NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA :
v. :
: :
GEORGE SIPLE, IV :
:
Appellant : No. 2497 EDA 2025
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered August 29, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-23-CR-0000846-2012
BEFORE: NICHOLS, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and KING, J.
MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED AUGUST 19, 2026
Appellant George Siple, IV, appeals from the order dismissing his Post
Conviction Relief Act (PCRA)1 petition following an evidentiary hearing. On
appeal, Appellant claims that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
communicate a plea agreement prior to trial. After review, we affirm.
A prior panel of this Court summarized the facts of this case as follows:
On May 18, 2011, at 724 Mountain Road in Aston Township, Pennsylvania, Kevin Sweeney (hereinafter “Kevin”) was visiting his son Derrick Sweeney (hereinafter “Derrick”), who had been spending time with his friend Kieren Martin (hereinafter “Kieren”). Kieren left, leaving Kevin and Derrick together in the house. At some point, they heard a scuffling noise outside. When Kevin and Derrick went outside to investigate, they were attacked, and Derrick was robbed of money by two individuals. Both Derrick and Kevin suffered stab wounds to their heads and bodies.
In conducting their investigation, Aston Township Police Detectives Nardone and Berkeyheiser spoke with Kieren Martin,
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1 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.
who told police that shortly before the attack, he received a telephone call from Paul Gill, and drove to Mr. Gill’s residence on Upland Avenue to pick him up. However, when Mr. Martin arrived at Mr. Gill’s residence, Mr. Gill was not home. Mr. Martin waited on the porch for about an hour, and observed an unknown individual run up to and enter Mr. Gill’s house, dressed only in underwear. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Gill returned to the residence, walking with a limp and wearing wet clothing.
The detectives also spoke with Jesse Wilson, who informed them that Appellant told him that he had committed a robbery, after which he shed his bloody clothes, and returned to the house on Upland Avenue wearing only boxer shorts. Additionally, on the night of the attack, Appellant’s cousin, Michael Siple, and Michael Siple’s girlfriend at the time, Kim Mirra, were asleep in a car outside the residence on Upland Avenue when they were woken by Appellant. Michael Siple then left with Appellant, and when Michael Siple returned, he told Ms. Mirra that Appellant had blood on his clothes, and that he had to help Appellant dispose of his pants. Detective Nardone subsequently prepared a photographic lineup from which Kevin Sweeney identified Paul Gill as one of his assailants.
Commonwealth v. Siple, 275 EDA 2013, 2014 WL 10917672, at *1 (Pa.
Super. filed June 19, 2014) (unpublished mem.) (citations and footnotes
omitted and some formatting altered).
On September 28, 2012, following a jury trial, Appellant was convicted
of two counts each of attempted murder, aggravated assault, robbery, and
criminal conspiracy.2 On November 30, 2012, Appellant was sentenced to an
aggregate term of thirty to sixty years’ imprisonment followed by ten years of
probation. Appellant filed a timely direct appeal, and this Court affirmed his
judgment of sentence on June 19, 2014. See Siple, 2014 WL 10917672.
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2 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 901, 2702(a), 3701(a), and 903(a), respectively.
3
On April 20, 2015, Appellant filed a PCRA petition. The PCRA court
appointed Henry DiBenedetto Forrest, Esq. to represent Appellant on April 30,
2015. On September 13, 2023,3 Attorney Forrest filed an amended PCRA
petition raising four claims. See Amended PCRA Petition, 9/13/23. In the
amended petition, Appellant claimed, inter alia, that trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to convey a plea offer.4 See id. at 3 (unpaginated).
On October 4, 2023, Attorney Forrest filed a motion to withdraw, citing
his discontinuation of criminal practice in Delaware County, Pennsylvania, and
seeking the appointment of new counsel for Appellant. See Application to
Withdraw, 10/4/23. On October 9, 2023, the PCRA court granted Attorney
Forrest’s application to withdraw and appointed David C. Devine, Esq. as
counsel for Appellant. On April 30, 2024, the PCRA court granted Appellant
an evidentiary hearing on his claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing
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3 For reasons unknown, there was a delay of over eight years between the appointment of Attorney Forrest and the filing of an amended petition. While the record contains requests for continuances from Attorney Forrest through March 24, 2016, the record is silent as to the reason for the additional seven years of delay. We caution PCRA courts that PCRA petitions are to be litigated in a timely fashion. See Commonwealth v. Renchenski, 52 A.3d 251, 623 (Pa. 2012) (recognizing that “the PCRA court [has] the ability and responsibility to manage its docket and caseload and thus has an essential role in ensuring the timely resolution of PCRA matters” (citation omitted)).
4 Appellant has not raised the other claims put forth in his PCRA petition on
appeal. See Appellant’s Brief at 4; see also Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a), 2119(a); Commonwealth v. McGill, 832 A.2d 1014, 1018 n.6 (Pa. 2003) (finding waiver where the appellant abandoned a claim on appeal).
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to convey a plea offer.5 On September 30, 2024, the PCRA court dismissed
Attorney Devine as counsel for Appellant and appointed Scott Galloway, Esq.
to represent Appellant.
On May 19, 2025, the PCRA court held an evidentiary hearing on
Appellant’s claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to convey a plea
offer.6 On July 22, 2025, the PCRA court issued another notice of its intent to
dismiss Appellant’s petition. The PCRA court ultimately dismissed Appellant’s
PCRA petition on August 29, 2025. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.
Both Appellant and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
On appeal, Appellant presents the following issue for our review:
Was trial counsel ineffective for failing to communicate an offer in which the lead charge of attempted murder would have been withdrawn from the criminal information in exchange for a plea to aggravated assault?
Appellant’s Brief at 4 (some formatting altered).
Specifically, Appellant argues that trial counsel, Earl Raynor, Esq.,
testified at the PCRA evidentiary hearing “that an attorney representing the
Commonwealth at the scheduled preliminary hearing offered to drop the
attempted murder charges if . . . Appellant waived his preliminary hearing as
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5 In the same order, the PCRA court also provided Appellant with notice of its
intent to dismiss the remaining three claims without a hearing. See PCRA Ct. Order, 4/30/24.
6 We note that between the appointment of Attorney Galloway and the evidentiary hearing this case was transferred from the Honorable George A. Pagano to the Honorable Stephanie H. Klein, who presided over the May 19, 2025 hearing.
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well as tendered an open guilty plea to aggravated assault.” Id. at 8 (citing
N.T., 5/19/24, at 40) (some formatting altered). Appellant argues that trial
counsel failed to present him with that plea offer prior to the preliminary
hearing and that he would have accepted the plea agreement had it been
offered to him. See id. at 8-9, 13.
In reviewing the denial of a PCRA petition, our standard of review
is limited to examining whether the PCRA court’s determination is supported by the evidence of record and whether it is free of legal error. The PCRA court’s credibility determinations, when supported by the record, are binding on this Court; however, we apply a de novo standard of review to the PCRA court’s legal conclusions.
Commonwealth v. Sandusky, 203 A.3d 1033, 1043 (Pa. Super. 2019)
(citations omitted and some formatting altered). Further, we presume that a
defendant’s counsel was effective. See Commonwealth v. Turetsky, 925
A.2d 876, 880 (Pa. Super. 2007). This Court has explained that
to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show, by a preponderance of the evidence, ineffective assistance of counsel which, in the circumstances of the particular case, so undermined the truth-determining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place. The burden is on the defendant to prove all three of the following prongs: (1) the underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) that counsel had no reasonable strategic basis for his or her action or inaction; and (3) but for the errors and omissions of counsel, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different.
We have explained that a claim has arguable merit where the factual averments, if accurate, could establish cause for relief. Whether the facts rise to the level of arguable merit is a legal determination.
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The test for deciding whether counsel had a reasonable basis for his [or her] action or inaction is whether no competent counsel would have chosen that action or inaction, or, the alternative, not chosen, offered a significantly greater potential chance of success. Counsel’s decisions will be considered reasonable if they effectuated his [or her] client’s interests. We do not employ a hindsight analysis in comparing trial counsel’s actions with other efforts he [or she] may have taken.
Prejudice is established if there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.
Boilerplate allegations and bald assertions of no reasonable basis and/or ensuing prejudice cannot satisfy a petitioner’s burden to prove that counsel was ineffective. Moreover, a failure to satisfy any prong of the ineffectiveness test requires rejection of the claim of ineffectiveness.
Sandusky, 203 A.3d at 1043-44 (citations omitted and some formatting
altered).
The PCRA court summarized the testimony at the evidentiary hearing as
follows:
At the evidentiary hearing, several witnesses testified: Joseph Nardone, Detective, Delaware County Criminal Investigative Division[;] Michelle Cunningham, Esquire, formerly Michelle Stranen[;] and Earl Raynor, Esquire, [Appellant’s] trial counsel[.] The [PCRA] court also admitted exhibits submitted by the Commonwealth and Appellant.
[Ms.] Cunningham . . . testified that she was formerly employed with Delaware County’s District Attorney’s Office until 2014 or 2015. [N.T., 5/19/25,] at 7. She was the Assistant District Attorney [(ADA)] assigned to the instant case, Docket No. [846]- 2012. Appellant had another open case assigned to ADA Christopher Di Rosato, Docket No. [5749-2011]. Id. at [9, 11, 23]. Ms. Cunningham was assigned this matter at the Court of Common Pleas level after the preliminary hearing.
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Prior to testifying, Ms. Cunningham was able to review her case file from the District Attorney’s office in this matter. Id. at 19. Detective Nardone had contacted her after [Appellant’s] arrest while she was serving as the duty ADA. He had inquired about the procedure for a proffer. Id. at [15-]16. Such a proffer would typically involve having a defendant provide information to assist them in an investigation in the hope of obtaining favorable consideration from the district attorney in his case. After consulting with her supervisor, she advised Detective Nardone that that if someone were interested in proceeding with a proffer, they would need to waive the preliminary hearing and then the proffer would occur at Common Pleas. Id. [at 16.] She later learned that Detective Nardone was calling about the case at hand. Ms. Cunningham testified that Appellant never waived his preliminary hearing and she heard no more about proffer discussions or an offer.
Moreover, Ms. Cunningham testified that she had never made an offer in this matter since Mr. Raynor indicated that [Appellant] wanted to proceed with a trial. The trial was then quickly scheduled. Id. at 19.
[Mr.] Raynor . . . testified that he represented Appellant in the two criminal cases, Docket No. 846-2012 and Docket No. 5749- [20]11. . . . Id. at 47. Mr. Raynor stated that he no longer had an original file for this case nor did he have anything in writing to indicate an offer was made. Id. at 53.
At first, Mr. Raynor testified . . . that the Commonwealth had made no offer but believed he had asked for an offer. Id. at 43, 44. Then he seemingly changed his testimony and recalled that a male district attorney offered to drop the attempted murder charges if Appellant waived his preliminary hearing as well as tendered an open plea to aggravated assault. Other than . . . that the assistant district attorney was male, [Mr. Raynor] could remember nothing about this individual, including his name. Id. at 40-41. Mr. Raynor recollected that he advised [Appellant] of the offer, but that he advised him to proceed with the preliminary hearing and not waive because at that time, no witnesses were able to identify him. Id. at 43-4[5]. Mr. Raynor was firm when he testified that the ADA could not have been ADA Caitlyn Andrews (sic). Id. at 41.FN1 The preliminary hearing transcript for this matter, however, lists Caitlyn McAndrews as the Attorney representing the Commonwealth. District Court 32-2-38, CR 0000268, N.T. 2/8/2012.
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FN1 Mr. Raynor referred to the [ADA] as Caitlyn Andrews, but
the preliminary hearing transcript reflects that her [last] name was . . . “McAndrews.”
When asked if the open plea referred to [Appellant’s] other case, Docket No. [5749-2011], Mr. Raynor testified that: “ I don’t know. I can’t go back. I don’t recall.” Id. at 51.
Mr. Raynor no longer had any written documentation of this case like an email, a case file or anything in writing to confirm the existence of any offer or refresh his recollection. Additionally, his testimony was contradictory.
Appellant [himself] next testified that Mr. Raynor was present with him at the preliminary hearing, and that Mr. Raynor never conveyed an offer to him at the preliminary hearing. Id. at 62- 63. He further testified that Mr. Raynor never brought him any offers for either docket number. Id. at 65.
Appellant further testified that he had wanted to plead guilty because his cousin, Paul McGill, was a co-defendant. Id. at 67. He stated that he wanted this matter over with and did not want to go to trial. He had made this clear to Mr. Raynor on “numerous” occasions. Id. at 65. He then admitted that “they wouldn’t offer me any deals.” Id. at 66.
Appellant claimed simultaneously that he wanted to plead guilty to return home to his motherless eight-year-old child but also wanted to plead guilty to mitigate any legal consequences for his cousin, Mr. McGill. He testified he was willing to go to jail for 10 to 20 years. Id. at 67-68, . . . 74. Like Mr. Raynor[, Appellant’s] testimony was contradictory.
Detective Joseph Nardone testified that he was a detective at the Aston Township Police Department, and he had been employed there for twenty-six years. Id. at 82. He stated he had explored a proffer with Appellant after his arrest because a third suspect was involved in the case. However, the third suspect was never arrested, and Detective Nardone never sought approval of a proffer from the District Attorney’s office. [See id. at 17, 86].
PCRA Ct. Op., 11/21/25, at 2-4 (some formatting altered).
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Ultimately, the PCRA analyzed Appellant’s claim of ineffective assistance
as follows:
Ms. Cunningham testified that she was able to review her original case file to refresh her recollection as the DA’s office had retained it. She found no documentation in the case file that evidenced the tendering of an offer to [Appellant’s] defense[] counsel. Accordingly, at the [PCRA] evidentiary hearing, based on her review of the District Attorney’s retained file and her recollection, Ms. Cunningham stated unequivocally that the Commonwealth had never made an offer, contrary to Appellant’s assertion.
Similarly, Detective Nardone testified that . . . he had had preliminary discussions [with Appellant] about a proffer at the beginning of the criminal proceedings, but neither he nor [Appellant’s] counsel ever pursued that avenue.
On the other hand, the [PCRA] court found Mr. Raynor’s testimony less convincing than Ms. Cunningham’s. He lacked any case file or any other written documentation to support his testimony that he had received an offer in the instant case. His recollection of which ADA made the offer was murky. Indeed, the [PCRA] court was constrained to conclude that Mr. Raynor must have confused Appellant’s two cases. The offer of 20-40 months most likely occurred in [Appellant’s] other case, Docket No. [5749-2011], in which he was also charged with aggravated assault. This conclusion is supported by the fact that the Commonwealth had sought to resolve both cases at the sentencing proceeding and had offered [Appellant] a sentence on Docket No. [5749-2011] concurrent with this case, an offer which he ultimately accepted.
Based on the admitted evidence, the [PCRA] court concluded that [Appellant] failed to establish that his counsel was ineffective by failing to inform him of a tendered plea agreement . . . .
Simply put, the record fails to support a finding that any formal plea offer was extended to Appellant for this case. Based on the admitted evidence, the [PCRA] court was constrained to credit Ms. Cunningham’s testimony that no offer was ever tendered. Her testimony was based not only on her recollection, but also review of the District Attorney’s retained file. Moreover, as stated in the [PCRA] court’s order, Ms. Cunningham credibly explained that Mr. Raynor advised her that [Appellant] wished to proceed to trial posthaste and therefore they quickly scheduled the trial.
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In contrast, the [PCRA] court determined that Mr. Raynor’s testimony was less credible due to the contradictory nature of his testimony and his murky recollections. See Commonwealth v. Rizor, 304 A.3d 1034, 1058 (Pa. 2023) (stating [a PCRA court’s] credibility determinations are provided great[] deference in PCRA evidentiary hearing).
Consequently, the [PCRA] court found that Appellant failed to meet his burden under the PCRA. He had failed to demonstrate the existence of a plea offer.
Id. at 7-8 (some citations omitted and some formatting altered).
After our review of the record, we conclude that the PCRA court’s
conclusions are supported by the record and free of legal error. See
Sandusky, 203 A.3d at 1043-44. As the PCRA court states, Ms. Cunningham
testified at the PCRA evidentiary hearing that she was the ADA assigned to
this case and that she never made a plea offer to Appellant. See N.T.,
5/19/25, at 18-21, 28-29. She also testified that the Commonwealth
extended an offer on a different case then-pending against Appellant, which
was being handled by ADA Christopher DiRosato. See id. at 11, 21-25, 28-
29.
Further, the PCRA court’s conclusion that trial counsel’s evidentiary
hearing testimony was less credible than Ms. Cunningham’s testimony is
supported by the record. See Sandusky, 203 A.3d at 1043-44; see also
Rizor, 304 A.3d at 1058. Trial counsel’s testimony was equivocal and at times
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contradictory,7 he appeared to confuse the details of Appellant’s two cases,8
and at multiple points he conceded that he could not recall certain details of
the cases. See N.T, 5/19/25, at 33-55; see also Rizor, 304 A.3d at 1058.
Accordingly, we conclude that the PCRA court’s conclusion that Appellant failed
to prove a plea offer was extended on this case and, therefore, trial counsel
could not be ineffective for failing to disclose, is supported by the record and
free of legal error. See Sandusky, 203 A.3d at 1043.
Order affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.
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7 For example, Attorney Raynor testified that an offer was made before the
preliminary hearing, that no offer was made on the case, and that an offer was made on the case at the time of sentencing. See N.T., 5/19/25, at 34- 36, 39-43, 46-53.
8 As the PCRA court noted, Attorney Raynor testified that the Commonwealth
extended a plea deal offer for this case wherein Appellant would have pled guilty to aggravated assault in exchange for the charge of attempted murder being dropped. N.T., 5/19/25, at 46-51. However, when confronted with the sentencing transcript for this case, wherein the offer was discussed, trial counsel could not explain why the pending plea offer would have been discussed at sentencing after the trial for this case had concluded and why Ms. Cunningham, when concluding the conversation about the pending offer during the sentencing hearing, stated “Judge, if we could turn back to transcript number 846 of 2012.” Id. at 48-51. Ms. Cunningham explained in her evidentiary hearing testimony that this conversation was about a plea offer extended by the Commonwealth on Appellant’s other matter. See id. at 23-26.
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Date: 8/19/2026