J-S07043-24
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : MATTHEW JOHN SHEFFER : : Appellant : No. 965 MDA 2023
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered June 8, 2023 In the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-14-CR-0000205-2017
BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., KUNSELMAN, J., and COLINS, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY COLINS, J.: FILED OCTOBER 17, 2024
Appellant, Matthew John Sheffer, appeals from the order of the Court of
Common Pleas of Centre County that denied his timely first petition filed under
the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA).1 After careful review, we affirm.
This case arises out of Appellant’s sexual abuse of his former girlfriend’s
11-year-old daughter (Victim). Victim and her mother lived in Maine when
Appellant, who lived in Pennsylvania, first met Victim’s mother online. Victim’s
mother did not live with Victim’s father, who had physically abused her, and
Victim’s mother obtained a protection from abuse (PFA) order against Victim’s
father in 2012. Appellant moved to Maine to live with Victim’s mother and
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. J-S07043-24
Victim in February 2013. Victim’s mother sought and obtained full custody of
Victim, after which Victim’s mother, Appellant, and Victim moved to Centre
County, Pennsylvania, in 2014. The assaults occurred between December
2015 and April 2016, when Appellant moved out of the house. Victim first
reported the assaults in the summer of 2016, when she was visiting her father
in Maine.
On January 24, 2017, Appellant was charged with rape of a child and
other sexual offenses for sexually abusing Victim. A jury trial of these charges
began on August 15, 2018 and ended in a hung jury, and a second trial in
October 2018 also ended in a hung jury. A third jury trial began on February
13, 2019. Appellant testified at all three trials, denied that he engaged in any
sexual conduct with Victim, and argued that Victim was urged by her father
to make false accusations against Appellant. On February 15, 2019, the jury
in the third trial convicted Appellant of all charges. On May 3, 2019, the trial
court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate 20 to 40 years’ imprisonment.
Appellant filed a post-sentence motion in which he sought, inter alia, a new
trial on the ground that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence,
and the trial court denied that motion.
Appellant filed a timely appeal from his judgment of sentence in which
he challenged a number of the trial court’s evidentiary rulings and argued that
the jury verdict was against the weight of the evidence. Commonwealth v.
Sheffer, No. 1501 MDA 2019, slip op. at 5, 22 (Pa. Super. September 25,
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2020). On September 25, 2020, this Court affirmed Appellant’s judgment of
sentence. Id. at 1, 26. Appellant filed a petition for allowance of appeal,
which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied on August 10, 2021.
Commonwealth v. Sheffer, 260 A.3d 919 (Pa. 2021).
Appellant filed the instant timely first PCRA petition on October 28,
2021, in which he asserted various claims of ineffectiveness of counsel at both
the trial court and appellate levels. Following the appointment of PCRA
counsel to represent Appellant, the PCRA court held a hearing on Appellant’s
PCRA petition on May 17, 2022, at which both an attorney who represented
Appellant prior to his first trial and the attorney who represented him at all
three trials and on appeal testified. On June 8, 2023, the PCRA court denied
Appellant’s PCRA petition in its entirety. PCRA Court Order, 6/8/23. This
timely appeal followed.
In this Court, Appellant argues that the PCRA court erred in denying the
following four of his PCRA claims: (1) that his counsel were ineffective for
failing to file a motion to dismiss the charges pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 600
prior to his first trial, (2) that his trial and appellate counsel was ineffective
for failing to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence in his direct appeal, (3)
that this counsel was ineffective for failing to object to alleged misconduct by
the prosecutor in his cross-examination of him and closing arguments, and
(4) that this counsel was ineffective for failing to request that a juror be
excused for cause.
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Our review of an order denying a PCRA petition is limited to determining
whether the record supports the PCRA court’s findings and whether its decision
is free of legal error. Commonwealth v. Mason, 130 A.3d 601, 617 (Pa.
2015); Commonwealth v. Maddrey, 205 A.3d 323, 327 (Pa. Super. 2019);
Commonwealth v. Orlando, 156 A.3d 1274, 1280 (Pa. Super. 2017). We
must view the findings of the PCRA court and the evidence of record in a light
most favorable to the prevailing party. Mason, 130 A.3d at 617;
Commonwealth v. Mojica, 242 A.3d 949, 953 (Pa. Super. 2020); Maddrey,
205 A.3d at 327. The PCRA court’s credibility determinations, if supported by
the record, are binding on this Court. Mason, 130 A.3d at 617; Mojica, 242
A.3d at 953, 956; Orlando, 156 A.3d at 1280.
All of Appellant’s issues involve claims that his pretrial counsel or his
trial and appellate counsel was ineffective. To be entitled to relief on a claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must prove: 1) that the
underlying claim is of arguable merit; 2) that counsel had no reasonable basis
for her action or inaction; and 3) that he suffered prejudice as a result of
counsel’s action or inaction. Mason, 130 A.3d at 618; Commonwealth v.
Ligon, 206 A.3d 515, 519 (Pa. Super. 2019); Maddrey, 205 A.3d at 327.
The defendant must satisfy all three prongs of this test to obtain relief under
the PCRA. Mason, 130 A.3d at 618; Mojica, 242 A.3d at 955;
Commonwealth v. Smith, 181 A.3d 1168, 1175 (Pa. Super. 2018).
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With respect to Appellant’s first issue, the PCRA court found that this
claim of ineffectiveness of counsel failed because the Rule 600 motion that
Appellant contends that counsel should have filed lacked arguable merit.
PCRA Court Opinion, 6/8/23, at 3-4. That finding is supported by the record.
Rule 600 requires that the Commonwealth bring a defendant to trial
within 365 days from the date on which the criminal complaint was filed.
Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(A)(2)(a); Commonwealth v. Barbour, 189 A.3d 944, 947
(Pa. 2018); Commonwealth v. Dixon, 140 A.3d 718, 722 (Pa. Super. 2016).
Rule 600 provides that in determining whether the 365-day period has
expired, “periods of delay at any stage of the proceedings caused by the
Commonwealth when the Commonwealth has failed to exercise due diligence
shall be included in the computation of the time within which trial must
commence” and that “[a]ny other periods of delay shall be excluded from the
computation.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(C)(1). Delays caused by the defendant do
not count toward Rule 600’s 365-day limit for bringing a defendant to trial.
Pa.R.Crim.P. 600, cmt.; Barbour, 189 A.3d at 955-56, 958; Maddrey, 205
A.3d at 327. Because Appellant is asserting a claim of ineffectiveness of
counsel for failure to file a Rule 600 motion, the burden is on Appellant to
prove that he was not brought to trial within 365 days that are chargeable to
the Commonwealth under Rule 600. Maddrey, 205 A.3d at 328.
The criminal complaint against Appellant was filed on January 24, 2017,
and Appellant’s first trial began on August 15, 2018, 568 days after the
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criminal complaint was filed. The record, however, shows that most of this
delay was the result of continuances sought by Appellant. 5/26/17 Motion for
Trial Postponement; Trial Court Order, 8/10/17; 11/14/17 Motion for Trial
Postponement; Trial Court Order, 2/6/18; Trial Court Order, 3/16/18.
Counsel’s testimony at the PCRA hearing, which the PCRA court found credible,
showed that the Commonwealth provided discovery in March 2017 and that
defense delays were requested to obtain evidence from proceedings in Maine
for Appellant’s defense and due to a change in counsel representing Appellant
and not because of delay by the Commonwealth in providing discovery. N.T.
PCRA at 6-7, 10-12, 15, 19-23, 63-64, 68; PCRA Court Opinion at 4. Of the
568 days between the criminal complaint and Appellant’s August 15, 2018
trial, the record shows that the only periods of delay not caused by Appellant
were the period from January 24, 2017 to Appellant’s first continuance request
and delays caused by continuances ordered by the court for scheduling
reasons in October 2017 and July 2018. Trial Court Order, 10/4/17; Trial
Court Order, 7/6/18. Those three periods of time total at most 243 days, well
within Rule 600’s 365-day limit.
Appellant argues that the Commonwealth did not turn over certain items
of evidence to Appellant until shortly before trial and that under
Commonwealth v. Harth, 252 A.3d 600 (Pa. 2021), almost all of the 568
days before trial must therefore be included in the Rule 600 calculation
because the Commonwealth did not act with due diligence. We do not agree.
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Harth holds that time attributable to judicial delay cannot be excluded where
the Commonwealth has not demonstrated that it acted with due diligence in
prosecuting the case, 252 A.3d at 603, 617-19, not that delays caused by the
defendant cannot be excluded because there was other unrelated
Commonwealth lack of diligence. Appellant did not show that the delays that
he sought were caused by failure to produce these items of evidence earlier.
Because the delays caused by Appellant must be excluded in applying
Rule 600, Pa.R.Crim.P. 600, cmt.; Barbour, 189 A.3d at 955-56, 958;
Maddrey, 205 A.3d at 327, Appellant’s August 15, 2018 trial was within Rule
600’s 365-day limit. Any Rule 600 motion therefore would have lacked merit,
and the PCRA court correctly concluded that neither of Appellant’s counsel was
ineffective for failing to file such a motion.
The PCRA court rejected Appellant’s second PCRA claim in this appeal
on the ground that the insufficiency of the evidence issue that is the subject
of this PCRA claim was really a weight of the evidence claim and therefore
failed because Appellant’s counsel raised and argued a weight of the evidence
challenge in Appellant’s direct appeal. PCRA Court Opinion, 6/8/23, at 5.
Appellant argues that this was error because his PCRA claim involved an
insufficiency of the evidence claim under Commonwealth v. Karkaria, 625
A.2d 1167 (Pa. 1993), which was not raised on direct appeal, not a claim that
the verdict was against the weight of the evidence.
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Appellant is correct that his PCRA petition raised a claim that counsel
was ineffective for failing to raise an insufficiency of the evidence claim under
Karkaria. PCRA Petition at 5, 19-20. That, however, does not make this
PCRA claim meritorious. To prevail on a claim of ineffectiveness of appellate
counsel, the defendant must show both that the issue that counsel failed to
raise had arguable merit and that there is a reasonable probability that the
outcome of the appeal would have been different but for counsel’s deficient
performance. Commonwealth v. Staton, 120 A.3d 277, 294-95 (Pa. 2015);
Commonwealth v. Blakeney, 108 A.3d 739, 749-50 (Pa. 2014).
Karkaria’s holding that evidence can be insufficient to support a
conviction where it is so unreliable or contradictory as to make any verdict
based on such evidence pure conjecture is a narrow exception to the rule that
credibility determinations are for the jury. 625 A.2d at 1170. The
contradictions and unreliability that made the evidence insufficient in
Karkaria were not a mere lack of corroboration or the presence of some
inconsistencies in the complainant’s testimony. Rather, the complainant’s
testimony was found insufficient because she testified that the assaults
occurred in circumstances that she admitted did not exist during the time
period of the criminal charges and never existed at any time and testified only
that she was assaulted years before the period to which the criminal charges
related. Id. at 1171-72.
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Victim’s testimony here did not have the impossibility that made the
testimony in Karkaria insufficient to support a conviction. Victim testified to
specific sexual assaults on which the charges were based and did not testify
that the circumstances of those assaults were physically impossible or could
not have existed. N.T. Trial, 2/13/19, at 66-74, 77-84, 102-03. While no
other witness testified that the sexual assaults occurred and there was no
physical evidence corroborating Victim’s testimony, that does not make her
testimony insufficient to support Appellant’s convictions, as the
uncorroborated testimony of the victim is sufficient to support a sexual offense
conviction. 18 Pa.C.S. § 3106; Commonwealth v. Banniger, 303 A.3d
1085, 1091 (Pa. Super. 2023); Commonwealth v. Owens, 649 A.2d 129,
133 (Pa. Super. 1994). The PCRA court’s denial of this claim for relief was
therefore proper because Appellant failed to show that there was a reasonable
probability that the outcome of his direct appeal would have been different if
a sufficiency of the evidence argument had been asserted.2
In his third issue, Appellant argues that the PCRA court erred in denying
his claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the prosecutor’s
allegedly improper statements in cross-examination and closing argument.
2 While the reason for our conclusion that this claim was properly denied differs
from the PCRA court’s reason for its decision, we may affirm a lower court on any valid basis, even if those grounds are different from those on which the court based its decision. Commonwealth v. Janda, 14 A.3d 147, 161 n.8 (Pa. Super. 2011); Commonwealth v. Priovolos, 746 A.2d 621, 626 n.6 (Pa. Super. 2000).
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This argument fails for two reasons, Appellant failed to show that objections
to these questions and argument had arguable merit and he failed to show
that counsel lacked a reasonable basis for her actions.
The prosecution conduct on which this ineffectiveness claim is primarily
based consisted of assertions in cross-examination and closing argument that
Appellant had testified at his prior trials that accusations that he had sexually
abused Victim were investigated in Maine and found unsupported. N.T. Trial,
2/14/19, at 142-46; N.T. Trial, 2/15/19, at 48-49. Contrary to Appellant’s
assertion, the prosecutor’s characterization of Appellant’s prior testimony was
not improper. Appellant testified at his first trial:
Q. Are you aware of what happened at any of [the PFA proceedings]?
A. Yes, at one of the one of those proceedings [Victim’s father] made the allegation that he was informed by [Victim] that I sexually assaulted and molested his daughter.
Q. And what happened?
A. Well they were proven to be false because I was never alone with [Victim], you know between working and [Victim’s mother] and her babysitting schedule.
Q. So did you have criminal charges for that?
A. No criminal charges or anything were pressed. It was pretty much unfounded.
Q. Did the courts do anything about that?
A. No. We eventually wind up getting a guardian ad litem over the whole thing because he, you know, guardian ad litems are for the interest of the child.
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N.T. Trial, 8/15/18, at 145-46. Although Appellant did not use the word
“investigation” in that testimony, the reference to the claims being “proven to
be false” and being “unfounded” could reasonably be characterized as implying
some kind of official inquiry. Moreover, the prosecutor made clear in his cross-
examination that his use of the term “investigation” was based on that
testimony, as he specifically quoted that testimony as the basis for his
questions. N.T. Trial, 2/14/19, at 143-44. In addition, Appellant testified in
his second trial that the guardian ad litem in the custody proceeding
questioned him on whether he had ever molested or inappropriately touched
Victim. N.T. Trial, 10/23/18, at 123.
Nor was the prosecutor’s closing argument on this issue objectionable.
Prosecutors are entitled to present their arguments with reasonable latitude
and with logical force and vigor. Commonwealth v. Epps, 240 A.3d 640,
646 (Pa. Super. 2020); Ligon, 206 A.3d at 520. Referring to the above prior
testimony as claiming that sexual abuse allegations had been investigated and
that they were found to be false and that he was exonerated, N.T. Trial,
2/15/19, at 48-49, is proper comment on the evidence.
The other prosecution conduct that Appellant claims was improper was
the cross-examination of Appellant concerning the timing of Victim’s mother’s
PFA order. N.T. Trial, 2/14/19, at 151-54. This cross-examination was also
unobjectionable. In these questions, the prosecutor correctly stated the date
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of the PFA order and that Appellant had not moved to Maine at that time. Id.
at 153-54.
In any event, the record showed that counsel had a reasonable basis for
not objecting. Counsel who represented Appellant at all three of his trials
testified at the PCRA hearing that none of this conduct constituted
prosecutorial misconduct and that she feels that it is strategically better not
to object to every possible objectionable question or statement because
frequent objections tend to cause the jury to believe that the objector is trying
to hide something and because the objection can draw more attention to the
unfavorable testimony or statement. N.T. PCRA at 47, 52-53. The trial record
shows that counsel in fact dealt with the prosecutor’s characterizations by
redirect examination of Appellant in which she brought out that Appellant had
never said that there was a formal investigation of the sexual abuse
allegations in Maine. N.T. Trial, 2/14/19, at 167-69.
Appellant’s fourth and final issue challenges the denial of his claim that
counsel was ineffective for failing to move to excuse a juror who revealed
during trial that she knew one of the Commonwealth’s witnesses. This
argument fails because a motion to excuse the juror would not have been
successful.
The juror in question, Juror No. 1, notified the trial court at the close of
the Commonwealth’s case that she knew Commonwealth witness Dr. Kristie
Kaufman, the doctor who performed a physical examination of Victim after
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Victim reported the sexual assaults. N.T. Trial, 2/14/19, at 85-86. Juror No.
1 testified that Dr. Kaufman had been the pediatrician for her daughter, who
has a rare genetic disorder, for four years. Id. at 86-87. Juror No. 1 testified
that Dr. Kaufman was also a member of her church, but that “we don’t see
[Dr. Kaufman] very often in church” and that Dr. Kaufman “is not there very
often.” Id. at 86. Juror No. 1 also testified that the fact that Dr. Kaufman
was her daughter’s pediatrician and that she knew Dr. Kaufman would not
affect her ability to render a fair verdict and that she would not be more likely
to believe Dr. Kaufman as opposed to any other witness. Id. at 87-88.
A trial court must grant a motion to excuse a juror for cause in two types
of situations: (1) where the juror has such a close familial, financial, or
situational relationship with a party, counsel, victim, or witness that a
likelihood of prejudice must be presumed; or, alternatively, (2) where the
juror’s conduct or answers to questions demonstrate a likelihood of prejudice.
Shinal v. Toms, 162 A.3d 429, 440-41 (Pa. 2017); Commonwealth v.
Kelly, 134 A.3d 59, 61-62 (Pa. Super. 2016); Commonwealth v. Colon, 299
A.2d 326, 327 (Pa. Super. 1972). Here, Juror No. 1’s answers did not
demonstrate any likelihood of prejudice, as she testified unequivocally that
she would be unaffected by the fact that she knew Dr. Kauffman and would
be no more likely to believe Dr. Kauffman than any other witness.
The only basis for her removal from the jury would be if her relationship
to Dr. Kauffman required a presumption of prejudice. Not all relationships
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between a juror and the parties, counsel, victims, or witnesses are sufficiently
close to create a presumption of prejudice. Shinal, 162 A.3d at 443. The
mere fact that the juror knows or has some ties to one or more of the parties,
counsel, victim, and witnesses is not sufficient by itself to disqualify a juror.
Id. at 443, 447-50 (employment relationship with non-party that was an
affiliate of a defendant was insufficient by itself to create a presumption of
prejudice); Commonwealth v. Colson, 490 A.2d 811, 818-19 (Pa. 1985)
(fact that prospective juror had known victim’s mother in the past and was
acquainted with a witness and with the wife of the prosecuting state trooper
did not require disqualification), abrogated on other issue by
Commonwealth v. Burke, 781 A.2d 1136 (Pa. 2001); Commonwealth v.
Banks, 677 A.2d 335, 342 (Pa. Super. 1996) (exclusion of juror based on fact
that defense counsel had represented her a few years earlier was error where
juror testified that it would not affect her ability to be impartial);
Commonwealth v. Bright, 420 A.2d 714, 716 (Pa. Super. 1980) (fact that
prospective juror lived in the same neighborhood as prosecuting attorney, had
known him since he was a boy, and “liked him” did not require
disqualification).
Where the physician is a party to the case, a doctor-patient relationship
between a juror or her immediate family member and the physician is
sufficiently close to presume prejudice. Cordes v. Associates of Internal
Medicine, 87 A.3d 829, 841-43, 867-69 (Pa. Super. 2014) (trial court was
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required to exclude jurors whose family members were patients of doctor who
was defendant in a malpractice action). A juror’s status as a patient of a
doctor whose relationship to the case is less central, however, does not create
a presumption of prejudice. Commonwealth v. Blasioli, 685 A.2d 151, 158-
59 (Pa. Super. 1996) (no presumed prejudice where prosecutor's wife
was juror’s family doctor), aff'd, 713 A.2d 1117 (Pa. 1998). Dr. Kauffman
was not a party or a victim in this case and her testimony was not central to
the Commonwealth’s case. The matter as to which Dr. Kauffman testified was
the examination of Victim, and Dr. Kauffman testified that she found no signs
of abuse. N.T. Trial, 2/14/19, at 52-53, 59-61. Although Dr. Kauffman also
testified that abnormalities typically heal within a month after the sexual
activity ends, she testified that she could not conclude that Victim had been
sexually abused or that Victim had not been sexually abused. Id. at 54-55,
60-61. Appellant did not challenge Dr. Kauffman’s credibility or call any
witness to offer testimony that disputed any part of Dr. Kauffman’s testimony.
Indeed, it was Appellant, not the Commonwealth, who called Dr. Kauffman as
a witness in his first trial. N.T. Trial, 8/16/18, at 4-12.
Given that Dr. Kauffman’s testimony neither supported nor negated the
Commonwealth’s case, the mere fact that Juror No. 1’s daughter was her
patient for a condition entirely different from Dr. Kauffman’s examination and
testimony is not sufficient to create any appearance of partiality or
presumption of prejudice. Appellant therefore cannot show prejudice because
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the motion that he contends that counsel should have filed would not have
resulted in Juror No. 1’s exclusion from the jury.
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that none of Appellant’s issues
merits relief. We therefore affirm the PCRA court’s decision denying
Appellant’s PCRA petition.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq. Prothonotary
Date: 10/17/2024
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