Com. v. Shoatz, H.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: July 14, 2026
• Docket: 3080 EDA 2024
• Status: Unpublished
• Author: Lane

Opinion

J-A10025-26

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : HASSAN SHOATZ : : Appellant : No. 3080 EDA 2024

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered June 14, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0005791-2023

BEFORE: STABILE, J., LANE, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY LANE, J.: FILED JULY 14, 2026

Hassan Shoatz (“Shoatz”) appeals from the judgment of sentence

imposed following his negotiated nolo contendere plea to theft of immovable

property and criminal trespass.1 After careful review, we vacate the judgment

of sentence and remand for resentencing.

The relevant factual and procedural history of this matter is as follows.

In February 2023, Wilfred Anderson Frisby (“the decedent”) died, leaving his

niece, Yvette Frisby-Veal (“Yvette”), as the administratrix of his estate. At the

time of his death, the decedent owned a house at 1122 North 63rd Street in

Philadelphia. Between February and July of 2023, Yvette visited the house

ten or eleven times to check on the house and collect the mail, since the house

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3921(b), 3503(a)(1)(i). J-A10025-26

was vacant. During each visit, she walked through the entire house and

visually checked to ensure that several belongings were inside the house,

including the urn containing the decedent’s ashes, a jewelry box containing

multiple diamond rings, and a cello. After every visit, Yvette turned off the

lights and thermostat. While the estate was pending, Yvette used the estate’s

funds to pay for the utility services for the house, including water, electricity,

and gas.

In July of 2023, Shoatz unlawfully entered the house and changed the

locks. Yvette returned to the house for another visit on July 31, 2023, and

encountered Shoatz, who told her that he was the owner. When Yvette walked

through the house, she noticed several items were missing, including the urn

containing the decedent’s ashes, the jewelry box containing multiple diamond

rings, and the cello.2 Yvette subsequently paid to have the locks changed.

Throughout October, November, and December 2023, Yvette returned

to the house to pack things up to prepare for the sale of the house. In

December of 2023, Yvette received a call from the alarm company and a police

officer alerting her that Shoatz was inside the house. When Yvette arrived,

she again found Shoatz in the house. Yvette also discovered that, in October

2 The record does not indicate how Shoatz gained entry to the house, or whether he permitted Yvette to enter the house when she arrived on July 31, 2023.

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2023, Shoatz had fraudulently transferred the deed to the house to himself. 3

Yvette hired an attorney to initiate a quiet title action to reconvey the title of

the house back to the estate.

Police arrested Shoatz on January 5, 2024, and the Commonwealth

charged him with burglary, criminal trespass, and theft of movable property.

The Commonwealth then amended the bill of information to include theft of

immovable property. On April 30, 2024, Shoatz entered a negotiated nolo

contendere plea to theft of immovable property and criminal trespass in

exchange for the Commonwealth withdrawing the remaining charges. On that

same date, the trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of time-served to

twenty-three months of incarceration, with immediate parole, followed by two

years of probation. As a condition of probation, the court ordered Shoatz not

to contest or challenge the transfer of the title back to the estate. Further,

the court ordered nominal restitution of $200, to be paid at $50 per month,

with further restitution to be determined following a restitution hearing. See

N.T., 4/30/24, at 26–28; see also Sentencing Order, 4/30/24. However, the

trial court did not conduct any on-the-record assessment of Shoatz’s ability to

pay or specify the method of payment by which he was to pay the $50 per

month at the sentencing hearing, nor did the trial court t specify — either at

3 The record does not include any details as to how the deed to the house was

transferred to Shoatz, or when Yvette discovered the deed transfer.

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sentencing or in its sentencing order — whether the restitution was to be

imposed at part of Shoatz’s sentence or as a condition of his probation.

The trial court thereafter conducted a restitution hearing on June 14,

2024. Yvette testified that she had paid for the decedent’s cremation with her

own funds, and that she kept the urn containing his ashes on the dining room

table of the house. She explained that when she first encountered Shoatz in

the house on July 31, 2023, the urn was gone, as well as a cello, a jewelry

box containing multiple diamond rings, and several other items. Yvette

provided the court with receipts for the urn, the cost of cremation, and the

changing of the locks. Yvette also produced a certificate of appraisal for one

diamond ring worth $640 and a cello worth $2,500. She testified that several

other items were missing from the home, including additional diamond rings,

a violin, paintings, and silver dollars. However, she was unable to find

certificates of appraisal for those items.

Yvette further testified that during her infrequent visits to the house,

she turned off the lights and the thermostat because she believed the house

to be empty. She explained that the price of utilities went up after Shoatz

began residing in the house. Yvette provided the court with utility bills from

January, February, and March of 2024. When Shoatz’s attorney informed

Yvette that Shoatz was incarcerated starting on January 5, 2024, Yvette

testified that there were other, unknown people — to whom she had not

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granted entry — living at the house during that period. The trial court

observed that, during these months, the house was deeded to Shoatz.

The court questioned Yvette about the time she personally spent dealing

with the consequences of Shoatz’s criminal actions. Yvette testified that she

spent twenty or thirty hours of her own time going to the house, speaking

with lawyers, and otherwise handling the consequences of Shoatz’s trespass

and theft. Yvette also testified that she took two days off of work to come to

court and had to use her accrued vacation time.

At the conclusion of the restitution hearing, the trial court ordered

Shoatz to pay an aggregate sum of $12,715.11 in restitution, allocating

$10,111.15 to the estate and $2,603.96 to Yvette. With respect to the

$10,111.15 restitution amount due to the estate, the court explained that this

sum consisted of: (1) $640 - the value of a diamond ring; (2) $2,500 – the

value of the cello; (3) $2,971.15 – the value of utilities for the months of

February, March, and April 2024; and (4) $4,000 for attorney’s fees for the

civil action to quiet title (including a $3,250 invoice and $750 in expected

future attorney’s fees to enforce the judgement). See N.T., 6/14/24, at 53-

55. With respect to the $2,603.96 restitution amount due to Yvette, the court

explained that this sum consisted of: (1) $118.96 paid for changed locks; (2)

$1,635 for the urn and cremation costs; (3) $675 for twenty-five hours of her

time spent on dealing with the fraudulent transfer multiplied by her hourly

salary at her job; and (4) $175 for reimbursement of a vacation day to attend

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court. See id. On that same date, the trial court entered an amended

sentencing order which reflected the total amount of restitution, as well as the

breakdown of the amounts to be paid to the estate and to Yvette. See

Amended Order of Sentencing, 6/14/24, at 1. However, once again, the trial

court did not specify — either at the restitution hearing or in its amended

sentencing order — whether the restitution was to be imposed at part of

Shoatz’s sentence or as a condition of his probation.

Shoatz filed a timely post-sentence motion challenging the order of

restitution, which was denied by operation of law. Shoatz thereafter filed a

timely notice of appeal, and both he and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P.

1925.

Shoatz raises the following issues for our review:

A. Did the trial court’s entire restitution order constitute an illegal condition of probation under 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 9763, as the court failed to consider Mr. Shoatz’s ability to pay, as required by the statute?

B. Was the trial court’s order of $4,000 restitution for attorneys’ fees illegal under either § 9763 or 18 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 1106, as neither statute authorizes a court to impose restitution for such fees?

C. Even if the trial court invoked § 1106, rather than § 9763, in ordering restitution for the remaining items—property stolen from the house, cremation expenses, utilities and the complainant’s time—those items fall outside the scope of § 1106.

Shoatz’s Brief at 2-3.

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A challenge to the authority of the trial court to impose an order of

restitution is a challenge to the legality of sentence. See Commonwealth v.

Royal, 312 A.3d 317, 325 (Pa. Super. 2024); see also Commonwealth v.

Risoldi, 238 A.3d 434, 461 n.23 (Pa. Super. 2020) (holding that a challenge

to the trial court’s authority to impose a sentence of restitution based on its

finding that the restitution was a direct result of the criminal conduct is a

challenge to the legality of the sentence”). When presented with a challenge

to the legality of a sentence, our standard of review is de novo and our scope

of review is plenary. See Royal, 312 A.3d at 325.

A sentencing court may impose restitution as a sentence, pursuant to

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1106, or as a condition of probation pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 9754(b). When restitution is imposed as part of a direct sentence, section

1106 mandates that courts shall sentence offenders to make restitution in

certain cases of injury to persons or property. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1106(a).

Such restitution is limited to direct victims of the crime and requires a direct

nexus between the loss and the amount of restitution. See Commonwealth

v. Whatley, 221 A.3d 651, 653-54 (Pa. Super. 2019). Section 1106 requires

that, “[a]t the time of sentencing the court shall specify the amount and

method of restitution.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1106(c)(2).

However, when restitution is imposed as a condition of probation

pursuant to section 9754, its purpose is to rehabilitate the defendant and

provide some redress to the victim. See Commonwealth v. Harner, 617

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A.2d 702, 706 (Pa. 1992). Under section 9754, the sentencing court is given

the flexibility to fashion the condition to rehabilitate the defendant. See id.

Therefore, the requirement of a nexus between the loss and amount of

restitution is relaxed. See id. Such sentences are encouraged, and give the

trial court the flexibility to determine all the direct and indirect damages

caused by a defendant, and permit the court to order restitution so that the

defendant will understand the egregiousness of his conduct, be deterred from

repeating this conduct, and be encouraged to live in a responsible way. See

id. at 707. Notably, restitution imposed under section 9754 is unique in that

it requires a court to explicitly consider a defendant’s ability to pay. See 42

Pa.C.S.A. § 9754(c)(8) (providing that a court may, as a condition of

probation, require the defendant “[t]o make restitution of the fruits of his

crime or to make reparations, in an amount he can afford to pay, for the

loss or damage caused thereby”) (emphasis added).

When restitution is ordered under section 1106(a) and an offender has

been placed on probation or parole, restitution also may be ordered as a

condition of such probation or parole. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1106(b).

Nonetheless, this restitution is still a condition of an offender’s sentence as

opposed to a condition of probation under section 9754. See

Commonwealth v. Holmes, 155 A.3d 69, 87 n.11 (Pa. Super. 2017) (en

banc) (Stabile, J., opinion in support of affirmance). If restitution must be

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ordered as part of a sentence under section 1106(a), it cannot at the same

time also be ordered as a condition under section 9754. See id.

However, when restitution is imposed under either statute, the court

must specify the method of payment at the sentencing hearing. See 18

Pa.C.S.A. § 1106(c)(2) (providing that, “[a]t the time of sentencing the court

shall specify the amount and method of restitution”); see also Holmes, 155

A.3d at 86 (holding that, upon ordering restitution as a condition of probation,

the court must determine “how the restitution is to be paid”). A sentence

intended to include restitution, which is entered without a definite amount and

method of payment, is illegal and must be vacated in its entirety. See

Commonwealth v. McCabe, 230 A.3d 1199, 1209 (Pa. Super. 2020).

Similarly, where a sentencing court fails to consider a defendant’s ability to

pay prior to imposing restitution as a probationary condition, the order of

restitution constitutes an illegal sentence and must be vacated. See

Whatley, 221 A.3d at 654.

Based on our review of the record, it is unclear whether the trial court

ordered restitution as a mandatory direct sentence or as a condition of

Shoatz’s probation. The trial court did not indicate the nature of the restitution

imposed at the time of sentencing, at the restitution hearing, in the sentencing

orders, or in its 1925(a) opinion. Thus, the record is silent as to whether the

trial court was ordering the restitution as a way to rehabilitate Shoatz, or as

a punishment for direct injuries to persons or property, or potentially some of

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each. Therefore, our ability to review the merits of Shoatz’s challenges to the

legality of restitution is impeded by our inability to ascertain the applicable

statutory framework.

Nonetheless, we conclude that the order of restitution is illegal under

either section 1106 or section 9754 because the trial court failed to specify a

method of payment or determine Shoatz’s ability to pay at the sentencing

hearing. See N.T., 4/30/24, at 1-30; see also McCabe, 230 A.3d at 1209;

Whatley, 221 A.3d at 654. Accordingly, we are constrained to vacate the

judgment of sentence and remand for resentencing. Upon remand, the trial

court must make an on-the-record determination as to whether restitution is

being imposed as a separate sentence, in accordance with section 1106, or as

a condition of probation, in accordance with section 9754. The court must

also specify both the amount of restitution and the method of payment at the

sentencing hearing. Further, if the court imposes restitution as a condition of

probation pursuant to section 9754, the court must also consider Shoatz’s

ability to pay.4

Judgment of sentence vacated. Case remanded. Jurisdiction

relinquished.

4 Because we have determined the sentence is illegal, we need not reach the

merits of Shoatz’s other claims.

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Date: 7/14/2026

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