J-S40006-14
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellee
v.
THOMAS L. SCHORR,
Appellant No. 1218 MDA 2013
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 29, 2013 In the Court of Common Pleas of Northumberland County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-49-CR-0000898-2010
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., BOWES, J., and PANELLA, J.
MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED SEPTEMBER 15, 2014
Appellant, Thomas L. Schorr, appeals from the judgment of sentence
of an aggregate term of 18
challenges the sufficiency of the evidence introduced at his trial. After
careful review, we affirm.
Appellant proceeded to a nonjury trial on April 15, 2013. The facts
adduced at trial were as follows:
On the date of the accident, [Appellant] and his girlfriend went where she lived with her mother, to pick up her and her boyfriend, Joel Nies. The home is situated at the end of a long, dirt driveway. Inexplicably, [Appellant] immediately upon leaving started to drive in an erratic fashion. Harris'[s] mother testified that when [Appellant] pulled away from the house she could hear the car "burn out" and heard stones hitting her vehicle, which was parked in the
"flying up the road" after turning out of the driveway. Harris'[s] mother was J-S40006-14
her daughter's cell phone. This was corroborated by Nies, who was in the backseat of the car with Harris. He testified that as [Appellant] drove down Rebecca Harris'[s] driveway, he slid on gravel and nearly failed to make it around a turn in the driveway. At that point, both he and Bethany Harris told [Appellant] that if he was going to drive that way they were going to get out of the car. According to Nies, Harris was scared, and was shuddering and shaking, as she had been a passenger in a car that was in an accident just three months prior thereto.
McKees Road a two-lane highway, [Appellant] continued to speed up and he left the road, nearly hitting several mailboxes. After that near miss, [Appellant] left the road again, traveling into a ditch so that the tires of the car were off the ground and Nies could see the ground next to his face. [Appellant] managed to drive the car out of the ditch and resumed his high speed, at which point Harris again pleaded with [Appellant], screaming: "Stop the car or I'm going to jump out." When [Appellant] still failed to stop the car or otherwise react in any way to her pleas, Harris jumped out. It was only then that [Appellant] finally stopped his car. While Harris was lying in the road bleeding from her head and struggling to breathe, [Appellant] did not render aid to her but instead proceeded to change a tire on his car, which had blown out when he careened into the ditch along the side of the road.
Trial Court Opinion (TCO), 9/13/13, at 2 3.
Id. at 1. At the conclusion
accidents involving death or serious bodily injury while not properly licensed,
recklessly endangering another person, disregarding traffic lanes, driving
vehicle at unsafe speed, reckless driving, and false reports; and two counts
each of driving while operating privileges are suspended or revoked, and
careless driving. On May 28, 2013, Appellant was sentenced to an
-2- J-S40006-14
aggregate term of 18 -
appeal, as well as a timely concise statement of errors complained of on
appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P 1925(b).
Appellant now presents the following question for our review:
1. Was the evidence legally insufficient and[,] therefore[,] did the lower court err when it found Appellant guilty of accident involving death while not properly licensed and recklessly endangering another person?
capitalization omitted).
Appellant first argues that the evidence was not sufficient to sustain
his conviction for accident involving death while not properly licensed.1
occurred;
collision.2 urisprudence has ____________________________________________
1 Accidents involving death or personal injury while not properly licensed is defined in applicable part at 75 Pa.C.S. § 3742.1: A person whose operating privilege was disqualified, canceled, recalled, revoked or suspended and not ense under this section if the person was the driver of any vehicle and caused an accident resulting in injury or death of
2 Our standard of review of such claims on appeal is well-settled:
A claim challenging the sufficiency of the evidence is a question of law. Evidence will be deemed sufficient to support the verdict when it establishes each material element of the crime charged and the commission thereof by the accused, beyond a (Footnote Continued Next Page)
-3- J-S40006-14
in 75 Pa.C.S. § 3742, accidents involving death or personal injury (which
criminalizes leaving the scene after a so-called hit-and-run accident). This
physical contact with a vehicle, other object, or person during the course of
Commonwealth v. Lowry, 55 A.3d 743, 748 (Pa. Super.
2012). This Court observed,
To interpret Section 3742 to require some form of physical contact would permit defendants to circumvent that intent. For example, under Appellant's interpretation of Section 3742, a driver who intentionally runs someone off the road, yet does not contact the other vehicle, and then flees the scene, would not be guilty of a Section 3742 violation (although he may be guilty of other offenses). Certainly, such an absurd result was not the General Assembly's intent when it passed Section 3742.
Id. at 748.
_______________________ (Footnote Continued)
reasonable doubt . . . . When reviewing the sufficiency claim the court is required to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict winner giving the prosecution the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence.
Commonwealth v. Widmer, 744 A.2d 745, 751 (Pa. 2000) (citations
omitted).
-4- J-S40006-14
The Lowry
instant case. The Lowry
language in 3742.1.
However, the Lowry C
holding in Commonwealth v. Wisneski, 29 A.3d 1150 (Pa. 2011), noting
the Wisneski
Lowry, 55 A.3d at 749. In
Wisneski, the victim was subject to multiple collisions. The Wisneski
Court concluded that the individual facts of a case would determine whether
a victim subjected to multiple collisions was also subjected to multiple
accidents within the meaning of the statute. As such, the Supreme Court
for the purposes of section 3742.
Moreover, it is not difficult to conceive of factual situations where a
driver could cause an accident resulting in injury or death where the victim
is not subjected to a collision
vehicle leaves the road, then stops abruptly on a rough surface, which
causes his passenger to suffer a concussion. Accordingly, we conclude
3742.1 requires proof of a collision is without merit.
-5- J-S40006-14
the record. As
observed by the trial court:
Commonwealth must prove that a defendant acted with criminal negligence; on its face[,] the statute contains a causation element. Commonwealth v. Hurst, 889 A.2d 624 (Pa.Super. 2005). In Commonwealth v. Rementer, 598 A.2d 1300 (Pa. Super.
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J-S40006-14
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellee
v.
THOMAS L. SCHORR,
Appellant No. 1218 MDA 2013
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 29, 2013 In the Court of Common Pleas of Northumberland County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-49-CR-0000898-2010
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., BOWES, J., and PANELLA, J.
MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED SEPTEMBER 15, 2014
Appellant, Thomas L. Schorr, appeals from the judgment of sentence
of an aggregate term of 18
challenges the sufficiency of the evidence introduced at his trial. After
careful review, we affirm.
Appellant proceeded to a nonjury trial on April 15, 2013. The facts
adduced at trial were as follows:
On the date of the accident, [Appellant] and his girlfriend went where she lived with her mother, to pick up her and her boyfriend, Joel Nies. The home is situated at the end of a long, dirt driveway. Inexplicably, [Appellant] immediately upon leaving started to drive in an erratic fashion. Harris'[s] mother testified that when [Appellant] pulled away from the house she could hear the car "burn out" and heard stones hitting her vehicle, which was parked in the
"flying up the road" after turning out of the driveway. Harris'[s] mother was J-S40006-14
her daughter's cell phone. This was corroborated by Nies, who was in the backseat of the car with Harris. He testified that as [Appellant] drove down Rebecca Harris'[s] driveway, he slid on gravel and nearly failed to make it around a turn in the driveway. At that point, both he and Bethany Harris told [Appellant] that if he was going to drive that way they were going to get out of the car. According to Nies, Harris was scared, and was shuddering and shaking, as she had been a passenger in a car that was in an accident just three months prior thereto.
McKees Road a two-lane highway, [Appellant] continued to speed up and he left the road, nearly hitting several mailboxes. After that near miss, [Appellant] left the road again, traveling into a ditch so that the tires of the car were off the ground and Nies could see the ground next to his face. [Appellant] managed to drive the car out of the ditch and resumed his high speed, at which point Harris again pleaded with [Appellant], screaming: "Stop the car or I'm going to jump out." When [Appellant] still failed to stop the car or otherwise react in any way to her pleas, Harris jumped out. It was only then that [Appellant] finally stopped his car. While Harris was lying in the road bleeding from her head and struggling to breathe, [Appellant] did not render aid to her but instead proceeded to change a tire on his car, which had blown out when he careened into the ditch along the side of the road.
Trial Court Opinion (TCO), 9/13/13, at 2 3.
Id. at 1. At the conclusion
accidents involving death or serious bodily injury while not properly licensed,
recklessly endangering another person, disregarding traffic lanes, driving
vehicle at unsafe speed, reckless driving, and false reports; and two counts
each of driving while operating privileges are suspended or revoked, and
careless driving. On May 28, 2013, Appellant was sentenced to an
-2- J-S40006-14
aggregate term of 18 -
appeal, as well as a timely concise statement of errors complained of on
appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P 1925(b).
Appellant now presents the following question for our review:
1. Was the evidence legally insufficient and[,] therefore[,] did the lower court err when it found Appellant guilty of accident involving death while not properly licensed and recklessly endangering another person?
capitalization omitted).
Appellant first argues that the evidence was not sufficient to sustain
his conviction for accident involving death while not properly licensed.1
occurred;
collision.2 urisprudence has ____________________________________________
1 Accidents involving death or personal injury while not properly licensed is defined in applicable part at 75 Pa.C.S. § 3742.1: A person whose operating privilege was disqualified, canceled, recalled, revoked or suspended and not ense under this section if the person was the driver of any vehicle and caused an accident resulting in injury or death of
2 Our standard of review of such claims on appeal is well-settled:
A claim challenging the sufficiency of the evidence is a question of law. Evidence will be deemed sufficient to support the verdict when it establishes each material element of the crime charged and the commission thereof by the accused, beyond a (Footnote Continued Next Page)
-3- J-S40006-14
in 75 Pa.C.S. § 3742, accidents involving death or personal injury (which
criminalizes leaving the scene after a so-called hit-and-run accident). This
physical contact with a vehicle, other object, or person during the course of
Commonwealth v. Lowry, 55 A.3d 743, 748 (Pa. Super.
2012). This Court observed,
To interpret Section 3742 to require some form of physical contact would permit defendants to circumvent that intent. For example, under Appellant's interpretation of Section 3742, a driver who intentionally runs someone off the road, yet does not contact the other vehicle, and then flees the scene, would not be guilty of a Section 3742 violation (although he may be guilty of other offenses). Certainly, such an absurd result was not the General Assembly's intent when it passed Section 3742.
Id. at 748.
_______________________ (Footnote Continued)
reasonable doubt . . . . When reviewing the sufficiency claim the court is required to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict winner giving the prosecution the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence.
Commonwealth v. Widmer, 744 A.2d 745, 751 (Pa. 2000) (citations
omitted).
-4- J-S40006-14
The Lowry
instant case. The Lowry
language in 3742.1.
However, the Lowry C
holding in Commonwealth v. Wisneski, 29 A.3d 1150 (Pa. 2011), noting
the Wisneski
Lowry, 55 A.3d at 749. In
Wisneski, the victim was subject to multiple collisions. The Wisneski
Court concluded that the individual facts of a case would determine whether
a victim subjected to multiple collisions was also subjected to multiple
accidents within the meaning of the statute. As such, the Supreme Court
for the purposes of section 3742.
Moreover, it is not difficult to conceive of factual situations where a
driver could cause an accident resulting in injury or death where the victim
is not subjected to a collision
vehicle leaves the road, then stops abruptly on a rough surface, which
causes his passenger to suffer a concussion. Accordingly, we conclude
3742.1 requires proof of a collision is without merit.
-5- J-S40006-14
the record. As
observed by the trial court:
Commonwealth must prove that a defendant acted with criminal negligence; on its face[,] the statute contains a causation element. Commonwealth v. Hurst, 889 A.2d 624 (Pa.Super. 2005). In Commonwealth v. Rementer, 598 A.2d 1300 (Pa. Super. 1991), the Superior Court considered a defendant's challenge to his third-degree murder conviction on the basis that there was insufficient evidence on the issue of causation to prove that his conduct caused the victim's death. In Rementer, the victim was attempting to escape an ongoing assault by the Defendant when she was struck and killed by a car. Id. The Court reasoned that criminal causation involves a case-by-case determination of whether "the defendant's conduct [was] so directly and substantially linked to the actual result as to give rise to the imposition of criminal liability or was the actual result so remote and attenuated that it would be unfair to hold the defendant responsible for it." Id. at 1304-05. The Superior Court ultimately concluded that it was natural and foreseeable that an assault victim would attempt to escape the harm of an assault, and the victim in that case "was clearly intent upon escaping her assailant at any cost and attempted to do so repeatedly." Id. at 1308. Likewise, in this case it was -of-control driving could or
only did [Appellant] lose control of the car multiple times before the victim exited the vehicle, the victim, who had a history of being a victim of a prior motor vehicle accident on this same road, also pleaded with him to stop the car, told him that she wanted to get out of the car before they he [sic] had even left her driveway, and plainly told him right before she did so: "Stop the car or I'm going to jump out." Thus, [Appellant] was aware of her intentions[,] yet recklessly ignored her pleas while continuing to drive in a [dangerous] manner. While a person driving down the road in a normal fashion could not be expected to anticipate that a rear seat passenger would decide to jump out of the moving car, this case presents a far different factual scenario. This case presents the other end of the spectrum as
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referred to in Rementer, ie., conduct by a defendant that gives rise to criminal liability [because] [that] defendant is aware of the risk of harm posed to the victim[,] and persists in such conduct.
TCO at 3 - 5
conviction of accidents involving death is meritless.
cient to
sustain his conviction for recklessly endangering another person. Appellant
26. Furthermor
Id.
Recklessly endangering another person is defined at 18 Pa.C.S. §
2705 A person commits a misdemeanor of the second degree if he
recklessly engages in conduct which places or may place another person in
left the road surface, nearly striking several mailboxes; and then navigated
the car into a ditch. Even then, Appellant did not stop the car, and damaged
a tire as he continued to drive. Appellant refused to stop over the increasing
objections of his passengers, even as he traveled 71 feet along a berm. We
driving placed his passengers in danger of death or serious bodily injury.
-7- J-S40006-14
ot result
the causation required to support a conviction under this statute. The
statute criminalizes conduct which places another in danger of death or
serious bodily injury, regardless of whether such injury results. See
Commonwealth v. Trowbridge, 395 A.2d 1337, 1340 (Pa. Super. 1978)
(holding that a mens rea [of]
recklessness, (2) an actus reus
The record clearly supports the
of serious bodily injury. As such, this claim is meritless.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary
Date: 9/15/2014
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