Com. v. Ruiz, C.

Opinion

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA :

v. :

: :

CARLOS RUIZ :

:

Appellant : No. 828 EDA 2025

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered November 7, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0000562-2008

BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., MURRAY, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E. *

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED AUGUST 18, 2026

Carlos Ruiz (Appellant) appeals, nunc pro tunc, from the order

dismissing his third petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act

(PCRA). See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. Appellant claims he is entitled to

relief, under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(vi), based on new exculpatory

evidence of police misconduct committed, in unrelated cases, by former

Philadelphia Police Detective Philip Nordo (Detective Nordo). 1 After careful

review, we affirm.

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 In 2022, Detective Nordo was convicted of multiple counts of rape, sexual

assault, stalking, and official oppression. See Commonwealth v. Nordo, CP-51-CR-0001856-2019, and CP-51-CR-0004070-2021; see also Commonwealth v. Young, 348 A.3d 684 n.3, 3041-3043 EDA 2022 (Pa. (Footnote Continued Next Page)

This Court previously detailed the factual history underlying this case:

[Appellant], a drug dealer, had been fighting over drug-dealing turf with Marcos Martinez (the victim). [In a prior interaction, Appellant] was badly beaten by the victim and vowed to take revenge. (N.T. Trial, 1/6/09, at 144-45). On January 3, 2007, [Appellant’s co-conspirator and co-defendant, Jesus] Ramos [(Ramos),] drove Appellant [] in a burgundy Toyota Camry to the 2800 block of North Swanson Street, Philadelphia, where the victim lived. [Appellant] spotted the victim and directed Ramos to slow the car down so the victim would think it was someone coming to purchase drugs, and draw him to the car. (See id. at 147-48). Ramos complied and when the vehicle stopped, Appellant [] exited the vehicle and attempted to shoot the victim. However, no bullets discharged from the gun, as it was locked. The victim fled inside the house of a neighbor, Amil Gonzalez [(Mr. Gonzalez)], and Appellant [] shot two bullets through the door. (See id. at 149). One of these bullets struck the victim in the head, fatally injuring him. [Appellant] ran back to the Camry, and Ramos drove him away from the scene. Neighbors called 911 and reported the shooting, describing the getaway car.

Ramos’[s] ex-girlfriend, Alison Ramirez [(“Ramirez” or “Ms.

Ramirez”)], testified to events that occurred shortly before the shooting. Ramirez explained that on the day in question, Ramos arrived at her sister’s home, where she lived with [Ramirez,] located just three blocks from North Swanson Street. Ramirez had previously obtained a protection from abuse (PFA)2 order [regarding Ramos], so she telephoned 911 [upon] seeing Ramos. Appellant [], whom Ramirez recognized, then arrived in a burgundy Camry, and Ramos got in the passenger seat. The vehicle left but returned shortly thereafter, and Ramos got out of the car. Philadelphia Police Officers John Boyle [(Officer Boyle)] and Jason Forsythe [(Officer Forsythe)] responded to [Ramirez’s]

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Super. 2025) (unpublished memorandum at 3 n.3) (explaining that “[t]he evidence presented at [Detective] Nordo’s trial established that he sexually assaulted male witnesses and informants in homicide cases where he was involved as a detective, and that he illegally procured crime reward money for one of the victims.”). Here, none of Detective Nordo’s convictions or charges related to Appellant’s case.

2 See Protection From Abuse Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6101-6122.

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911 call. [Upon law enforcement’s] arrival, Ramirez pointed to the burgundy Camry at the corner and identified Ramos as the subject of the PFA order. Ramos saw the police and went back to the Camry; however, Appellant [] moved to the passenger seat, and Ramos got in the driver’s seat and drove off.

While the police were interviewing Ramirez, they received a flash report that a shooting had occurred a few blocks away in the 2800 block of Swanson Street. On their arrival, the victim was lying outside the front door of his neighbor’s home with a bullet through his brain. Investigators found two fired cartridge casings and two fired bullets nearby. Officers Boyle and Forsythe heard over the police radio that the perpetrators had fled in a burgundy Toyota Camry, the same car that they had just seen Ramos and Appellant [occupying] … minutes earlier a few blocks away. The officers returned to Ramirez’[s] home and learned that Ramos lived in the 2900 block of Waterloo Street. On arrival, the officers saw a burgundy Camry parked across from Ramos’[s] home. A computer check showed that the vehicle was registered to a woman who lived on Horrocks Street. (See id. at 249-62).

In the meantime, Ramos telephoned Ramirez and told her that he had just shot someone. Ramos explained that the gun locked as he was trying to shoot, but he managed to get off two shots through the door of a house. (See id. at 88-117). Unknown to Ramos, Ramirez’[s] sister, Marangeli Rivera [(Rivera)], was listening on the other end of the phone. Ramos pleaded with Ramirez to meet with him; she [initially] agreed but then hung up the telephone and called 911 to report what she had just heard.

The police instructed Ramirez to go to the police station.

Ramirez complied, with [Rivera] accompanying her. While Ramirez was giving a statement to the detectives, Rivera had to leave to pick up her children at school. When Rivera and the children arrived home, she saw Ramos standing on the corner. [Rivera] called 911 and the police arrived to arrest Ramos for the assault/robbery he had committed on Ramirez the day before, and for his continuing violation of the PFA order.

Commonwealth v. Ruiz, 83 A.3d 1071, 701 EDA 2012 (Pa. Super. filed Aug.

23, 2013) (unpublished memorandum at 2-4) (footnote added; brackets,

4

ellipses, and some citations omitted; some punctuation and citations

modified).

This Court further detailed the shooting investigation, including

Detective Nordo’s involvement:

Detective [Nordo] testified that he took a statement from Ramos[, upon] his arrest, after [Ramos] waived his [] Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), rights. Ramos detailed the nature and extent of his involvement in the shooting. (N.T., Trial, 8/6/09, at 131-58). Ramos explained that [Appellant] had a previous altercation with the “boys on Swanson Street” over drug dealing and [Ramos] knew that Appellant [] wanted to “get back at them.” (Id. at 144). For weeks after the fight, Appellant [] asked Ramos to give him a gun so he could “fuck these guys up.” (Id. at 145). Three days before the shooting, Appellant [] told Ramos that [Appellant] had secured a gun and had gone over to Swanson Street “to shoot” the victim, but did not do so.

On the day of the murder, Ramos agreed to go with Appellant [] to Swanson Street to “get these mother fuckers.” While in the car, Appellant [] showed Ramos the gun that he was carrying and Ramos stated, “you are going to kill this mother fucker with that.” (Id. at 146-47). Ramos then admitted that he drove [Appellant] to Swanson Street, and explained that he “drove real slowly. I wanted to make it look like a buy.” (Id. at 147). Ramos stated that Appellant [] had the gun right in his lap. (See id.). When [Appellant] spotted the victim, Ramos followed [Appellant’s] instruction to reverse the car slowly and stop. (See id. at 148). [Appellant] then got out of the car and attempted to shoot the victim, but the gun did not fire. (See id.) [Appellant] then fired two bullets through the front door, jumped back into the Camry, and yelled to Ramos, “get off the fucking block.” (Id. at 149). Ramos obeyed and drove off “real fast.” (See id.)

The police also obtained a statement from [Mr.] Gonzalez, the victim’s neighbor, who lived at 2837 North Swanson Street. In his January 5, 2008, statement to the police, [Mr.] Gonzalez averred that he was outside of his home when he saw the victim walking towards him from the other end of the street. [Mr.] Gonzalez saw a burgundy car coming up the street at a high rate of speed. The car stopped in front of [Mr. Gonzalez’s] house and

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the passenger got out. The victim then ran into [Mr.] Gonzalez’s house and closed the door. The passenger stood by the car and attempted to fire, but the gun misfired. The man then fired two shots at the door, returned to the car, and left the scene. [Mr.] Gonzalez found the victim lying behind the door of his home.

The police subsequently showed [Mr.] Gonzalez a photo array; he identified Appellant [] as the person who got out of the burgundy car and shot at his house. (See id. at 119). When asked if he was certain of his identification, [Mr.] Gonzalez answered affirmatively. [Mr.] Gonzalez also recounted that [Appellant] had sustained an earlier beating at the hands of the victim. (See id. at 122).

Ruiz, 83 A.3d 1071 (unpublished memorandum at 4-5) (brackets and some

citations omitted).

The Commonwealth charged Appellant with, inter alia, one count each

of third-degree murder, criminal conspiracy, and firearms not to be carried

without a license.3 Appellant filed a pre-trial motion to suppress his statement

to law enforcement, which the trial court denied after a hearing.

The matter proceeded to a non-jury trial on August 5-6, 2009, wherein

Appellant and Ramos were jointly tried. The trial testimony of Mr. Gonzalez,

a Commonwealth witness, is relevant to the instant appeal. As this Court

previously explained,

[a]t the time of trial, [Mr.] Gonzalez was serving a federal prison sentence. At trial, [Mr.] Gonzalez gave a different version of events from the January 5, 2008, statement to the police, testifying that, at the time of the shooting, he was inside his house with his wife, Aurelia Delgado. [Mr.] Gonzalez testified that he heard two gunshots but denied seeing who shot the victim.

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3 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502(c), 903(a), 6106(a)(1).

6

Ruiz, 83 A.3d 1071 (unpublished memorandum at 8) (emphasis added).

At trial, Mr. Gonzalez testified that on January 5, 2008, Detectives Nordo

and Samuel Gonzalez (Detective Gonzalez) 4 interviewed him inside a room in

the Philadelphia East Detective’s Division. N.T., 8/6/09, at 45-48. Mr.

Gonzalez alleged that the detectives mistreated him during the protracted

interview:5

[I was t]ired and hungry, [] because the[ police] had me over there all this time without eating anything, not even water. There was not even a bathroom. It was like a room with a chair and a small table, that is all. Even one of the cops hit me, because he said that I was lying, a white chunky one.

Id. at 85. In open court, Mr. Gonzalez identified Detective Nordo as “the one

that hit me.” Id. at 86.

Mr. Gonzalez testified that after the assault, Detective Nordo exited the

interview room and Detective Gonzalez entered. Id. at 88. Detective

Gonzalez interviewed Mr. Gonzalez and took a written statement. Id. In his

testimony, Mr. Gonzalez recanted this police statement, asserting he was

inside his residence at the time of the shooting. Id. at 60. According to Mr.

Gonzalez, “I told [law enforcement] that I didn’t see anything … [and] didn’t

know why they had me there.” Id.

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4 Mr. Gonzalez and Detective Gonzalez are not related.

5 On cross-examination, Appellant’s counsel questioned Mr. Gonzalez, “The police held you for 36 hours before you spoke to them; isn’t that right?” N.T., 8/6/09, at 84. Mr. Gonzalez responded that law enforcement “h[e]ld me for awhile, but I cannot say the time or the hour.” Id. at 86.

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Mr. Gonzalez stated that Detective Gonzalez provided him with a written

statement that, Mr. Gonzalez alleged, he did not read in light of his inability

to read the English language. Id. at 88-89. According to Mr. Gonzalez,

Detective Gonzalez, without reading the statement to Mr. Gonzalez, “just told

me this is what you told me, sign here, and I trusted him, so I signed.” Id.

at 89. After reviewing his written statement, which was admitted into

evidence, Mr. Gonzalez testified that “[n]ot all of them were the questions that

were made and not all of them were the answers that I gave.” Id.; see also

id. at 60 (Mr. Gonzalez asserting that in his statement, the detectives

“change[d] a lot of stuff, because I never told them that I saw [Appellant]

outside the house.”). Mr. Gonzalez testified, “I never said that I had seen the

one who did the shooting.” Id. at 89.

Detective Gonzalez next testified regarding his participation in Mr.

Gonzalez’s police interview, which the detective described as his sole

involvement in the investigation. See id. at 104-06. Detective Gonzalez

stated that he conducted the interview along with Detective Ronald Aitken

(Detective Aitken).6 Id. at 105. Detective Gonzalez described Mr. Gonzalez’s

participation in the interview as knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Id. at

106, 108. Detective Gonzalez testified that, during the interview, Mr.

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6 Detective Gonzalez stated that Detective Aitken requested Detective Gonzalez’s participation in the interview because he is fluent in Spanish. N.T., 8/6/09, at 105. Detective Gonzalez testified that Mr. Gonzalez spoke only Spanish during the interview. Id. at 106.

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Gonzalez made no complaints regarding the duration of the interview, his

tiredness, or the alleged lack of access to food or drink. Id. at 109. Detective

Gonzalez further confirmed that at no time did Mr. Gonzalez “complain to

[Detective Gonzalez] that he had been hit or struck or assaulted in any way

by any police officers or detectives while he had been at East Detectives[.]”

Id. at 109-10.

Detective Nordo testified that he was present in court during Mr.

Gonzalez’s trial testimony, and denied Mr. Gonzalez’s assault allegations. Id.

at 158. Contrary to Mr. Gonzalez’s account, Detective Nordo stated that he

was not present for Mr. Gonzalez’s interview, as he was interviewing Ramos,

in a separate room in the same building, at that time. Id. at 182-85.

Detective Nordo testified that taking Ramos’s police statement was his sole

involvement in the investigation. See id. at 133-57.

At the conclusion of trial, the trial court convicted Appellant of the

aforementioned offenses.7 On October 29, 2009, the trial court sentenced

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7 The trial court also convicted Ramos of the same offenses, i.e., third-degree

murder, conspiracy, and firearms not to be carried without a license. This Court affirmed Ramos’s judgment of sentence, after which our Supreme Court denied allowance of appeal. Commonwealth v. Ramos, 46 A.3d 817, 155 EDA 2011 (Pa. Super. 2012) (unpublished memorandum), appeal denied, 48 A.3d 1248 (Pa. 2012). This Court subsequently affirmed the PCRA court’s dismissal of Ramos’s PCRA petition. Commonwealth v. Ramos, 190 A.3d 712, 2018 WL 1790395, 289 EDA 2017 (Pa. Super. 2018) (unpublished memorandum).

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Appellant to an aggregate 13 to 26 years of imprisonment. Appellant filed

post-sentence motions, which were denied by operation of law.

Although Appellant did not file a timely direct appeal, in April 2011, he

filed a PCRA petition seeking the reinstatement of his direct appeal rights,

nunc pro tunc. The PCRA court granted the petition, after which Appellant

filed a direct appeal, nunc pro tunc. On August 23, 2013, this Court affirmed

Appellant’s judgment of sentence, rejecting the merits of his sole challenge to

the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions. See generally

Ruiz, 83 A.3d 1071. Appellant thereafter filed a petition for allowance of

appeal, which our Supreme Court denied. Commonwealth v. Ruiz, 87 A.3d

815 (Pa. 2014).

On August 19, 2014, Appellant, pro se, filed a timely first PCRA petition.

Appellant asserted, inter alia, that he had recently discovered new evidence,

in the form of an affidavit from Ramos that Appellant attached as an exhibit

to his petition. In his affidavit, Ramos alleged that “[Appellant] had nothing

to do with the homicide death of [the victim]. In fact, [Appellant] was not

even at the location when the shooting happen[e]d.” 8 PCRA Petition, 8/19/14,

Affidavit (punctuation modified).

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8 Significantly, Ramos later recanted his affidavit in his own PCRA proceedings.

Ramos’s PCRA petition asserted that Appellant had coerced him to drive Appellant to the crime scene, where Appellant shot the victim. See Appellant’s Brief at 3 (Appellant conceding that “Ramos filed a PCRA Petition wherein he recanted his admission and claimed that [Appellant] was the shooter.”); (Footnote Continued Next Page)

10

The PCRA court appointed Appellant PCRA counsel, who subsequently

filed a thorough “no-merit” letter, and accompanying motion to withdraw as

counsel, pursuant to Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988),

and Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc).

Appellant filed no response. On September 18, 2015, the PCRA court

dismissed Appellant’s petition. Appellant did not timely appeal. 9

Over two years later, with no intervening docket activity, Appellant filed

the instant, pro se PCRA petition on January 17, 2018.10 Appellant conceded

the facial untimeliness of his petition, but asserted the newly-discovered fact

exception to the PCRA’s jurisdictional time-bar, 11 based upon new evidence of

Detective Nordo’s misconduct in other cases. See generally PCRA Petition,

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Commonwealth’s Letter Brief, 6/4/20, Ex. C-2 (Ramos’s PCRA petition); see also generally Ramos, supra.

9 On December 15, 2015, nearly three months after the filing of the dismissal

order, Appellant filed a pro se petition seeking permission to file a notice of appeal, nunc pro tunc. The PCRA court did not issue a ruling on Appellant’s petition.

10 Appellant filed a pro se amended PCRA petition on April 10, 2018.

11 Under the PCRA, all petitions must be filed within one year of the date the

judgment becomes final. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1); see also id. § 9545(b)(3) (providing that “a judgment becomes final at the conclusion of direct review … or at the expiration of time for seeking the review.”). However, courts may consider an untimely petition if the appellant can explicitly plead and prove one of three timeliness exceptions delineated in Section 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii), including subsection (ii)’s exception for newly- discovered facts. Id. § 9545(b)(1)(ii).

11

1/17/18. Appellant asserted that on December 20, 2017, he first discovered

a newspaper article detailing Detective Nordo’s misconduct. Id. at 3-4.

Private counsel (PCRA counsel) subsequently entered his appearance on

Appellant’s behalf and filed an amended PCRA petition on March 11, 2020. 12

Therein, Appellant asserted that Detective Nordo’s

misconduct tainted the entire investigation, and resulted in a forced and false positive identification by [Mr.] Gonzalez, the only witness implicating [Appellant] as the shooter. [Mr. Gonzalez] further contended that Detective Nordo lied under oath to conceal his misconduct.

Amended PCRA Petition, 3/11/20, ¶ 12. Pointing to the trial testimony,

Appellant alleged that Detective Nordo mistreated Mr. Gonzalez during his

interrogation, by assaulting him and detaining him in excess of 30 hours, in

an interview room without access to food, drink, or restroom facilities. Id. ¶¶

14-15. Appellant claimed that “[w]hile [Mr.] Gonzalez’s [police] statement,

coerced by Detective Nordo, implicated” Appellant, Mr. Gonzalez’s trial

testimony “reflects the complete opposite, i.e., that he never saw [Appellant]

on the date of the shooting.” Id. ¶ 13 (emphasis omitted)).

On June 4, 2020, the Commonwealth filed a thorough letter brief in

opposition to the PCRA petition. Appellant, through PCRA counsel, filed a

response to the Commonwealth’s filing on December 29, 2020.

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12Subsequently, on July 14, 2023, PCRA counsel filed a supplemental amended PCRA petition.

12

Following several continuances, on September 4, 2024, the PCRA court

gave Appellant appropriate Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of its intention to dismiss

his PCRA petition without an evidentiary hearing.13, 14 The PCRA court

determined that although Appellant satisfied the PCRA’s timeliness exception

for newly-discovered facts, Appellant’s claim of after-discovered evidence,

based on new evidence of Detective Nordo’s misconduct in other cases, failed

on the merits.

On November 7, 2024, the PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s petition.

Though Appellant initially failed to file a notice of appeal within 30 days of this

order, see Pa.R.A.P. 903(a) (establishing 30-day time limitation for appeals),

the PCRA court subsequently granted Appellant’s “Unopposed Motion for Leave

to File a Notice of Appeal Nunc Pro Tunc.” Appellant timely filed a notice of

appeal, nunc pro tunc. Appellant and the PCRA court have complied with

Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

Appellant presents the following question for our review:

Did the [PCRA] court err in denying post-conviction relief where the sole eyewitness was held for over 36 hours before he gave a statement[,] and who was otherwise abused by disgraced …

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13 In his appellate brief, Appellant asserts that the PCRA court initially “granted

[him] a hearing, but [Mr.] Gonzalez could not be found[,] so the [PCRA] court was presented with a paper record of the several misconduct cases involving [Detective] Nordo.” Appellant’s Brief at 4.

14 Although the record contains no response from Appellant to the Rule 907

notice, the PCRA court entered an order on November 7, 2024 (i.e., the same date as the PCRA court’s dismissal order), denying Appellant’s purported “Motion for Reconsideration.” PCRA Court Order, 11/7/24 (unpaginated).

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Detective [] Nordo, who nearly a decade later was exposed for his misconduct, especially since this evidence of abuse, which was disbelieved by the trial court, has now come to light and likely [would have] resulted in a different trial result?

Appellant’s Brief at 2.

When reviewing the dismissal of a PCRA petition, “an appellate court

must determine whether the PCRA court’s order is supported by the record

and free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Shields, 347 A.3d 752, 762 (Pa.

Super. 2025) (citation omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Pointer, 348

A.3d 1216, 1227 (Pa. Super. 2025) (“[A]s long as the PCRA court’s ruling is

free of legal error and is supported by record evidence, we will not disturb its

ruling.” (citation omitted)). Our scope of review “is limited to the findings of

the PCRA court and the evidence of record, viewed in the light most favorable

to the prevailing party at the PCRA court level.” Commonwealth v.

Conforti, 303 A.3d 715, 725 (Pa. 2023) (citation omitted); see also

Commonwealth v. Kapellusch, 323 A.3d 837, 844 (Pa. Super. 2024)

(stating appellate courts “grant great deference to the PCRA court’s findings

that are supported in the record.” (citation omitted)). A PCRA petitioner bears

“the burden of persuading th[e appellate c]ourt that the PCRA court erred and

that such error requires relief.” Commonwealth v. Montalvo, 205 A.3d 274,

286 (Pa. 2019).

All PCRA petitions must be filed within one year of the date the judgment

becomes final, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1), unless the petitioner pleads and

proves one of the timeliness exceptions contained in subsection 9545(b)(1)(i)-

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(iii). Any PCRA petition invoking one of these timeliness exceptions must also

establish that the petitioner invoked the exception within one year of the date

the claim could have been first presented. Id. § 9545(b)(2). The PCRA’s

timeliness requirements are jurisdictional in nature, and a court may not

address the merits of the issues raised if the PCRA petition was not timely

filed. Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 994 A.2d 1091, 1093 (Pa. 2010).

Here, because Appellant did not petition the United States Supreme

Court for further review following our Supreme Court’s March 24, 2014, order

denying allowance of appeal, his judgment of sentence became final on June

22, 2014. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3); see also U.S. SUP. CT. R. 13

(providing a petition for writ of certiorari must be filed within 90 days after

the entry of the order denying discretionary review).

Accordingly, Appellant’s instant PCRA petition, filed on January 17,

2018, is facially untimely. However, Appellant invoked the newly-discovered

fact exception set forth in subsection 9545(b)(1)(ii). See generally PCRA

Petition, 1/17/18.

This Court has explained that

[t]he timeliness exception set forth in Section 9545(b)(1)(ii) requires a petitioner to demonstrate he did not know the facts upon which he based his petition and could not have learned those facts earlier by the exercise of due diligence. Commonwealth v. Bennett, 930 A.2d 1264, 1271 (Pa. 2007). .... Additionally, the focus of this exception “is on the newly discovered facts, not on a newly discovered or newly willing source for previously known facts.” Commonwealth v. Marshall, 947 A.2d 714, 720 (Pa. 2008) (emphasis in original).

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***

[A]s an initial jurisdictional threshold, Section 9545(b)(1)(ii) requires a petitioner to allege and prove that there were facts unknown to him[,] and that he exercised due diligence in discovering those facts. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(ii). Once jurisdiction is established, a PCRA petitioner can present a substantive after-discovered-evidence claim. See id. § 9543(a)(2)(vi) (explaining that to be eligible for relief, petitioner must plead and prove by a preponderance of evidence that the conviction or sentence resulted from, inter alia, unavailability at the time of trial of exculpatory evidence that has subsequently become available and would have changed [the] outcome of trial if it had been introduced).

***

Thus, the “new facts” exception at Section 9545(b)(1)(ii) does not require any merits analysis of an underlying after-discoveredevidence claim. [Commonwealth v. Bennett, 930 A.2d 1264, 1271 (Pa. 2007).]

Commonwealth v. Brown, 111 A.3d 171, 176 (Pa. Super. 2015) (footnote

omitted; some citations modified); see also Commonwealth v. Branthafer,

315 A.3d 113, 128 (Pa. Super. 2024) (“[T]he newly-discovered facts

exception to the jurisdictional time-bar is distinct from an after-discovered

evidence claim, which is a substantive basis for relief pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 9543(a)(2)([vi])”).

Instantly, Appellant claims that he met the requirements of both the

newly-discovered fact exception and subsection 9545(b)(2), where he filed his

instant PCRA petition

on January 17, 2018. [Appellant stated therein] that he learned of Detective Nordo’s misconduct on December 20, 2017, and filed his PCRA Petition on January 17, 2018, well before the one[-]year limitations period was over under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545[(b)(1)].

16

Appellant’s Brief at 14 (internal record citation omitted; citation modified).

Upon review, we determine that Appellant established all requirements

of both subsections 9545(b)(1)(ii) and (b)(2), as he invoked a timeliness

exception in a PCRA petition filed within one year of the date the claim could

have been first presented.15

We thus address the merits of Appellant’s claim that the PCRA court

erred in denying relief on his after-discovered evidence claim under subsection

9543(a)(2)(vi). See Commonwealth v. Reeves, 296 A.3d 1228, 1232 (Pa.

Super. 2023) (“Once jurisdiction is established, a PCRA petitioner can present

a substantive after-discovered-evidence claim.”); see also Commonwealth

v. Brown, 350 A.3d 12, 34 (Pa. 2026) (stating that a PCRA “petitioner may

satisfy the timeliness exception even if his or her underlying, substantive claim

turns out to be meritless.”).

This Court has stated that

[w]hen we examine the decision of a trial court to grant a new trial on the basis of after-discovered evidence, we ask only if the court committed an abuse of discretion or an error of law which controlled the outcome of the case. Discretion is abused when the course pursued represents not merely an error of judgment, but where the judgment is manifestly unreasonable or where the law is not applied or where the record shows that the action is a result

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15 In its appellate brief, the Commonwealth concedes that “[Appellant] has met his burden to establish the jurisdiction of the PCRA court to review his claim, by a preponderance of the evidence.” Commonwealth Brief at 9 (punctuation modified); see also PCRA Court Opinion, 7/17/25, at 3-5 (addressing the merits of Appellant’s claim).

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of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will. If a trial court erred in its application of the law, an appellate court will correct the error.

Commonwealth v. Padillas, 997 A.2d 356, 361 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citations

and quotation marks omitted).

Our Supreme Court has explained that

to prevail on an after-discovered evidence claim for relief under subsection 9543(a)(2)(vi), a petitioner must prove that (1) the exculpatory evidence has been discovered after trial and could not have been obtained at or prior to trial through reasonable diligence; (2) the evidence is not cumulative; (3) it is not being used solely to impeach credibility; and (4) it would likely compel a different verdict.

Commonwealth v. Burton, 158 A.3d 618, 629 (Pa. 2017) (emphasis

added). “The test is conjunctive; the appellant must show by a preponderance

of the evidence that each of these factors has been met in order for a new

trial to be warranted.” Commonwealth v. Foreman, 55 A.3d 532, 537 (Pa.

Super. 2012) (citation and brackets omitted); see also Commonwealth v.

Watson, 292 A.3d 562, 567 (Pa. Super. 2023) (defining “preponderance of

the evidence” as “tantamount to a more likely than not inquiry.” (citation

omitted)).

This Court has stated that in evaluating the foregoing factors, “a court

should consider the integrity of the alleged after-discovered evidence, the

motive of those offering the evidence, and the overall strength of the

evidence supporting the conviction.” Padillas, 997 A.2d at 365

(emphasis added). Further, where, as here, “after-discovered evidence is

based upon an officer’s undisclosed misconduct, a PCRA petitioner bears the

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burden of establishing a direct ‘nexus’ between the undisclosed misconduct

and the petitioner’s case.” Commonwealth v. Baynard, 355 A.3d 21, 27

(Pa. Super. 2026) (citing Foreman, 55 A.3d at 537-38)).

Appellant asserts that the PCRA court improperly denied his request for

a new trial, where he timely presented new evidence of Detective Nordo’s

misconduct in other cases. Appellant’s Brief at 15-29. Appellant claims such

evidence was “not known [to him] at the time of trial,” and would result in a

not guilty verdict if Appellant’s request for a new trial was granted. Id. at 13,

25. Appellant maintains that Mr. Gonzalez’s police statement was “[t]he only

substantive evidence that” Appellant was the perpetrator. Id. at 18; see also

Appellant’s Reply Brief at 5 (asserting Mr. Gonzalez’s “coerced statement []

was the backbone of the Commonwealth’s case and the sole evidence that

[Appellant] was the shooter.”).

Appellant emphasizes Mr. Gonzalez’s trial testimony, wherein he

described being “subjected to coercion by Detective Nordo[;] he was struck,

not fed, denied the use of a bathroom, and held in seclusion for a day and a

half.” Appellant’s Brief at 18-19 (citing N.T., 8/6/09, at 80-81, 85-87, 98-

100).

After this abuse[, Mr. Gonzalez] eventually gave a statement to [] Detective [] Gonzalez. [At trial, Mr.] Gonzalez repeatedly testified that [his police] statement was not true[,] as he did not see who shot the victim and was inside his home when the victim was shot.

Id. at 19. According to Appellant, if the trial court “had known that the acts

[and inappropriate police behavior] that [Mr.] Gonzalez claimed [at trial] were

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true had occurred in other cases by [Detective Nordo], then it is likely that

the trial court would not have found [Appellant] guilty.” Id. at 25.

Although Appellant concedes that, in a pre-trial proffer dated March 20,

2007, he admitted to police that he was the driver of the burgundy Camry at

the time of the shooting, he claims that “[m]ere presence is clearly insufficient

to prove guilt.” Id. at 22-23 (citing Commonwealth v. Lambert, 795 A.2d

1010, 1016 (Pa. Super. 2002) (en banc) (stating that an accused’s “[m]ere

association with the perpetrators, mere presence at the scene, or mere

knowledge of the crime is insufficient” to sustain a conviction for criminal

conspiracy)).

Finally, Appellant complains that the PCRA court improperly

“minimize[d] the effects of [Detective Nordo’s] misconduct here.” Appellant’s

Reply Brief at 4.

[The PCRA] court ignore[d] that this additional misconduct of [Detective] Nordo is relevant to the determination of the fact finder16 in weighing just how tainted the evidence was and whether [Mr.] Gonzalez’s trial testimony was credible. Indeed, these numerous allegations of [Detective Nordo’s] misconduct [in other cases], tainting [Mr.] Gonzalez[’s] statement, were not presented at trial.

Id. (footnote added).

The Commonwealth counters that the PCRA court properly dismissed

Appellant’s petition, as he failed to establish the requirements of subsection

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16 We reiterate that the trial court acted as fact-finder at Appellant’s bench trial.

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9543(a)(2)(vi). It contends Detective Nordo’s “misconduct in unrelated cases

[would] not likely produce a different verdict” if Appellant was granted a new

trial. Commonwealth Brief at 8. According to the Commonwealth, new

evidence of Detective Nordo’s misconduct in other cases “would not have

made a difference in light of [Detective] Nordo’s de minimis role in

[Appellant’s] conviction.” Id. at 11. The Commonwealth further points out

that, at Appellant’s trial, the fact-finder considered testimony that Detective

Nordo had assaulted Mr. Gonzalez. Id.

After our careful review of the record, we determine that Appellant’s

claimed new evidence regarding Detective Nordo’s police misconduct and

convictions, in unrelated matters, does not meet the after-discovered

evidence test; such evidence would not likely “compel a different verdict” if a

new trial were granted. Burton, 158 A.3d at 629. As the PCRA court adeptly

reasoned in its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion:

After carefully reviewing the evidence and notes of testimony, [the PCRA] court found that Detective Nordo did not take any statements from any testifying witnesses who inculpated Appellant. The prosecutor introduced persuasive evidence establishing Appellant’s guilt at trial, evidence that has since been corroborated by Appellant’s own [] proffer.

The Commonwealth first presented testimony from three witness[es], establishing that Appellant was with co-defendant Ramos in a particular vehicle immediately prior to the shooting of the victim. [Ms.] Ramirez, [] Ramos’s [ex-]girlfriend, testified that, shortly before the instant shooting, she called for police assistance because [] Ramos was outside her home, in violation of a [PFA] order. During this encounter, Ms. Ramirez also observed Appellant, together with [] Ramos inside of a burgundy Toyota Camry. When police arrived, the car moved off the block,

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but not before [] Ramos got into the driver’s seat and Appellant moved to the passenger’s seat. (N.T., 8/5/09, at 88-149). Ms. Ramirez gave a statement to this effect to [law enforcement,] and adhered to her statement in testimony at trial.

The Commonwealth also called Police Officer John Boyle [(Officer Boyle)], who responded to Ms. Ramirez’s 911 call. Officer Boyle also observed the burgundy Toyota Camry and identified [Ramos] as the driver and Appellant as the passenger. Officer Boyle received a radio report of a shooting a couple blocks away within minutes of his interaction with Ms. Ramirez. Officer Boyle ascertained the address of [Ramos] from Ms. Ramirez. [Officer Boyle] proceeded to the … block [on which Ramos resided,] where he found a burgundy Toyota Camry parked on the street. (N.T., 8/5/09, at 245-54). ….

Shortly after Ms. Ramirez spoke to Officer Boyle, [] Ramos called Ms. Ramirez and told her he had just shot someone. Ms. Ramirez’s sister, [] Rivera, testified at trial that she overheard the call, and specifically heard [Ramos] admit to shooting someone. [Rivera], too, testified that Appellant was in the passenger seat when the burgundy Toyota Camry pulled [away from] Ms. Ramirez’s street before the shooting. (N.T., 8/6/09, at 198). ….

On March 20th, 2007, roughly two months after the murder, Appellant engaged in a proffer session at the District Attorney’s Office with [two Philadelphia Police] Detectives…. During the proffer, Appellant claimed he was the driver of the Camry, despite the eyewitness accounts that placed him in the passenger seat. Further, Appellant claimed that [] Ramos shot the victim from inside the car, which is inconsistent with the ballistic evidence. Despite admitting to being present in the car during the murder in this proffer session, Appellant later filed a pro se PCRA [petition], where he claimed he was not even with [] Ramos at the time of the shooting. Appellant included an affidavit from [] Ramos alleging that Appellant was not present during the murder. [In his own case,] Ramos then filed a [PCRA] petition placing the blame entirely on Appellant. Appellant’s claims are undermined by his and [Ramos’s] contradictory filings.

It should be noted that [Mr.] Gonzalez claimed, at trial, that Detective Nordo mistreated him, but [Mr. Gonzalez testified that] he was not coerced into giving a false statement. [Mr.] Gonzalez

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testified that after Detective Nordo’s mistreatment, he was interviewed by Detective Gonzale[z]. [Mr. Gonzalez] testified that he trusted Detective Gonzale[z] and told him the truth. Then, [Mr. Gonzalez] claimed it was Detective Gonzale[z]’s misconduct that caused him to recant and state that Appellant was not with him.

[Mr.] Gonzalez, in his statement to Detectives Gonzale[z]

and Aitken, said he was walking home from the store at the time of the shooting, when he saw the victim walking towards him from the other end of the block. Then, [Mr. Gonzalez] noticed a burgundy Toyota Camry pull onto the block. [Mr. Gonzalez] observed Appellant get out of the passenger seat and attempt to shoot a gun at the victim. The gun misfired, and [Mr. Gonzalez] observed the victim run into [Mr. Gonzalez’s] home and shut the door. [Mr. Gonzalez] … told the two detectives that Appellant fired the gun two more times through the door.

[At trial, Mr.] Gonzalez recanted his statement, testifying that he was inside the whole time and could not have seen who fired the fatal shot. [Mr. Gonzalez] testified to Detective Nordo hitting him and calling him a liar prior to his statement being taken. [Mr. Gonzalez] never alleged that Detective Nordo coerced his statement. Rather, he testified at trial that Detective Gonzale[z], who was translating from Spanish to English for [Mr. Gonzalez], wrote down something [that Mr. Gonzalez] never said. [Mr. Gonzalez] alleged that Detective Gonzale[z] never read the report back to [Mr. Gonzalez] in Spanish, [and that Mr. Gonzalez] could not read the report, [as it was] written in English.

The [PCRA] court finds that the new evidence of Detective Nordo’s misconduct in other cases, which the court finds repulsive, would not have affected the trial, especially since his misconduct was brought up at Appellant’s trial. Appellant fails to prove that the new evidence will likely result in a different verdict if a new trial is granted because the only relevant alleged misconduct is Detective Gonzale[z]’s, not Detective Nordo’s. The allegations of misconduct tainting [Mr.] Gonzalez’s statement were fully present[ed] at trial and considered prior to the guilty verdict.

PCRA Court Opinion, 7/11/25, at 3-5 (unpaginated) (emphasis added;

capitalization and punctuation modified).

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Our review confirms that the PCRA court’s reasoning is supported by the

record, and we agree with its legal conclusion. Appellant has made no showing

that the new evidence of Detective Nordo’s misconduct, committed in cases

entirely unrelated to Appellant’s, would likely compel a different verdict if

Appellant was granted a new trial. Burton, supra. Appellant failed to carry

his “burden of establishing a direct ‘nexus’ between” his case and Detective

Nordo’s misconduct in unrelated cases. 17 Baynard, 355 A.3d at 27; see also

Foreman, 55 A.3d at 537-38 (upholding PCRA court’s rejection of the

appellant’s after-discovered evidence claim based upon new evidence of police

misconduct, where the appellant could not establish that “the new evidence

would result in a different verdict if a new trial were granted, [as a]ppellant

has failed to show any nexus between his case and [the implicated detective’s]

alleged misconduct in an incident, which occurred more than two years after

[a]ppellant’s conviction.”); Commonwealth v. Soto, 983 A.2d 212, 215 (Pa.

Super. 2009) (same). Finally, because the Commonwealth produced

overwhelming evidence of Appellant’s guilt at trial,18 no evidentiary hearing

on Appellant’s claim was warranted. Padillas, supra.

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17 Regarding Detective Nordo’s alleged mistreatment of Mr. Gonzalez during

his police interview, even assuming, arguendo, the truth of this disputed allegation, at no time did Mr. Gonzalez claim that Detective Nordo’s alleged conduct caused Mr. Gonzalez to falsely incriminate Appellant.

18 We reiterate that in Appellant’s direct appeal, this Court rejected his challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions. See Ruiz, 83 A.3d 1071 (unpublished memorandum at 7-9).

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Based upon the foregoing, we discern no error or abuse of discretion in

the PCRA court’s dismissal of Appellant’s third PCRA petition without a hearing.

Order affirmed.

Date: 8/18/2026