J-S13035-26
2026 PA Super 101
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : CHARLES N. SARGENT : : Appellant : No. 2179 EDA 2025
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered July 30, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0011441-2014
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., NICHOLS, J., and KING, J.
OPINION BY KING, J.: FILED MAY 15, 2026
Appellant, Charles N. Sargent, appeals from the order entered in the
Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, denying his first petition filed
under the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). 1 We affirm.
A prior panel of this Court set forth the relevant facts and procedural
history of this case as follows:
[Appellant] left his job as a club bouncer on the night of July 13, 2013. He took a cab to an area known for prostitution where he was introduced to Ms. Diamond Williams. [Ms.] Williams was a transgender female and biological male.
They then took the cab back to [Appellant’s] home where he lived with his girlfriend, Veronica Johnson, and her son, Lamar Johnson. [Appellant] agreed to pay [Ms.] Williams for oral sex. After engaging in oral and anal sex in Lamar Johnson’s bedroom, [Appellant] claimed to have then realized [Ms.] Williams was male and admitted to slamming [Ms.] Williams’ head against the wall in a fit of anger. The impact left a hole in the wall as well as traces of [Ms.] ____________________________________________
1 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. J-S13035-26
Williams’ blood and hair. [Appellant] claimed that [Ms.] Williams then drew a knife and tried to attack him, but he put [Ms.] Williams in a headlock, causing her to drop the knife and fall to the ground. The knife was never found. After kicking her a few times, [Appellant] stated that he believed [Ms.] Williams was about to get up, so he ran downstairs and grabbed a screwdriver. [Appellant] then returned upstairs, and upon seeing [Ms.] Williams trying to stand up, fatally stabbed her in the head with the screwdriver.
At about 8:00 AM on July 14, 2013, Veronica Johnson arrived at [Appellant’s] home after working a night shift. She witnessed [Appellant] walking down the stairs naked, and he told her to leave. Ms. Johnson refused to leave and later saw [Appellant] dragging “what appeared to be a man’s body wrapped in her son’s sheets” down the stairs, which he left near the door to the basement. [Appellant] said that he had to go to his father’s home for a while and then threatened Ms. Johnson, saying “[t]hat’s right. You going to be so nosey. This is going to be you next, you and your children.” When [Appellant] later returned from his father’s residence, he carried a protective suit used for asbestos work and a large roll of plastic. He then proceeded to drag the body down to the basement. Soon, [Appellant] reemerged and grabbed a large axe, after which Ms. Johnson heard repeated loud thudding noises coming from the basement.
On either July 14 or 15, 2013, Ms. Johnson and her daughter investigated the home when [Appellant] was absent. They found a purse, clothes, and a wig, none of which belonged to them. They also discovered several blood-stained items, including a screwdriver, a hammer, and a pair of underwear. Ms. Johnson also recovered a used condom, which later tested positive for DNA from [Appellant] and [Ms.] Williams, from the trash of the upstairs bathroom. In the basement, Ms. Johnson saw bloodstains on the floor and trash bags sealed with duct tape. Ms. Johnson spoke to [Appellant] on July 15, 2013 about what had happened. After suggesting that [Appellant] killed [Ms.] Williams to stop her from telling others that [Appellant] had sex with another man, [Appellant] denied it and said that [Ms.] Williams had stolen several thousand dollars’ worth of drugs while [Appellant]
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was previously incarcerated.
On July 17, 2013, Ms. Johnson told her son, Lamar, what happened. Lamar then entered his room and noticed a strange smell, wet spots on the carpet, new sheets on his bed, unfamiliar clothing on the floor, a new hole in the wall, and a bloodstain on his mattress. Lamar then contacted the police. A subsequent law enforcement analysis of the blood found on the items and in the residence determined that none of it belonged to [Appellant].
Eventually, police arrested [Appellant] on July 19, 2013 pursuant to an arrest warrant for making terroristic threats against Ms. Johnson. After being given Miranda[2] warnings, [Appellant] confessed to killing [Ms.] Williams, dismembering her body, and dumping her body parts in a vacant lot. Remains were recovered from the lot and from a sealed bag found floating in the Schuylkill River, all of which belonged to [Ms.] Williams.
[Attorney Michael J. Farrell represented Appellant at his preliminary hearing. After the preliminary hearing, Appellant elected to represent himself and waived his right to counsel.] [Appellant] represented himself at trial [with Attorney Benjamin Cooper serving as standby counsel. At trial, Appellant] asserted [that] he killed [Ms.] Williams in self-defense. On March 6, 2018, a jury found [Appellant] guilty of first-degree murder. Subsequently, he was sentenced to life without parole for the murder charge.
Commonwealth v. Sargent, No. 692 EDA 2021, unpublished memorandum
at 1-4 (Pa.Super. filed May 26, 2022), appeal denied, ___ Pa. ___, 286 A.3d
217 (2022) (footnotes omitted).
This Court affirmed Appellant’s judgment of sentence on May 26, 2022,
and our Supreme court denied Appellant’s petition for allowance of appeal on
October 13, 2022. See id. On October 3, 2023, Appellant filed a pro se PCRA
____________________________________________
2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).
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petition, alleging, inter alia, that Attorney Farrell was ineffective for stipulating
to the medical examiner’s (“M.E.”) testimony at the preliminary hearing and
Attorney Cooper provided ineffective assistance by failing to properly assist
and advise Appellant as standby counsel during trial. The court appointed
Attorney Stephen O’Hanlon as PCRA counsel. On November 20, 2023,
Attorney O’Hanlon filed a motion to withdraw as counsel and a
Turner/Finley3 “no merit” letter.
On November 30, 2023, Appellant filed a motion asserting that Attorney
O’Hanlon provided ineffective assistance, and the court appointed new counsel
to address Appellant’s claim. On February 13, 2025, Appellant filed a
counseled amended PCRA petition, asserting that Attorney O’Hanlon was
ineffective for failing to properly evaluate the claims Appellant raised in his
pro se PCRA petition. After issuing notice of intent to dismiss the petition
without a hearing pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907, the PCRA court formally
dismissed Appellant’s petition on July 30, 2025. Appellant filed a timely notice
of appeal on August 13, 2025. On August 15, 2025, the court ordered
Appellant to file a concise statement of errors pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b),
and Appellant timely complied on August 26, 2025.
Appellant raises the following issues for our review:
Whether PCRA counsel failed to investigate if preliminary hearing counsel was ineffective?
3 Commonwealth v. Turner, 518 Pa. 491, 544 A.2d 927 (1988); Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa.Super. 1988) (en banc).
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Whether PCRA counsel failed to investigate if standby trial counsel was ineffective?
(Appellant’s Brief at vii).
In his issues combined, Appellant asserts that Attorney Farrell was
ineffective by stipulating to the M.E.’s testimony at the preliminary hearing.
Appellant claims that because Appellant asserted that he acted in self-defense,
the ME.’s findings may have been critical to supporting his defense. Appellant
contends that Attorney Farrell could have questioned the M.E. on “key forensic
evidence regarding (1) the nature of the victim’s injuries; (2) if the number
and location of the wounds were consistent with a close-quarters struggle
rather than an assault of the victim; (3) whether the victim was intoxicated,
(4) the cause of death, as well as key legal elements such as (5) the
proportionality, and (6) the reasonableness of the force used.” (Id. at 5).
Additionally, Appellant contends that Attorney Cooper was ineffective
for failing to properly assist Appellant at trial as standby counsel. Specifically,
Appellant claims that although he informed Attorney Cooper that he was under
the influence of cocaine and ecstasy on the day of the murder, Attorney
Cooper did not advise Appellant that this evidence could support a diminished
capacity defense at trial. Appellant also asserts that Attorney Cooper did not
advise Appellant on whether Appellant should testify in his own defense at
trial. Appellant claims that if Attorney Cooper had properly advised Appellant
at trial, the jury may have returned a verdict of voluntary manslaughter
instead of murder. Appellant maintains that Attorney O’Hanlon was ineffective
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for concluding that Appellant’s ineffective assistance claims regarding
Attorney Farrell and Attorney Cooper lacked merit without conducting any
meaningful inquiry into the claims. Appellant concludes that the PCRA court
erred in denying Appellant’s petition, and this Court should vacate the PCRA
court’s order. We disagree.
“Our standard of review of the denial of a PCRA petition is limited to
examining whether the evidence of record supports the court’s determination
and whether its decision is free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Beatty,
207 A.3d 957, 960-61 (Pa.Super. 2019), appeal denied, 655 Pa. 482, 218
A.3d 850 (2019). This Court grants great deference to the factual findings of
the PCRA court if the record contains any support for those findings.
Commonwealth v. Howard, 249 A.3d 1229 (Pa.Super. 2021). “[W]e review
the court’s legal conclusions de novo.” Commonwealth v. Prater, 256 A.3d
1274, 1282 (Pa.Super. 2021).
“Counsel is presumed to have rendered effective assistance.”
Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 231 A.3d 855, 871 (Pa.Super. 2020), appeal
denied, 663 Pa. 418, 242 A.3d 908 (2020).
[T]o establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show, by a preponderance of the evidence, ineffective assistance of counsel which, in the circumstances of the particular case, so undermined the truth-determining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place. The burden is on the defendant to prove all three of the following prongs: (1) the underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) that counsel had no reasonable strategic basis for his or her action or inaction; and (3) but for the errors and omissions of counsel, there is
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a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different.
Commonwealth v. Sandusky, 203 A.3d 1033, 1043 (Pa.Super. 2019),
appeal denied, 654 Pa. 568, 216 A.3d 1029 (2019) (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted).
“The threshold inquiry in ineffectiveness claims is whether the
issue/argument/tactic which counsel has foregone and which forms the basis
for the assertion of ineffectiveness is of arguable merit[.]” Commonwealth
v. Smith, 167 A.3d 782, 788 (Pa.Super. 2017), appeal denied, 645 Pa. 175,
179 A.3d 6 (2018) (quoting Commonwealth v. Pierce, 537 Pa. 514, 524,
645 A.2d 189, 194 (1994)). “Counsel cannot be found ineffective for failing
to pursue a baseless or meritless claim.” Commonwealth v. Poplawski,
852 A.2d 323, 327 (Pa.Super. 2004) (quoting Commonwealth v. Geathers,
847 A.2d 730, 733 (Pa.Super. 2004)).
“Once this threshold is met we apply the ‘reasonable basis’ test to
determine whether counsel’s chosen course was designed to effectuate his
client’s interests.” Commonwealth v. Kelley, 136 A.3d 1007, 1012
(Pa.Super. 2016) (quoting Pierce, supra at 524, 645 A.2d at 194-95).
The test for deciding whether counsel had a reasonable basis for his action or inaction is whether no competent counsel would have chosen that action or inaction, or, the alternative, not chosen, offered a significantly greater potential chance of success. Counsel’s decisions will be considered reasonable if they effectuated his client’s interests. We do not employ a hindsight analysis in comparing trial counsel’s actions with other efforts he may have taken.
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Commonwealth v. King, 259 A.3d 511, 520 (Pa.Super. 2021) (quoting
Sandusky, supra at 1043-44).
“To show prejudice, the petitioner must demonstrate that there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s allegedly unprofessional conduct,
the result of the proceedings would have been different. A reasonable
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 635 Pa. 665, 710, 139 A.3d 1257, 1284 (2016)
(quoting Commonwealth v. Baumhammers, 625 Pa. 354, 383, 92 A.3d
708, 725 (2014)).
Regarding “layered” claims of ineffective assistance:
[A petitioner] “must plead in his PCRA petition that his prior counsel, whose alleged ineffectiveness is at issue, was ineffective for failing to raise the claim that the counsel who preceded him was ineffective in taking or omitting some action.” The petitioner must further “present argument, in briefs or other court memoranda, on the three prongs of the [the ineffectiveness] test as to each relevant layer of representation.”
Commonwealth v. Montalvo, 651 Pa. 359, 379-80, 205 A.3d 274, 286
(2019) (quoting Commonwealth v. McGill, 574 Pa. 574, 589, 832 A.2d
1014, 1023 (2003)). “[T]o succeed on an allegation of…counsel’s
ineffectiveness…a post-conviction petitioner must, at a minimum, present
argumentation relative to each layer of ineffective assistance, on all three
prongs of the ineffectiveness standard….” Commonwealth v. D’Amato, 579
Pa. 490, 500, 856 A.2d 806, 812 (2004) (internal citations omitted). “[A]n
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undeveloped argument, which fails to meaningfully discuss and apply the
standard governing the review of ineffectiveness claims, simply does not
satisfy [the petitioner’s] burden of establishing that he is entitled to any
relief.” Commonwealth v. Bracey, 568 Pa. 264, 273 n.4, 795 A.2d 935,
940 n.4 (2001). See also Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 612 Pa. 333, 362, 30
A.3d 1111, 1128 (2011) (explaining boilerplate allegations and bald assertions
of no reasonable basis and/or ensuing prejudice cannot satisfy petitioner’s
burden of proving ineffectiveness).
Additionally, with respect to standby counsel, our Supreme Court has
explained:
[W]hen a defendant elects to proceed at trial pro se, the defendant, and not standby counsel, is counsel of record and is responsible for trying the case. The limited role of standby counsel is essential to satisfy the United States Supreme Court’s directive that a defendant’s choice to proceed pro se must be honored out of that respect for the individual which is the lifeblood of the law even when the defendant acts to his own detriment. This understanding undergirds our jurisprudence, which dictates that a defendant who chooses to represent himself cannot obtain post-conviction relief by raising a claim of his own ineffectiveness or that of standby counsel.
Commonwealth v. Blakeney, 631 Pa. 1, 30, 108 A.3d 739, 756 (2014),
cert. denied, 576 U.S. 1009, 135 S.Ct. 2817, 192 L.Ed.2d 857 (2015)
(citations and quotation marks omitted).
Instantly, the PCRA court determined that Appellant failed to establish
that Attorney Farrell lacked a reasonable strategic basis for stipulating to the
M.E.’s testimony. Specifically, Attorney Farrell stipulated that the M.E., if
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called, would testify that the cause of Ms. Williams’ death was penetrating
blunt force trauma and that the manner of death was homicide. The PCRA
court found that Attorney Farrell employed a reasonable strategy in stipulating
to the M.E.’s testimony “to limit the [M.E.’s] testimony to basic information
regarding the autopsy, preventing the gruesome details from coloring the
judge’s perspective.” (PCRA Court Opinion, filed 9/17/25, at 8). We discern
no error in the court’s assessment, particularly given the state in which the
victim’s body was recovered in this case. See Commonwealth v. Hanible,
612 Pa. 183, 247, 30 A.3d 426, 464 (2011), cert. denied, 568 U.S. 1091, 133
S.Ct. 835, 184 L.Ed.2d 662 (2013) (holding counsel acted reasonably in
stipulating to admissible testimony to reduce more harmful impact if
testimony was presented); Commonwealth v. Smith, 609 Pa. 605, 669, 17
A.3d 873, 911 (2011), cert. denied, 567 U.S. 937, 133 S.Ct. 24, 183 L.Ed.2d
680 (2012) (affirming that counsel employed reasonable strategy in
stipulating to expert testimony about victim’s injuries because it minimized
emotional impact testimony could have had). 4
Additionally, Appellant fails to explain how he was prejudiced by
Attorney Farrell’s stipulation to the M.E.’s testimony at the preliminary
4 We note that the PCRA court did not hold an evidentiary hearing in this case.
Generally, an evidentiary hearing on counsel’s strategy is preferred before the PCRA court decides if counsel had a reasonable basis for his actions. See Hanible, supra at 210, 30 A.3d at 442. Nevertheless, the PCRA court may do so in cases where the reasons for counsel’s conduct are clear and apparent from the record. See id.
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hearing. While Appellant speculates that questioning the M.E. at the
preliminary hearing “could have supported the dismissal at the preliminary
stage, the suppression or impeachment later, or the inference of
justification[,]” Appellant fails to support this argument in any meaningful
way. (Appellant’s Brief at 5). Appellant also does not cite to anything in the
record, including the M.E.’s report or the M.E.’s subsequent testimony at
Appellant’s trial, to establish that questioning the M.E. at the preliminary
hearing would have revealed any support for his claim that he acted in self-
defense. See Commonwealth v. Fletcher, 604 Pa. 493, 542, 986 A.2d 759,
789 (2009) (holding that trial counsel was not ineffective for stipulating to
M.E.’s testimony because appellant’s assertion that cross-examination of M.E.
would have elicited testimony supporting claim of self-defense was mere
speculation).
Furthermore, where an appellant alleges counsel was ineffective at the
preliminary hearing, “[t]he PCRA statute requires the prejudice to affect the
adjudication of guilt[,]” not merely the outcome of the preliminary hearing.
Commonwealth v. Stultz, 114 A.3d 865, 881 (Pa.Super. 2015), appeal
denied, 633 Pa. 767, 125 A.3d 1201 (2015). Here, the M.E. testified at
Appellant’s trial and Appellant had the opportunity to cross-examine the M.E.
to elicit any such testimony to support his defense. The jury, nevertheless,
found Appellant guilty of first-degree murder. As such, Appellant cannot
establish that he was prejudiced as a result of Attorney Farrell’s alleged error
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at the preliminary hearing. See id.
With respect to Appellant’s ineffective assistance claim against Attorney
Cooper, Appellant elected to represent himself at trial and Attorney Cooper
was only present in the capacity of standby counsel. As such, Appellant cannot
obtain post-conviction relief by asserting deficiencies in his own performance
and attributing them to standby counsel. See Blakely, supra. As Appellant
has failed to establish that either Attorney Farrell or Attorney Cooper provided
ineffective assistance, Attorney O’Hanlon cannot be found ineffective for
failing to argue a meritless claim. See Montalvo, supra; Poplawski, supra.
Thus, we agree with the PCRA court that Appellant is not entitled to relief on
his layered ineffective assistance of counsel claim. See Beatty, supra.
Accordingly, we affirm.
Order affirmed.
Date: 5/15/2026
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