Com. v. Santiago, J.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: March 21, 2025
• Docket: 93 EDA 2024
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

J-S02005-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : JESUS MANUEL SANTIAGO : : Appellant : No. 93 EDA 2024

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered June 28, 2023 In the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-45-CR-0000429-2022

BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., DUBOW, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, P.J.: FILED MARCH 21, 2025

Jesus Manuel Santiago appeals from the judgment of sentence, entered

in the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County, following his conviction of

one count of theft by unlawful taking.1 Santiago’s counsel, Ángela-Patricia

Ramos, Esquire, has filed an application to withdraw as counsel and an

accompanying Anders2 brief. Upon review, we grant Attorney Ramos’s

application to withdraw and affirm Santiago’s judgment of sentence.

The trial court summarized the factual history of this matter as follows:

[Santiago’s conviction stems] from an encounter between Veree Hilton (“Hilton”) and [Santiago] in a Wawa parking lot on October 3, 2021. [At trial, Hilton testified that] he pulled into the Wawa ____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3921(a).

2 Anders v. California, 368 U.S. 738 (1967); Commonwealth v. McClendon, 434 A.2d 1185 (Pa. 1981); Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009). J-S02005-25

parking lot and engaged in conversation with [Santiago]. It is important to note that [Santiago] had not been named at this point of Hilton’s testimony, and as such, there was [a hearsay] objection to the “content of the conversation.” [Santiago] sought to use Hilton’s cellphone because, as [Santiago] had explained, he was recently discharged from a nearby facility and could not return home to Allentown or contact anyone. . . . While Hilton was in the Wawa acquiring a charger for his phone, he observed his vehicle, later identified as a grey Chevrolet Cruz[,] backing out of the parking lot and proceeding to pull off. [Hilton called the police.] When Hilton was asked to identify who inappropriately procured his vehicle, Hilton identified [Santiago] in the [c]ourtroom. . . .

The next witness that was called was Trooper Scott Walck [, who responded to Hilton’s call reporting the stolen vehicle. In the course of his investigation, [Trooper] Walck located a geographically close rehab facility, Pyramid Health, from which one person had been discharged] on that very day. [Trooper] Walck was then asked if he had received any identifying information about the individual discharged, to which he answered in the affirmative. There was an objection to an alleged Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act [(“HIPAA”)] violation that was ultimately overruled. Once overruled, the officer identified [Santiago] as [the individual] recently released from Pyramid Health. After this, the Commonwealth introduced[] discharge papers from that rehab facility indicating the discharge date for [Santiago] to be October 3, 2021. Again, counsel for the defense raised a similar [HIPAA] objection[, which] the Court ultimately overruled[]. After this, [Trooper] Walck [testified that he obtained surveillance video from the Wawa]. Upon [the] Commonwealth’s attempt to admit the video[], another objection was made based on lack of authentication; however, [the video] was ultimately admitted into evidence. On October 4, the [stolen] vehicle was found in Allentown by Allentown City Police. [Trooper Walck testified that he performed a forensic analysis of DNA material in the vehicle and collected DNA from Santiago.]

[The n]ext witness called was [Officer] Paul McAdams, an officer for the Allentown police department. . . . [Officer McAdams] explained that [a passenger in the stolen vehicle] gave him a description of the person driving the vehicle [], which matched the description [of Santiago] that Hilton had provided the day before. ...

-2- J-S02005-25

Next to the stand was Ut Dinh3 [], who [] was admitted as an expert in the analysis of DNA [and testified that Santiago’s DNA matched DNA that was found in the stolen vehicle]. . . . This concluded the Commonwealth’s case.

[Santiago testified in his own defense] that[,] although he has similar counts on his record to the one pending against him[], those were [committed by] his brother, as was [this particular offense]. [H]e claimed that his brother was released from the rehabilitative facility, and his brother stole his I.D. to check in and out. It was determined on cross-examination that [Santiago] was convicted of false identification in January of the year prior. It was also determined that he [had previously been] convicted of unauthorized use of a motor vehicle[, driving under the influence, and theft].

Trial Court Opinion, 5/17/24, at 1-6 (unpaginated).

Santiago was charged with the above-mentioned count of theft by

unlawful taking and two related lesser offenses4 that were later withdrawn by

the Commonwealth. On April 28, 2023, Santiago proceeded to a non-jury

trial, following which the trial court found him guilty and, on June 28, 2023,

sentenced him to 27 to 84 months’ incarceration. On July 7, 2023, Santiago

filed a motion to reconsider sentence, arguing that he was afforded insufficient

credit for time served. On November 28, 2023, after a hearing, the trial court

granted Santiago’s motion in part and granted him a total time credit of 246

days.

Santiago filed a timely notice of appeal and a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P.

1925(b) concise statement of errors complained on appeal. Attorney Ramos ____________________________________________

3 Dinh is a forensic scientist employed with the Pennsylvania State Police’s Forensic DNA Division. N.T. Trial, 4/28/23, at 59-60. 4 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3928(a) (unauthorized use of a motor vehicle); 75 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 1543 (operating a motor vehicle while privilege is suspended or revoked).

-3- J-S02005-25

subsequently filed with this Court an application to withdraw as counsel and a

brief pursuant to Anders. Santiago filed a pro se response to counsel’s

Anders brief.

When counsel files an Anders brief, and appellant files a pro se or

counseled response, this Court will first determine whether counsel has

complied with the dictates of Anders. See Commonwealth v. Bennet, 124

A.3d 327, 333 (Pa. Super. 2015) (outlining proper procedure where counsel

files Anders brief and appellant files pro se response). If counsel has

complied with the dictates of Anders and Santiago, we will address the

issues raised in the Anders brief and conduct our independent examination

of the record as to those issues. See id. Finally, if we determine those issues

to be without merit, we next examine the appellant’s pro se allegations. See

id. As to appellant’s pro se allegations, when an advocate’s brief has been

filed, “[this] Court is limited to examining only those issues raised and

developed in the brief[; we] do not act as, and are forbidden from acting as,

appellant’s counsel.” Id.

Pursuant to Anders, when counsel believes that an appeal is frivolous

and wishes to withdraw from representation, she must:

(1) petition the court for leave to withdraw stating that after making a conscientious examination of the record and interviewing the defendant, counsel has determined the appeal would be frivolous, (2) file a brief referring to any issues in the record of arguable merit, and (3) furnish a copy of the brief to defendant and advise him of his right to retain new counsel or to raise any additional points that he deems worthy of the court’s attention. The determination of whether the appeal is frivolous remains with the court.

-4- J-S02005-25

Commonwealth v. Burwell, 42 A.3d 1077, 1083 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation

omitted).

Additionally, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has explained that a

proper Anders brief must:

(1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, with citations to the record; (2) refer to anything in the record that counsel believes arguably supports the appeal; (3) set forth counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and (4) state counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record, controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that have led to the conclusion that the appeal is frivolous.

Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361.

After determining that counsel has satisfied the technical requirements

of Anders and Santiago, this Court must then “conduct a simple review of

the record to ascertain if there appear[] on its face to be arguably meritorious

issues that counsel, intentionally or not, missed or misstated.”

Commonwealth v. Dempster, 187 A.3d 266, 272 (Pa. Super. 2018) (en

banc).

Instantly, our review of counsel’s Anders brief and application to

withdraw reveals that Attorney Ramos has complied with each of the technical

requirements of Anders/Santiago. Attorney Ramos indicates that she has

made a conscientious examination of the record and determined that an

appeal would be frivolous. The record further reflects that Attorney Ramos

has furnished a copy of the Anders brief to Santiago and advised Santiago of

-5- J-S02005-25

his right to retain new counsel, proceed pro se, or raise any additional points

that he deems worthy of this Court’s attention. Additionally, the Anders brief

complies with the requirements of Santiago. As Attorney Ramos has

complied with all of the requirements for withdrawing from representation, we

will examine the record and make an independent determination of whether

Santiago’s appeal is, in fact, wholly frivolous.

In the Anders brief, Attorney Ramos raises three issues. See Anders

Brief, at 5. In the first issue, Santiago challenges the trial court’s evidentiary

ruling admitting Hilton’s hearsay testimony. Id. at 11. Santiago argues that

because Hilton testified to Santiago’s hearsay statements before identifying

him as the suspect, the evidence was inadmissible and the trial court

improperly applied the relevant hearsay exception. Id.

Our standard of review for a challenge to the court’s admission of

evidence is well-established:

The admission or exclusion of evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial court, and in reviewing a challenge to the admissibility of evidence, we will only reverse a ruling by the trial court upon a showing that it abused its discretion or committed an error of law. Thus[,] our standard of review is very narrow. To constitute reversible error, an evidentiary ruling must not only be erroneous, but also harmful or prejudicial to the complaining party.

Commonwealth v. Lopez, 57 A.3d 74, 81 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citations and

quotation marks omitted). We note that “a trial court, acting as the finder of

fact, is presumed to know the law, ignore prejudicial statements, and

-6- J-S02005-25

disregard inadmissible evidence.” Commonwealth v. Smith, 97 A.3d 782,

788 (Pa. Super. 2014).

Under Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 803, hearsay testimony is

admissible if: (1) the statement is offered against an opposing party, and (2)

it was made by the declarant in an individual capacity. See Pa.R.E.

803(25)(A); see Commonwealth v. Edwards, 903 A.2d 1139, 1157-58 (Pa.

2006) (“[T]his Court has consistently held that a defendant’s out-of-court

statements are party admissions and are exceptions to the hearsay rule.”).

Instantly, prior to overruling the hearsay objection and admitting

Hilton’s hearsay testimony, the trial court asked Hilton whether “the person .

. . making these statements was the person who eventually . . . stole your

car,” to which Hilton responded in the affirmative. N.T. Trial, 4/28/23, at 8.

Therefore, the trial court properly admitted the testimony as a statement

offered against an opposing party.5 See Pa.R.E 803(25)(A). Furthermore,

the trial court is presumed to have ignored any inadmissible evidence or

prejudicial statements. See Smith, 97 A.3d at 788. As such, we discern no

abuse of discretion by the trial court. See Lopez, 57 A.3d at 81.

____________________________________________

5 We acknowledge that, in its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court justified its

decision to admit the evidence on the basis of a different hearsay exception. See Trial Court Opinion, 5/17/24, at 7-8 (unpaginated). Nevertheless, we may affirm the decision of the trial court on any basis, so long as the record supports it. Commonwealth v. Martin, 205 A.3d 1247, 1248 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2019).

-7- J-S02005-25

In his second issue, Santiago again challenges an evidentiary ruling

made by the trial court, arguing that evidence provided by Pyramid Health

was inadmissible because it was obtained in violation of HIPAA. Anders Brief,

at 25.

As Attorney Ramos points out, this Court has already addressed that

HIPAA does not have evidentiary implications and serves only to create a

mechanism for imposing penalties against covered entities that violate the

statute. Id. at 30-31; see Commonwealth v. Williams, 176 A.3d 298, 318

(Pa. Super. 2017) (“HIPAA violations are punished through the imposition of

civil and criminal penalties against covered entities. There is no right to

private action or relief for HIPAA violations.”) (internal citations omitted); see

also Commonwealth v. Kresge, 240 A.3d 905, 916 (Pa. Super. 2020)

(“HIPAA does not create an evidentiary privilege[.]”). There is no legal basis

to support the conclusion that HIPAA violations are grounds for the exclusion

of evidence at trial. Anders Brief, at 32-33. This issue is, therefore, without

merit.

In his third issue, Santiago challenges the sufficiency of the evidence

supporting his conviction of theft by unlawful taking. 6 Id. at 33. Specifically,

6 A person commits the offense of theft by unlawful taking if “he unlawfully

takes, or exercises unlawful control over, movable property of another with intent to deprive him thereof.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3921(a).

-8- J-S02005-25

Santiago argues that there was insufficient evidence at trial to identify him as

the perpetrator. Id.

When examining a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we

adhere to the following standard of review:

The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence is whether[,] viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying [the above] test, we may not [re- ]weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for [that of] the fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that[,] as a matter of law[,] no probability of fact may be drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and all evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the [trier] of fact[,] while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part[,] or none of the evidence.

Smith, 97 A.3d at 790 (citation omitted).

It is well-settled that in any prosecution, the Commonwealth must

establish the identity of the defendant as the perpetrator of the offenses

beyond a reasonable doubt. See Commonwealth v. Smyser, 195 A.3d 912,

915 (Pa. Super. 2018). Generally, any indefiniteness or uncertainty in

identification evidence goes to the weight, not the sufficiency, of the evidence.

See Commonwealth v. Orr, 38 A.3d 868, 874 (Pa. Super. 2011) (en banc).

As with any element of an offense, the Commonwealth may sustain its burden

-9- J-S02005-25

of proving the defendant’s identity as the perpetrator of the offenses by

circumstantial evidence. See Smyser, 195 A.3d at 915.

The trial court concluded that there was ample identification evidence

presented at trial, including “DNA analysis, video surveillance, and eyewitness

testimonies.” Trial Court Opinion, 5/17/24, at 13 (unpaginated). After a

thorough review of the record, we agree with the trial court that the

Commonwealth presented sufficient and conclusive evidence of Santiago’s

identity. See Smith, 97 A.3d at 790. The record establishes both direct and

circumstantial evidence linking him to the stolen vehicle: identification by the

victim; discharge papers from Pyramid Health; surveillance video from the

Wawa; identification by a passenger in the vehicle; and DNA evidence. See

N.T. Trial, 4/28/23, at 9, 27-28, 45-47, 65-70. Accordingly, Santiago’s

challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is wholly frivolous.

Finally, our independent review of the record discloses no other

“arguably meritorious issues that counsel, intentionally or not, missed or

misstated.” Dempster, 187 A.3d at 272.7

7 Attorney Ramos also identifies an additional issue that Santiago did not raise

in his Rule 1925(b) statement: she argues that this protected health information obtained in violation of HIPAA should have been suppressed based on Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Anders Brief, at 38. However, as Attorney Ramos candidly admits, Santiago did not file an omnibus pretrial motion or make an oral suppression motion on the record. Id. Thus, this issue is waived on appeal, and we make no determination on whether it is meritorious. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (“Issues not raised in the trial court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.”).

- 10 - J-S02005-25

We now turn to Santiago’s issues, raised in his pro se response. In his

response, Santiago challenges the police officers’ account of the investigation

and reiterates that he “did not steal any car.” See Pro Se Response to Anders

Brief, 2/12/25, at 1-2 (unpaginated). Santiago’s entire pro se response is

two pages in length. He does not advance any additional argument, nor does

he cite to relevant legal authority. See id. Accordingly, we conclude that

Santiago has waived these claims. See Bennet, 124 A.3d at 333; see also

Commonwealth v. Rivera, 685 A.2d 1011, 1013 (Pa. Super. 1996) (this

Court does not review wholly inadequate brief that fails to comply with

guidelines in Pa.R.A.P. 2111(a)); Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) (argument section shall

include “such discussion and citation of authorities as are deemed

pertinent.”)). As such, we grant Attorney Ramos’s application to withdraw

and affirm the judgment of sentence.

Judgment of sentence affirmed. Application to withdraw granted.

Date: 3/21/2025

- 11 -