Com. v. Salazar, T.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: March 21, 2025
• Docket: 800 MDA 2024
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

J-S45020-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : THERESA R. SALAZAR : : Appellant : No. 800 MDA 2024

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 18, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Lycoming County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-41-CR-0001187-2022

BEFORE: OLSON, J., DUBOW, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.: FILED: MARCH 21, 2025

Appellant, Theresa R. Salazar, appeals from the January 18, 2024

judgment of sentence entered by the Lycoming County Court of Common

Pleas following her conviction of, inter alia, Risking Catastrophe and Recklessly

Endangering Another Person (“REAP”). On appeal, Appellant challenges the

sufficiency of the evidence and claims that the trial court should have merged

her sentences for Risking Catastrophe and REAP. After careful review, we

affirm the judgment of sentence.

On July 3, 2022, Appellant drove her minivan through the entrance of

the Little League Museum in South Williamsport. The trial court recited the

relevant facts:

Being the July 4th Holiday weekend, the Little League Museum was occupied by a number of employees and patrons at the time of the [i]ncident. The vehicle was travelling southbound on Route 15 Highway in front of the museum. It stopped and waited for oncoming traffic before making a left turn, crossing the J-S45020-24

northbound lane and entering Little League property. It then crashed into the entryway and momentarily stopped in the vestibule. At least one Little League employee began to approach the vehicle to check on the driver, when the driver hit the accelerator, crashed through another set of lobby doors and drove further into the building until hitting an interior wall approximately 20-25 feet north of the interior lobby doors.

Four Museum employees and two patrons were in the immediate area of the impact, and approximately three dozen other employees and patrons were in the building at the time. At least some of those individuals were in plain view of [Appellant] when she accelerated further into the building. Upon hitting the interior wall, [Appellant] turned to an employee and said, “I am Teresa Salazar. You know who I am, and you should be scared.” The employees and patrons largely fled the immediate area of the accident, but [Appellant] remained and was taken into custody by South Williamsport Police shortly thereafter.

Trial Ct. Op. and Order, 5/21/24, at 1-2.

The trial court explained that for decades prior to this incident Appellant

“maintained a vendetta against Little League Baseball[,]” based upon her

belief that Little League Baseball should have credited her relatives, George

and Bert Bebble, as co-founders of Little League. Id. at 1. Over the years,

she “had numerous contacts with Little League officials, sent numerous

messages to them[,] and attempted to extract monetary compensation from

the organization.” Id. Indeed, Appellant left several voice mails with Little

League Baseball on the day before, and on the morning of, the incident. Id.

at 5 n.21.

The Commonwealth charged Appellant with numerous crimes related to

the incident. The trial court presided over a three-day jury trial, from

November 7-9, 2023, during which Appellant testified in her own defense,

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claiming that she crashed through the building due to a “sneezing attack.”

N.T., 11/9/23, at 27.

On November 9, 2023, the jury convicted Appellant of the following

crimes: Risking Catastrophe, Criminal Trespass, Terroristic Threats, Criminal

Mischief, and six counts of REAP.1 The jury acquitted Appellant of Attempted

Murder, Aggravated Assault-Attempt to Cause Bodily Injury with a Deadly

Weapon, and Aggravated Assault-Attempt to Cause Serious Bodily Injury.

On January 18, 2024, the court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate

sentence of 6 to 43 years of incarceration, which included a sentence of 6

months to 7 years of incarceration for Risking Catastrophe and 6 months to 2

years of incarceration for each of the six REAP counts, with all sentences

imposed consecutively.

On January 23, 2024, Appellant filed a post-sentence motion raising

numerous issues, including those raised on appeal. On May 21, 2024, the

court denied the motion, setting forth its analysis in a thorough opinion.

Appellant filed a notice of appeal on June 3, 2024. Appellant and the

trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a), with the trial court relying upon

its May 21, 2024 opinion.

Appellant raises the following questions on appeal:

1. Was the evidence presented insufficient to sustain a guilty verdict for Risking a Catastrophe?

____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3302(b), 3503(a)(1)(ii), 2706(a)(3), 3304(a)(1), and 2705,

respectively.

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2. Did the trial court impose an illegal sentence, thereby committing an abuse of discretion and error of law when it did not merge the sentences for [REAP] with the count of Risking a Catastrophe?

Appellant’s Br. at 5.

Appellant first claims that the Commonwealth presented insufficient

evidence to sustain her conviction for Risking Catastrophe. Appellant’s Br. at

23-33. As challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence raise questions of law,

“our standard of review is de novo[,] and our scope of review is plenary.”

Commonwealth v. Johnson, 236 A.3d 1141, 1152 (Pa. Super. 2020) (en

banc) (citation omitted). “We review claims regarding the sufficiency of the

evidence by considering whether, viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in

the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence to

enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond a reasonable

doubt.” Commonwealth v. Miller, 172 A.3d 632, 640 (Pa. Super. 2017)

(citation and internal question marks omitted). The trier of fact may rely

“wholly on circumstantial evidence” and is “free to believe all, part, or none of

the evidence.” Id. “[An] appellate court may not weigh the evidence and

substitute its judgment for the fact-finder.” Id.

Relevant to Appellant’s claim, a person is guilty of Risking Catastrophe

“if [s]he recklessly creates a risk of catastrophe in the employment of fire,

explosives or other dangerous means listed in [Section 3302(a)]. 18 Pa.C.S.

§ 3302(b). Section 3302(a) provides the following non-exclusive list of

dangerous means: “explosion, fire, flood, avalanche, collapse of building,

release of poison gas, radioactive material or other harmful or destructive

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force or substance, or by any other means of causing potentially

widespread injury or damage[.]” Id. at § 3302(a) (emphasis added).

“The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has described the risk proscribed by Section

3302 as the use of dangerous means by one who consciously disregards a

substantial and unjustifiable risk and thereby unnecessarily exposes society

to an extraordinary disaster.” Commonwealth v. McCoy, 199 A.3d 411, 417

(Pa. Super. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting

Commonwealth v. Hughes, 364 A.2d 306, 311 (Pa. 1976)).

Appellant avers that the Commonwealth failed to prove that she

employed a “dangerous means” as required by the statute. Appellant’s Br. at

23-33. She argues that “[e]ven if Appellant acted recklessly in driving her

van into the glass entrance of the museum, that action does not amount to

the use of fire, explosives, collapse of building, or a harmful or destructive

force that could bring about a catastrophe.” Id. at 28 (internal quotation

marks omitted). Appellant notes that there were no injuries and the “building

did not collapse.” Id. at 31. She claims that her actions did not risk the

widespread injury or damage required by the statute, asserting that “her

actions do not equate to the plain understanding and meaning of what society

would define as a catastrophe.” Id. at 28.

We disagree. As the trial court explained, “[w]hen one deliberately or

recklessly propels two tons of metal and related materials at speed into an

occupied business during normal business hours on a holiday weekend, when

it may very well be occupied by many people, widespread injury to persons

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and damage to property is a possible, if not a probable, outcome.” Trial Ct.

Op. and Order at 15. Accordingly, following our de novo review, we conclude

that the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence from which the jury

could conclude that Appellant committed an act “that put large numbers of

people at risk of death or serious bodily injury and that caused substantial

property damage” as required for conviction of Risking Catastrophe. Id. at

14. This issue warrants no relief.

***

In her second issue, Appellant asserts that her sentence is illegal

because the court should have merged her convictions for Risking Catastrophe

and REAP for sentencing purposes. Appellant’s Br. at 34-37. When an

appellant claims that her crimes should merge for sentencing purposes, she

presents a question of law. Commonwealth v. Edwards, 256 A.3d 1130,

1136 (Pa. 2021). Accordingly, “our standard of review is de novo[,] and our

scope of review is plenary.” Id.

Merger of sentences “is appropriate only when two distinct criteria are

satisfied: (1) the crimes arise from a single criminal act; and (2) all of the

statutory elements of one of the offenses are included within the statutory

elements of the other.” Commonwealth v. Raven, 97 A.3d 1244, 1249 (Pa.

Super. 2014); see also 42 Pa.C.S.§ 9765. The Supreme Court recently

clarified that Section 9765’s merger analysis “begins and ends with the

statutory elements of each offense” and, thus, “does not require an evaluation

of the specific facts [of the case] as applied to the elements.” Edwards, 256

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A.3d at 1137. “Where crimes merge for sentencing purposes, the court may

sentence the defendant only on the higher graded offense.” 42

Pa.C.S.§ 9765.

Turning to the elements of the crimes at issue, the General Assembly

has defined REAP as follows:

A person commits a misdemeanor of the second degree if [s]he recklessly engages in conduct which places or may place another person in danger of death or serious bodily injury.

18 Pa.C.S. § 2705. As set forth above, the Crimes Code defines Risking

Catastrophe as follows:

A person is guilty of a felony of the third degree if [s]he recklessly creates a risk of catastrophe in the employment of fire, explosives or other dangerous means listed in subsection (a) of this section.

Id. at § 3302(b). The “other dangerous means listed in subsection (a)”

include the following: “explosion, fire, flood, avalanche, collapse of building,

release of poison gas, radioactive material or other harmful or destructive

force or substance, or by any other means of causing potentially widespread

injury or damage[.]” Id. § 3302(a).

As stated, Appellant claims that the trial court imposed an illegal

sentence when it failed to merge her convictions for REAP and Risking

Catastrophe for sentencing purposes. Appellant’s Br. at 34-37. Specifically,

Appellant asserts that the Commonwealth employed the same underlying

facts—her driving into the occupied museum—to support its claim that she

both risked “widespread injury to persons inside the building,” for purposes of

proving Risking Catastrophe, and that she “placed the persons present therein

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in danger of serious bodily injury or death,” for purposes of proving REAP. Id.

at 36. Based on this overlapping proof, she claims that her sentences should

have merged. Id. at 36-37. Appellant, however, ignores the Supreme Court’s

direction in Edwards and instead focuses her analysis on the application of

the “facts and circumstances” of her case to the statutory elements, rather

than determining whether all the statutory elements of one crime are

encompassed by the other.

Applying the correct analysis, the trial court observed that, while both

crimes “broadly apply to reckless conduct that creates a risk of harm[,]” each

crime requires an element not included in the other crime. Trial Ct. Op. and

Order at 26. Specifically, Risking Catastrophe requires conduct that creates a

“risk of catastrophe” through the employment of “dangerous means,” which

are “capable of causing potentially widespread injury or damage,” whereas

REAP is focused on an injury to an individual, without requiring “dangerous

means.” Id. Likewise, REAP “entails potential death or serious bodily injury

to a person[,]” whereas Risking Catastrophe does not require bodily injury, as

it also includes property damage. Id. Because each crime includes elements

not incorporated into the other crime, we affirm the trial court’s conclusion

that the crimes do not merge for sentencing purposes. Accordingly, neither

of Appellant’s claims warrants relief.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

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Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 3/21/2025

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