J-S06035-18
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : BRANDON SAWYER, : : Appellant : No. 1370 EDA 2017 :
Appeal from the PCRA Order April 3, 2017 in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0012941-2011
BEFORE: BOWES, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED APRIL 13, 2018
Brandon Sawyer (“Sawyer”) appeals from the Order dismissing his
Petition for relief filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”).1
We affirm.
This Court previously summarized the factual history of this case as
follows:
At approximately 1[:00] o’clock in the morning of November 4, 2008, Philadelphia Police Officer Sterling Staton [(“Officer Staton”)] and his partner, Officer Vance, were called to 54th Street and Florence Avenue in West Philadelphia. When they arrived at the scene, Officer Staton observed the body of the victim in this case, Charmaine McGuilken [(hereinafter “McGuilken” or “the decedent”)], lying beneath a pay phone, unresponsive and bleeding from her face. She had the telephone handset in her hand, and the cord connecting it to the phone had been severed. When the medics arrived a few minutes later, they
____________________________________________
1 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. J-S06035-18
pronounced her deceased at the scene. N.T. October 22, 2013, pp. 56-69.
Dr. Sam Gulino [(“Dr. Gulino”)], Chief Medical Examiner in the Office of the Medical Examiner of Philadelphia, performed an autopsy on the decedent …. The decedent sustained two perforating gunshot wounds, to the right side of her face and to her chest. [Id. at] 76-100. Officer John Cannon [(“Officer Cannon”)] of the Firearms Identification Unit gave expert testimony that the ballistics evidence recovered at the scene and from the Medical Examiner all came from the same firearm. Id. at 153-164.
Corey Williams [(“Williams”)] lived in Southwest Philadelphia in 2008, where he knew two men named Aasim Stibbins [(“Stibbins”)] and Aaron McCallum [(“McCallum”)]. [] McCallum, also known as Beano, is [Sawyer’s] cousin. On November 4th, 2008, at approximately 1[:00] in the morning, Williams was selling crack cocaine on the 5400 block of Belmar Terrace, which is a little less than two full blocks east of Florence Avenue. He heard shots, but he stayed on Belmar Terrace because they sounded sufficiently far away that he did not fear for himself. Shortly thereafter, he heard police cars rushing to the scene of the shooting and saw [Sawyer], Stibbins, and McCallum emerge from an alleyway, looking shocked and fearful. The three men went to Stibbins’[s] house. Earlier that day, Williams had seen McCallum with a gun. He knew McCallum to own two guns, a 40-caliber and a 9-millimeter. Id. at 170-181.
At some point after the shooting, Williams was at Stibbins’[s] house speaking with [Sawyer] and McCallum. [Sawyer] told him that he shot [] McGuilken in the head, and he and McCallum laughed off the incident. [Sawyer] said he came out of the alleyway, he shot [the decedent] in the head, and when he shot her the receiver on the phone came off. Stibbins seemed more troubled by what had happened. Id. at 182-187.
On November 6, 2008, Detective Keith Scott [(“Detective Scott”)] and his partner were working near 55th Street and Florence Avenue. He saw [Sawyer] and attempted to stop him, and [Sawyer] ran from him for approximately 100 feet. [Detective] Scott overcame [Sawyer] and took him into custody on an unrelated matter. N.T. October 23, 2013, pp. 36-40.
-2- J-S06035-18
On February 9, 2011, Williams was arrested for selling narcotics. In order to avoid harsh penalties for his narcotics involvement, Williams agreed to give a statement about the murder of [] McGuilken. He told homicide detectives what he remembered from the night of the shooting, and from [Sawyer’s] confession. N.T. October 22, 2013, pp. 188-197.
[] Stibbins knew the decedent, who was his mother’s friend. On February 16th, 2011, he gave a statement to police in which he implicated [Sawyer]. In his statement, he says that he was leaving a woman’s house sometime after midnight and saw [Sawyer] and [] McCallum coming out of a vacant lot, and then saw [Sawyer] raise a gun and shoot the decedent while she was on the phone. N.T. October 23, 2013, pp. 47-79.
On November 8, 2011, Stibbins and his lawyer signed a Memorandum of Agreement with the District Attorney memorializing their agreement that Stibbins [would] testify against [Sawyer] in this case, and that the District Attorney would agree to a sentence of time served on Stibbins’[s] open gun case. Stibbins testified at [Sawyer’s] preliminary hearing that he saw [Sawyer] shoot the decedent. Id. at 104-145.
On the witness stand, [Stibbins] denied being present for [decedent’s] shooting or involved in any way. Rather, he claimed that the detectives who took his statement used [] Williams’[s] statement in order to fabricate a statement for him as well, and that he was not present when the shooting occurred but he was threatened with being charged in this case if he did not put himself at the scene as a witness. Id. at 47-79.
On March 8, 2011, Tyree Thomas [(“Thomas”)] gave a statement to police in which he reported that in February of 2009[,] he was at [] Stibbins’[s] house when Stibbins told him about the shooting. Stibbins said that “the boy, [Sawyer], shot the fiend in the head while she was on the phone” and that Stibbins had witnessed the shooting, having walked up to the intersection just as it was taking place. Id. at 211-224.
Tevin Clark [(“Clark”)], a friend of [] Stibbins, gave a statement on February 17, 2011[,] that Stibbins had told him that [Sawyer] shot the decedent in the eye without provocation, and that Stibbins witnessed the shooting but was not involved. At
-3- J-S06035-18
trial, he claimed that the statement was inaccurate. Id. at 211- 232.
At trial, the Commonwealth played recordings of two phone calls that [Sawyer] made while he was in custody awaiting trial. In the first one, he discusses the fact that “Corey” (presumably [] Williams) gave a statement in this case and “told” in some other cases as well. In the second call, he declares that he has statements made by Williams and “Diddy” and “two other young bouls [sic]” and “I’m’ a send ‘em jawns out tonight, you heard me?” N.T. October 28, 2013, pp. 59; Commonwealth Exhibit 39 (transcripts).
Commonwealth v. Sawyer, 122 A.3d 1118 (Pa. Super. 2015) (unpublished
memorandum at 1-6) (citation omitted).
A jury found Sawyer guilty of first-degree murder, carrying a firearm on
public streets or property in Philadelphia, and possessing an instrument of
crime.2 Thereafter, the trial court sentenced Sawyer to a 42½ years to life in
prison for his conviction of first-degree murder,3 and concurrent prison terms
of one to two years for his convictions of carrying a firearm on the streets or
property in Philadelphia and possessing an instrument of crime. This Court
affirmed Sawyer’s judgment of sentence, after which the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court denied Sawyer’s Petition for allowance of appeal. See
Sawyer, 122 A.3d 1118 (Pa. Super. 2015) (unpublished memorandum),
appeal denied 128 A.3d 1206 (Pa. 2015).
2 See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502, 6108, 907.
3 Sawyer was 15 years old at the time of the murder.
-4- J-S06035-18
On November 2, 2016, Sawyer timely filed the instant PCRA Petition, his
first. After the appointment of counsel and an evidentiary hearing, the PCRA
court dismissed Sawyer’s Petition. Thereafter, Sawyer filed the instant timely
appeal, followed by a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Concise Statement of
matters complained of on appeal.
Sawyer presents the following claims for our review:
I. Were [Sawyer’s] rights pursuant to the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution and Article 1, sec. 9 of the PA Constitution violated in that counsel failed to investigate and present an available witness and evidence that would have corroborated Stibbins[’s] recantation at trial?
II. Were [Sawyer’s] rights pursuant to the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution and Article 1, sec. 9 of the PA Constitution [] violated by counsel[’s] failure to investigate and present available witnesses and evidence of an alternative suspect and the Commonwealth’s abandonment of investigation of that person?
III. Were [Sawyer’s] rights pursuant to the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution and Article 1, sec. 9 of the PA Constitution [] violated by trial counsel’s failure to obtain and present available evidence that would prove that [] Williams[’s] testimony that he had a conversation with [Sawyer] was contrary to the incontrovertible physical evidence of record and should be suppressed?
IV. Were [Sawyer’s] rights pursuant to the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution and Article 1, sec. 9 of the PA Constitution [] violated by counsel’s ineffective failure to object to the hearsay testimony of [] Clark?
V. Were [Sawyer’s] constitutional right to due process of law and a fair trial … violated by the cumulative impact
-5- J-S06035-18
of trial counsel[’s] ineffectiveness in violation of the Sixth Amendment?
Brief for Appellant at 3.
“In reviewing the denial of PCRA relief, we examine whether the PCRA
court's determination is supported by the record and free of legal error.”
Commonwealth v. Montalvo, 114 A.3d 401, 409 (Pa. 2015) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted). “Where a PCRA court fails to support its
holding with sufficient explanations of the facts and law, or fails to provide an
adequate opinion addressing all of the claims raised in a PCRA petition,
including factual and credibility disputes, a remand is appropriate.” Id. at
410.
Sawyer first claims that his constitutional right to effective assistance of
counsel, pursuant to the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution, and Article I, section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution,
was violated by counsel’s failure to investigate and present an available
witness, and evidence that would have corroborated the recantation testimony
of Stibbins. Brief for Appellant at 12. Sawyer directs our attention to
Stibbins’s trial testimony that the detectives interrogating him, including
Detective Pitts, told Stibbins what to say, and corrected his statement about
the incident. Id. at 14. Sawyer asserts that at trial, Stibbins denied telling
Clark that Sawyer had shot the victim. Id. at 15. Sawyer states, “Stibbins
testified at the trial that he only gave testimony at the preliminary hearing
consistent with [his] statement because the [District Attorney] told him to.”
-6- J-S06035-18
Id. In addition, Sawyer contends that at trial, Clark testified that the
statement attributed to him was not correct, and he denied having spoken to
Williams about the crime. Id.
Sawyer asserts that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by
not investigating the detectives involved in taking Stibbins’s statement,
especially Detective Pitts. Id. at 15, 17. Sawyer contends that had counsel
investigated Detective Pitts,
she would have learned that [Detective] Pitts has a documented, admissible, pattern and practice of holding suspects and witnesses in isolation, often handcuffed, for prolonged interrogation periods, threatening, bullying and physically and psychologically coercing suspects and witnesses into giving statements that incriminate a pre-ordained suspect. In other words, [Detective] Pitts had a pattern and practice of making the evidence fit the intended suspect[,] as he did in the instant case.
Id. at 17. Sawyer contends that Detective Pitts was the subject of six civil
lawsuits, each of which accused Detective Pitts of misconduct, including
excessive use of force and false arrest. Id. at 18. According to Sawyer, the
City of Philadelphia settled several lawsuits against Detective Pitts. Id. at 18
n.3. Sawyer asserts that an evidentiary hearing is required, during which trial
counsel can be questioned about her failure to call Detective Pitts, as well as
the men who had filed civil claims against Detective Pitts. Id. at 18. Sawyer
details the cases against these men, Unique Drayton, Nafis Pinkney and Amin
Speaks. Id. at 19-21. Sawyer also disputes the PCRA court’s conclusion that
he did not suffer prejudice from counsel’s inaction, and its conclusion that the
jury considered and rejected Stibbins’s trial recantation testimony. Id. at 22.
-7- J-S06035-18
According to Sawyer, had the evidence of the pattern and practices of
Detective Pitts been presented to the jury, it would have corroborated the
recantation testimony of Stibbins and Clark. Id. at 23.
As this Court has explained,
[t]o be entitled to relief on an ineffectiveness claim, [the petitioner] must prove the underlying claim is of arguable merit, counsel’s performance lacked a reasonable basis, and counsel’s ineffectiveness caused him prejudice. Prejudice in the context of ineffective assistance of counsel means demonstrating there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s error, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. This standard is the same in the PCRA context as when ineffectiveness claims are raised on direct review. Failure to establish any prong of the test will defeat an ineffectiveness claim.
Commonwealth v. Solano, 129 A.3d 1156, 1162-63 (Pa. 2015) (citations
omitted).
In its Opinion, the PCRA court addressed Sawyer’s claim and concluded
that it lacks merit. See PCRA Court Opinion, 5/10/17, at 9-10. The PCRA
court’s findings are supported in the record, and we discern no abuse of
discretion by the PCRA court in rejecting Sawyer’s claim. See id. We
therefore affirm on the basis of the PCRA court’s Opinion with regard to this
-8- J-S06035-18
claim.4 See id.
In his next claim, Sawyer argues that counsel rendered ineffective
assistance by failing to adequately investigate and present available witnesses
regarding an alternative suspect, Joseph Brunner (“Brunner”). Brief for
Appellant at 24. Sawyer contends that Brunner had a lengthy criminal history
involving firearms, drugs and violent crimes. Id. at 25. Sawyer contends
that counsel’s trial strategy, i.e., to implicate Stibbins rather than Brunner,
was not reasonable. Id. at 24. Further, Sawyer contends that the
circumstantial evidence provided by these witnesses would have established
reasonable doubt as to his own involvement. Id. at 27.
In particular, Sawyer points out that Denise Webster (“Webster”), in her
statement to police, observed Brunner running out of Ridgewood Street just
minutes after the shooting. Id. Webster also told police that Brunner carried
a silver-colored revolver, and had previously threatened to “Fuck her up[,]”
referring to the decedent. Id. Sawyer also states that his trial counsel was
4 Sawyer also has filed a Petition for Remand based upon newly obtained evidence. Specifically, Sawyer points out other cases in which it was alleged that Detective Pitts had physically assaulted and coerced witnesses. However, this evidence does not contradict the PCRA court’s determination that Sawyer “neither alleges that Stibbins was physically coerced by Detective Pitts before giving his statement, nor does he argue that Stibbins would testify that he was.” See PCRA Court Opinion, 5/10/17, at 9. Further, Sawyer does not assert that any of the people allegedly assaulted by Detective Pitts would be available to testify upon remand to the PCRA court. Finally, Sawyer does not explain how this information was not available at the time he filed his PCRA Petition or during the PCRA hearing in 2017. Accordingly, we deny Sawyer’s Petition for remand.
-9- J-S06035-18
aware that Jeanine Jones had told police that she had seen Brunner running
through the nearby driveway following the shooting. Id. at 29. Similarly,
Sawyer points out that LaVerne McCall could have testified regarding
animosity between Brunner and the decedent. Id. at 30. Sawyer argues that
these witnesses would have rebutted the testimony of Detective Morton, who
had testified that the case had “gone cold,” and that they had no suspect in
December 2008. Id. at 31. Sawyer takes exception to his trial counsel’s
failure to investigate Brunner, and should have argued that the police believed
that Brunner was the primary suspect. Id. at 32. According to Sawyer,
“Brunner had both motive and opportunity to kill the victim.” Id. at 33.
Sawyer also disputes the PCRA court’s determination that trial counsel’s
strategic decisions were reasonable. Id. at 34.
In its Opinion, the PCRA court addressed this claim and concluded that
it lacks merit. See PCRA Court Opinion, 5/10/17, at 5-8. We agree with the
sound reasoning of the PCRA court, and its conclusion that the claim lacks
merit. See id. We therefore affirm on the basis of the PCRA court’s Opinion
with regard to this claim. See id.
In his third claim, Sawyer asserts that his trial counsel rendered
ineffective assistance by failing to present evidence contradicting Williams’s
testimony, requiring its suppression. Brief for Appellant at 37. Sawyer states
that in Williams’s February 9, 2011 statement to police and trial testimony, he
recalled an incriminating statement by Sawyer wherein Sawyer referred to
- 10 - J-S06035-18
decedent saying that he had “rocked” her and stated, “I shot her in the head.”
Id. According to Sawyer, he told trial counsel that Williams’s statement was
a lie, because Sawyer was in police custody at the time. Id. Sawyer disputes
the PCRA court’s finding that the claim is frivolous, based upon the parties’
stipulation that Sawyer was not in Philadelphia from November 2008 through
February 2010. Id. at 38. In spite of the stipulation, Sawyer argues that his
counsel should have subpoenaed records showing that he was not in
Philadelphia during this time period. Id. at 39.
In its Opinion, the PCRA court addressed this claim and concluded that
it lacks merit. See PCRA Court Opinion, 5/10/17, at 10-11. We agree with
the sound reasoning of the PCRA court, as expressed in its Opinion, and
discern no abuse of discretion in this regard. See id. Accordingly, we affirm
on the basis of the PCRA court’s Opinion with regard to this claim. See id.
In his fourth claim, Sawyer argues that his counsel rendered ineffective
assistance by not objecting to the hearsay testimony of Clark. Brief for
Appellant at 44. According to Sawyer, his counsel should have objected to
the following statement, wherein the prosecutor read out loud, to Clark,
Clark’s prior statement:
[The Prosecutor, reading from Clark’s Statement]: I have a friend named [Stibbins]. We’ve been hanging around together for about a year or two. In February of ‘09[,] I was at [Stibbins’s] house when he told me about the shooting of the lady at 54 th and Florence Avenue back in November the year before. [Stibbins] told me that the boy, [Sawyer], shot the friend in the head while she was on the phone. [Stibbins] told me that Brandon was with another guy named Aaron[,] but he didn’t say what Aaron did.
- 11 - J-S06035-18
[Stibbins] said that he was out there when this happened and he saw what they did. He had just walked up when it happened.
So, [] Clark, my first question is[,] did I get that right? Did I read that accurately?
[Clark]: Yes, you read it accurately.
Q. And that’s what’s on the statement?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you recall that question and answer?
A. No.
Brief for Appellant at 43 (citation omitted). Sawyer contends that because
there was no hearing, there is no evidence as to why counsel failed to object
to this hearsay testimony. Id. at 44. Sawyer insists that a hearing is
necessary, at which time counsel can testify as to his reasons for not objecting
to this testimony. Id.
In its Opinion, the PCRA court addressed this claim and concluded that
it lacks merit. See PCRA Court Opinion, 5/10/17, at 11-12. We agree with
the sound reasoning of the PCRA court, and affirm on this basis as to Sawyer’s
fourth claim. See id. We additionally note the following.
The record supports the trial court’s determination that the statement
at issue was offered to impeach the earlier testimony of Stibbins. In addition,
our review of the record discloses that the statement at issue was used to
impeach Clark’s own testimony. At trial, Clark represented that he was under
the influence and tired at the time he spoke with homicide detectives on
- 12 - J-S06035-18
February 17, 2011. N.T., 10/23/13, at 220. When confronted with each
statement that he made to the homicide detectives, Clark could not recall
making the statement. See id. 220-25 (wherein the prosecutor confronted
Clark with each statement that he made to the detectives, and Clark denied
remembering his statements). We conclude that the evidence also was
properly admitted to refute Clark’s claim that he was under the influence at
the time he spoke with homicide detectives, and could not recall major
portions of his statement. See id.
In his fifth and final claim, Sawyer argues that he is entitled to relief
based upon the cumulative effect of all of his prior claims. Brief for Appellant
at 45. However, because we conclude that the PCRA court did not abuse its
discretion or err, Sawyer is not entitled to relief on this claim.
Petition for Remand denied. Order affirmed.
Judge McLaughlin joins the memorandum.
Judge Bowes concurs in the result.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary
Date: 4/13/18
- 13 - -···-·· · ···-··�··-,·· · . ·"···.· .... · .··... · -·· _,.._.,..... ·•· -Y· ·'vt···.' .. · · ·-·- · '· 0062_Opinion . - ·· · .• -.:s·· .., .. ··· .. · ·:·.•.. -._ ·_: :._:_.:_,::.�:.• : ... · ....,•J·.:· · _. .. ,." ..-.•.. · ...• ··..__,._.-· ·. · .•. · ·· --:::2:;;�. »·· :· ·' '··1. .. ·: ... C ·:•.:.. ::..�·-�.-:.JL· ".·: .. •.. ·--··.·'· .... · .. -· .• · .. : ' ' ... ·. ··.. ; __
Circulated 03/14/2018 11:29 AM
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA CRIMINAL TRIAL DIVISION
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA CP-51-CR-0012941-2011
v. FILED CP-Sl-CR-0012941-2011 c Op,ni:m. v. Sawyer. Brandon
MAY 102017 BRANDON SAWYER Office of Judicial Records IIII I/I II/Ill//II111 /I Ill Appeals/Post Trial 7944991021
OPINION
McDermott, J. May 10, 2017
Procedural History
On July 23, 2011, the Petitioner, Brandon Sawyer, was arrested and charged with Murder
and related offenses. On October 29, 2013, after a trial before this Court, a jury convicted the
Petitioner of First-Degree Murder, Carrying a Firearm in Philadelphia, and Possession of an
Instrument of Crime (PIC). On April 10, 2014, this Court sentenced the Petitioner to forty-two
and one-half years to life in prison for First-Degree Murder, as well as concurrent sentences of
one to two years of incarceration for PIC and Carrying a Firearm in Philadelphia.1 The
Petitioner was fifteen years old at the time of the murder in this case.
The Petitioner appealed and on June 1, 2015, the Superior Court affirmed the Petitioner's
judgment of sentence. On November 24, 2015, the Petitioner's Petition for Allowance of Appeal
was denied.
I On April 10, 2014, at CP-51-CR-0012798-2010, CP-51-CR-0012799-2010, CP-51-CR-0011761-2011, and CP-51- CR-0011762-2011, this Court accepted the defendant's negotiated guilty plea in four Aggravated Assault cases, with the sentences to be run concurrent to the sentence in this case. He received seven and one-half to fifteen years on each charge of Aggravated Assault, seven and one-half to fifteen years for Conspiracy, and one to two years for each of two charges for Possession of an Instrument of Crime, all to run concurrent to one another and to the sentence in this matter. ···"'··--·· ··-·.··-··.···· ·. __ , __..,, .., .. __ · __ ._.·, _.· : ·, ···�.r�··!...-·· .: ··· ··_,:·· .·,,__...•...__:_·._,.::-.:·--·.·· ·.· �·-··· ,_··,.. "·"··,�· ::··:.>.;·'. .. · :,:.,.-.: .. : .. :�· ·, :·�·.··,'..:...:.....J.:JL'...:...�. ·�.....:....�....:..:.:.- ·-�.c:.::..:. a.�.-...:·�..:....- .·· ·-•.:..- . __
On November 2, 2016, the Petitioner filed a timely, counseled Post-Conviction Relief
Act ("PCRA") petition, his first. On January 3, 2017, the Commonwealth filed a Motion to
Dismiss. On March 17, 2017, this Court held an evidentiary hearing. On April 3, 2017, after
hearing argument, this Court dismissed the instant petition. On April 24, 2017, the Petitioner
appealed and on May 2, 2017 filed a Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal pursuant to
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).
On direct appeal, the Superior Court adopted this Court's summary of the relevant facts
and restated them as follows:
At approximately 1 o'clock in the morning of November 4, 2008, Philadelphia Police Officer Sterling Staton and his partner, Officer Vance, were called to 54th Street and Florence Avenue in West Philadelphia. When they arrived at the scene, Officer Staton observed the body of the victim in this case, Charmaine McGuilken, lying beneath a pay phone, unresponsive and bleeding from her face. She had the telephone handset in her hand, and the cord connecting it to the phone had been severed. When the medics arrived a few minutes later, they pronounced her deceased at the scene. Dr. Sam Gulino, Chief Medical Examiner in the Office of the Medical Examiner of Philadelphia, performed an autopsy on the decedent, Charmaine McGuilken. The decedent sustained two perforating gunshot wounds, to the right side of her face and to her chest. Officer John Cannon of the Firearms Identification Unit gave expert testimony that the ballistics evidence recovered at the scene and from the Medical Examiner all came from the same firearm. Corey Williams lived in Southwest Philadelphia in 2008, where he knew two men named Aasim Stibbins and Aaron McCallum. Aaron McCallum, also known as Beano, is (the PetitionerJ's cousin. On November 4th, 2008, at approximately 1 in the morning, Williams was selling crack cocaine on the 5400 block of Belmar Terrace, which is a little less than two full blocks east of Florence Avenue. He heard shots, but he stayed on Belmar Terrace because they sounded sufficiently far away that he did not fear for himself. Shortly thereafter, he heard police cars rushing to the scene of the shooting and saw [the Petitioner], Stibbins, and McCallum emerge from an alleyway, looking shocked and fearful. The three men went to Stibbins' house. Earlier that day, Williams had seen McCallum
2 ·--·-· --�·.. . · · ·- ·�- ·. · _,_. ·. _ �����'- -'- '--"'-'�-'-'-'-'-'-"- '-·'---'"---'-'- '-'�- ---������,�=----�� . J:Ak"···.:.:..:i..a& ·._ :· .1· ·.• -�·;,:.·-- �
with a gun. He knew McCallum to own two guns, a 40-caliber and a 9-millimeter. At some point after the shooting, Williams was at Stibbins' house speaking with [the Petitioner] and McCallum. [The Petitioner] told him that he shot Charmaine McGuilken in the head, and he and McCallum laughed off the incident. [The Petitioner] said he came out of the alleyway, he shot Charmaine in the head, and when he shot her the receiver on the phone came off. Stibbins seemed more troubled by what had happened. On November 6, 2008, Detective Keith Scott and his partner were working near 55th Street and Florence Avenue. He saw [the Petitioner] and attempted to stop him, and [the Petitioner] ran from him for approximately 100 feet. Scott overcame him and took him into custody on an unrelated matter. On February 9, 2011, Williams was arrested for selling narcotics. In order to avoid harsh penalties for his narcotics involvement, Williams agreed to give a statement about the murder of Charmaine McGuilken. He told homicide detectives what he remembered from the night of the shooting, and from [the Petitioner's] confession. Aasim Stibbins knew the decedent, who was his mother's friend. On February 16th, 2011, he gave a statement to police in which he implicated [the Petitioner], In _his statement, he says that he was leaving a woman's house sometime after midnight and saw [the Petitioner] and Aaron McCallum coming out of a vacant lot, and then saw [the Petitioner] raise a gun and shoot the decedent while she was on the phone. On November 8, 2011, Stibbins and his lawyer signed a Memorandum of Agreement with the District Attorney memorializing their agreement that Stibbins testify against [the Petitioner] in this case, and that the District Attorney would agree to a sentence of time served on Stibbins' open gun case. Stibbins testified at [the Petitioner's] preliminary hearing that he saw [the Petitioner] shoot the decedent. On the witness stand, he denied being present for her shooting or involved in any way. Rather, he claimed that the detectives who took his statement used Corey Williams' statement in order to fabricate a statement for him as well, and that he was not present when the shooting occurred but he was threatened with being charged in this case if he did not put himself at the scene as a witness. On March 8, 2011, Tyree Thomas gave a statement to police in which he reported that in February of 2009 he was at Aasim Stibbins' house when Stibbins told him about the shooting. Stibbins said that "the boy, Brandon, shot the fiend in the head while she was on the phone" and that Stibbins had witnessed the shooting, having walked up to the intersection just as it was taking place.
3 .. :._·--.:. .;.;_ _;__;_�__;_•._;_•.;.".•-....il;..:.._......:........:.:.-·_;.:,..;__ . :·.. _ · ·.;....;..;,._;......;;,;,:,:_.._;__....:..:...._.:....:.;::........:..:.:....:_ · .i,:...___:,o_';.._;.•,(.::...�·,,.. _ _._ �··:_·····.- _ .•.. � •.:,"'0'L0"·"C'0··',''•�·'J<:.....:..:'.- :_:..:...::...:.:�·-.:.:_.·." �.-•'•. '·�'···'-',•,a··.:,;,:'·,·'..:;,; •. ·· ..,4·_.,··.····-•···
· Tevin Clark, a friend of Aasim Stibbins, gave a statement on February 17, 2011 that Stibbins had told him that [the Petitioner] shot the decedent in the eye without provocation, and that Stibbins witnessed the shooting but was not involved. At trial, he claimed that the statement was inaccurate. At trial, the Commonwealth played recordings of two phone calls that [the Petitioner] made while he was in custody awaiting trial. In the first one, he discusses the fact that "Corey" (presumably Corey Williams) gave a statement in this case and "told" in some other cases as well. In the second call, he declares that he has statements made by Williams and "Diddy" and "two other young bouls" and "l'm'a send 'emjawns out tonight, you heard me?"
Commonwealth v. Brandon Sawyer, 1403 EDA 2014 at *1-4 (Pa. Super. June 1, 2015) (non-
precedential decision) (citations and footnotes omitted).
Discussion The Petitioner raised five issues for review, arguing that trial counsel were ineffective for
failing to investigate and present: (1) witnesses to establish that alternative suspect Joseph
Brunner was the perpetrator; (2) Detective Pitts, who would have corroborated Stibbins'
recantation (based on impeachment evidence concerning his history of coercing witnesses); and,
(3) physical evidence proving that the Petitioner was in custody when he allegedly confessed to
Williams. The Petitioner further avers the trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to
Tevin Clark's hearsay testimony and that the cumulative effect of counsel's ineffectiveness
prejudiced him.
To warrant relief based on an ineffectiveness claim, a petitioner must show that such
ineffectiveness "in the circumstances of the particular case, so undermined the truth-determining
process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place.
Commonwealth v. Bardo, 105 A.3d 678, 684 (Pa. 2014); 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2)(ii). Counsel is
presumed to have rendered effective assistance. Commonwealth v. Weiss, 81 A.3d 767, 783 (Pa.
2013) (citing Commonwealth v. Sepulveda, 55 A.3d 1108, 1117 (Pa. 2012)).
4 To overcome the presumption, the Petitioner has to satisfy the performance and prejudice
test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). The Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania has applied the Strickland test by looking to three elements, whether (1) the
underlying claim has arguable merit; (2) no reasonable basis existed for counsel's action or
failure to act; and (3) the petitioner has shown that he suffered prejudice as a result of counsel's
lapse, i.e., that there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been
different. Commonwealth v. Pierce, 527 A.2d 973, 975 (Pa. 1987). If a claim fails under any
necessary element of the Strickland/Pierce test, the court may proceed to that element first.
Commonwealth v. Bennett, 57 A.3d 1185, 1195-1196 (Pa. 2011). Counsel will not be deemed
ineffective for failing to raise a meritless claim. Commonwealth v. Rivera, 108 A.3d 779, 789
(Pa. 2014) (citing Commonwealth v. Jones, 912 A.2d 268, 278 (Pa. 2006)).
The Petitioner claims that trial counsel were ineffective for failing to investigate the
alternative suspect Joseph "Jo-Jo" Brunner, and present five witnesses to support the theory that
Brunner was the perpetrator. Appellate courts review matters involving trial strategy
deferentially, and trial counsel will be deemed to have acted reasonably if the chosen strategy
had some reasonable basis designed to effectuate the client's interest. Commonwealth v. Miller,
987 A.2d 638, 653 (Pa. 2009) (citing Commonwealth v. Puksar, 951 A.2d 267, 277 (Pa. 2008)).
A claim of ineffectiveness will not succeed by comparing, in hindsight, the employed trial
strategy with unpursued alternatives. Puksar, 951 A.2d at 277 (citing Commonwealth v. Miller,
819 A.2d 504, 517 (Pa. 2002)). While appellate courts do not completely disregard the
reasonableness of pursuing alternative strategies, the balance tips in favor of finding
effectiveness upon determining that trial counsel's decision had a reasonable basis. Miller, 987
5 ---·--··-:··.. ··--· ··.·,··· · .. ·: --·· ...... ·.·•.·•·· • ·.._.·.,�· .·...-.· ···.· ···--·-···-.: ·.• · ·-·-·--·, ·'·.;·..· .-; ' ..:_ .:, dc·d- ·;' ·,.··.. �- '•· •'' .:, �-·�,-·-· · · ... .;:; ."·:.'c·•.:: -:.:'·�'k:c!/'..:.:.·.;�. · ·.·::.v·:' -�· .. ·: �;dl':r .::.'...:..c".>.".:...:.......:.a·''··::;.:.....;:_;_..:.:i.;,._.· ·.. ·... _.· __...;;+· · · �.:..:..:..-4::_�._...,.:::..;.:.__.:.,.:; __.:: _
. A.2d at 653 (citing Commonwealth v. Cooper, 941 A.2d 655 (Pa. 2007); Pierce, 527 A.2d at
975).
To be entitled to relief on a claim of ineffectiveness for failure to call a witness, an
appellant must demonstrate that the witness: (1) existed; (2) was available and willing to
cooperate; (3) was or should have been known to counsel; and, (4) could have provided
testimony the absence of which prejudiced him. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 139 A.3d 1257,
1284 (Pa. 2016) (citing Commonwealth v. Birdsong, 24 A.3d 319, 334 (Pa. 2011)). To show
prejudice, the petitioner must demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that, but for trail
counsel's allegedly unprofessional conduct, the result of the proceedings would have been
different. Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Baumhammers, 92 A.3d 708, 725 (Pa. 2014)). Where a
petitioner requests an evidentiary hearing, the petition must include a signed certification of each
intended witness stating the witness' name, address, date of birth, substance of his or her
testimony, and any material documents. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(d)(l). Failure to substantially
comply renders the witness' testimony inadmissible. Id
The Petitioner theorizes that, because Brunner often sold Alka Seltzer in place of crack
cocaine, he made a lot of enemies, including the decedent, whom he had a motive to murder. To
support this theory, the Petitioner sought to present Denise Webster as a witness, who would
allegedly testify that she was with the decedent before the murder, that the decedent left her
home, that she and Brunner constantly argued, and that Brunner claimed to have seen her before
the shooting. This testimony would be corroborated by Laverne McCall, who would testify that
she saw the decedent walk towards Ridgewood and 54th Street immediately before the shooting,
that the decedent was upset at Brunner for selling her fake narcotics, and that Brunner threatened
the witness with a revolver on a prior occasion. The Petitioner also sought to present Jeannie
6 �-··.:.,..;..,· -�----·-·................:.·.::...:........:.-.,-- ··--·-·· ..• .- ·---· .. -- ·- ·.·...... - __- .. :..... • .. · .. ' . ·.·- .. · ···� ... �-�··,.·. '· ·•·· . ', .-� ·.-. '. ·.... _.. _. ·.,·.' -���� : •.! ·G"·,···"...!.:.i=�� · -���,.-.;:,,·.. , ..• :, ...... · ... · ... J�.-' .• ·.-.·----�..-·: ....•
Jones, who would testify that she spoke to the deceased eyewitness Cheeri Glen, who allegedly
saw Brunner run away from the crime scene after the shooting. The Petitioner finally sought to
introduce the testimony of two unidentified males, who allegedly told police that they heard that
Brunner was the shooter.
The certifications attached to the PCRA are insufficient to warrant testimony from these
witnesses at the evidentiary hearing this Court conducted regarding trial counsel's selected
defense. Jones is not a witness to the shooting, and serves only to provide the inadmissible
hearsay testimony of the deceased Cheeri Glen. The Petitioner also presents police statements
provided by witnesses Webster and McCall, where they each claim that animosity brewed
between Brunner and the decedent because Brunner repeatedly sold fake drugs. The Petitioner
further submits certifications wherein both Webster and McCall confirm that their original
statement was true. While the statements and certifications support the theory that there was
animosity between Brunner and the decedent, no certification is sufficient to identify any
alternative suspect, let alone Brunner, as the actual shooter. Finally, the Petitioner's failure to
identify the two males who spoke to police violates the PCRA's certification requirement. In
any event, this Court reviewed the Petitioner's pleadings and exhibits and determined that none
of the witnesses claimed to have observed the actual shooting. This evidence, if presented, is
insufficient to prevail over the facts presented at trial, where an eyewitness observed the
Petitioner shoot the decedent, and where the Petitioner confessed his guilt.
Furthermore, during the evidentiary hearing, trial counsel Francis Carmen, Esq. testified
that he was familiar with Brunner based on his investigation prior to trial, that he personally
interviewed Jones, and he investigated McCall and Denise Webster. N.T. 3/17/2017 at 11-21.
Based on the information he and co-counsel Susan Ricci gathered, including Brunner's prior
7 ·--"..:.:....:.....:....;.,.·.:......_c:...;.:.....: · · - ·· ··--·· ·· .. · ·:·· · ··: ·•· -· ···-'. · · · .. -, �.·-.. ·· · ·..·--··· ·· ·.• ··. · ,··-----'· ..••. • · ·· ··."·.�· '.· .•.• ·:: ··• --·-----· .. ··. ·.:: .. :. ·.·., ·' · · · .,__ ;:-•,,,.: """ ••.•• :., •. •-· ·.�···'· ·dl.··.<.··_:·:··: :.. .-:_._-_.,.·,,...,.c-:'; ·.,.· · · c.,.. : ·., ··.._· •.•. ,, ,,>l-,..t:....:..'"...:·:':..:.;.;z,;..;:;:..,,; ••:.·••.
record and his whereabouts at the time of the shooting, trial counsel adopted the theory that
Stibbins was the shooter. Id. at 26-29. As a matter of strategy, trial counsel was concerned that
Glen's death impeded any defense implicating Brunner, as she was the only person who could
place him at the location of the shooting. Id. at 38. Beyond that, trial counsel struggled to
develop Brunner's motive for shooting the decedent. While the decedent may have been upset at
the Petitioner for selling fake drugs, nothing indicated that the Petitioner was upset with the
decedent or had a motive to kill her. Id. at 44-45. Trial counsel also felt that, due to his host of
legal problems, including having been investigated for the instant shooting, Stibbins had great
motive to falsely implicate the Petitioner. Id. at 41, 44. These factors, combined with Stibbins'
availability for cross-examination, convinced trial counsel to implicate him as the shooter. Id. at
41-45.
After hearing trial counsel's testimony, this Court found that trial counsel was not
ineffective for pursuing the chosen trial strategy. Significant evidence, including the
Philadelphia police's own investigation, pointed to Stibbins as a possible suspect, and trial
counsel's theory served the dual purpose of diminishing Stibbins' identification of the Petitioner
as the shooter while implicating Stibbins' as a suspect. The Petitioner further fails to
demonstrate prejudice for failing to call the witnesses supporting his theory that Brunner was the
shooter. None of the suggested witnesses (Webster, McCall, or Jones) witnessed the shooting or
saw Brunner near its location. Glen, the only witness who could place Brunner near the scene
died prior to trial, rendering her unavailable and her alleged testimony as hearsay. Because of
these issues, the purported testimony of these witnesses would do little to advance the
Petitioner's theory that Brunner was the shooter.
8 ,_ -·.. ·�- .. - - ....,�···-���· .,, ,' , .. · .:·.-- : -· . - ' ,·.�:::··.;; .· - .._.,,_ .,·,._.- •. · • .,_ ��)}IL._)··'··· .. ··�- .. -·.: _ ,_,;__ -··-::·.··.,-:·.-·.:·, .. · ·-,,�·:'.:-·'···:.-·,. :,J.':.:· ,
The Petitioner argues that, had trial counsel investigated Detective Pitts' interrogation
techniques, he would have discovered a pattern and practice of coercing individuals into giving
false statements, thereby corroborating Aasim Stibbins' recantation. To support this claim, the
Petitioner cites the cases of former defendants Unique Drayton, Amin Speaks, and Nefis
Pinkney, each of whom could establish Detective Pitts' habitual use of coercive interrogation
techniques. The Petitioner bolsters this claim by citing an April 2016 Philadelphia Daily News
article documenting the more than $1 million dollars the City of Philadelphia paid to settle
claims made against Detective Pitts.
A PCRA petition must, at the very least, describe the evidence that will be presented at a
hearing, and the simple reliance of conclusory accusations is insufficient to warrant a hearing.
Commonwealth v. Castro, 93 A.3d 818, 827 (Pa. 2014). An evidentiary hearing is not meant to
function as a fishing expedition for the potential discovery of evidence to support a speculative
claim. Id. at 827-828 (citing Commonwealth v. Scott, 752 A.2d 871, 877 n. 8 (Pa. 2000)). Any
new evidence must be producible and admissible, but newspaper articles generally constitute
inadmissible hearsay that merely suggests that evidence may exist. Id at 825; Commonwealth v.
Perrin, 108 A.3d 50, 53 (Pa. Super. 2015).
The Petitioner neither alleges that Stibbins was physically coerced by Detective Pitts
before giving his statement, nor does he argue that Stibbins would testify that he was. Instead,
the Petitioner appears to argue that, because Detective Pitts' may have used coercive
interrogation techniques against Pinkney, Drayton, and Speaks in unrelated matters, he must
have done the same to Stibbins. The Petitioner sought to call Pinkney, Drayton, and Speaks to
testify that Pitts coerced them into giving false statements, and trial counsel to explain his alleged
failure to investigate and examine Pitts at trial. The Petitioner failed to attach certifications from
9 ' .... ' ._... ·.,·.·-. -_".. _ _-._ ·-···.,_··_:_..,.:..·�--;· '·_;-··· •.•• •·-•·_;,, __.: . ·..:.,.,_.__ ,·-· ··: ·... ·c•.•-···-.. r., .. · .._•;:;.. .:..c<;.1,:_;,.··-·_c....·. · ·.::>·.· .�····.·._·.. ·:- ......�··-··· ... �(.,...,,;".·'.,'·. ·."' ·:·...:..·0 .. ··,· .. ·-.· ··--···· ·.·... , ...... �·.·��� ·' ''· = ''__;�______:______. ' .;____
any of the witnesses, and merely cites the aforementioned Philadelphia Daily News article and
the holdings in each of their cases to support his argument. 2 While the article points to
allegations that, if true, had the potential to aid the Petitioner's cause, they are nothing more than
inadmissible hearsay in its current form. See Castro, 93 A.3d at 828. Mere speculation as to the
contents of Drayton' s, Speaks', and Pinkney' s testimony are similarly insufficient, as the
Petitioner fails to sufficiently explain the context of their testimony or how it would meet a
hearsay exception.
Even if the Petitioner were permitted to present this evidence in an evidentiary hearing, it
would not sway this Court's opinion for want of prejudice. At trial, Stibbins recanted his police
statement and testified that detectives fabricated said statement by providing him answers to the
questions that he posed. N.T. 10/23/2013 at 56. Stibbins said he did so to avoid being recharged
with an unrelated attempted murder. Id at 56-58. Evidence of what action, if any, Detective
Pitts took during interrogation would only serve to impeach the truthfulness of Stibbins' police
statement, which Stibbins recanted at trial. The jury considered Stibbins' recantation and
rejected it.
The Petitioner next alleges that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to secure evidence
that he was in police custody at the time he allegedly confessed his guilt to Stibbins and witness
Corey Williams. At trial, Williams testified that the Petitioner told himself and Stibbins that he
(the Petitioner) "rocked" the decedent, shooting her in the head and chest. N.T. 10/22/2013 at
241-245. Williams surmised that this conversation took place between two and three months
after the shooting, during either January or February 2009. Id. at 244. The Petitioner claims that
2 The Petitioner acknowledges that Pinkney and Drayton testified at the evidentiary hearing for Commownea/th v. Reed, 1269 EDA 2013, but was unable to obtain the transcripts.
10 ... · ·--"'·.:··.-· ·, ·-·-·--·-·;·. · ·· --·: ··,· ·,· · ·· · · .. -···.:.. ·· .. ·. ··.· ·· _··. · ·· ·· .:.. ·' · · · Z:n--· ·· d:-': · _ ..· ·· · · ·�··-·-- •. ··--·· ··.;-.;··· ••,· .• \· ··· · · ·.' • : -·-· •· ·,. · •· .""=· '·"·· ···· ·· ····,iL,:··.·--:·. · .. ·�: ·'· · ··'··· . ,:�·-"····"'-· ,.·.···" .. : ..,:>*�· , · ..; ..··· ..:.. ,::.;.:..��·..;,; .
he was in custody during that timeframe and that the conversation in question could not have
taken place.
This argument is frivolous as the parties stipulated that the Petitioner was not in
Philadelphia from November 2008 to February 2010. N.T. 10/28/2013 at 73. Where a
stipulation is announced in front of a jury, a challenge to counsel's failure to elicit the
information stipulated to during testimony is frivolous. See Commonwealth v. Paddy, 15 A.3d
431, 459-460 (Pa. 2011). In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, this Court addressed a similar issue where
the Petitioner challenged the weight of the evidence based on Williams' testimony. Then, this
Court noted that trial counsel cross-examined Williams to this discrepancy, to which he
responded that the conversation occurred two months before he gave his statement, in autumn
2010. Rule 1925(a) Opinion at *10; N.T. 10/22/2013 at 228-229. This Court further noted that
the Petitioner failed to submit evidence to establish that he was in custody at the time. In the
intervening two and one-half years since the Petitioner's direct appeal, he still has yet to submit
evidence to support his contention.3 Nevertheless, the stipulation renders the Petitioner's
argument toothless.
The Petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to witness
Tevin Clark's alleged hearsay testimony. Hearsay is a statement that the declarant does not
make while testifying at the current trial or hearing and a party offers that statement in evidence
to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Pa.R.E. 801(c)(l)-(2). Hearsay is generally
inadmissible. A witness may be impeached by extrinsic evidence where (1) the statement is
3The Petitioner sought leave to obtain these records in his November 2, 2016 Motion for Discovery. This Court denied that motion for discovery on the basis that the parties stipulated that the Petitioner was in custody at the time of the alleged conversation and that a very similar issue was addressed by both this Court and the Superior Court on direct appeal.
11 --·······'..·-···-- ... · .·..- .. · ....-.... ·· ·.·.· ··-· · ·; ---�-<.··· ..·· · ·····: ........ �· .:."· · ..... ····:.··· ···,. · ···---······--·:·_.·. · .-0: ··· .· .-;�. .. ,·. ·�-·--··.: ...:·. ,.-.·�.-�·�.h··' ..,-...... · ·.·:--:.·.·.- .......- .• '· ·.•. · 'JL·, .. ·- ·-· ---··.. · ..;. ·<···.r.· ..... ,, ···:·<·.• ·._.·-.:.."·.. , ... · · •• -·-2.·· -. --�· · · · ·. ··�·-�-- ·
disclosed to the witness, (2) the witness had an opportunity to explain or deny the statement, and
(3) the opposing party has the opportunity to cross-examine. Pa.R.E. 613(b).
The Petitioner's argument focuses on a brief exchange between the prosecutor and Clark
where Clark recounted the instance where Stibbins told him that the Petitioner shot the decedent:
Q. "I have a friend named Aasim. We've been hanging around together for about a year or two. In February of '09 I was at Aasim's house when he told me about the shooting of the lady at 54th and Florence Avenue back in November the year before. Aasim told me that the boy, Brandon, shot the fiend in the head while she was on the phone. Aasim told me that Brandon was with another guy named Aaron but he didn't say what Aaron did. Aasim said that he was out there when this happened and saw what they did. He had just walked up when it happened." So, Mr. Clark, my first question is did I get that right? Did I read that accurately? A. Yes, you read it accurately. Q. And that's what's on the statement? A. Yes. Q. Do you recall that question and answer? A.No. Q. Do you recall Aasim telling you what happened to Ms. Charmaine at 54th and Florence? A.No. Q, Do you recall him telling you that Brandon and Aaron were involved in her death? A.No. N.T. 10/23/2013 at 223-224. This evidence was properly admitted to impeach Stibbins'
testimony. Earlier during direct examination, after the prosecutor asked Stibbins whether he
recalled telling Clark about the shooting, Stibbins denied ever having that conversation. Id. at
125-126. Clark was available to cross-examine, and trial counsel did in fact cross-examine
Clark later that day. Id. at 235-238. Trial counsel had no basis to object, and accordingly cannot
be held ineffective for failing to do so.
The Petitioner finally avers that he is entitled to relief based on the cumulative prejudicial
effect of all the aforementioned errors. No number of failed ineffectiveness claims may
12 ...•" ··.•·.·.• · �--·· · ·--·· ·.·· ·,·, ·. �· .. ·.;.. · · -·- · · -�--� ·: ·· . ·· .. -�·· · · ··- ··�--..,.,_· · · · · •.• · .. ·· ..• ······ ··� :·,._ ··&.·· .,.,.· .. v' .. , ·,. ·.·�;,.· '····-··.;..2:;..iL· ,· , __.. ·.,.:.:_,:·.··,,'�··· ·+ ···>·.:·.' ···.�:·.-. · :.,.·. · .. _··· -· '· ..;: --··-
collectively warrant relief if they fail to do so individually. Commonwealth v. Reid, 99 A.3d
470, 520 (Pa. 2014) (citing Commonwealth v. Johnson, 966 A.2d 523, 532 (Pa. 2009)). The
Petitioner failed to allege any meritorious ineffective assistance claim. Therefore, there is no
basis to evaluate any cumulative prejudicial effect.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of this Court should be affirmed.
BY THE COURT,
Barbara A. McDermott, J.
13 '-��.. --·:· -·· .. · · · · ·._ .. -· · .•..:·-�./."'·· --·::._· __.. "0.u.'LU.r;.,.,__ ;d)+ "· ·�d!::�·'
Commonwealth v. Brandon Sawyer, CP-51-CR-0012941-2011
PROOF OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I am this day serving the foregoing filing upon the person(s), and in the manner indicated below, which service satisfies the requirements of Pa. R. Crim. P. 114:
Philadelphia District Attorney's Office Three South Penn Square Philadelphia, PA 19107 Attn: Samuel Ritterman, Esquire
Type of Service: DA's Courthouse Assigned Box
Teri B. Himebaugh, Esq. 2201 Pennsylvania Avenue #513 Philadelphia, PA 19130
Type of Service: First Class Mail
Brandon Sawyer LM 3143 SCI Houtzdale 209 Institution Drive Houtzdale, PA 16698
Type of Service: Certified Mail
Law Clerk to he Honorable Barbara A. McDermott