Com. v. Setzler, J.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: May 19, 2026
• Docket: 660 MDA 2025
• Status: Unpublished
• Author: Dubow

Opinion

J-S18013-26

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : JESSICA LYNN SETZLER : : Appellant : No. 660 MDA 2025

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 8, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Northumberland County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-49-MD-0000098-2025

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : JESSICA LYNN SETZLER : : Appellant : No. 668 MDA 2025

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 8, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Northumberland County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-49-MD-0000182-2025

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., BECK, J., and BENDER, P.J.E.

JUDGMENT ORDER BY DUBOW, J.: FILED: MAY 19, 2026

Appellant, Jessical Lynn Setlzer, appeals from the April 8, 2025

aggregate judgment of sentence of 12 months of incarceration entered in the

Northumberland County Court of Common Pleas following her conviction at

two docket numbers of Indirect Criminal Contempt (“ICC”).1 Appellant claims

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1 23 Pa.C.S. § 6114. J-S18013-26

the trial court erred in failing to colloquy her before conducting the

adjudicatory and sentencing hearing without counsel. After careful review,

we vacate Appellant’s judgment of sentence and her guilty plea and remand

for further proceedings.

The relevant facts and procedural history are as follows. The

Commonwealth charged Appellant with ICC after she violated a protection

from abuse order (“PFA”) on two separate occasions. On April 8, 2025,

Appellant appeared at the adjudicatory hearing unrepresented by counsel and

admitted that she violated the PFA order. The trial court did not colloquy

Appellant to determine whether her waiver of counsel was knowing,

intelligent, and voluntary as required by Pa.R.Crim.P. 121.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court found Appellant guilty

and imposed a term of 6 months of incarceration for each conviction, to be

served consecutively. Appellant did not file a post-sentence motion.

This timely appeal followed. Both Appellant and the trial court complied

with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.2

Appellant raises the following issue on appeal:

Was [Appellant’s] statutory right to counsel violated when she appeared pro se at an [ICC] proceeding for [] alleged PFA violations and no knowing, intelligent[,] and voluntary waiver of counsel was made?

Appellant’s Br. at 6.

2 In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court acknowledged its error in failing

to conduct a guilty plea colloquy.

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In support of this claim, Appellant argues that the trial court violated

her statutory right to counsel and committed reversible error when it failed to

conduct a thorough on-the-record colloquy to determine whether Appellant’s

waiver of counsel was voluntary, intelligent, and knowing. Id. at 9.

Our Domestic Relations Code provides that, although a person charged

with ICC does not have a right to a jury trial, she “shall be entitled to counsel.”

23 Pa.C.S. § 6114(b)(3).

A “defendant may waive the right to be represented by counsel.”

Pa.R.Crim.P. 121(A)(1). However, when a defendant seeks to waive the right

to counsel, the court must “ensure that the defendant’s waiver of the right to

counsel is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent” before permitting the defendant

to proceed pro se. Id. at 121(A)(2). A trial court commits reversible error

when it fails to conduct an on the record colloquy under Rule 121 before

permitting the defendant to proceed pro se. Commonwealth v. Johnson,

158 A.3d 117, 122 (Pa. Super. 2017).

Our review of the record confirms that the trial court failed to conduct a

Rule 121 colloquy before permitting Appellant to proceed pro se at the

adjudicatory and sentencing hearing. Because the failure to conduct an on-

the-record waiver of counsel colloquy constitutes reversible error, we vacate

Appellant’s judgment of sentence and her convictions, and remand for

proceedings consistent with this memorandum.

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Judgment of sentence vacated. Case remanded for further proceedings.

Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 05/19/2026

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