Com. v. Schreffler, J.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: March 6, 2026
• Docket: 286 MDA 2025
• Status: Unpublished
• Author: Stabile

Opinions

J-S34041-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA Appellant : : : v. : : : JONATHAN MICHAEL SCHREFFLER : No. 286 MDA 2025

Appeal from the Suppression Order Entered January 29, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Criminal Division at No: CP-67-CR-0003890-2024

BEFORE: STABILE, J., SULLIVAN, J., and BENDER, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED: MARCH 6, 2026

The Commonwealth challenges the trial court’s order denying its motion

for a continuance and granting the motion to suppress filed by Appellee,

Jonathan Michael Schreffler, due to the Commonwealth’s failure to secure the

presence of an essential witness. The Commonwealth has certified in its

timely notice of appeal that the order will terminate or substantially handicap

the prosecution pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 311. Upon review, we reverse and

remand for further proceedings.

On June 29, 2024, Appellee was arrested, and later charged with,

driving under the influence (DUI) – general impairment and driving at an

unsafe speed.1 Following a preliminary hearing, the charges were bound over

the court of common pleas. After filing a continuance request prior to the

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1 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(a)(1) and 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3361, respectively. J-S34041-25

initial plea hearing, Appellee filed a motion to suppress evidence on November

22, 2024. Contemporaneous with the motion, Appellee also filed another

continuance request, noting that the suppression motion should be decided

prior to the scheduled trial date of December 4, 2024. The trial court granted

the continuance, and scheduled both the suppression and plea hearings for

January 29, 2025.

At the January 29th hearing, the Commonwealth informed the court that

the affiant, Officer Douglas Klinefelter of the Newberry Township Police

Department, was not present. N.T. Suppression Hearing, 1/29/25, at 1. The

Commonwealth noted that it sent Officer Klinefelter a subpoena to appear for

the hearing on January 9, 2025. Id. at 4. After failing to appear for the

hearing, the Commonwealth called the officer and spoke with him on the

phone. Id. at 1. Officer Klinefelter informed the Commonwealth that he had

the wrong date for the hearing on his calendar. Id. at 2. When asked if he

could still attend, albeit late, Officer Klinefelter said that he had the flu and

had just left work to start a sick day. Id. As Officer Klinefelter had a fever,

the Commonwealth told him not to come to court. Id. The Commonwealth

then asked for a continuance of the suppression hearing. Id.

After discussion, the trial court denied the continuance request. The

trial court also found that the Commonwealth was unable to meet its burden

of establishing that the evidence was not obtained in violation of Appellee’s

rights. See id. at 4. Accordingly, the trial court granted the motion to

suppress, and set a new date for Appellee’s trial. Id. The Commonwealth

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filed a timely notice of appeal on February 28, 2024. Both the Commonwealth

and the trial court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

On appeal, the Commonwealth presents the following issues for our

review:2

I. The trial court abused its discretion in denying the Commonwealth’s motion for a continuance where its essential witness was unexpectedly unavailable.

II. The trial court erred in granting [Appellee’s] motion to suppress as a direct consequence of improperly denying the Commonwealth’s continuance request.

Commonwealth’s Brief, at 9, 17 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

We review the grant or denial of a request for a continuance for abuse

of discretion:

[A]n abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment. Rather, discretion is abused when the law is overridden or misapplied, the judgment exercised is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will, as shown by the evidence or the record[.]

Commonwealth v. Brooks, 104 A.3d 466, 469 (Pa. 2014) (citation omitted).

The granting of continuances in criminal cases is governed by

Pa.R.Crim.P. 106, which reads, in pertinent part:

2 We note that the Commonwealth’s brief fails to include, as required by Rule

of Appellate Procedure 2111(a)(4), a separate section setting forth a Statement of the Questions Involved. The brief likewise fails to include the documents required by Rule 2111(a)(10) (trial court opinion) and Rule 2111(a)(11) (statement of errors complained of on appeal). We caution counsel to be more careful in future appeals to adhere to the Rules of Appellate Procedure. However, as these discrepancies do not hamper our appellate review in this case, we take no action with respect to these errors in the brief.

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(A) The court or issuing authority may, in the interests of justice, grant a continuance, on its own motion, or on the motion of either party.

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(D) A motion for continuance on behalf of the defendant shall be made not later than 48 hours before the time set for the proceeding. A later motion shall be entertained only when the opportunity therefor did not previously exist, or the defendant was not aware of the grounds for the motion, or the interests of justice require it.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 106(A), (D). While subsection 106(D) refers to a “motion for

continuance on behalf of the defendant,” this Court has applied the language

to motions by the Commonwealth as well. See, e.g., Commonwealth v.

Micelli, 573 A.2d 606 (Pa. Super. 1990). We are further guided by the

following:

This Court has observed that trial judges necessarily require a great deal of latitude in scheduling trials. Not the least of their problems is that of assembling the witnesses, lawyers, and jurors at the same place at the same time, and this burden counsels against continuances except for compelling reasons. However, the trial court exceeds the bounds of its discretion when it denies a continuance on the basis of an unreasonable and arbitrary insistence upon expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for delay. Accordingly, we must examine the reasons presented to the trial court for requesting the continuance, as well as the trial court’s reasons for denying the request.

Commonwealth v. Norton, 144 A.3d 139, 143 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citations

and quotation marks omitted).

Instantly, the Commonwealth argues that the trial court abused its

discretion in failing to grant its motion for continuance. See Commonwealth’s

Brief, at 9-11. The Commonwealth directs our attention, inter alia, to Micelli.

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In that case, the defendant was charged with DUI and possession of drug

paraphernalia. Micelli, 573 A.2d at 607. A trial was scheduled for June 28,

1989. Id. On May 12, 1989, the Commonwealth sent a subpoena to Officer

Manning, the main witness in the case. Id.

Four days later, on May 16, 1989, Officer Manning was ordered to report

for a two-week period of reserve duty in the Pennsylvania National Guard,

which overlapped with the trial date. Id. The Commonwealth received notice

of Officer Manning’s unavailability for trial on June 15, 1989. Id. On June 19,

1989, the Commonwealth requested a continuance on the basis that an

essential witness would be unavailable. Id. Following a hearing, the trial

court denied the continuance, noting that the officer knew of his orders

months previously, but the Commonwealth failed to act diligently in ensuring

the officer’s availability for trial. Id. The trial court dismissed the charges,

and the Commonwealth appealed to this Court. Id.

On appeal, a panel of this Court observed that several factors should be

taken into consideration when determining whether to grant a continuance

based on the absence of a witness:

(1) the necessity of the witness to strengthen the [requesting party’s] case; (2) the essentiality of the witness to the [party’s case]; (3) the diligence exercised to procure his [or her] presence at trial; (4) the facts to which he [or she] could testify; and (5) the likelihood that he [or she] could be produced at the next term of court.

Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Scott, 365 A.2d 140, 143 (Pa. 1976)).

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Applying these factors, this Court in Micelli concluded that the trial

court abused its discretion. We emphasized that the presence of the officer

was necessary to the Commonwealth’s case, that the Commonwealth would

have “no problem” securing the officer’s presence at a later trial date, and

that the Commonwealth acted with due diligence in ensuring the presence of

the officer. Id. at 608. Specifically, we noted:

Officer Manning was given notice on May 12th of the trial date but did not receive his orders for reserve duty until May 16th. He did not notify the district attorney’s office of the conflict in his schedule until June 15, 1989[,] which was a Thursday. The following Monday the Commonwealth petitioned for a continuance. We find the Commonwealth acted diligently and cannot be expected to continually verify the trial date with all of its witnesses.

Id. (emphasis added).

In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court explained its reasoning for

denying the Commonwealth’s continuance request:

[D]uring the pendency of this case, [Appellee] made two timely continuance requests that provided the [trial court] with a surfeit time to consider the requests without wasting precious time in our bloated and overflowing schedule. The Commonwealth, by contrast, despite the January 29, 2025[,] suppression hearing having been scheduled on November 25, 2024, waited until January 9, 2025[,] to subpoena the officer. Setting aside the clearly lax attitude that the Commonwealth had towards securing a necessary witness, the Commonwealth attorney made clear that no one from the District Attorney’s office had been in contact with Officer Klinefelter prior to and about the January 29, 2025[,] hearing. The assistant district attorney informed the [trial court] that he called Officer Klinefelter after the officer failed to appear.

It was surprising that the Commonwealth had not prepared or even touched bases with an indispensable witness prior to a suppression hearing that would turn upon that witness’ testimony.

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The Commonwealth did not perform their due diligence in securing their necessary witness. Moreover, [Appellee] incurred costs in taking off from work while simultaneously paying for defense counsel to prepare and appear for the hearing.

To the extent that the Commonwealth might seek to bolster its having issued a subpoena by noting that it reached out to Officer Klinefelter via phone call and ascertained that the officer might have been ill, we would note the temporal deficiency of such an assertion. Any actions taken by the Commonwealth after the officer had failed to appear should not be factored into any due diligence calculus. Had the Commonwealth done their due diligence and reached out to the officer before the hearing then the officer would have been aware of the hearing and he likely would have been able to apprise the Commonwealth of his illness much sooner than after the hearing was scheduled to occur. Had this orderly progression, based upon due diligence, occurred then the [trial court] could have, on an emergency basis, excused the officer as unavailable and quite possibly limited the extra costs borne by [Appellee].

Trial Court Opinion, 4/25/25, at 7-8 (emphasis in the original).

We disagree with the rationale of the trial court, and find Micelli

controls. First, the trial court failed to acknowledge that Rule 106 allows for

late requests for a continuance to be granted when “the opportunity therefor

did not previously exist, or the [Commonwealth] was not aware of the grounds

for the motion, or the interests of justice request it.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 106(D).

The Commonwealth “was not aware of the grounds for the motion,” i.e. that

Officer Klinefelter had the wrong date in his calendar and was sick, until the

date of the hearing, and “the interests of justice” indicate that a continuance

should have been granted.

Second, the trial court faults the Commonwealth for something that they

could have done. The Commonwealth sent Officer Klinefelter a subpoena on

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January 9, 2025 – 20 days before the scheduled hearing. We cannot locate

any authority requiring the Commonwealth to prepare or “touch base” with a

witness after a subpoena was lawfully sent. Nor has Appellee or the trial court

provided us with any. Moreover, the Commonwealth “cannot be expected to

continually verify the trial date” with its witness. Micelli, 573 A.2d at 608.

The Commonwealth sent Officer Klinefelter a subpoena to attend the hearing.

The mistake came from a clerical error. There was no evidence of negligent

behavior on behalf of the Commonwealth. The fact that the Commonwealth

could have done something and fortuitously learned that the officer had the

wrong date in his calendar does not amount to negligence or malfeasance on

the part of the Commonwealth. Even if the Commonwealth contacted the

officer prior to the hearing and ensured that he had the correct date, the fact

remains that Officer Klinefelter was sick the day of the hearing, and that would

have been grounds for a continuance.

Lastly, applying the Micelli factors to the instant case supports the

conclusion that a continuance should have been granted. As the affiant,

Officer Klinefelter was essential to the Commonwealth’s case, his testimony

was necessary to the prosecution, and the Commonwealth would likely be able

to produce him at the next available trial date. The Commonwealth sent the

officer a subpoena with the correct date of the suppression hearing.

Therefore, we conclude that the Commonwealth exercised diligence in

ensuring the officer’s presence.

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Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in

refusing to grant the Commonwealth’s continuance request, and we remand

so that a new suppression hearing may be scheduled.

Order reversed. Case remanded for further proceedings consistent with

this memorandum. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judge Sullivan joins the memorandum.

President Judge Emeritus Bender files a dissenting memorandum.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 03/06/2026

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