Com. v. Seagraves, I.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: November 6, 2014
• Docket: 2758 EDA 2013
• Status: Published

Opinion

J.S43045/14

2014 PA Super 252

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA Appellee : : v. : : IAN THOMAS SEAGRAVES, : : Appellant : No. 2758 EDA 2013

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence September 20, 2013 In the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County Criminal Division No(s).: CP-45-CR-0000298-2009

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., ALLEN, and FITZGERALD,* JJ.

DISSENTING OPINION BY FITZGERALD, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 06, 2014

I respectfully dissent. While Appellant argues the trial court erred in

focusing solely on decertification factors, his Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) statement

also avers the court abused its discretion in failing to consider properly

mitigating factors due to his status as a juvenile. In Commonwealth v.

Batts, 620 Pa. 115, 66 A.3d 286 (2013), our Supreme Court discussed

Miller v. Alabama, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed. 407 (2012), in

pertinent part:

The majority [in Miller found] individualized consideration of mitigating circumstances—particularly youth—was constitutionally required before the imposition of . . . the harshest sentence possible for a juvenile. [T]he

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court. J. S43045/14

mandatory nature of the life-without-parole sentences at issue precluded the sentencing court from considering important factors, such as chronological age, level of maturity, family and home environment, the circumstances of the offense, the extent of the juvenile’s participation in the unlawful conduct, the impact of familial and peer pressures, the juvenile’s ability to negotiate with police or prosecutors, and the possibility of rehabilitation. . . .

However, the Supreme Court did not entirely foreclose the imposition of a life-without-parole sentence on a juvenile offender; rather, the majority stated that the occasion for such a punishment would be “uncommon,” and, in any event, must first “take into account how children are different, and how those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison.”

Batts, 620 Pa. at 123, 66 A.3d at 290-91 (emphases added) (citations

omitted).

At resentencing, defense counsel vigorously argued for the possibility

of parole, to permit a future parole board to examine how Appellant’s “life

has progressed.” N.T., 9/20/13, at 6-7. Counsel reasoned that Appellant

may not ever be paroled, but that “to close that door on him [now] is

against what the [C]onstitution stands for based on” Miller. Id. at 7.

The majority cogently summarizes the trial court’s findings with

respect to each of the Miller factors. However, I depart from its analysis

with respect to the finding as to whether Appellant may be amenable to

rehabilitation. In its opinion, the trial court summarized Appellant’s past

contacts with the juvenile system and concluded Appellant “possesses a

limited, if any, capacity for change.” Trial Ct. Op., 11/27/13, at 5

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(emphasis added). Although this statement must be considered in context

of the trial court’s lengthy discussion, I believe its equivocality does not

support an irrevocable sentence that prohibits a parole board from ever

reviewing Appellant’s case. I emphasize Miller’s caution that life

imprisonment without parole is “the harshest sentence possible for a

juvenile” and should be an “uncommon” punishment. Batts, 620 Pa. at

123, 66 A.3d at 290-91. Accordingly, I would remand for the trial court to

reconsider the possibility of Appellant’s rehabilitation. See id.

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