J-S15018-26
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : JOSE A. RUIZ : : Appellant : No. 1753 EDA 2025
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered June 9, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0908941-1997
BEFORE: OLSON, J., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E. *
MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED JULY 20, 2026
Jose A. Ruiz (Appellant) appeals pro se from the order dismissing as
untimely his third petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act
(PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. After careful review, we affirm.
We previously summarized the relevant factual history:
On July 13, 1997, at approximately 7:30 p.m., Hiram Rojas Cuba [(the victim)] was shot multiple times in the head and chest, and he died on the sidewalk near the intersection of Hancock and Sommerset Streets in Philadelphia. Two eyewitnesses to the shooting testified at the trial and identified [Appellant] as the shooter. [Appellant] was approximately six feet away from the victim when he fired the first shot, and the follow-up shots were made while the shooter stood over the victim, who laid on the sidewalk. After a bench trial, the [trial court] found [Appellant]
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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court. J-S15018-26
guilty of first-degree murder1 and sentenced [Appellant] to [an aggregate term of] life in prison without the possibility of parole.
Commonwealth v. Ruiz, 323 A.3d 198, 1102 EDA 2023 (Pa. Super. 2024)
(unpublished memorandum at 1) (footnote added; citation omitted; some
punctuation modified).
This Court subsequently affirmed Appellant’s judgment of sentence.
Commonwealth v. Ruiz, 863 A.2d 1231, 3182 EDA 2003 (Pa. Super. 2004)
(unpublished memorandum). On August 22, 2005, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court denied Appellant’s petition for allowance of appeal. Commonwealth
v. Ruiz, 881 A.2d 819 (Pa. 2005). Appellant did not file a petition for writ of
certiorari in the United States Supreme Court.
On September 16, 2005, Appellant timely filed his first PCRA petition,
wherein he challenged his trial counsel’s effectiveness. Following an
evidentiary hearing, the PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s petition. We
affirmed the PCRA court’s dismissal order, and our Supreme Court denied
allowance of appeal. Commonwealth v. Ruiz, 996 A.2d 15, 42 EDA 2009
(Pa. Super. 2010) (unpublished memorandum), appeal denied, 3 A.3d 670
(Pa. 2010).
We summarized the ensuing procedural history as follows:
On April 3, 2020, Appellant filed [a] petition/motion for DNA test[ing (petition for DNA testing),] pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] § ____________________________________________
1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(a). The trial court additionally convicted Appellant of one count each of carrying a firearm on public streets in Philadelphia and possessing instruments of a crime. See id. §§ 6108, 907.
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9543.1. Although titled as requesting relief under Section 9543.1[,] relating to DNA testing, the contents of the petition raised issues beyond DNA testing[,] which [the PCRA court] characterized as a second or subsequent PCRA petition[, see 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(2)(i)-(viii) (enumerating cognizable grounds for PCRA relief)].
The PCRA court issued a notice of intent to dismiss pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 on April 25, 2022, wherein Appellant was given an opportunity to address identified defects in the portions of his petition asserting standard PCRA claims. At the subsequent video status conference on June 21, 2022, Appellant acknowledged receipt of the [Rule 907] notice[,] and he indicated that he did not intend to pursue any relief except for the DNA [testing] request. Following that status conference, the PCRA court entered an order dismissing [as untimely 2] the standard PCRA portions of the petition.
With regard to the DNA request pursuant to Section 9543.1, the PCRA court scheduled a second video conference[,] because Appellant indicated at the June conference that he had not yet received the Commonwealth’s motion to dismiss Appellant’s petition for post-conviction DNA testing ….[FN]
[FN] On August 9, 2022, the Commonwealth [provided]
to Appellant [a letter with attached reports (misconduct disclosure notice) indicating] that Philadelphia Police Department [H]omicide Detectives Kenneth Fleming [(Detective Fleming)] and John Rossiter [(Detective Rossiter)] were involved in [Appellant’s] case and were subject to [disciplinary] investigations following allegations of misconduct. ____________________________________________
2 The PCRA requires that any PCRA petition, “including a second or subsequent
petition, shall be filed within one year of the date the judgment of sentence becomes final,” unless the petitioner pleads and proves the applicability of an enumerated exception to the timeliness requirement, discussed infra. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b). But see Commonwealth v. Hardy, 337 A.3d 385, 391, 418 (Pa. 2025) (observing that “[u]nlike the PCRA’s express filing period[,] … Section 9543.1 does not provide any fixed period of time within which to request DNA testing”; concluding the appellant’s Section 9543.1 petition was timely, and he “was authorized to file it at any time” (quotation marks omitted)).
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At the status conference on August 29, 2022, Appellant renewed his request for appointed counsel, which he first raised in [a] July 18, 2022[,] filing. … [T]he PCRA court granted Appellant’s request and appointed Michael I. McDermott, Esq[uire] (PCRA counsel)[,] on Appellant’s behalf.
Ruiz, 323 A.3d 198 (unpublished memorandum at 2-3) (citation and original
brackets omitted; one footnote in original; one footnote added).
On January 3, 2023, Appellant filed a pro se “Motion for Change of
Appointed Counsel” (motion to substitute counsel). Therein, Appellant
averred that he advised PCRA counsel of the misconduct disclosure notice,
about which PCRA counsel responded, “I’ll look into it, but nothing yet.”
Motion to Substitute Counsel, 1/3/23, ¶ 5. Appellant claimed PCRA counsel
subsequently told Appellant that his motion for DNA testing was meritless.
Id. ¶ 9. Appellant alleged PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness and requested that
the PCRA court appoint substitute counsel. Id. ¶¶ 9-11.
The matter proceeded to a status conference on February 17, 2023. At
the conference, PCRA counsel provided Appellant and the PCRA court with a
no-merit letter (subsequently filed on February 22, 2023), pursuant to
Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988), and Commonwealth
v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc). N.T., 2/17/23, at 3.3
3 PCRA counsel opined in his no-merit letter that while “the DNA testing may
eliminate [Appellant] as the source of DNA recovered from the victim’s clothing and the blood samples[,] it will not be sufficient to exonerate [Appellant] of the crime.” No-Merit Letter, 2/22/23, at 4 (unpaginated). PCRA (Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Following a colloquy, Appellant withdrew his motion to substitute counsel. Id.
at 4-6.
On February 24, 2023, the PCRA court filed Rule 907 notice of its intent
to dismiss Appellant’s petition for DNA testing. Appellant filed a pro se
response, again alleging PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness, based on, inter alia,
PCRA counsel’s failure “to address the issue/claim of police misconduct
concerning the officers assigned to [Appellant’s] case[.]” Response, 3/24/23,
¶ 2(b). The PCRA court formally dismissed Appellant’s petition for DNA testing
on April 18, 2023.
Appellant, pro se, timely filed a notice of appeal. Appellant subsequently
filed several applications for relief in this Court, most of which are irrelevant
to the instant appeal. However, on November 8, 2023, Appellant filed an
application for relief, which requested, inter alia, that we direct the PCRA court
to supplement the certified record with various documents. See generally
Application for Relief, 11/8/23; see also Order, 12/4/23 (directing the PCRA
court to certify and transmit to this Court a missing transcript, but denying
Appellant’s other requested relief). Relevantly, for the first time in any court
counsel’s no-merit letter did not address the misconduct disclosure notice. See generally id. Additionally, PCRA counsel’s no-merit letter did not contain a request to withdraw as Appellant’s counsel, and PCRA counsel did not file a separate motion to withdraw. Consequently, this Court previously remanded the case for the PCRA court to resolve Appellant’s representation status. The PCRA court ordered PCRA counsel’s appearance on behalf of Appellant withdrawn on September 12, 2023.
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filing, Appellant attached to his application for relief a copy of the misconduct
disclosure notice. See id., Attachment. The misconduct disclosure notice
consisted of a letter from the Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office and several
reports, prepared by the Internal Affairs Division of the Philadelphia Police
Department, which detailed administrative findings of misconduct against
Detectives Fleming and Rossiter. Id.
Pertinently, on appeal, Appellant raised the issue of whether PCRA
counsel rendered ineffective assistance by
failing to investigate and raise a claim concerning the circumstances and the relevance of evidence relating to homicide detectives who were involved in investigating this case and have engaged in misconduct that necessitated disclosure by the Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)?
Ruiz, 323 A.3d 198 (unpublished memorandum at 4) (brackets and citation
omitted); see also id. (noting Appellant argued the misconduct disclosure
notice constituted “newly[-]discovered evidence which [was] ‘unknown’ to
[Appellant] and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due
diligence.”); 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(b)(1)(ii) (newly-discovered facts exception).
We determined Appellant’s request for PCRA relief was untimely,
reasoning as follows:
[W]hile the newly-discovered facts timeliness exception at Section 9545(b)(1)(ii) does not require a “‘direct connection’ between the newly-discovered facts and the claims asserted by the petitioner,” there must be “some relationship between the two.” See Commonwealth v. Shannon, 184 A.3d 1010, 1017 (Pa. Super. 2018). Here, Appellant did not explain how the “new facts”— i.e.[,] allegations concerning misconduct by Detective[] Fleming
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and [Detective] Rossiter …—were specifically related to his case. See id. Therefore, Appellant has failed to properly invoke the newly-discovered fact exception.
Ruiz, 323 A.3d 198 (unpublished memorandum at 8-9) (citation modified).
We further determined that Appellant could not challenge PCRA
counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness on appeal from the denial of his untimely-
filed, second PCRA petition. Id. (unpublished memorandum at 9) (concluding
the holding in Commonwealth v. Bradley, 261 A.3d 381 (Pa. 2021),4 does
not extend to “cases which involve an untimely second PCRA petition, and
Bradley does not provide a basis to overcome the PCRA time[-]bar.” (citation
omitted)).
Finally, we concluded Appellant’s claim that the PCRA court erred in
denying his DNA testing request merited no relief, and affirmed the PCRA
court’s dismissal order. Id. (unpublished memorandum at 14). Appellant did
not petition our Supreme Court for allowance of appeal.
On March 11, 2025, Appellant, pro se, filed the instant, facially untimely
PCRA petition, his third. Therein, Appellant averred that his trial counsel “was
not provided the police misconduct or any other Brady evidence in this case.”
PCRA Petition, 3/11/25, at 4. Appellant claimed he could not have discovered
the “misconduct disclosure [] evidence” until it was provided to him by the
4 The Bradley Court held that a PCRA petitioner may, following denial of a
first PCRA petition, raise claims of PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness at the first opportunity to do so, even if on appeal. Bradley, 261 A.3d at 402.
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Commonwealth. Id. Appellant attached to his petition a copy of the
misconduct disclosure notice, which is identical to the documents attached to
his November 2023 application for relief filed in his prior appeal. Id.,
Attachment.
On May 12, 2025, the PCRA court issued Rule 907 notice of its intent to
dismiss Appellant’s petition without a hearing. On May 23, 2025, Appellant
filed a response. On June 9, 2025, the PCRA court held a conference at which
it permitted Appellant to make further argument. N.T., 6/9/25, at 6. At the
conclusion of the conference, the PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s third PCRA
petition. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. 5 Appellant and the PCRA
court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
Appellant raises the following three issues:
1. Whether Appellant’s due process rights were violated under Brady[,] where the prosecution failed to supply the defense with the misconduct history of the detectives involved in this case?
2. Whether Appellant’s right to a fair trial was violated where Appellant can show after-discovered evidence of a pattern, practice[,] and custom within the Philadelphia Homicide Detectives Unit of threatening, coercing, and falsifying witnesses[’] and suspects[’] statements?
3. Whether Appellant’s due process suffered where he did not receive an impartial and disinterested tribunal and received prosecutorial misconduct? ____________________________________________
5 Appellant’s June 24, 2025, notice of appeal contains an apparent typographical error, i.e., stating the appeal is taken from a June 24, 2025, order. See Notice of Appeal, 6/24/25. We discern, however, that Appellant intended to appeal from the PCRA court’s June 9, 2025, order dismissing his third PCRA petition.
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Appellant’s Brief at 5-6 (some capitalization modified).
“Appellate review of a PCRA court’s dismissal of a PCRA petition is
limited to the examination of whether the PCRA court’s determination is
supported by the record and free of legal error.” Commonwealth v.
Maxwell, 232 A.3d 739, 744 (Pa. Super. 2020) (en banc) (citation and
quotation marks omitted). “[W]e review the PCRA court’s legal conclusions
de novo.” Id. (citation omitted).
Before considering the merits of Appellant’s claims, we must address
the timeliness of Appellant’s third PCRA petition. See Commonwealth v.
Brown, 111 A.3d 171, 175 (Pa. Super. 2015) (“[T]he timeliness of a PCRA
petition is a jurisdictional requisite.” (citation omitted)). As set forth above,
under the PCRA, any petition, “including a second or subsequent petition, shall
be filed within one year of the date the judgment of sentence becomes final[.]”
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). A judgment of sentence becomes final “at the
conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in the Supreme
Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the
expiration of time for seeking the review.” Id. § 9545(b)(3).
Instantly, Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final in November
2005, when his time for seeking direct review with the United States Supreme
Court expired. See id.; U.S.SUP.CT.R. 13 (a petition for a writ of certiorari is
timely when filed within 90 days of the denial of discretionary review). As
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Appellant filed his third PCRA petition nearly 20 years later, his petition is
facially untimely.
Nevertheless, a court may consider an untimely PCRA petition if the
petitioner pleads and proves one of three statutory exceptions:
(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of interference by government officials with the presentation of the claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States;
(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or
(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and has been held by that court to apply retroactively.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii).
To properly invoke the newly-discovered fact timeliness exception, the
petition must plead and prove two prongs: “(1) the facts upon which the claim
was predicated were unknown[;] and (2) they could not have been
ascertained by the exercise of due diligence.” Commonwealth v. Cox, 146
A.3d 221, 227 (Pa. 2016) (citation omitted).
“To plead and prove the governmental interference exception, [the
petitioner] must show ‘the failure to raise the claim previously was the result
of interference by government officials.’” Commonwealth v. Reeves, 296
A.3d 1228, 1231 (Pa. Super. 2023) (quoting 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i)).
“In other words, [the petitioner] is required to show that but for the
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interference of a government actor ‘he could not have filed his claim earlier.’”
Commonwealth v. Staton, 184 A.3d 949, 955 (Pa. 2018) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Stokes, 959 A.2d 306, 310 (Pa. 2008)).
Any petition invoking one of these exceptions “shall be filed within one
year of the date the claim could have been presented.” Id. § 9545(b)(2); see
also Commonwealth v. Mickeals, 335 A.3d 13, 20 (Pa. Super. 2025) (“[I]f
a [PCRA] petition is untimely, and none of the timeliness exceptions are met,
courts do not have jurisdiction to address the substance of the underlying
claims.” (citation omitted)).
“The PCRA petitioner bears the burden of proving the applicability of one
of the exceptions.” Commonwealth v. Spotz, 171 A.3d 675, 678 (Pa. 2017).
Significantly, “[e]xceptions to the time[-]bar must be pled in the PCRA
petition, and may not be raised for the first time on appeal.”
Commonwealth v. Thomas, 340 A.3d 1053, 1058 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2025)
(emphasis added; quoting Commonwealth v. Burton, 936 A.2d 521, 525
(Pa. Super. 2007)).
Relevant to our timeliness analysis in the instant case, the PCRA
additionally requires that, to be eligible for relief, the petitioner must show
that “the allegation of error has not been previously litigated or waived.” 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(3). “An issue is previously litigated if ‘the highest
appellate court in which [the appellant] could have had review as a matter of
right has ruled on the merits of the issue.’” Commonwealth v. Cousar, 154
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A.3d 287, 296 (Pa. 2017) (quoting 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9544(a)(2)). Our Supreme
Court has explained that a PCRA petitioner “cannot obtain post-conviction
review of claims that were previously litigated by alleging ineffectiveness of
prior counsel and presenting new theories to support the previously litigated
versions of the claims.” Commonwealth v. Lambert, 797 A.2d 232, 240
(Pa. 2001) (citations omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Bond, 819 A.2d
33, 39 (Pa. 2002) (“a PCRA petitioner cannot obtain review of claims that were
previously litigated by presenting new theories of relief, including allegations
of ineffectiveness, to relitigate previously litigated claims.”).
“[A] PCRA claim is waived ‘if the petitioner could have raised it but failed
to do so before trial, at trial, during unitary review, on appeal or in a prior
state post-conviction proceeding.’” Commonwealth v. Koehler, 36 A.3d
121, 161 (Pa. 2012) (quoting 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9544(b)).
In its Rule 1925 opinion, the PCRA court accurately observed that
Appellant’s court-ordered Rule 1925 concise statement “only raises three
issues concerning alleged ineffectiveness of … PCRA counsel for failing to
address issues and claims relating to detectives referenced in [the]
misconduct disclosure notice ….” PCRA Court Opinion, 8/18/25, at 1-2.
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Consequently, the PCRA court only addressed PCRA counsel’s alleged
ineffectiveness.6
The PCRA court opined that Appellant’s argument that PCRA counsel was
ineffective for failing to raise issues regarding the misconduct disclosure notice
was previously litigated … in connection with [Appellant’s] second PCRA petition, and the holding issued thereon … is binding and cannot be relitigated in a new PCRA petition. See Ruiz, 323 A.3d 198 (unpublished memorandum at 8-9). ….
The [PCRA] court identified, in [its May 12, 2025,] Rule 907 notice, that [Appellant] did not adequately allege an exception to the timeliness provision of the PCRA. Thereafter, the [PCRA] court held a status hearing on June 9, 2025. During the hearing, the court discussed the [Ruiz] Court’s prior ruling[] and gave [Appellant] an opportunity to explain why his third PCRA petition … should not be dismissed on timeliness grounds. [Appellant] was unable to show that his petition alleged and proved an exception to the PCRA’s jurisdictional time-bar.
PCRA Court Opinion, 8/18/25, at 1-2 (some citations omitted; citation,
punctuation, and capitalization modified).
Upon review, the PCRA court accurately characterized our prior holding
in Ruiz, supra, and we agree with the PCRA court’s legal conclusions. See
Maxwell, 232 A.3d at 744.
6 As we conclude Appellant’s third PCRA petition is patently untimely, and that
Appellant has failed to prove an exception to the PCRA’s time-bar, we need not address whether Appellant has otherwise preserved the issues presented in his brief. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Lord, 719 A.2d 306, 309 (Pa. 1998) (“Any issues not raised in a [Rule] 1925(b) statement will be deemed waived.”).
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In preparing his third PCRA petition, Appellant utilized a standardized
preprinted form petition. See generally PCRA Petition, 3/11/25. Therein,
Appellant checked boxes indicating his belief that his facially untimely petition
satisfies the criteria for the governmental interference and newly-discovered
facts exceptions to the PCRA’s one-year time-bar. Id. at 3; see also 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i), (ii). However, the only facts Appellant pled in his
petition that could arguably support his timeliness arguments were that (1)
his trial counsel “was not provided the police misconduct or any other Brady
evidence in this case”;7 (2) PCRA counsel “fail[ed] to amend [Appellant’s
second] PCRA [petition] to include new evidence”; and (3) Appellant “could
not have obtained [the misconduct disclosure notice] until it was provided to
me by the [Commonwealth.]” Id. at 4, 7.
As outlined above, this Court previously determined that Appellant could
not rely on Bradley, supra, to challenge PCRA counsel’s effectiveness in his
untimely-filed, second PCRA petition. Ruiz, 323 A.3d 198 (unpublished
memorandum at 9). We additionally concluded that Appellant failed to
properly invoke the newly-discovered facts exception, as he “did not explain
how the ‘new facts’ … were specifically related to his case.” Id. at
(unpublished memorandum at 8-9).
7 Upon review, we observe that the misconduct disclosure notice does not indicate whether Detectives Fleming’s and Rossiter’s misconduct occurred prior to Appellant’s trial.
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Instantly, Appellant attached to his third PCRA petition the same
misconduct disclosure notice (detailing the same misconduct committed by
Detectives Fleming and Rossiter)8 that he relied upon in his prior appeal. See
PCRA Petition, 3/11/25, Attachment; Application for Relief, 11/8/23,
Attachment. Appellant has failed to establish that his invocation of the newly-
discovered facts exception was not previously litigated, or that he could not
have invoked the governmental interference exception in connection with the
8 We note that in his appellate brief Appellant additionally identifies Philadelphia Police Detective James Pitts (Detective Pitts), as a law enforcement officer involved in Appellant’s case who had subsequently been found to have engaged in official misconduct. See Appellant’s Brief at 19-23, 36. Appellant offers no explanation for how he came to discover Detective Pitts’s misconduct, nor does he explain how his discovery of Detective Pitts’s misconduct satisfies a PCRA timeliness exception. See generally id. In its brief, however, the Commonwealth represents that, in August 2025, it provided Appellant with an updated misconduct disclosure notice indicating Detective Pitts “had [been] investigated [for] conduct outside of [Appellant’s] case.” Commonwealth Brief at 9; see also id. at 16 (stating Detective Pitts’s “involvement in this case was limited to recording the statement of [a police officer] about his role in the investigation, specifically [the officer’s] management of the crime scene.”).
We are not in a position to address Appellant’s underdeveloped claim regarding Detective Pitts, which he raises for the first time on appeal. Appellant may seek relief from the PCRA court when it regains jurisdiction. See Commonwealth v. Tyler, 234 A.3d 750, 752 (Pa. Super. 2022) (observing that a PCRA court is precluded from considering a “subsequent PCRA petition while [an] appeal of [a] prior PCRA petition is pending.” (citation omitted)); 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2) (providing that a claim pleading an exception to the PCRA’s time-bar must be raised within one year of the date the claim could have been presented); Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (stating a claim cannot be raised for the first time on appeal).
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misconduct disclosure notice. 9 See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9544(a), (b). Accordingly,
we conclude Appellant’s invocation of the newly-discovered facts exception
and the governmental interference exception, both of which rely upon the
misconduct disclosure notice, are previously litigated and waived,
respectively.
As Appellant has otherwise failed to plead and prove an exception to the
PCRA’s time-bar, the PCRA court correctly dismissed as untimely Appellant’s
third PCRA petition.
Order affirmed.
Date: 7/20/2026
9 Appellant did not allege in his third PCRA petition any facts or information
concerning the Commonwealth’s purported interference with Appellant’s ability to raise his claim concerning police misconduct. See Thomas, 340 A.3d at 1058 n.3 (stating the facts supporting the applicability of PCRA time- bar exceptions must be pled in the PCRA petition). To the extent Appellant asserts the governmental interference exception in an attempt to circumvent the Ruiz Court’s conclusion that the misconduct disclosure notice did not satisfy the newly-discovered fact exception, we reiterate that “a PCRA petitioner cannot obtain review of claims that were previously litigated by presenting new theories of relief … to relitigate previously litigated claims.” Bond, 819 A.2d at 39.
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