the briefs of the parties, the applicable law, and the well-reasoned analysis of the PCRA court, it is our determination that Appellant’s Rule 600 motion was properly denied and that appellate counsel cannot be found ineffective for failing to preserve this meritless claim. The PCRA court’s December 22, 2025 opinion meticulously discussed and analyzed Appellant’s Rule 600 claim and concluded that it was devoid of merit. The conclusions of the PCRA court with regard to this issue are supported by competent evidence and are consistent with
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applicable law. Accordingly, we adopt well-reasoned December 22, 2025 analsyis of the Honorable John J. Mead as our own with respect to this issue. See PCRA court opinion, 12/22/25 at 2-12.
The bulk of Appellant’s remaining claims challenge the purported ineffectiveness of his trial and direct appeal counsel.3 Appellant’s brief at 30- 42. Appellant also contends that the PCRA erred in permitting him to waive his right to counsel and failing to recognize a purported conflict of interest with his standby-counsel.4 See id. at 27-29.
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under the PCRA, a petitioner must establish the following three factors: “first[,] the underlying claim has arguable merit; second, that counsel had no reasonable basis for his action or inaction; and third, that Appellant was prejudiced.” Commonwealth v. Charleston, 94 A.3d 1012, 1020 (Pa.Super. 2014) (citation omitted), appeal denied, 104 A.3d 523 (Pa. 2014).
[A] PCRA petitioner will be granted relief only when he proves, by a preponderance of the evidence, that his conviction or sentence resulted from the [i]neffective assistance of counsel which, in the circumstances of the particular case, so undermined the truth-determining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place.
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3 Tyler Lindquist, Esq. and Tina Fryling, Esq., respectively.
4 Michael Harmon, Esq.
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Commonwealth v. Spotz, 84 A.3d 294, 311 (Pa. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted; some brackets in original), citing 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(ii).
“[C]ounsel is presumed to be effective and the burden of demonstrating ineffectiveness rests on appellant.” Commonwealth v. Ousley, 21 A.3d 1238, 1242 (Pa.Super. 2011) (citation omitted), appeal denied, 30 A.3d 487 (Pa. 2011). “If a petitioner fails to prove any of these prongs, his claim fails.” Commonwealth v. Simpson, 66 A.3d 253, 260 (Pa. 2013).
Upon review, it is our determination that Appellant’s remaining claims also warrant no relief. The PCRA court’s August 20, 2024 opinion comprehensively discussed each of these issues and concluded that they were meritless. We again find that the conclusions of the PCRA court are supported by competent evidence and are clearly free of legal error, and adopt the analysis set forth on pages 4 to 10 of the PCRA Court’s August 20, 2024 opinion as our own for purposes of this appellate review. See PCRA court opinion, 8/20/24 at 4-10.
Based on the foregoing, we discern no error on the part of the PCRA court in dismissing Appellant’s PCRA petition and affirm its December 22, 2025 order. We hereby direct the parties to attach the August 20, 2024 and December 22, 2025 opinions to this Memorandum in all future proceedings.
Order affirmed.
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DATE: 8/18/2026
1
7_(See 388-2020) Opinion and Order- Petitioner's claims are meritless and the PCRA petition is denied.pdf Circulated 07/21/2026 02:41 PM
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS .
CLERK OF RECOHrr:; OF ERIE COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA ?S O : CRIMINAL DIVISION V. 2D~,. EC 22 PH 1:: 18
LARRY SLEDGE
December 22, 2025 · OPINION AND ORDER On September 12, 2025, the Pennsylvania Superior Court issued an Order vacating this Court's September 24, 2024, Order dismissing petitioner's PCRA Petition without a hearing. The matter was remanded to this Court to hold a hearing to determine whether direct appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to preserve Petitioner's Rule 600 claims.
The Superior Court directed this Court to make a factual finding as to the filing date of the criminal complaint. 1 The Superior Court also instructed this Court to conduct a thorough analysis accounting for each continuance granted and other relevant time periods.
A hearing was held on October 28, 2025, and November 21, 2025. On November 21, 2025, the Commonwealth filed a response to Petitioner's Motion to Dismiss. For the following reasons, Petitioner's Rule 600 motion was properly denied. Thus, Petitioner's direct appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to pursue a meritless claim. The Court hereby incorporates its August 20, 2024, Opinion and Notice of Intent to Dismiss. Petitioner's claims are meritless, and_ his PCRA petition is denied.
FINDING OF FACTS
1. The Court heard testimony from Michelle Husted from the clerk of courts, Attorney Michael Harmon, and Assistant District Attorney ("ADA") Hillary Hoffman.
1 The record contained conflicting dates, January 15, 2020 and January 24 , 2020, as the date the 388-2020 complaint was filed .
· 2. The Court finds credible the testimony of ADA Hoffman that the criminal complaint at docket 388-2020 was filed on January 15, 2020 (alleging attempted homicide and related crimes), and the criminal complaint at docket 722-2020 2 was filed on March 4, 2020.
3. Thus, the Rule 600 mechanical run date at docket 388-2020 is January 15, 2021.
4. The Court notes that during much of the time period between March 17, 2020 and January 31, 2021, Rule 600 was suspended by Court Order due to the COVID-19 pandemic:
On March 16, 2020, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court declared a statewide judicial emergency on account of COVID-19. The March 16, 2020, Order specifically permitted the President Judges to declare judicial emergencies in their judicial districts through April 14, 2020. The Order, at Paragraph 3, provided that:
"The President Judge specifically SHALL HAVE THE AUTHORITY to suspend the operation of Rule of Criminal Procedure 600 within a judicial district. .. The purpose of the suspension shall be that the time period of the local judicial emergency (or a shorter time period if specified) shall be excluded from the time computation under Rule of Criminal Procedure 600 (C) ."
On March 17, 2020, President Judge John Trucilla filed an Emergency Judicial Order similar to the Supreme Court's Order, which suspended the operation of Rule 600 in Erie County.
On April 1, 2020, the PA Supreme Court filed a second supplemental Order, which extended the judicial emergency declared in the Court's March 16; 2020, Order
2 Docket 722 of 2020 relates to Petitioner's attempt to intimidate the victim of the attempted homicide at docket 388 of 2020
3
to April 30, 2020. In addition, the Order stated that "President Judges are AUTHORIZED to declare judicial emergencies in their judicial districts through May 31, 2020 . . ." The Order further stated that Rule 600(C) is "hereby SUSPENDED in all judicial districts at least through April 30, 2020."
The same Order provided that President Judges were authorized to declare judicial emergencies through May 31, 2020. Accordingly, President Judge Trucilla issued a Second Amended Emergency Judicial Order, which extended the judicial emergency through May 31, 2020. The Order further stated that any postponement that impacts a criminal defendant's trial date and right to a speedy trial shall_ be considered a court postponement and shall cpnstitute excludable time for purposes of the application of Pa. R. Crim. P. 600, subject to constitutional limitations.
On May 27, 2020, the Supreme Court ordered that the statewide judicial emergency shall cease as of June 1, 2020. The Order, however, noted that "a President Judge IS HEREBY SPECIFICALLY EMPOWERED, subject to state and federal constitutional requirements, to do any and or all of the following :
(4) Suspend statewide rules pertaining to the rule-based right of criminal defendants to a prompt trial, and (5) Suspend jury trials until such time that they can be conducted consistent with prevailing health and safety norms."
Accordingly, on May 6, 2020, President Judge Trucilla filed a judicial order canceling the .June 2020 trial term. The Order stated that the cancelation shall be considered a court postponement and shall constitute excludable time for purposes of Rule 600. 5. The Court notes that in 2020, Erie County did not have a scheduled July trial term.
6 . . The Court notes that on approximately August 17, 2020, the Erie County Court of Common Pleas held its first "test" jury trial. Because of COVID-19 concerns, the Court could only bring in a limited number of jurors and conduct a limited number. of trials. Thus, only two "experimental" trials were able to be held in August 2020 .
From March 17, 2020 to August 7, 2020 totals excludable time of 154 days.
7. On August 7, 2020, defense counsel, Victoria Herman, filed a motion to continue .
trial off the August 2020 trial term. No Order was filed but the trial was then administratively scheduled for the September 2020 trial term.
8 . . On August 31, 2020, Attorney Herman filed a motion to continue off the September 2020 trial term. The trial was then scheduled for the November 2020 trial term.
9. On September 25, 2020, a status conference was scheduled for October 2, 2020.
10. On October 23, 2020, defense counsel, Tyler Lindquist3, filed a motion to continue the case off the November 2020 trial term. The motion was granted and the case was continued to the January 2021 trial term.
11. The Court notes that on November 12, 2020, President Judge Trucilla issued an Emergency Judicial Order postponing all jury trials through January 4, 2021. The Order stated that "this postponement shall be considered a Court postponement and shall constitute excludable time for purposes of the application of Pa. R. Crim.
P. 600, subject to constitutional limitations." On December 21, 2020, President Judge Trucilla filed a Supplemental Emergency Judicial Order. The Order postponed jury trials until January 31, 2021. The Order stated that the postponement "shall constitute excludable time for purposes of the applicatibn of
3 Tyler Lindquist, Esq. entered his appearance on October 9, 2020.
Pa.R.Crim.P. 600, subject to constitutional limitations." From November 12, 2020 to January 31, 2021, totals excludable time of 178 days.
12. Petitioner's case was then scheduled for the February 2021 trial term.
13. On February 3, 2021, defense counsel, Tyler Lindquist, filed a motion to continue trial and the case was continued to the April 2021 trial term.
14. On March 31, 2021, Attorney Lindquist filed a Motion to Withdraw, which was granted on April 6, 2021. As a result, petitioner's case was scheduled for the May 2021 trial term. A pro-se colloquy was scheduled for April 21, 2021.
- 15. The time from February 3, 2021 through May 14, 2021 (the last day of the May 2021 trial term) consists of excludable time of 101 days.
16. On April 12, 2021, petitioner filed a Petition for Nominal Bond pursuant to Rule 600
and Motion to Dismiss (in the nature of a habeas motion).·The Commonwealth filed a response to the motions on April 30, 2021. The motions were denied on May 3,
2021 .4 17. On April 23, 2021, petitioner was permitted to proceed pro-se and was appointed Nicole Sloane, Esq. as stand-by counsel.
18. On April 28, 2021, the Commonwealth filed a motion to continue the case off the May 2021 trial term. On April 29, 2021 , the motion was granted and the case was continued to the June 2021 trial term.
19. On April 14, 2021, petitioner filed a Motion to Suppress. A hearing was scheduled on petitioner's motion for May 19, 2021 . On May 14, 2021 the Commonwealth filed
4 An additional Order denying petition_ er's motion for nominal bond, referencing the May 3, 2021, Order was filed May 25, 2025. .
a Motion to Reschedule the Suppression Hearing which was granted. The hearing was rescheduled for June 4, 2021.
20. On May 24, 2021, Michael Harmon, Esq. 5 , filed a Motion to Continue Suppression hearing, which was granted. Petitioner's suppression hearing was ·rescheduled for July 26, 2021.
21. On June 3, 2021, Petitioner filed a motion to compel discovery and on June 4, 2021, Petitioner filed an omnibus pre-trial motion. On June 28, 2021, petitioner filed a petition for records. The Court issued orders scheduling these motions to be heard at the July 26, 2021, Suppression hearing.
22. On July 27, 2021, following the suppression hearing, Petitioner's motions to suppress and habeas were denied. Petitioner's motion to compel discovery was granted. The Commonwealth's motion to sever docket 388-2020 was granted.
23. The time from June 4, 2021 (the date the Suppression Hearing was first rescheduled to at the Commonwealth's request) through July 27, 2021 (date Suppression was denied) consists of 54 excludable days.
24. Petitioner's case was then scheduled for the August 2021 trial term. On August 4, ·2021, the Commonwealth filed a motion to continue. On August 5, 2021, the motion was granted and the case was moved to the September 2021 trial term.
25. On August 12, 2021, defendant filed a motion for nominal bail pursuant.to Rule 600 which was denied on August 13, 2021 .
26. On August 16, 2021, defendant filed a motion requesting counsel. Michael Harmon, Esq. was appointed to represent defendant.
5 Due to the public defender's office having a conflict, Attorney Harmon was appointed stand-by counsel on April 29, 2025.
27. On August 20, 2021, the Superior Court Ordered this Court to issue a short statement of reasons why petitioner's motion for nominal bail was denied. This Court filed its response on August 24, 2021.
28. On August 30, 2021, Attorney Harmon filed a motion to continue Petitioner's trial off the September 2021 trial term, which was granted. Petitioner's case was scheduled for the November 2021 trial term .
29. The time from August 30, 2021 through November 12, 2021 (the last d·ay of the November 2021 trial term) totals excludable time of 75 days.
30. On October 27, 2021, the Commonwealth filed a motion to continue due to unavailability of the affiant6 from October 25, 2021 through November 20, 2021. The motion was granted and the case was continued to the January 2022 trial term.
31. On November 10, 2021, Petitioner filed a Motion to Proceed pro-se.
32. On November 18, 2021, Attorney Harmon filed a Motion to Withdraw.
33. On December 28, 2021, a hearing was held and petitioner was permitted to proceed pro-se. Attorney Harmon was again appointed as stand-by counsel.
34. There was no December trial term in 2021. Thus, the Commonwealth could not have brought the case to trial between November 21, 2021 (when the affiant may have been available) through December 28, 2021 (when the hearing of the motion to proceed was held and the motion granted). This results in excludable time of 38 days.
35. On December 30, 2021, the Commonwealth filed a motion, on petitioner's behalf, continuing his cases off the January 2022 trial term. The Motion set forth:
6 The affiant was out of town.
"The Commonwealth spoke with the defendant via video conference on December 30, 2021 regarding his pro-se dockets. The Defendant indicated his request to continue his cases. Due to the Defendant's incarceration and delayed nature of the mail system, the Undersigned offered to file the within motion on the Defendant's behalf. The Commonwealth consents to the Defendant's request. There are no pending Rule 600 issues that would prevent this case being continued. All Rule 600 time shall be counted against the Defendant." The Motion was granted on January 3, 2022, and the cases scheduled for the February 2022 trial term. February 18, 2022 was the last day of the February 2022 trial term. This results in excludable time of 51 days.
36. On January 28, 2022, the Commonwealth filed a motion to continue due to the unavailability of the affiant.7 On January 28, 2022, the motion was granted, and the cases were scheduled for the March 2022 trial term.
37. On February 4, 2022, defendant filed an Omnibus pre-trial motion (requesting nominal bond pursuant to Rule 600). On February 8, 2022, the motion for nominal bond was denied.
38. On March 22, 2022, the Commonwealth filed a motion to continue trial due to unavailability of the affiant. 8 On March 23, 2022, the motion was granted and the cases were continued to the May 2022 trial term.
39. On April 29, 2022, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss due to lack of evidence which was denied on May 3, 2022.
7 The affiant was unavailable due to medical issues.
8 The affiant was recovering from surgery.
40. On May 12, 2022, the Commonwealth filed a Motion for a Date Certain but no Order was immediately filed . On June 2, 2022, petitioner filed a Motion for Requested Information. On June 3, 2022, this Court Ordered the Commonwealth to file a response within 10 days. The Commonwealth timely filed its response on June 13, 2022 . 41. On June 6, 2022, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 600, Motion for Change of Venue and for Individual Vair Dire. On June 7, 2022, petitioner filed a Habeas Corpus Motion to Dismiss. Petitioner's motions were all denied June 9, 2022 . 42. On June 29, 2022, a date certain was scheduled for July 19, 2022. 43. On July 1, 2022, the date certain was rescheduled to July 11, 2022. 44. On July 6, 2022, Attorney Harmon filed a motion to continue due to his unavailability. 45. The date certain was rescheduled for August 8, 2022. The time between July 11, 2022 and August 8, 2022 consists of excludable time of 28 days. 46. On July 11, 2022, petitioner filed a Motion for Case Dismissal/Nominal Bond pursuant to Rule 600 which was denied on August 8, 2022. 47. On July 28, 2022, petitioner filed a Habeas Corpus Motion to Dismiss which was denied on August 8, 2022. 48. Petitioner's trial took place August 8, 2022 through August 12, 2022. 49. Thus, the time between the date the complaint was filed (January 15, 2020) and the date petitioner was brought to trial (August 8, 2022) is 937 days. However, q79 days are excludable. Thus, at the time the Commonwealth brought petitioner to trial, 258 non-excludable days had elapsed, and 107 days remained.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Superior Court has explained:
[Rule] 600 provides that "[t]rial in a court case in which a written complaint is filed against the defendant shall commence within 365 days from the date on which the complaint is filed." Pa. R. Crim. P. 600(A)(2)(a).
[However,] "periods of delay at any stage of the proceedings caused by the Commonwealth when the Commonwealth has failed to exercise due diligence shall be included in the computation of the time within which trial must commence. Any other periods of delay shall be excluded from the computation." Pa. R. Crim. P.
600(C)(1).
Com. v. Carl, 276 A.3d 743, 759 (Pa. Super. 2022).
First, a trial court shall determine the mechanical run date, which "is calculated by adding 365 days to the date the criminal complaint is filed." See Com. v. Peterson, 19 A.3d 1131, 1137 n.6 (Pa. Super. 2011); Carl, at 749.
· "Second, [the Court] determine[s] whether any excludable time exists pursuant to Rule 600(C). [The Court] add[s] the amount of excludable time, if any, to the mechanical run date to arrive at an adjusted run date." Carl, at 749 (citation omitted).
"Excludable time" is defined ... as ... any period of time for which the defendant expressly waived Rule 600; and/or such period of delay at any stage of the proceedings as results from (a) the unavailability of the defendant or the defendant's attorney; (b) any continuance granted at the request of the defendant or the defendant's attorney." .. .
Peterson, 19 A.3d at 1137 (citation omitted). Additionally, "periods of delay at any stage of the proceedings caused by the Commonwealth when the Commonwealth has failed to exercise due diligence shall be included in the computation of the time within which trial must commence." Carl, at 749, citing Pa. R. Crim. P. 600(C)(1).
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Finally,
[i]f the trial takes place after the adjusted run date, we apply the due diligence analysis set forth in Rule 600([0]) ... Rule 600 [] encompasses a wide variety of circumstances under which a period of delay was outside the control of the Commonwealth and not the result of the Commonwealth's lack of diligence. Any such period of delay results in an extension of the run date. Addition of any Rule 600 [ ] extensions to the adjusted run date produces the final Rule 600 run date.
If the Commonwealth does not bring the defendant to trial on or before the final run date, the trial court must dismiss the charges.
Carl, at 749 (some citations omitted). "The Commonwealth bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of evidence, that it acted with due diligence throughout the proceedings." Id. at 748 (citation omitted). The Court must also consider the dual public policy concerns behind Rule 600:
The protection of the accused's speedy trial rights, and (2) the protection of society ... So long as there has been no misconduct on the part of the Commonwealth in an effort to evade the fundamental speedy trial rights of an accused, Rule [600] must be construed in a manner consistent with society's right to punish and deter crime. In considering [these] · matters ... , courts must carefully factor into the ultimate equation not only the prerogatives of the individual accused, but the collective right of the community to vigorous law enforcemer,t as well.
Carl, at 748 (citation omitted) .
Here, in addition to the time Rule 600 was suspended due to the COVID-19 pandemic, at least eight motions to continue (trial and hearings) were filed by Petitioner or on his behalf. Petitioner was represented by three defense counsel and proceeded pro-se with standby counsel at different times. Petitioner also filed numerous pre-trial motions, . which had to be decided. Thus, there were 679 days excludable, resulting in 107 days remaining.
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In addition, the Court finds the Commonwealth satisfied its burden of due diligence as the record shows consistent effort to bring Petitioner's cases to trial. The Court finds there was no misconduct on the part of the Commonwealth to evade the speedy trial rights of the Petitioner.
The Court, in reviewing Petitioner's claims, is mindful that the law presumes counsel was effective and that the Petitioner has the burden of proving her ineffectiveness. Com. v. Payne, 794 A.2d 902 (Pa. Super. 2002). Further, to be eligible for PCRA relief for ineffective assistance of counsel, Petitioner must plead and prove that: (1) the underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) that counsel had no reasonable strategic basis for his action or inaction; and (3) but for the errors or omissions of counsel there is a reasonable · probability the outcome would have been different. Com. v. Guess, 53 A.3d 895 (Pa. Super. 2012), reargument denied, appeal denied, 67 A.3d 794 (Pa. 2012). A failure to satisfy any prong of the test for ineffectiveness will require rejection of the claim.
Here, as the Court finds Petitioner's Rule 600 claim is meritless, appellate counsel cannot be found ineffective for failing to preserve this claim. Wherefore, for the above stated reasons, Petitioner's claims are meritless, and his PCRA petition is denied .
cc: I" Michael Burns - ADA / Hillary Hoffman - ADA / William Hathaway, Esq - 1401 State St., PO BOX 28, Erie, PA 16512 .J Court Admin.