Com. v. Sargent, S.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania

Com. v. Sargent, S.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania·Decided December 23, 2022·No. 506 MDA 2021·Unpublished

Opinion

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA

:

v. :

:

SCOTT LEE SARGENT :

:

Appellant : No. 506 MDA 2021

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered February 1, 2018 In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-40-CR-0000228-2016

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E., and LAZARUS, J. MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.: FILED: DECEMBER 23, 2022 Scott Lee Sargent engaged in a shooting rampage outside of a Walmart store that quickly turned into a police standoff. He now brings a second nunc pro tunc direct appeal and asks us to review evidentiary determinations made by the trial court and to consider the legality of his sentence. We affirm.

On October 17, 2015, after having visited a local casino, Sargent and his girlfriend went to a Walmart in Wilkes-Barre Township, Pennsylvania. Sargent stayed in the parking lot while his girlfriend went into the store. Believing that he was being followed by two individuals, Sargent used an AR- 15 rifle to open fire into the garage doors at the rear of the store. Police responded to the scene, and Sargent opened fire in the direction of the officers. During a fifteen-minute standoff, Sargent continued to shoot at the various officers as they took positions around the area. When Sargent tried to

flee the area, he continued to shoot at the police as they followed him. Sargent was ultimately subdued when he was shot in the abdomen.

Sargent was charged with multiple counts of attempted murder and related crimes. On October 16, 2017, a jury convicted Sargent of five counts of attempted murder of a law enforcement officer, six counts of assault of a law enforcement officer, one count of aggravated assault, nine counts of recklessly endangering another person (“REAP”), and one count of harassment.1 On December 14, 2017, the trial court sentenced Sargent to serve an aggregate term of incarceration of 179 to 358 years, with an additional 90 days, to be served consecutively. Sargent failed to take a direct appeal. Nevertheless, he filed a petition under the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546, and the PCRA court reinstated his direct appeal rights. However, in his nunc pro tunc direct appeal, Sargent only raised claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Because such issues must await collateral review, this Court affirmed Sargent’s judgment of sentence without prejudice to raise the ineffective assistance claims in a timely PCRA petition. Commonwealth v. Sargent, 1989 MDA 2018, 226 A.3d 629 (Pa. Super. filed January 13, 2020) (unpublished memorandum).

On July 24, 2020, Sargent filed a pro se PCRA petition, and appointed counsel filed an amended petition seeking permission to file post-sentence

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 901(a), 2507(a), 2702.1(a), 2702(a)(1), 2705, 2709(a)(1).

motions nunc pro tunc and a direct appeal nunc pro tunc. On April 14, 2021, the PCRA court granted Sargent’s request to file a direct appeal but denied his request to file post-sentence motions. This appeal followed in which Sargent raises multiple issues pertaining to the exclusion of evidence, as well as issues relating the legality of his sentence.

Sargent first argues that the trial court improperly precluded him from cross-examining Officer Mitchell Rennick about the officer’s familiarity with the effects of crystal meth on an individual’s judgment and perception. See Appellant’s Brief at 11-12. Specifically, Sargent claims “[t]he testimony which was attempted to be [elicited] dealt with understanding the effect of drugs and alcohol on [Sargent’s] actions. Because intent is a fact at issue, the answers could help the jury in its determination of [Sargent’s] intent at the time of the incident.” Id. at 12.

“[Q]uestions concerning the admissibility of evidence are committed to the sound discretion of the trial judge, whose rulings will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion.” Commonwealth v. Reed, 990 A.2d 1158, 1167-68 (Pa. 2010) (citation omitted). The basic requisite for the admissibility of any evidence in a case is that it be competent and relevant. See Commonwealth v. Freidl, 834 A.2d 638, 641 (Pa. Super. 2003).

One of a trial judge’s broad powers is controlling the scope of the examination of witnesses. We are mindful that

[o]n cross-examination, an attorney is entitled to question the witness about subjects raised during direct examination as well as

any facts tending to refute inferences arising from matters raised during direct testimony. Similarly, an attorney may discredit a witness by cross-examining the witness about omissions or acts that are inconsistent with his testimony. However, the scope and limits of cross-examination is [sic] vested in the trial court’s discretion and that discretion will not be reversed unless the trial court has clearly abused its discretion or made an error of law.

Commonwealth v. Ogrod, 839 A.2d 294, 322 (Pa. 2003).

Here, the trial court prevented Sargent from cross-examining Officer Rennick about Sargent’s use of crystal meth prior to the rampage. Generally, “[n]either voluntary intoxication nor voluntary drugged condition is a defense to a criminal charge.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 308.

However, evidence of voluntary intoxication “may be offered by the defendant whenever it is relevant to reduce murder from a higher degree to a lower degree of murder.” Id. Our Supreme Court has long stated that “[e]vidence of substantial intoxication ... [, i]f believed, [] may negate the intent to kill necessary for a conviction of murder in the first degree, and a defendant is entitled to an instruction to that effect.” Commonwealth v. Rose, 344 A.2d 824, 826 (Pa. 1975) (citation omitted). Nonetheless, § 308 acts to exclude evidence of voluntary intoxication to a charge of attempted homicide. See Commonwealth v. Williams, 730 A.2d 507, 511 (Pa. Super. 1999).

As the trial court here correctly stated, “defense counsel acknowledged on the record that voluntary intoxication was not a defense at issue[.]” Trial Court Opinion, 12/29/21, at 8 (citing N.T., 10/16/17, at 393-394, 398-401).

“[A]ny evidence that [Sargent] was voluntarily intoxicated or drugged was not relevant to the issue of intent.” Id. Likewise, “Officer Rennick’s familiarity with the effects of crystal meth on a person’s judgment and perception, or [the officer’s] dealings with people under the influence [was not relevant].” Id. We agree with this assessment by the trial court. Because voluntary intoxication was not a defense to the crimes charged against Sargent, any such evidence lacks relevance. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in limiting the cross-examination of Officer Rennick and precluding testimony pertaining to the officer’s knowledge of the effects of particular drugs.

In a similar vein, Sargent’s issues 2, 3, 4, and 5,2 raise challenges to the trial court’s rulings that precluded him from offering testimony about his voluntary intoxication at the time of the rampage. See Appellant’s Brief at 12- 16. The underlying theory in each of these issues is that evidence of Sargent’s impaired condition should have been permitted to negate any element of specific intent to shoot at the officers.

2 Issue 2 pertains to the trial court precluding testimony concerning Sargent’s condition at the time of the incident. Issue 3 addresses the trial court sustaining the Commonwealth’s objection to Sargent’s testimony about his drug use on the day of the incident. Issue 4 concerns the trial court sustaining the Commonwealth’s objection to Sargent’s attempt to testify that he was under the influence of alcohol on the day of the incident. Issue 5 returns to the claim that Sargent was improperly precluded from offering testimony regarding his intoxicated state, which would have negated the element of intent.

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