Com. v. Seay, S.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: October 23, 2025
• Docket: 1614 MDA 2024
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

J-A21038-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : SAHALA DEE TURAHN SEAY : : Appellant : No. 1614 MDA 2024

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered July 2, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-21-CR-0001910-2023

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., LANE, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED: OCTOBER 23, 2025

Appellant, Sahala Dee Turahn Seay, Appeals from the judgment of

sentence entered July 2, 2024 in the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland

County. Appellant was convicted of Indecent Assault following trial by jury.

After careful review, we affirm.

This charge arose from an incident which occurred on June 27, 2023, at

the Ross Distribution center in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, where Appellant and the

victim, Annette Kirby, were then employed. N.T. Jury Trial 3/13/2024 at 7-8.

Appellant and the victim exchanged cell phone numbers during their overnight

shift beginning on June 26, 2023, and ending on June 27. Id. at 9. At

approximately 3:00 A.M. on June 27, 2023, Appellant encountered Ms. Kirby

and told her he “know[s] how [she] like[s] it,” then tugged her hair and

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court. J-A21038-25

“patt[ed her] on the behind” twice. Id. at 11. Ms. Kirby reported this incident

to a supervisor at approximately 5:30 A.M. on June 27. Id. at 12. At 6:40

A.M. on June 27, Ms. Kirby texted Appellant “please don’t text me,” in

response to the above-described incident. Id. at 15. This and several

preceding texts from that evening1 would come to be depicted in a screenshot

referred to as “Commonwealth’s Exhibit 2.” Id. at 5.

On the evening of June 27, 2023, Appellant was informed at the

beginning of his next shift following the incident that he was being placed on

administrative leave by a senior operations manager, and he was

subsequently escorted from the building. Id. at 22, 25-26. In the early

morning hours of June 28, 2023, Ms. Kirby received four text messages, sent

at 1:22 A.M., which read: “[1] U UGLY BITCH [fire, skull, and gun emojis] [;]

[2] ANNETTE KIRBY [;] [3] U GOT AIDS [;] [4] [gun emojis].” These text

messages would come to be depicted in a screenshot referred to as

“Commonwealth’s Exhibit 1.” Id. at 3. These texts did not come from a

number known to belong to Appellant, and the Commonwealth was not able

to provide direct evidence of who sent these messages. Id.

On July 3, 2023, Appellant was charged with Indecent Assault and

Harassment. During the course of pre-trial discovery, the Commonwealth

provided Appellant’s counsel with an incident report which quoted the content ____________________________________________

1 These texts consist of the following: Ms. Kirby texted to the Appellant “Hey

whats [sic] up,” and Appellant later texted Ms. Kirby “[h]ow are you? [Smiley face emoji].” Id. at 4. That these texts were sent between Appellant’s phone and Ms. Kirby’s is not contested. Id. at 5.

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of Commonwealth’s Exhibit 1 verbatim, but it did not quote the content of

Commonwealth’s Exhibit 2 in whole or in part. Trial Court Opinion 12/4/2024

at 3. However, copies of both Commonwealth exhibits depicting text messages

were provided to Appellant’s counsel five days prior to trial. Id. at 3, 4.

Immediately prior to jury selection, Appellant made an oral motion in

limine, seeking to exclude Commonwealth’s exhibits 1 and 2. Id. at 2.

Appellant sought to exclude Commonwealth Exhibit 1 on two bases: first, that

the Commonwealth could not authenticate the messages; second, that the

screenshot of the messages was late discovery. Id. Appellant sought to

exclude Commonwealth Exhibit 2 only on the basis of late discovery. Id. The

trial court granted Appellant’s motion to exclude as to Commonwealth’s

Exhibit 1 on the basis of authentication2 and denied his motion as to

Commonwealth’s Exhibit 2 “on the basis of a statement made by counsel for

the Commonwealth that the ‘messages are quoted verbatim in the incident

report that defense counsel received with the initial batch of discovery, so this

is not any new information.’” Id. at 2-3. The trial court notes in its Opinion

that at that time it believed this statement applied to both Commonwealth

exhibits, and Appellant did not correct or clarify this statement upon which the

court relied until a post-sentence motion for reconsideration, at which time he

referred to this statement as a “misrepresentation.” Id. at 3.

2 Upon granting Appellant’s motion to suppress Commonwealth Exhibit 1,

the trial court also dismissed the sole count of harassment, which had been based upon the content of the suppressed text messages. Id. at 3-6, 36-37.

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At trial, the Commonwealth introduced Commonwealth Exhibit 2

through the testimony of Ms. Kirby. Notes of Testimony, Jury Trial 3/13/2024

at 13-14. When asked by the prosecution why the final message, sent by her

at 6:40 A.M., in which she told Appellant not to text her, was “terse or less

friendly,” than her previous message sent at the beginning of their shift, Ms.

Kirby said the same was due to “the fact that he tugged my hair and, you

know, pat [sic] me on the behind.” Id. at 15.

Appellant filed a post-sentence motion on July 12, 2024, requesting a

new trial on the basis that the Commonwealth’s late disclosure of

Commonwealth’s Exhibit 2, which was admitted over objection, was

prejudicial to his ability to effectively prepare with counsel. Trial Court Opinion

12/4/2024 at 1. His motion was denied on July 17, 2024, due to the trial

court’s aforementioned belief that the substance of these texts had been

included in the incident report provided to the defense in the initial discovery

packet. Id. Appellant then filed a motion for reconsideration on August 13,

2024, only now for the first time averring that the content of Commonwealth’s

Exhibit 2 was not included in the incident report. The trial court vacated their

prior order denying Appellant’s motion and ordered the Commonwealth to

respond. Following receipt of said response, the court again denied Appellant’s

motion due to lack of prejudice. Id. at 4. Appellant received the text messages

five days prior to trial; he did not request a continuance; and the trial court

considered the weight of the messages to be minimal. Id.

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Appellant filed a renewed motion for reconsideration on October 31,

2024, which the trial court denied for lack of jurisdiction, as Appellant had

filed late in the day on “the penultimate day of the appeal period.” Id. at 5.

Appellant in this motion raised a Brady claim for the first time, relative to

Commonwealth’s Exhibit 1, which had previously been excluded on his own

motion. Id. Appellant filed his notice of appeal on November 1, 2024.

Appellant raises three questions for review:

“I. Was Defendant deprived of his right to a fair trial due to the Commonwealth's Brady violation, where the cumulative effect of all text message evidence suppressed by the Commonwealth impacted the Defendant's trial strategy, the evidence presented to the jury at trial, and the jury's ability to fairly weigh the credibility of the Commonwealth's witnesses? Suggested Answer: YES.

II. Did the trial court err by Denying Defendant's motion to exclude text message evidence suppressed by the Commonwealth for months where the court's jury instruction permitted conviction based on the alleged victim's testimony alone if found credible gave extra weight to the suppressed text evidence which was used to punctuate her testimony and bolster the perception of her credibility? Suggested Answer: YES.

III. Did the trial court err by denying Defendant's post sentence motion for a new trial without a hearing? Suggested Answer: YES.”

Appellant’s Brief at 4.

Regarding Appellant’s first issue, we have previously observed that:

in order to establish a Brady violation:

“a defendant must show that: (1) evidence was suppressed by the state, either willfully or inadvertently; (2) the evidence was

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favorable to the defendant, either because it was exculpatory or because it could have been used for impeachment; and (3) the evidence was material, in that its omission resulted in prejudice to the defendant. See Commonwealth v. Lambert, 584 Pa. 461, 471, 884 A.2d 848, 854 (2005); Commonwealth v. Collins, 585 Pa. 45, 68, 888 A.2d 564, 577-78 (2005). However, [‘]the mere possibility that an item of undisclosed information might have helped the defense, or might have affected the outcome of the trial, does not establish materiality in the constitutional sense.[’] Commonwealth v. Chambers, 570 Pa. 3, 29, 807 A.2d 872, 887 (2002) (citation omitted and emphasis added). Rather, evidence is material [‘]only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.[’] Id. at 29, 807 A.2d at 887-88.”

Commonwealth v. Willis, 46 A.3d 648, 656 (2012).

Regarding Appellant’s first issue, we find that Appellant has failed to

show he was prejudiced as a result of the timing of the Commonwealth’s

disclosure. Here, it is undisputed that Appellant was provided with verbatim

transcriptions of the text messages represented in Commonwealth’s Exhibit 1

since the initial discovery packet was sent, and Appellant was provided with

screenshots of both sets of messages five days in advance of trial. Appellant

did not seek a continuance based on the timing of this disclosure in order to

develop an alternate trial strategy. Rather, he proceeded on a suppression

strategy, in which he was partially successful. In fact, this strategy yielded the

dismissal of one of the two charges Appellant faced. Relative to

Commonwealth’s Exhibit 2, On appeal, he has not presented a compelling

argument as to how the timing of the Commonwealth’s disclosure of this

evidence gave rise to a reasonable probability that, but for earlier disclosure,

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the proceeding would have been different. Demonstrating that the

Commonwealth made use of the exhibit at trial is not a complete argument in

favor of finding that Appellant was prejudiced, nor is a bald statement that

earlier disclosure might have helped the defense. As such, Appellant’s first

issue merits no relief.

Regarding Appellant’s second and third issues, he has waived them by

failing to develop arguments on those points in his brief3. Although Appellant

presents three questions in his statements of questions involved, his argument

is divided into only two sections, and both sections address only his Brady

claim as set forth in his first question. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a)(requiring that

“[t]he argument shall be divided into as many parts as there are questions to

be argued.”). Confoundingly, Appellant titles the second section of his

argument “[t]he trial court should have excluded all text message evidence,”

but does develop a recognizable argument concerning exclusion of evidence.

While his brief’s summary of the argument signals that he intended to develop

an argument relative to his second question presented predicated upon an

alleged violation of Pa.R.Crim.P. 573 arising from to the late disclosure of the

text message screenshots, no mention of said rule is included in this section,

nor is any authority cited in support of this contention. Appellant does not so

3 We note that Appellant’s “Summary of Argument” does include summaries of arguments relative to his second and third questions presented, but he appears to have abandoned these arguments as they are absent from the remainder of his brief. See Appellant’s Brief at 8-9, 9-16.

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much as include a third section to address his third question, let alone develop

an argument sufficient to allow for our review. It is well established that this

Court will not act as counsel and will not develop arguments on behalf of an

appellant." Commonwealth v. Kane, 10 A.3d 327, 331 (Pa. Super. 2010).

See also, Commonwealth v. Buterbaugh, 91 A.3d 1247, 1262 (Pa. Super.

2014) (en banc), appeal denied, 104 A.3d 1 (Pa. 2014)("The Pennsylvania

Rules of Appellate Procedure require that each question an appellant raises be

supported by discussion and analysis of pertinent authority, and failure to do

so constitutes waiver of the claim.") (citation omitted, emphasis added). Thus,

Appellant’s second and third issues are waived and do not entitle Appellant to

relief.

Therefore, for the foregoing reasons, Appellant has failed to present any

issue meriting relief, and we affirm his judgment of sentence. Judgment of

sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 10/23/2025

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